

A N
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
ORIGINAL
O F
MORAL VIRTUE

Wherein it is shewn,

(Against the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*, &c.)

That VIRTUE is founded in the *Nature*
of Things, is *unalterable*, and *eternal*, and
the *great Means* of private and publick
HAPPINESS.

WITH

Some Reflections on a late Book, intituled, *An*
Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of
BEAUTY and VIRTUE.

By ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, S.T.P.
and *Regius Professor* of Ecclesiastical History in
the University of St. Andrews.

Διδόσκει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τῷ ἑκτοντῷ ἀναμνηστικὰ καὶ
πομπικὰ, ἀμνημονεύον, καὶ καὶ βανδάν, ἐν ἀμνημονίᾳ, καὶ
ἀναμνηστικῇ ἀμνημονεύον ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τῷ ἑκτοντῷ, ἀναμνηστικῇ
καὶ βανδάν. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 2.

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and COMPANY. M.DCC.LXXXIII.

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(Against the Author of the Hable of the Best, &c.)



BEAUTY AND VIRTUE.

the University of St. Andrews.

Mexico City, Plaza de Armas, Lib. 2.

EDWARD R. G. H.

Printed for GAVIN HAMILTON, by R. FLEMING
and COMPANY, M.DCCCXXXIII.



To the RIGHT HONOURABLE,

ARCHIBALD

Earl of ILAY:

Lord ORONSY, DUNOON and AROS,

Lord Justice-General of SCOTLAND,

Lord Keeper of the *Great-Seal*, and

**One of His Majesty's most Honour-
able *Privy Council*,**

This BOOK is most humbly Dedicated,

by his LORDSHIP'S most devoted,

and most obliged humble Servant,

ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL



To the Right Honourable

ARCHIBALD

Earl of Argyll

Lord Oronsay, Dunoon and Argyll

Lord Justice-General of Scotland

Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, and

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THE P R E F A C E.



THE Subject of Moral Virtue having been explain'd by so many excellent Hands, Men of the finest Parts and Learning; it may be thought, at least, needless for any one now, to set about a further Enquiry. But as every Man is bound to contribute all he can towards the universal Good of intelligent Beings, and particularly the real Happiness of those of his own Species; and as the same Object, by being placed in different Lights, may receive Advantage, and come to take more universally; so having bestowed some Time and Application in the Study of moral Philosophy, I thought it my Duty humbly to offer to the World a Share in the Fruits of my Labour, and to give them a View of Moral Virtue in that Point of Light, wherein, beyond others, it approves itself to my good Liking and Acceptance, and wherein, I would fain think, it

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may come to meet with a favourable Reception at the Hands of some other People.

Indeed the Standard I propose, whereby one is to determine the Goodness or Virtue of the Actions of rational Minds, one towards another; and the great Motive which I assign to all virtuous Actions, may not immediately fall in with that particular Series of Ideas, that are familiar to those Persons who have been accustomed to conceive of the Actions of intelligent Beings in an abstracted and metaphysical Manner, and to place Moral Virtue in the Fitness and Congruity which those Actions, abstractedly considered, have to one another, and whereby, I confess, all Selfishness seems wholly to be excluded: Nor will my Account of Things, at first Sight, prove agreeable to that Turn of Thought wherein some People indulge themselves, while they make the Virtue of moral Actions to depend entirely on their arising from a mere Instinct in our Nature, that leads us to promote the Happiness of other Beings, without our being at all mov'd to it by any secret Impulse of Self-interest.

But if there be any real Inconsistency in my Principles with those of others who have gone before me in Defence of natural Religion, I must leave it to be determined by the Judgment of the Reader, who will think for himself, and decide how far my Sentiments are just, and ought to be admitted. For
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my own Particular, I shall frankly own, that, so far as I can understand Things, and compare them together, I apprehend no real Inconsistency in my Scheme, with what has been advanced by ingenious and learned Men on the same Subject: Nay, I will say further, that, among all the different Schemes, wherein Moral Virtue has been explain'd and maintain'd, I never could discern any one of them inconsistent with another.

So that I am not to introduce my self into the World, and to recommend my Principles in the unhandsom Way of finding Fault with those of other People, who have all done good Service to the Cause of Religion. No, let every Man see with his own Eyes, and hold fast that which is Good: In what particular Dress soever Virtue may appear to one most agreeable, let him steadily pursue it, and, inspir'd with its Influences, make himself happy, and the World happy about him. I shall only briefly observe, that the Principles to which I have reduc'd Moral Virtue, are essential to all intelligent Beings, they are the most prevalent in human Nature, and those who ingloriously appear in Opposition to Virtue, and would make it wholly to depend on the arbitrary Will of civil Governors, do all acknowledge them: And therefore Moral Virtue, in the Way wherein I have set it forth, is no metaphysical Thing, but is brought Home to

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Mankind,

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Mankind; it takes fast hold of our leading Faculties; and its Opposers, if they stand by the Principles they allow, must unavoidably confess its eternal and unalterable Nature, as, with no Difficulty, might plainly be demonstrated against Mr. Hobbes, Spinosa, &c. whatever they have said to the contrary.

I do not indeed expect, that this particular View of Moral Virtue, which I here offer to the Publick, will please universally, and be approved by every Body. The same sensible Object is not equally taking in all the different Lights wherein it is represented, tho, in general, all, or most People may agree, every Man according to the particular Point of Light wherein he apprehends it, that the Piece is fine and valuable. And I doubt not, but the same Thing likewise happens with respect to intellectual Objects: For, however Moral Virtue in Speculation, is every where mightily cried up and commended; yet these universal Praises it receives, do not seem to arise from Peoples perceiving it under the same particular Ideas: For, from the different Accounts we have of it, one should think that, in the Way wherein People apprehend it, there is great Variety and Difference. Nor is there any Thing here that can be judged blameable.

Is it not however an odd Piece of Conduct, when those who are engag'd in the Cause of Virtue, go about to condemn one another's Prospects,

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Prospects, and to spoil and ruine those different Views we severally take of the same Object, and upon which we are all led jointly to declare, it is fine and valuable? Were we under the Influence of Moral Virtue, which we all account so fine and illustrious, we would rather, methinks, benevolently regard one another as Fellow-labourers, contributing our several Parts towards perfecting the same Design, which, all united together, would certainly afford us the noblest Prospect. For I can't but incline to think, if an open Mind, without Prejudice, would behold Moral Virtue, in all the different Lights, wherein by ingenious Men it has been set before us, one could not possibly be entertained with any Appearance more beautiful. 'Tis true, among the many different Views in which it is apprehended, there may be one particular Point of Light, that strikes one's Mind more agreeably than any other; but I say, taken all together, they cannot but set it forth extremely ravishing. And I do not question, but, when we are freed from our little Self-conceits, our peevish narrow Humours, and mean Prejudices, and come to have our Minds widen'd, so as to take in Objects in their full Dimensions, the viewing of Moral Virtue all at once, in the many different conspiring Lights wherein it can be apprehended, will prove a most delightful Entertainment. And for

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my self, I am in the mean while so disposed, that I always reckon it an unkind Interruption of my Happiness, when any ingenious Man goes about to ruine that particular View of Moral Virtue, which another ingenious Man hath afforded me.

The Reader therefore will observe, I am far from presuming to impose upon his Taste of Things, or in any Sort to take it amiss, if he does not so well like this particular View wherein I have plac'd Moral Virtue; but prefers before it some other Point of Light, wherein it appears to him far more beautiful. As I have already hinted, let every Man affect and pursue Moral Virtue in the View wherein he best likes it. I only mean to say, it will be extremely hard, if, to make Way for another Representation of the same Object, not only the particular Point of Light, wherein I have set it, must be quite ruin'd, but the Author thereof violently thrust beyond all Bounds, and forced over into the Society of the Disciples of Epicurus.

*I am not here to consider the Treatment I have met withal in some late Pamphlets, that pretend to examine and to remark on my Principles. 'Tis boldly affirmed, they are the Sum of that hellish System of Immorality, which the fallen Angels and ungodly Men are govern'd by! And is it not a little surprising, that the Reverend Authors, who
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are pleased to talk at this Rate, should have suffered such an impious System to go undisturbed through the World, till I had the Misfortune publickly to claim and vindicate the Book from Dr. Innes! I must certainly take it as a singular Proof of their Charity and Respect towards me; and that, whatever becomes of the rest of Mankind, they are deeply concerned to have me set right in my Principles. So rare an Instance of Benevolence well deserves to be acknowledged. And since Gratitude always likes to make kind Returns, I would presume, by their Indulgence, to observe to those Reverend Brethren in what Manner they might, in my Apprehension, do more Service to the Cause of Religion, and the great Interest of Mankind. They well know that Religion, both natural and reveal'd, has of late Years been attacked with the utmost Violence. On the other Hand, many learned Men have appeared in its Defence; and I likewise have contributed my hearty good Wishes, and my best Endeavours to the same Purpose. Now, while so many have been engaged in Vindication of Religion, and, I may say, fighting the good Fight of Faith, those Reverend Gentlemen have been only looking on, and were contented to remain idle Spectators, till they perceived I appear'd; and then indeed they took the Field, and exerted themselves pretty vigorously, not, you must know, against the

common Enemy, but, upon the Matter, espoused his Quarrel, and, with great Keenness, have done all they can to run me down, that I should not be able to harm him! Were this the Conduct among Christians, nothing would be left to Atheists and Deists, but to form their Attacks upon Religion, and, without meddling any further, to rest assured of Victory, while we mutually destroy each others Forces, and thereby expose Religion without any Guard or Support. If those Gentlemen apprehended, that my Arguments in Defence of Religion, natural and reveal'd, cannot serve our common Cause, why did they not, for the Sake of the publick Good, supply my Defects, or advance stronger Arguments of their own, and leave me to maintain my Part against our common Adversaries, who have not yet offered to shew the Weakness of the Defences I have made? This is the Conduct I would humbly propose to be observed by those Reverend Brethren, whereby, in my Judgment, they will act more consistently with the Character of Men and Christians; nor can the contrary Course ever be counted honourable.

Mean while I would fain know, do those Gentlemen imagine, that the Arguments I have explained here and elsewhere, are of no Consequence to perswade other People of the Truth of natural Religion, and of the Certainty of the Christian Revelation? I do

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I do assure them, that what I have advanced in the following Sheets, makes it plain to me, that natural Religion is of divine Original, and has no Dependence on human Authority: And what I have proposed in my Discourse, proving that the Apostles were no Enthusiasts, affords me full Conviction, that the Christian Institution is a divine Revelation. And if 'tis only possible that some others may go along with me by the same Steps towards the same Conclusion, why do they go about to rob Religion of the Advantage it may have by my Reasoning?

*It may, perhaps, be thought indecent for one to transcribe and propagate his own Praise. But, I hope, upon this Occasion the Reader will indulge me, and give me leave to take Notice of the Honour done me by an ingenious and learned Gentleman, who, after having given an Abstract of my Discourse concerning the Apostles, (which I here chuse to mention, because it is the Argument that has raised the loudest Clamour against me) is pleased to publish to the World his Opinion of that Performance in these Words: This Book, says he *, is one of the most valuable Works that ever were publish'd in Defence of the Christian Revelation. Great Britain*

* Literary Journal, Art. 15. July, August, September, 1730.

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Britain has produced of late Years the best Performances of this Kind. It does not appear to me, that the Gospel Miracles have been yet disproved: Nor can I see how this Work of *Dr. Campbell* can be well answered. The Deists will be very well pleased with the Author's Politeness: There is not one indecent Expression in the whole Book, &c. May not this Opinion of a learned Gentleman and Christian, reconcile our Brethren to the Advice I have presumed to offer them? at least, engage them to manage their Point with less Passion, that they may deal by me more fairly, and not shamefully (to the Conviction of every unbiassed Man of common Understanding) misrepresent my Opinions, and make me hold Conclusions that never had Place in my Thoughts?

But I must not neglect this Opportunity, to thank one of those Reverend Authors in particular, for his great Goodness in representing me, in so publick a Manner, as one of Professor Simson's Bosom-friends. 'Tis not my Business to enquire into his Design, in giving me up to the World in this Character: But I value the Event at so high a Rate, that, for the sake thereof, I heartily forgive him all the unworthy Reproaches he has cast upon me, and the daring Presumption he has been guilty of, in looking into my Heart, and proclaiming Abroad (what, I dare venture to say, God himself does not see

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see in the darkeſt Reſeſſes of my Soul) that I ſee my Principles tend to promote the Kingdom of Satan, and I am at Pains to diſguiſe it! And when I thus forgive this Reverend Brother, I would have him know, that as I herein obey a Precept of the Goſpel, ſo I likewise obſerve a Rule laid down by Socrates (1), who beautifully declares, that we are to render to no Man Evil for Evil: Which, with other numberleſs Things, may enable one to judge, whether this Gentleman had good Reaſon to be exceedingly provoked at my being ſo warm in Commendation of that great Philoſopher, who, I doubt not, was raiſed up by the ſpecial Providence

(1) Παντός μᾶλλον ὅπως ἔχει ὡς ποτε τότε ἡμῖν ἐλέγχετο, εἴτε φαίνεσθαι οἱ πολλοί, εἴτε μή· καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ πάνδε χρηλεπότερα πάσχειν, εἴτε καὶ φραδότερα, ὅμως πῶς ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικῶντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνειν οὐ παντὶ πρόσω φαμὲν, ἢ ὅ; Κρ. Φαμὲν. Σω. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. Κρ. Οὐ δῆτα. Σω. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἶον· ἐπιδήνη ἔδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. Κρ. εἰ οὐ φαίνεται. Σω. Τί δαι δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὡς Κεῖτων, ἢ ὅ; Κρ. Οὐ δῆ δῆ πε, ὡς Σόκратης. Σω. Τί δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχειν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον, ἢ ὅ δίκαιον; Κρ. Οὐδαμῶς. Σω. Τὸ γὰρ πε κακῶς ποιῆν ἀνδρώτους, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑδὲν διαφέρει. Κρ. Αληθῆ λέγεις. Σω. Οὐτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ, ὅτε κακῶς ποιῆν ἑδὲνα ἀνδρώπων, ἑδὲ ἀνὴρ πᾶσι οὐκ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἄρα ὡς Κεῖτων, πάντα ὁμολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ ὡς δὲ ὁμολογῆς. διδοὶ γὰρ ὅτι ὁλοῖς ποῖ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. — ἀκόπει ἐν δὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ μάλα, ποτερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖς σοι, καὶ φρεναιμαδα ἐντενδαν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς ἑδὲ ποτε ὁρῶς ἔχοντες ὅτε τὸ ἀδικεῖν ὅτε τὸ ἀνταδικεῖν, ὅτε κακῶς πάσχειν, τα αὐμύναδ ἀνδρώπων κακῶς· ἢ ἀοίστασαι καὶ ἐ κοινωνεῖς τὸ φρενῆς. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάσαι ἔτω, καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ σὺ δὲ εἰ πε ἀλλὰ δέδοκται, λέγει καὶ δίδασκε. Plat. in Crit.

vidence of God, to bear Witness to the glorious Truths of natural Religion. But I say, I heartily thank this Reverend Brother for the Honour he has done me: And I do assure him, I stand greatly obliged to the pious and learned Professor Simson, whose Scholar I was for some Years; and I am proud of being called his Friend. And since it here falls in my Way, I will take Notice of one Particular, which, I dare say, will bring no small Credit to my Book. My worthy and learned Friend, the Reverend Mr. Simson Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow, did very carefully give several Readings to this Book when in MS. he corrected some Things in it. The last Treatise, wherein I shew, that Moral Virtue promotes Trade, and aggrandizes a Nation, is owing to a Hint I had from him: And the Approbation which he frankly bestowed upon the whole, gave me Assurance, it would be acceptable to the Publick; wherein, I must further say, I am not disappointed, since it has had the Honour of being publicly commended by some learned Men.

But, however one may neglect the inconsiderate Sallies of little Characters, that do not seem to have studied the first Principles of Philosophy; I must express my self deeply concerned, that the ingenious Author of the Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty,

Beauty and Virtue, should seem so much out of Temper, and express himself in the Manner he does, when he comes to reflect on the Abettors of the Principles here maintain'd. I do not indeed complain of scurrilous Treatment or any personal Reflections against those whom he makes to differ from him: He is of too polite and refin'd a Taste, to prostitute himself to so unmanly a Practice. I am only sorry, he would have the World to think of us, that we are no better than the Disciples of Epicurus. But, to what Purpose does this learned Gentleman go about to brand us with so odious a Character? I dare say he does not mean to bring the World to form their Judgment of Things, by the Names that are put on them. This, I confess, is the common Way with the Herd of Mankind. But, alas! how much has Truth thereby suffered? And what Mischief has it not occasioned, especially among Christians? — Nor do I think he thereby intends to expose us to the World, as a Set of Men that deny the Being of a God and Providence, and therefore dangerous to human Society. I say, I cannot possibly apprehend that Mr. Hutcheson has any such Thing in View: And when nothing of this Nature is intended, why alarm the World in pointing us out under such frightful Imputations? — Is a Thing false, because Epicurus maintain'd it? Or is a Thing true, because the
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late Earl of Shaftsbury (whose Principles Mr. Hutcheson professes to explain and defend) was pleased to declare for it? I should think, that Truth and Falshood, or the Agreement and Disagreement of Things, have no Dependence on the Opinions of Men. And as a fair Enquirer is not to take Sanctuary in Names; so neither must he startle at a Truth, because it is maintained by an Atheist, a Deist, or an Heretick. It would cost me no great Pains to shew, that my Principles are not those of Epicurus. But what would that signify? — It might indeed serve the Purpose, if their Truth came to be determined by Names. But I lay Claim to no Man's Authority. My Principles are laid open before the World; they must stand or fall, not, I hope, by Names, but by the Nature of Things: And I will not affront my Reader in imagining, that in his Search after Truth, which he is to see with his own Eyes, he will pay a greater Regard to the Name Shaftsbury, than to the Name Epicurus.

I am sensible, I need here make no Reflections concerning the Importance of the Subject I have handled, and of what Consequence it is to the Well-being of Mankind. Every thinking Person will observe, that as the Knowledge of Moral Virtue is the lasting Foundation of the Peace, Comfort and Prosperity of all rational Agents; so the
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Practice thereof is the great Instrument whereby our common Happiness is secured and promoted. I shall only take Notice, that the Matter being of the highest Moment, it ought, with the highest Care and Circumspection, be enquir'd into, that we may neither impose upon our selves, nor come to be imposed upon by others, in Things that concern our Safety and Well-being, during the Continuance of our Existence, and while we are associated to other intelligent Beings. And therefore, as without any Regard to any particular Scheme of Things, or Set of Principles, I have, I am conscious, fairly enquired into the inward Make and Constitution of rational Agents, in order to discover the Nature of Moral Virtue; so I here cheerfully offer up my Sentiments to the impartial Examination of the World: And I shall be glad, (provided it be done with the Temper of a Philosopher, or a Lover of Truth, who is never a Prostitute to the angry Passions of persecuting Zealots) how much they are canvassed. For professing myself a Retainer to Truth, I hope I shall follow it, wherever I find it, and heartily thank the kind Hand that points me right, and sets me upon it, being well assured, there can be no human Happiness without it.

'Tis now Time that I give some short Account of what I have done in the following Sheets.

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In the first Treatise, I propose to trace out the Origin of Moral Virtue, and to examine, whether it has any Foundation in Nature, and is a Thing real and unchangeable. For this Purpose I consider the essential Properties of intelligent Beings. — I observe the Influence that the Actions of those Beings, one towards another, have upon their essential Properties; — and as Things have appear'd to me, there being only one particular Set of Actions that can have a Correspondency and Agreement with those essential Properties, I call these Actions the Moral Virtues, whose Goodness or Virtue consists in their Congruity to those Properties. — And upon the whole, I conclude, that the Actions of rational Beings, one towards another, are to be counted virtuous, as they are proportion'd and adapted to the particular Property of Self-love, or a Desire after Happiness, which is universally essential to all intelligent Natures. — 'Tis in this particular View of Moral Virtue, that, to speak for my self, I clearly see, not only the Absurdity of that Scheme, which is proposed by the Author of the Fable of the Bees, but of what is advanced by Mr. Hobbes and Spinosa. And the very Reason that mov'd me to introduce the Term Self-love, and to make use of it all along in my Argument, is, because those Authors, and all of their Party, do pretend, after an odd inconsistent

inconsistent Manner, to prove, that Moral Virtue must be a Thing wholly imaginary, since that Mankind can never act, but as they are influenced by Self-love: For one should think, that the making out that Self-love, rightly understood, is so far from producing Moral Virtue to a mere Chimera, that it is the very Measure and Standard, whereby we judge of the Virtue and Goodness of Actions; I say, one should think, that the making this out, is beating the Enemy in his Quarters, and forcing him either to confess the Truth and Authority of Moral Virtue, or to ly under the Shame of mere Obstinacy and Perverseness.

In the second Treatise, I explain my Principles more fully, and make some Reflections on Mr. Hutchelson's Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. And I must here say, as I willingly undertook the Defence of Moral Virtue against the Author of the Fable of the Bees, so it went cross to my Inclinations to appear so publicly in Opposition, upon any Instance, to this ingenious Author: He stands on the same Side of the Question; and he successfully maintains the same Cause wherein I am engaged. But I presume, no Body will blame me for vindicating the Principles I have espoused, from an Attack directly made upon them. And as I hope there appears, according to the Way wherein I have represented
 b Things,

Things, little or no Difference at the Bottom, between Mr. Hutcheson and me; so I would fain think, I have said nothing in the Course of my Argument, that does not jute with Justice and Honour, or that is not consistent with the Character of a fair and impartial Enquirer. But if any one will be pleased to point me out any Thing I have said any where, that is unhandsom and ungentlemanny, I do here promise, if my Book comes to another Impression, to take Care to have it rectify'd: For Truth can have no Concern with any Thing that is not humane and courteous.

In the third and last Treatise, I endeavour to make it appear, that Moral Virtue naturally tends to promote Trade, and to render politick Societies great and flourishing. That which the Author of the Fable of the Bees seems mainly to intend in his Book, is to impose upon the World a wild Conceit of his own, which is as mischievous, as it is absurd and inconsistent, namely, that the Vices and Corruptions of the individual Members of a Body Politick, effectually contribute to the Good and Well-being of the Whole. — In exposing the Falshood of this extravagant Opinion, and in shewing that the Principles of Moral Virtue are the only Means to aggrandize a Nation, I content my self with some general Reflections, that arose to me in considering human Nature, and
which

which, I think, are sufficient to the Purpose I have in View. But if any one wants to see a more particular and accurate Confutation of our Author's Paradox, he may meet with it in a late Book, intitled, An Enquiry, whether a general Practice of Virtue tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People, &c. 'Tis not long since I had the Pleasure of seeing this Book, it is done with so much good Sense and Judgment, and so well deserves the Notice and Regard of all Men of good Taste, that I much wonder how it happens that it is yet in so few Hands.

As for the Quotations which I have brought from heathen Philosophers, tho in the former Edition they appear large and numerous, yet, in this Impression, I have ventur'd to increase them. But I hope it will not be thought, that I thereby intend to make a Shew of Learning. That which, in my Opinion, deserves the Name of Learning, and upon which a Man may justly value himself, is the Knowledge, not of Words or Languages, but of Things useful to Mankind; or, (if it be not deem'd an unpardonable Affront to a great deal of Learning, especially among Scholastick Gentlemen) it is common Sense, improv'd from Books and Conversation, to the Benefit and Happiness of the human Species: So that, in my Way of Reckoning, a Man may be capable of read-

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ing Greek and Latin, he may excerpt as he goes along, and from thence bring forth Quotations in great Plenty, and at the same Time be void enough of Learning.

And as I do not mean that my Quotations should intitle the Transcriber to any Degree of Learning; so neither do I mean that the Truth of my Principles should rest on their Authority. 'Tis justly counted Matter of Reproach, when a Man shuts his own Eyes, and prostitutes himself to the Impositions of another. And I should reckon it no very honourable Post, to be at the Head of such People, or to have only so many blind Men for one's Disciples and Followers. I must here say, that Submission to Authority in Matters of Knowledge, particularly of Religion, whether Natural or Reveal'd, is a gross Abuse and Perversion of the Gifts of God, and a base Prostitution of our noblest Faculties. Thereby we betray the common Liberties and Blessings of Mankind; we become Slaves of the lowest Order; and strongly invite others to Oppression and Tyranny; and has not a Disposition to enforce Matters of Doctrine by Authority, produced the most dismal Effects? — It has turn'd Men into Monsters, even the Messengers of Peace into Heralds of Ruin, that have ravag'd all the Ornaments of human Life, and dreadfully rag'd in the Destruction of their Species! Call no Man Master upon Earth, is a Com-
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mand worthy the Institution to which it belongs ; and, did we prove faithful to God, and our Duty, would prevent the Usurpations of Authority in Religion. It is the Nature of Things, their Properties and Relations, it is Truth it self, that ought to direct us ; and if the Reader will neither approve nor condemn my Principles, till he brings them to this Standard, and perceives what the Nature of Things declares concerning them, I am content to stand or fall by his Judgment.

But to return to my Quotations, and to make some Apology for their Length and Number ; it must be observed, that since, in the following Sheets, I pretend to account for Moral Virtue from heathen Philosophers, I could not well make them shorter or fewer. For the most Part, indeed, People seem to content themselves with Scraps, Hints, or short Sentences : But, as this Method seem'd to me always defective, and, in my Apprehension, is of no Use or Consequence, without one's turning over the Books to which those Hints or Sentences may direct us ; so I have chosen to follow the Course, which I could have wish'd to have met with in other Writers, and which I judge is most likely to prove useful and agreeable. I have not spar'd the Labour of transcribing, but taken out the Quotations pretty large, that the Reader may have full before him the Sense and Meaning

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of the several Authors to whom I refer: And where I have not inserted the Quotation in the Body of the Book, I may say, that, for the most Part, either the Text or the Quotation is a Comment the one upon the other.

Nor have I follow'd this Method without a particular View to shew our young Gentlemen who apply themselves to the Study of Divinity, what considerable Advantage they may reap in a diligent Perusal of the Writings of heathen Philosophers. I am far from condemning one's carefully studying a common System of Divinity; the present unfortunate State of the Christian World, renders this very necessary: But for a Man, who sets up to preach the Gospel, and to be a Teacher of Righteousness, to lay out all or most of his Time and Labour in reading Systems, or what we call Scholastick Divinity, is most unworthy a generous Mind, and highly unbecoming a Preacher of the Gospel, as it tends to propagate that Mischief which Religion, the great Instrument of our Happiness, has suffer'd from that senseless unnatural Dress, in which the Schools have put it. As the main End of the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ, is to make us like God in his moral Perfections, that we may be happy with him to Eternity; one should think, that, next to the holy Scriptures, moral Philosophy ought to be the main Study of a Christian

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Christian Divine, whose Duty it is to teach his People, not Systems and Metaphysicks, but to deny Ungodliness and worldly Lusts, and to live soberly, righteously and godly. And from the Quotations I have brought, one may easily judge, what noble Sentiments heathen Philosophers are capable of affording us upon moral Subjects. So that I would fain hope, our young Gentlemen, who have their Views toward the holy Ministry, will be tempted to pursue this Sort of Study, whereby, through the Blessing of God, they shall avoid Superstition on the one Hand, and Infidelity on the other, and become real Blessings to Mankind, without Regard to Sect or Party. Nor needs a Minister of the Gospel be ashamed to follow this useful Study, since the Apostle Paul not only followed it, but has brought Quotations, from heathen Authors, into his sacred Writings.

But that which has swell'd the Quotations to so great a Bulk, is my having translated those of the first Treatise. And they are most of them of such Importance, that, I flatter my self, the English Reader will not judge the Labour it cost me imploy'd to no Purpose. It will, no doubt, be observed, that and Dii are all along translated God, or celestial Beings. And I chus'd to render those Words in this Manner, not only to avoid Harshness in our Language, but because I find deus, dei, dei, promiscuously used

in expressing the same individual Being. And the Platonists especially do acknowledge one infinite Mind, or one supreme Being, the Author and Former of all other Beings whatsoever: So that these Philosophers, when they say $\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota$, cannot possibly mean what Gods in our Language would seem to signify; they certainly mean no more than what one may understand by celestial Beings. — As for the Quotations in the other Treatises, I have let them go without a Translation, not only to save my self Trouble, but to keep the Book to a moderate Size. And I presume to say, the Translations I have made, are sufficient to shew our Students in Divinity, how much it may prove their Interest, to bestow some Pains in acquiring the Language of Plato, Xenophon, &c. who are well able to reward all their Labour, and to afford them as large a Return of moral Ideas and Sentiments, as any of their Scholars and Disciples, the Roman Philosophers.

Mean Time, it may prove, perhaps, not a little surprising to some People, to find those Heathens in my Quotations so very knowing with respect to the Existence of God, his Perfections and Providence, the Immortality of the Soul, a future State of Rewards and Punishments, and other great Principles and Laws of natural Religion. And as from hence, one Set of Men may be apt to conclude the Sufficiency of the Light of

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of Nature; so another Set may come to judge my Performance a Disservice to Revelation. But both Parties would do well to consider that which Origen observes (1), in answer-
ing

(1) Παρίδωκε γὰρ πλείονα, μάλιστα Πλάτωνος, ὁ Κέλσος, κοινοποιῶν τὰ δυναμένα εἶναι πᾶσι καὶ συστῆναι ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς χρημάτων φασκῶν, "βέλλων αὐτὰ παρ' Ἑλλήνων εἰρηῶς, καὶ χωρίς ἀνατάττης καὶ ἐπαγγελίας τῆς ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, ἢ καὶ Θεῶν." Φαμὲν ὅτι ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τὸ περιεχόμενον ἐστὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τῇ ἀληθείας πλείους, ὅσα δύναμις, ὠφελῶν, καὶ προσηγορίων, ὡς διδόν τῇ ἐσθίῃ, αὐτῇ δὲ φιλανθρωπίας πάντ' ὀνείρων, καὶ μόνον ἐν τριχῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων πάλιν δ' αὖ καὶ Ἑλλήνας μὲν, καὶ καὶ τὴν βαρβαρίαν, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ἐκείνῃ καὶ τὴν ἀχαιοκράτει καὶ ἰδιώτης διός τε περὶ γένεσιν ἀπερὶ τῶν δὴ λόν ἐστιν, ὅτι χαλακῶς ἐν τῇ λέξει φερρῶν αὐτῷ κοινοποιῶν, καὶ δυναμένα πᾶσι ἐπαγγελίας ἀκοῆν. ὅσοι καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ῥοὴν φερρῶντες ὡς ἀνδραπόδεις τοῖς ἰδιώταις, καὶ μὴ δίδωσι κατακρίνει τὸ ἐν φερρῶν λόγων καὶ τῆς ἐπαγγελλομένης ἀκολούθως μόνον ἐρρῶντος τῆς ἀνατρεφῶντος ἐν λόγοις καὶ μαθήμασιν. ὅσοι τὸ κοινοποιῶν εἰς κομῶν συνδὴ καὶ βραχὺ συνάραρον. ταῦτα καὶ μοι λέλεκται, ἀπολογισμῶν οὗ καὶ καταγομῶντος καὶ Κέλσῳ καὶ ἑτέρων ἐν λέξει ἐνταλίσαι τῶν χαρῶν, ἀμαυρῶντος δόκους καὶ τὸ ἐν συνδῶν λέξιν λαμβανῶντος. ἐπὶ οἱ καὶ ἡμᾶς περιφῶν, Ἰησοῦς τε, καὶ οἱ ἀποστόλοι αὐτοῦ, ἐκείδον τὸν ἀπαγγελίας, καὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ μόνον φειχέως, ἀλλὰ καὶ δυναμένη ἐπαγγελίας τὴν πολλὰς. — καὶ οἱ καὶ γὰρ πολὺ μόνον αὐτῶν, ὀλίγους μὲν ὤντων (εἴη ὤντων) ἢ φειχέως καὶ ἐπιτεταθυμένη Πλάτωνος, καὶ τῆς ὁδῶν πλείους φερρῶντων, λέξιν πλείους καὶ ἢ τῆς ἐνταλίσαι ἀμα καὶ φερρῶντος καὶ ἐστρατιμῶν τῆς πολλῶν διδασκάλων καὶ χαρῶντων. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἰδιῶν, καὶ μὲν Πλάτωνος ἐν χροσὶ τῆς δόκωντος ἢ φιλολόγων μόνον τὴν δὲ ἑκείνῃ, καὶ καὶ τῆς τυχόντων καὶ ῥοτῆν φερρῶν τὸ ὠφελῶντος ἐκείνῃ, δυναμῶντος, αἰδομένην τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς λόγων αὐτῷ βελτιώσας. καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ, ἐκ ἐγκαλῶντες Πλάτωνι, φαμὲν ὅτι γὰρ πολλὰ τῆς ἀνθρώπων κόσμος χρησίμους καὶ τῶν πᾶσι καὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ διανύντες τὸ βέλμα τῆς οἰόντων τὸ, Καὶ ὁ λόγος μὲν, καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα μὲν, ἐκ ἐν ποσὶς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ ἀπεδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως. Ἰν' ἢ πᾶσι ἡμῶν μὴ ἢ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ. Lib. 6. contra Cels. Origen expresses himself to the same Purpose in his VII Book, P. 371. where he illustrates his Opinion by

ing an Objection of Celsus, wherein that
 keen Enemy to the Christian Revelation
 (with whom is found almost every single Ar-
 ticle that is now objected to the Truth of
 Christianity) is pleased to maintain, that
 the Moral Truths contained in the Bible,
 are delivered with far greater Elegancy in
 the Writings of Greek Philosophers. Upon
 this, I say, Origen observes, That " the
 " moral Discourses or Disputations of hea-
 " then Philosophers, particularly those of
 " Plato, from whom Celsus fetches most of
 " his Examples, are so finely polish'd, and
 " so much labour'd, that they seem only
 " calculated to Men of exquisite Taste and
 " Learning, and are by no Means fitted to
 " the Capacity of the Vulgar, or the Bulk
 " of Mankind. And as those Philosophers
 " do herein express a narrow and scanty
 " Benevolence, so their Writings are only
 " in the Hands of the Learned, and very
 " few have Advantage by them. Whereas
 " the moral Doctrines contained in the
 " Bible, are delivered in so plain and famili-
 " ar a Manner, that they are adapted to
 " the Understanding of common Men, and
 " are of publick Use and Benefit. So that
 " the Authors thereof having been in-
 spir'd

by the Comparison I have glanc'd upon; and, at the same Time,
 takes Notice, that the Jewish Writings are older than those
 of the Greeks.

“spir’d with universal Benevolence, that
“made them studious of the Good of all
“Mankind, they may be compar’d to a
“wise beneficent Physician, who being ten-
“derly concern’d for the Safety of human
“Nature, exerts himself for the common
“Good, and prescribes a common Diet,
“that is not only proper for Men of a deli-
“cate Constitution, but that is suited to every
“other Individual, and of consequence to
“promote universal Health and Vigour.”

To which I may add, tho’ the heathen Phi-
losophers do sometimes deliver the great Mo-
tives of natural Religion pretty expressly;
yet, at other Times, they speak of them with
great Doubtfulness and Uncertainty; and
very often, in explaining the State of depart-
ed Souls in another World, they lay aside all
Consideration of God as a righteous Judge,
distributing Rewards and Punishments ac-
cording to the moral Qualities of his rati-
onal Creatures, and attribute the whole to a
certain Fatality, wherein one has no Noti-
on of the Superintendency and Equity of
Providence. The Stoicks in particular, not-
withstanding their great Zeal in the Cause
of Moral Virtue, give out the supreme Be-
ing to be only anima mundi, the Mind of the
World; and they deny the Eternity or Im-
mortality of the Soul. In short, all Philoso-
phers of whatever Sect, lay down a Prin-
ciple highly destructive, in my Apprehension,
of

of all Religion and Virtue; they teach, that what religious Worship soever happens to be establish'd by civil Authority, that is the only Worship, which in every Country ought to be observed. From all which one may easily apprehend, that the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles, are, by infinite Odds, superior to those of heathen Philosophers.

Nay, I will venture to say further, those very Truths and Principles of natural Religion, at least those upon which it is founded, and without which it can't possibly subsist, that are to be found in heathen Philosophers, are not the Discoveries of human Reason, but were all along handed down from one Generation to another, and came originally from supernatural Revelation. And in this Opinion, I have the Pleasure to be assured, I go along with the Apostle Paul (1), when he declares, that that which may be known of God, is manifest to them; for God hath shewed, or did plainly reveal it unto them, (in teaching them expressly, as one may likewise judge, from Heb. xi. 3. that themselves and all other Things, are his Workmanship, the Effects of his Power and Wisdom. And indeed

(1) Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς· ὃ καὶ Θεὸς αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν. τὰ καὶ ἀόρατα αὐτῷ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου, τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καὶ διορατὰ, ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς αὐτῷ δυνάμει καὶ δαίμονι. Rom. i. 19, 20.

Πίστει νοούμενα καὶ τηρεῖται τὰς αἰῶνας ῥήματα Θεοῦ, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλεπόμενα γινώσκουσιν. Heb. xi. 3.

indeed to those Persons who are taught, that this World, Sun, Moon and Stars, and all Things besides, are the Works of his Hands, it cannot fail, but the Being and Perfections of God must appear fully manifest.) For the invisible Things of him from the Creation, or Beginning of the World, being once understood from his Works, are then clearly seen and apprehended, even his eternal Power and Godhead.

But I have elsewhere (1) endeavoured to make good this Argument, so that I shall not here insist on it. I only beg leave to observe, that the great Articles and Doctrines of Religion and Virtue, being all founded in the Nature of Things; when an attentive Mind, in considering Things, and comparing them one with another, perceives thus much, it may from hence be induced to think, that those Articles or Doctrines that so clearly arise from the Nature of Things, are discoverable by Mankind left to themselves, without all foreign Instruction and Improvement. But the Mistake is, Supernatural Revelation affords us the Truths, without, perhaps, explaining their natural Fitnesses and Agreements; and an inquisitive Mind being once thus furnished, it pushes on its Enquiries, and comes to discover the Foundation they have in Nature and Reason. But that
Mankind

(1) Vide Orat. de vanitate luminis naturæ.

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Mankind, left to themselves, without the Assistance of supernatural Revelation, are capable of discovering those great Truths and Articles, and of giving a rational System of natural Religion, appears to me as impossible, as for a Workman to imagine and build a regular and well proportion'd Edifice, without any Thought or Use of Materials. Nor do I think, that the little Philosophers in our Day, who far exceed Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and all the great Men among the Heathens, in a rational and consistent Account of Religion and Virtue, can act a fair and modest Part, without attributing their Superiority to the Improvement they have got from Revelation or the Christian Religion. And certain it is, when a Man has once fairly got the Clue put in his Hand, he may then easily make his Way out of all the Darkness and Intricacies of a Labyrinth, and come to appear in broad Day-light.

I confess, this Opinion seems not so well suited to the Character I have assumed in the following Argument. But the Author of the Fable of the Bees, having given out the Jews and Christians, as the only Persons that have the Advantage of supernatural Revelation; I have mixed my self among heathen Philosophers, as Persons, who, according to our Author, have no Improvement from Revelation, and are only
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guided by the *Light of Nature*; and in this Character, I have taken Notice of those Truths, which I found in their Writings, without considering from whence they had them, which is a Question quite foreign to the Purpose in View.

Before I conclude, it may be expected, that, in Justice to my own Character and Reputation, I should account to the World, how I come to claim this Book, which, in the Year MDCCXVIII. Alexander Innes, D. D. Preacher Assistant at St. Margaret's Westminster, thought not unworthy of being published in his Name. But this Imposture, when I laid it open at London in the Year MDCCXX. made so great Noise, and appeared so evident to every Body, that, the Matter standing beyond all Doubt, I shall only here transcribe this short Fable,

Ἀλλοτρίους πρῆξιον ἡμετέροις,
ἔστι κακοὶς ἑτέροις ἀρεταῖς.
Πρῶτον ὃ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ Χελιδὼν ἡρώδει,
Μεθ' αὖ ἀπαρτίς. ὅτε γυμνὰς ἐνέειν.

GABR. Fab. 26.

which sets before us a silly enough Figure, and plainly shews (when κακοὶς ἀλλοτρίοις πρῆξις ἀρεταῖς) there is great Folly, to say no worse of it, in thus attempting to impose upon the World.

But as I here do my self Justice, I must not be found injurious to Dr. Innes, and therefore I willingly give him back his Title Page, his prefatory Introduction, and some few little marginal Notes, wherein he be-
trays

trays himself shamefully ignorant of the Meaning of the Text. Thus, for Example, he says in his marginal Note, p. 33. of his Edition, this by way of Irony; whereas the Text means the clean contrary: And the Dr. might have clearly seen it, had he attended to p. 81 and 82. Again, I observe p. 156. That, "if we imagine to our selves a single Man, as having no Relation to God and his Fellows, 'tis impossible there can be any the least Degree of Moral Virtue in all the Severities and Mortifications he can submit to:" Upon this the Dr. remarks in the Margin, tho they are great Helps towards it. Ridiculous! Can there be any Helps towards Virtue, in a State, wherein, I maintain, no Sort of Virtue can possibly exist? This is sufficient to shew, that the Doctor's not entering into the Views and Sentiments of the Author, has unluckily made him a blundering Commentator. So that I need instance in no more Particulars.

After all, 'tis of no Consequence to the Publick, by whose Labour the following Sheets were compos'd. If they are capable of serving any good End, this is all that can be judg'd valuable in the Performance. And as I know that this Book was written with a sincere and honest Intention to promote the real Interests of Mankind; so I heartily wish it may prove successful in recommending to the World the great Truths of Religion.

St. Andrews,
Sept. 12th 1733.

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	So


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After this manner it is that Man will not be	
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received, the Principles here laid down are	
most advantageous; not only as they promote every	
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renounce them	Page 178





AN ENQUIRY

Into the ORIGINAL of

Moral VIRTUE.

INTRODUCTION.



THE Author of the *Fable*
of the *Bees* very positive-
ly affirms, *That the near-*
er we search into human

'Tis pro-
tended, that
moral Vir-
tue is mere
Trick and
Chimera.

Nature, the more we shall
be convinc'd, that the mo-
ral Virtues are the politi-
cal Offspring, which Flat-
tery begot upon Pride, i. e.

that they are all a *Chimera*, an idle Fancy,
a mere Trick impos'd upon the World by
designing Law-givers and Philosophers.

A

THIS,

Introd.


In examining whether it really is so, one must enquire into the natural Frame and Constitution of rational Agents.

THIS, it seems, is the wonderful Discovery which this Gentleman has fallen upon, in the narrow Search he pretends to have made into human Nature. And it is really so very extraordinary, that one cannot but be tempted to follow his Example, and to enquire into the natural Frame and Constitution of rational Agents, that one may see with one's own Eyes, and from the Evidence of Things themselves be satisfied, whether any such strange Matter is to be discovered. And that I may stand the fairer to see Things in the same Point of Light, if possible, wherein, we must in Charity believe, they appear'd to our Author, I shall, in this Search which I am here to make into human Nature, particularly direct my Views towards those Principles, from which he draws his Conclusion, and upon which he founds his Discovery, and impartially lay before the Reader no one Article but what I shall see immediately flowing from the Nature and Reason of Things, and which I cannot therefore but necessarily propose, as true and certain. For (1) "As the Scale of a
" Balance must necessarily yield to the Gravi-
" ty of Weights; so must one's Mind necessa-
" rily submit to the Evidence of Things: Or, as
" an animate Being cannot but affect whatever
" seems

(1) *Neceſſe eſt, ut lancem in libra, ponderibus impositis, deprimi, ſic animum perſpicuis cedere. Nam quomodo non poteſt animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat; ſic non poteſt objectam rem perſpicuam non approbare. Cic. Acad. Q. lib. 4.*

Original of Moral Virtue.

3

“ seems accommodated to its Nature; so a *Introd.*
“ Man cannot but assent to that which appears 
“ manifest.”

AND since this Gentleman has thought fit to acquaint the World, that in the Course of his Argument he means neither *Jews* nor *Christians*, but mere *Men* in the State of Nature, *i. e.* without the Improvements of supernatural Revelation: I do here beg of the Reader (and I hope I may do it without any Indecency) not to regard me as either *Jew* or *Christian*, but as some *Heathen Philosopher*, who has nothing to guide him in his Enquiries but the bare Light of Nature. On which Account, I flatter myself, he will not take it amiss that I trouble him, as I go along, with some Quotations from my Fellow-heathens (as I suppose myself in the present Argument) which make it appear, that the Notions here advanced, were attended to, and approved of among other Sorts of People than *Jews* and *Christians*; and which serve to shew us the *natural Sense* of Mankind, with Respect to those Principles I insist upon.

IN the mean Time it is to be remarked, that in order to find out the Original, and to have a full View of Moral Virtue, we ought not to confine ourselves to human Nature, but must likewise take into Consideration the Nature of *God*, and of other rational Beings, with whom we may have any Correspondence; for Moral Virtue is confessedly of universal Concern, and relates to all rational Agents, that

And since in this Argument 'tis proposed we should not take Advantage of supernatural Revelation, the Author begs Leave to assume the Character of a heathen Philosopher, or to shew, at least in the Margin, that he has those Philosophers to speak for him.

Mean^d while, Moral Virtue being a Matter that relates to all rational Agents, that have Commerce together, we must consider the Nature of *God*, as well as of *Man*.

Sect. I. may be supposed to have any Sort of Commerce
 with one another.

SECTION I.

Self-love
 is essential to
 human Na-
 ture.

TO begin with that which is interwoven
 in the Constitution of all animate Beings:
 'Tis very certain, that all Men have implanted
 in their Nature a Principle (1) of *Self-love* or
 Preservation, that irresistibly operates upon us
 in all Instances whatsoever, and is the great
 Cause, or the *first Spring* (2) of all our several
 Motions and Actions, which Way soever they
 may happen to be directed. And as Self-love
 is the Principle that universally prevails over
 all

(1) Οὐκ ἔστιν ἑδὲς ὅστις ἑχ' αὐτὸν φιλεῖ. Omne enim ani-
 mal, simul ut ortum est, & seipsum, & omnes partes suas di-
 ligat. *There is no Man without Self-love. For so soon as*
any Animal is brought forth, it tenderly affects itself, and
all its Members. Cic. de Finib. L. 2.

(2) Τὸ ζῶον αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς.
 Præterea & appetendi, & refugiendi, & omnino rerum
 gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate, aut a dolore.
 Quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est, omnes rectas res, at-
 que laudabiles, eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur.
All the Actions of every animate Being, even those of
the Deity himself, proceed wholly from Self-interest. Arian.
 L. 1. Cap. 19. *And all our Desires and Aversions, our*
Pursuits of whatever Sort, do originally spring either from
Pleasure or Pain. So that 'tis manifest, that all Actions,
good and laudable, take their Aim at an easy and happy
Life. Cic. de Finib. L. 1.

Original of Moral Virtue.

5

Seet. I.

all Mankind; so, according to the Influence it really has over us, we are necessarily concern'd, not so much to maintain our Existence, as to pursue our *Well-being*, or to have our Existence preserved to us in such Circumstances wherein we may feel ourselves ever easy and happy. For, as *Plato* observes, (1) 'Tis not one's *Being* that is much to be regarded, but one's *Well-being*. So that Self-love is to be counted the very same with our natural Desire after Pleasure or Happiness.

BUT to prevent any Prejudices that may arise from introducing *Self-love* as a laudable Principle, in the Business of moral Virtue, I shall here transcribe some Observations from *Aristotle*, concerning this Principle.

In what Sense it ought to be understood.

" 'Tis a Question among some People, says that Philosopher, (2) Whether *Self-love*, or the *Love*

A 3

of

(1) 'Ου τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείονα πάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Plat. in Criton.

(2) Ἀπορεῖται δὲ, πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μέλιστα, ἢ ἄλλον τίνα. ἐπιτιμῶν γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μέλιστα ἀγαπῶσι καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀισχυρῷ, φιλοῦντες ἀποκαλύπτει δοκέει τὸ, ὃ μὲν φαῦλος, ἑαυτοῦ χρεῖν πάντα πρᾶττον καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοτέτῳ μᾶλλον. ἐγκαλεῖται δὲ αὐτῷ, διὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρᾶττον. ὃ δὲ ἐπιεικής, διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν βελτίαν ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλον ἔνεκα. τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ πείνησι τοῖς λόγοις διὰ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφανεῖ, καὶ ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γάρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μέλιστα, τὸν μέλιστα φίλον. φίλος δὲ μέλιστα ὁ βυλόμενος, ὃ βυλῆται τ' ἀγαθὰ, ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτοῦ παρὰ καὶ μέλιστα αὐτῷ ὡς αὐτοῦ. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ πάντα, οἷς ὁ φίλος ἐρείζεται. εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ, καὶ ὡς τὰς ἄλλας διάνους. καὶ αἱ περιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμιλιωμοῦσιν, αἰσὺν τὸ, μία ψυχὴ καὶ κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης. καὶ

2610

Sect. I. " of others, ought especially to govern us in the
 " Conduct of Life. Such as take that Side
 " of the Question, which maintains we ought
 " especially to be govern'd by the Love of o-
 " thers, they do highly condemn those Persons,
 " who are under the Influence of Self-love,
 " and, in the Way of Reproach, call them
 " *Selfish*, or *Self-lovers*. And, in order to
 " give some Weight to this Opinion, they
 " observe, That a vicious Man does every
 " Thing for his own Sake; and the more vicious
 " he is, the more is he govern'd by Self-love. So
 " that they accuse and blame him, because he
 " does

ἡνὺ κνήμης ἔγριον πάντα ὃ τὰυτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα ὕπαρ-
 χει μάλιστα ὃ φίλος ἑαυτῷ καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτὸν.
 Ἀπορεῖται δὲ εἰκότως ποτέ τις χρεὼν ἐπιδαί, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων
 τὸ πρῶτον; ἴσως ἐν τούτοις δὲ τῶν λόγων διακρίνει, καὶ
 διακρίνει, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πρὸ ἀλλήλων. οἱ δὲ λαβόμενοι
 τὸ εἰλαυτεν, πῶς ἐκάτεροι λέγουσι ταχὺ ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον· οἱ
 μὲν ἔν εἰς ὀνειδὸς ἄγοντες αὐτὸν, φιλαυτεν καλῶς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
 ἀπονέμενται, τὸ πλεονὲς ἐν χρήμασι, καὶ πημαῖς, καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σω-
 ματικαῖς. τούτων δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέζονται, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν περὶ
 αὐτῶν, ὥς αἰετὰ ὄντα διὰ καὶ πεινυμένη ἐστίν. Ὅτι δὴ περὶ
 τὰυτα πλεονέκται, χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, καὶ ὅλως τῆς
 πάσης, καὶ ὅλως ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τούτοις δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ· διὰ
 καὶ ἡ φρονεῖν γένηται ὅπου τὸ πολλὸν, φαύλου ὄντος. διακρίνει
 δὴ τῆς ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ὀνειδίζεσθαι. Ὅτι δὲ ἴσως τὰ τοιαῦτα
 αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμενται, εἰωθασί λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαυτεν, ἔκ
 ἀδελφον, εἰ δὲ πῶς αἰετὰ σκεδάζει τὰ δόγματα φράττειν, αὐτὸς μάλ-
 λιστα πάντων, ἢ τὰ σωφρονα, ἢ ὁποιαῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς
 ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιῶτο, ἔδειξεν ἐφ' αὐ-
 τῷ τῷ πρῶτον, ἔδειξεν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τούτος εἶναι μᾶλλον
 φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει δὲ ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα, καὶ μάλιστα ἀγα-
 θὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτῷ τῷ κυριώτατον, καὶ πάντα τέτταρα ποιεῖ-
 ται. ὥστε δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ πᾶν
 ἄλλο σύστημα, ἢ τῷ καὶ ἀνδραπο. καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τού-
 τῳ ἀγαπῶν, καὶ τούτῳ χαρίζομενος· καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὴ καὶ ἀκρατὴς
 λίγαι.

Original of Moral Virtue.

7

“ does nothing without a Regard to Self-interest. Sect. I.
 “ Whereas on the other Hand they alledge,
 “ That a Man of Virtue and Probity acts for
 “ the Sake of Virtue; and the better he is, the
 “ more does he act for Virtue's Sake, and the
 “ Sake of his Friend, without any Respect to his
 “ own Interest, which he quite lays aside and ne-
 “ glects; on which Account he is much commend-
 “ ed as kind and generous. This is what is ad-
 “ vanced on this Side of the Question: But
 “ the Misfortune is, that such Notions and
 “ Sentiments, as in Reason one cannot but
 “ allow, do not so well accord with the Na-
 “ ture of Things, and the universal Conduct
 “ of Mankind.”

“ FOR it is granted, that we ought parti-
 “ cularly to love that Man, who is particular-
 “ ly our Friend. And he in a particular Man-

A 4

“ ner

λέγεται, τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νῦν ἢ μὴ, ὥς τότε ἕκαστος οὗτος· καὶ
 πεπραγμένοι δοκῶσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐκυσίαι, τὰ μετὰ λόγους μάλιστα·
 ὅππῃ μὲν ἐν τῷδε ἕκαστος ἐστὶ μάλιστα, ἢ καὶ ἀδελφῶν. καὶ ὅππῃ ἐπικεκ-
 μένη τῷτο ἀγαθῷ· διὸ φίλουτος μάλιστα· ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅππῃ ἔτι
 εἶδος τῷ ὀνειδιζομένῳ, καὶ διαφέρειν τοσούτων, ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λό-
 γον ζῆν, τῷ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέσθαι ἢ τῷ καλῷ, ἢ τῷ δοκῶντος
 συμφέρον· τὸ μὲν ἔν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως
 ἀπερὶάζοντας, πάντες ἀποδέχονται, καὶ ἐπαινοῦσι. Πάντων δὲ
 ἀμειλλομένων πρὸς τὸ καλόν, καὶ διατηρομένων τὰ χεῖρις πρῶ-
 ται, κοινῇ τ' ἂν παντὶ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστῳ, τὰ μέγ-
 ιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἢ ἀρετὴ τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν
 ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλουτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται, τὰ καλὰ
 πράττειν, καὶ τὸς ἄλλους ὠφελέσει· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν δὲ δεῖ
 βλάψαι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τὸς πύλας, φάουλους πᾶσαν ἐπομένους·
 τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν ἔν διαφρονεῖ, ἢ δὲ πράττειν, καὶ ἂν φαν-
 τοῖ· ὁ δὲ ἐπικεκμένος, ἂν δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ νῦν αἰρεῖ-
 ται τὸ βέλτερον ἑαυτοῦ· ὁ δὲ ἐπικεκμένος, πενταρχεῖ τῷ νῦν.
 Arist. Eth. Lib. 9. Cap. 3.

Sect. I. "ner is our Friend, who wishes our Happiness,
 "and would promote our Well-being on our parti-
 "cular Account, though no Body else should know of
 "it. Now in this very Manner it is, that a
 "Man is affected with respect to himself; so
 "that these Things, and whatever else is in-
 "cluded in the Character of a Friend, may
 "more peculiarly be said of a Man in his Con-
 "duct towards himself: For it is pretty cer-
 "tain, that we all wish our selves happy, and
 "would promote our own Well-being, par-
 "ticularly for our own Sake, though no Body
 "else should know of it. Besides, it is con-
 "fessed, that in discharging the Offices of
 "Friendship toward others, a Man always
 "makes himself the Standard, or we embrace
 "our Friends with the same Affections, and
 "treat them in the same Manner we do our
 "selves. And thus much is express'd in all the
 "common Proverbs made use of upon Friend-
 "ship; such as, *One Soul; Friends have all*
 "*Things in common; Friendship is Equality;*
 "*One's Thigh is nearer to him than his Ankle.*
 "All which Things may be said of one's self,
 "in a more particular Manner, than with Re-
 "lation to one's Friend: So that a Man is
 "his own Friend, in a more particular and in-
 "timate Manner than any other Person. And
 "therefore it appears, that a Man must
 "love himself most, or that, in the Conduct of
 "Life, he will especially be govern'd by *Self-*
 "interest."

"How,

Original of Moral Virtue.

9

Sec. I.

“ HOWEVER, since there are some Apper-
“ rances of Truth on both Sides of the Question,
“ and one may therefore reasonably doubt which
“ Side is to be taken; it will not be amiss
“ that I here distinguish Things, in order to
“ shew how and in what Respect each Side
“ seems to be true. And if we consider Self-
“ love, as both Parties severally understand it,
“ the Matter will soon be decided.”

“ SUCH therefore as expose this Principle of
“ Self-love, do apply it peculiarly to those
“ Persons, and brand them with *Selfishness*, who
“ are *immoderate* in their Pursuits after Riches,
“ Honours, and bodily Pleasures. For many
“ do greatly affect these Things, and keenly
“ pursue them, as if they were the most valu-
“ able Enjoyments; whereby they prove the
“ Occasion of much Disorder and Confusion in
“ the World. And indeed such as go to Ex-
“ cess in these Pursuits, do indulge their Appe-
“ tites, and are absolutely govern'd by their Pas-
“ sions, and the unreasonable or sensual Part
“ of their Nature: So that there being great
“ Numbers this Way engaged, and the Name or
“ Character being taken from the many that are
“ vicious, there seems to be good Reason to
“ condemn and reproach such selfish Sort of
“ People, who thus suffer their Self-love to
“ hurry them away in such a Course of Ac-
“ tion.”

“ AND that the *World* do mean by the *Selfish*,
“ and such as are govern'd by Self-love or In-
“ terest,

Sect. I. " Interest, only those Persons that are devoted to
 " such Sort of Pursuits, is very obvious: For
 " let a Man exert himself in the Study of *Righ-*
 " *teousness, Temperance,* or any other Virtue,
 " and be still acquiring every moral Excellency;
 " no Body will count him *selfish*, or ever blame
 " him. And yet this is *the very Man, who*
 " *seems rather to be animated with Self-love, or*
 " *to be selfish in the highest Degree;* for he pos-
 " sesses himself of the fairest and best Enjoy-
 " ments, and gratifies that Part of his Con-
 " stitution, which is the most excellent, and
 " to which naturally belongs the supreme Com-
 " mand, and is in all Things subject to its In-
 " fluence, that is to say, *He is in every Thing*
 " *indulgent to himself.*"

" FOR as the *Self*, if I may speak so, of a
 " State, and of every other Community, seems
 " to be *that* in the Constitution, which is the
 " most excellent, and in which the sovereign
 " Power is lodged; so likewise a *Man's Self*
 " is said to be *that*, which in the human Na-
 " ture is the most excellent, and in which the
 " supreme Authority naturally resides; which
 " is understood only of the *Mind*. For a Man
 " is said to have, or not to have, the Com-
 " mand of himself, according as the Mind go-
 " verns, or not; and when the Mind has the
 " Government, then People seem to act freely,
 " and do only those Things that are consonant
 " to Reason. And therefore it being thus ma-
 " nifest, that *the Mind is a Man's Self*; and a
 " virtuous

Original of Moral Virtue:

II

“ virtuous Man having a particular Value and *Self-love*.
“ Love for his Mind, it plainly follows, that
“ this Man especially ought to be counted *selfish*,
“ or under the Power of Self-love, tho in a
“ nother Respect than those Persons are, who
“ are reproach’d with this Principle, and dif-
“ fering as much from them, as living by Rea-
“ son differs from living by Passion, and pur-
“ suing that which is excellent, from pursuing
“ that which only seems advantagious.”

“ AND indeed all the World do highly com-
“ mend and applaud those Persons who are
“ eminent in the Study and Exercise of vir-
“ tuous Actions. And if all Men would zea-
“ lously pursue moral Virtue, and exert them-
“ selves steadily in the Practice of whatever is
“ most virtuous; not only should every publick
“ Community become happy, great, and flou-
“ rishing, but every Individual should find him-
“ self possess’d of the highest Felicities, of the
“ best and the most valuable Enjoyments; for
“ such a Thing is moral Virtue in its Nature
“ and Consequents. So that a *good Man* ought,
“ by all Means, to be a *Self-lover*, or he should
“ indulge and pursue his Self-interest, since,
“ in the Practice of Virtue (*to which his Self-*
“ *love determines him*) he will promote both his
“ own, and the Happiness of other People:
“ But as for a vicious Man, he ought not at
“ all to submit to the Influence of this Principle,
“ according to the *Turn* it has taken with him;
“ for by following his wicked Passions, he
“ will

SECT. II. " will hurt himself, and do Mischief to his
 " Neighbours; and indeed the Things that
 " he ought to do, are vastly different from those
 " Things which he doth; whereas the Things
 " which a virtuous Man ought to do, are the
 " same that he does; for every Mind chuses
 " that which is best suited to its Well-being
 " and Happiness, and the Mind of a good
 " Man is that which governs and directs
 " him."

Self-love
 operates up-
 on us, by
 Means of our
 other Desires
 and Appe-
 tites.

BUT to return. I say, *Self-love* enters into the *inward Make* of all intelligent Beings; and in the human Nature is *branched* out in those Desires and Appetites that are inseparable from our present Constitution, or that belong peculiarly to our Minds as rational intelligent Beings. For all the several Affections and Passions that are laid in our Nature, are only, as it were, different *Modifications* of this essential Principle, or they are the great Instruments whereby it lays hold of us, exerts its Power, and operates upon us.

S E C T. II.

It irresistibly
 exerts itself
 in the Desire
 of Society.

NOW as all the Desires of the Mind are nothing but Self-love diversify'd, or the different Ways wherein it moves and affects us; so, in particular, 'tis exceedingly manifest, that no Man living in *Solitude*, without all Commerce with the rest of Mankind, can enjoy himself with any Satisfaction, even though he should be

be well provided in all Things whatsoever that Sect. II
 can be thought necessary to render a single Life every Way happy: For, by every one's Experience, there is so strong a Propension, so irresistible a Desire in the Mind of Man to have *Companions* of his own Make, or to *associate* himself with other rational Beings, that all the other Sweets and Enjoyments of Life, even the Contemplation of the Nature of Things, with all the inward Transports of Mind it can afford to us, would without *this* be quite tasteless and insipid (1).

AND

(1) Quod nemo in solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem, congregationemque hominum, & ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. *Since no Man would chuse to live in Solitude, no not amidst the greatest Affluence of all imaginable Pleasures, 'tis easie to understand, that Men are born to unite and associate together, and have it in their Nature to entertain Fellowship with one another.* Cic. de finib. L. 2. Ἀτις ὁ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὸ μόνον ὄντως τὸν μακάριον. ὅθεν καὶ ἔλκεται ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχει δύναμις πολιτικὴν καὶ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ συζῆναι μετὰ καὶ τὸ ἐνδύμεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁμαρξάν. *'Tis absurd to represent Solitude as an Ingredient in one's Happiness; for all the good Things one can possibly have in a solitary State, will never gratify and content him. We are social Creatures; and being naturally formed to Society, no Man can be happy without it.* Arist. Eth. L. 9. cap. 9. Ego vero cupio in te omnia transfundere; & in hoc gaudeo aliquid discere, ut doceam: Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet eximia sit & salutaris, quam mihi ipsi sciturus sum. Si cum hac exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam teneam, nec enunciem, rejiciam. Nullius boni sine socio jucunda possessio est. *As for me, I am fond to impart*

Sect. II.

Which is
natural to
Man, and
its Gratifica-
tion necessary
to one's
Happiness.

AND to shew that this Propension to associate together, is not any thing foreign or adventitious, but a *natural Turn* of Mind, or an Ingredient in the human Constitution; let us suppose that two Men, neither of which had ever before seen any Individual of his own Species, meet together: I would fain know, what are the Affections which we can imagine to arise, on this Rencounter, in the Minds of these two Strangers. Will they run away frightened at the dreadful Appearance? Or will they be push'd on with Resentment and Malice, to oppress and destroy one another? *But what has one Man, says Arian, (1) frightful to another, either in the Shape of his Body, the Tone of his Voice, or in his Presence and Company? No more, says he, than any one brute Creature has with respect to another of the same Species.* In my Opinion (since all Things of a like or common Nature do strongly attract one another by a mutual Force, that never

my whole Stock of Knowledge to you. And indeed the Thoughts of teaching and improving others, make me glad when I have something to learn; nor could I relish any Thing, however excellent and profitable, which no Body was to know but my self. Nay, if Wisdom and Knowledge should be given me, provided I possessed it my self, and did not communicate it to others, I would reject it. There is no good Thing one can have the Enjoyment of, without a Companion. Senec. Epist. 6.

(1) Τὸ ὅτι ἔχει ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν, ἢ ὀρθοῖς, ἢ λαλῆσας, ἢ ὅλως συναναστάσεις; ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰππῶν ἰππῶν, ἢ κύων κύων, ἢ μέλισσα μέλισσῃ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκάστου φοβερά ἐστὶ. ταῦτα δ' ὅταν περιποιῇ τις δι' ὧνταί τινι ἢ ὀφείλειται, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς φοβερός γίνεται. Arian. l. 3. cap. 26.

never fails to exert itself, where it is not over-
balanc'd by a superior Power, which cannot be
supposed in the present Case) (2) we may well
be assured, that what Surprize soever these two
may mutually conceive at first Sight, yet each
of them being struck with the Frame and Struc-
ture of the other's Body, and thereby quickly
seeing themselves in one another, this wonder-
ful Resemblance will warm their Breasts with
friendly Affections towards each other, and
powerfully incline them to make up, each to
his own Image, and to joyn Interest, each, as
it were, with his *second Self*.


NOR do I in this attribute any Thing more to
human Nature, than what is common to brute
Creatures, among which an Affection to their
own Species, and a Propension to mix together,
universally prevail: And every where we see
different Sorts of Animals feeding together in
the

(2) Ὅσα κοινὰ τινὶ μετέχει, πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενὲς σπεινῶσι τὰ
γενῶσι πᾶν ῥέπει ἐπὶ γῆν, τὸ ὑγρὸν πᾶν σύρρει, καὶ ἀερῶσις
ὁμοίως ὥστε χρῆζειν τῶν διαργόντων καὶ βίαι. — καὶ τούτων
πᾶν τὸ κοινὸν νεφεῶς φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοί-
ως σπεινῶσι, ἢ καὶ μέλλον. ὅσα γὰρ εἰσι κρεῖττον ὅσα τὰ ἀλλὰ,
τοσέτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκληῖσθαι τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ συγκληῖσθαι ἐτοι-
μότερον. *All Things endowed with common Qualities have
a Tendency, every Thing towards its like. Thus earthly
Bodies fall to the Ground. Water mixes, and runs toge-
ther; and the same happens with respect to Air: So that
there is need of Force to keep such Things asunder. —
After the same manner, all Beings that share in a com-
mon intelligent Nature, have a natural Propension towards
each other's Society, only with this Difference, that the more
perfect the Being is, the more strongly it is inclin'd to asso-
ciate and unite with its Fellows.* M. Anton. L. 9. § 9.

Se^{ct}. II. the same Pasture, living and maintained by the same Food; and yet they will divide and range themselves according to their several Tribes, and draw together, every Species by itself, into different Herds and Companies. This, no doubt, proceeds from the natural Affection (commonly called *Instinct*) which all the Individuals of the same Species do mutually bear one another. And I cannot imagine how it is possible to conceive human Nature void of the same kind social Propensions.

So that the two human Creatures, in the Circumstances above mentioned, cannot but make up, each to his own Likeness. And being thus conciliated to one another from the outward Structure of their Body, whereby they are made to feel a strong Propension to associate together (1); when they come further to understand, that

(1) Nihil est appetentius similitum sui, nihil rapacius quam natura, &c. quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucris, natantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum se ut ipsa diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur) deinde ut requirant, atque appetant, ad quas se applicent ejusdem generis animantes; idque faciunt cum desiderio, & cum quadam similitudine amoris humani: quanto id magis in homine sit natura, qui & se ipse diligit, & alterum acquirit, ejus animum ita cum suo commisceat, ut efficiat pæne unum ex duobus? *There is nothing that more strongly affects, nothing that more ardently embraces its like than Nature, &c. and if it appears in brute Creatures, Fowls, Fishes, wild and tame Beasts; first, that they love themselves (for this is equally natural to all animate Beings) and next, that with a certain Fondness, and something like human Love, they desire and seek after Animals of the same Kind with whom they may associate.*



that they can communicate their Thoughts distinctly to each other, and be reciprocally assisting in all their several Joys and Sorrows; this makes them affect living together with the greater Ardency (1). And thus it should seem, that a Disposition to Society is laid in the inward Frame of human Nature (2).

B

AND

State: How much more powerfully must such a social Disposition exert itself in the Nature of Man, who not only loves himself, but looks out till he finds a Companion, whose Mind he may so mix with his own, as, in a manner, to make up only one of them both. Cic. de Amic.

(1) Jam vero domina rerum, eloquendi vis, quam est præclara, quamq; divina? quæ primum efficit, ut ea quæ ignoramus, discere, ut ea quæ scimus, alios docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasq; restringimus. Hæc nos juris, legum, urbium societate devinxit; hæc a vita immani & fera segregavit. *And as for that Mistress of the World, our Faculty of Speech, how illustrious, how divine a Thing is it? By this it is that we are enabled to learn those Things we are ignorant of, and to teach others what we know. Hereby likewise we encourage, we persuade, we comfort the afflicted. Hereby we relieve the desponding from Fear, we check the wanton Joys of the light and frothy, and lay the Heat of inflamed Passions. 'Tis this that unites us under Laws and Government, and that has saved us from a wild and savage Life. Cic. de Nat. Deor.*

L. 2.

(2) In se reconditur, (sapiens) secum est: quamdiu quidem illi licet suo arbitrio res suas ordinare, se contentus est; & ducit uxorem, se contentus; & liberos tollit, se contentus; & tamen non vivet, si fuerit sine homine victurus. Ad amicitiam fert illum nulla utilitas sua, sed naturalis irritatio. Nam ut aliarum nobis rerum innata dulcedo est, sic amicitia. Quomodo

one Piece of Matter not in Company with another, Sect. II.
 than any of the human Species not associated with
 their Fellows.

NOR can the Conduct of some few that have retired from the rest of Mankind, and liv'd by themselves in deep Solitude, ever make it appear, that Man is not inspir'd with a natural Desire and Propension towards Society. For not to shew how People in their most lonely Retreats, may notwithstanding be conceived to entertain a Correspondence with Mankind, or other intelligent Beings; I shall only take notice, that one natural Passion or Appetite may be kept from exerting itself, or may happen to be counter-balanc'd and overpower'd by the prevailing Force of another, which, in many Instances, cannot but be evident to every one's Experience.

BUT, not to speak of the Structure and Disposition of the other Parts of the human Body, whereby we plainly seem to be form'd to the Offices of Society; has not God furnished all Men with the wonderful Faculty of *Speech*, an Endowment not to be found in any other Species of Creatures, but the great Instrument whereby we are rendred fit for Society, and are enabled to do the greatest Services to one another; which however would be of no manner of Use to us, did we not assemble and live together (1)?

Sect. II

gether (1)? And as our being thus provided in such a natural Faculty, is sufficient Evidence that God himself designs we should live associated together, and teach and improve one another,

(1) Ἡ δὲ ποτὲ σοὶ ἐπαλάδων ἐνδυνάμηναι, ὥς ἐπιμαλῶς οἱ θεοὶ ὧν ἄνθρωποι θύονται κατισκεύασαν; ———— τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐμπνεύσαι δύναιμι δι' ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομαι τοῖς ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες, καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν, καὶ νόμους πείνομεθα, καὶ πολεμώμεθα. πάντα παρὸν ἐβίκατον, ὃ Σωκράτης, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμαλῶς ποιεῖσθαι. Did you ever reflect, says Socrates to Euthydemus, with what exact Care God hath provided us of all Things needful to our Happiness? ———— He hath endued us with the Faculty of Speech, whereby, in our mutual Instructions, we communicate every Thing good and valuable to one another, we enjoy each others Society, we establish Laws, and manage the Affairs of the Publick. ———— Indeed it should seem, my dear Socrates, that God is deeply concerned in doing Good to Mankind. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 4. Εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔμεν τῷ πείθειν ἀλλήλους, καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ βελλιδόμεν, ὁ μόνον τὸ δεικνύειν ἦν ἀπαραγόμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιδιδόντες πολλὰς ὠφελείας, καὶ νόμους ἐδίδμεθα, καὶ τέχναις ἐνέεργον, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀπαντὰ τὰ δι' ἡμῶν μακροχρονίαια, λογος ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ κατασκευάσαι. ὅπως γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, καὶ τῶν ἀσχηρῶν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐνομοθέτησεν ὁ θεὸς μὴ διαταχθέντων, ἐκ δὲ διὰ τὰ ἡμῖν ὅπως μετ' ἀλλήλων, &c. Having a Power mutually to persuade one another, and to lay before our selves the Nature and Tendency of those Things upon which we are deliberating; not only are we thereby kept from living like wild and unsociable Creatures, but assembling together, we erect Common-wealths, we form, and enact Laws, we invent Arts, and almost whatever we do for each others Benefit, is effected by our Faculty of Speech. For hereby it is that we settle and declare what is just and unjust, virtuous and vicious; without which we should never be able to live associated together, &c. Socrat. in Nicocl.

Original of Moral Virtue:

II

Sec. II

as Xenophon observes (1), in all the Parts of our Duty, for our mutual Comfort and Happiness; so such a Design in the wise and powerful Framers of human Nature, may serve to satisfy us, that all Men are certainly created with an inward Turn of Mind that naturally determines us to associate together. Besides that, without Society, all Propagation, and Care for one's Offspring, and consequently the human Race itself, would, contrary to the Intention and Will of the Deity, be soon at an End: So that I say, an inward Propension to mix and associate together, is certainly an Ingredient in the Frame of our Nature. And since Providence has made it so necessary for us to depend upon the Affections and Care of our Parents, or other People, for so many Years, that every Man grows up under a quick Sense of the Advantages of Society; this, I say, cannot but greatly increase and fortify our natural Disposition to mix with one another. And therefore upon the whole, the Gratification of this social Appetite, is one very essential Ingredient of our Well-being.

BUT before I leave this Article, I must be so fair as to observe, that some People, particularly Mr. Hobbes, give a quite different Account of human Nature, and maintain that Mankind have naturally no kind Dispositions, that prompt them to associate together. Perhaps it will not be

Some Objections against the social Dispositions of human Nature, to be consider'd.

B 3

judg'd

(1) Ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώπων θού ἔδωκεν λόγον διδόντα, καὶ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. Xenoph. de re equest.

Sect. II. judg'd impertinent, that I here examine what is said on this Side of the Question: And, I hope, that what I may propose, will contribute to afford us a fuller View of the original Constitution of human Nature.

The Fears and Jealousies that prevail among Mankind, must come from their having malevolent Affections, and their being possess'd of equal Power to do Mischief.

Obj. I. 'Tis alledg'd, "That Mankind are so far from being mutually well affected to each other, and from having any friendly Dispositions to associate together, which could not but produce mutual Trust and Confidence; that, on the contrary, all Men are possess'd of mutual Fears and Jealousies, and do naturally dread and suspect one another; which must arise from a Consciousness of their being mutually ill affected, and of their being equally capable to fulfil their malevolent Passions in doing Mischief to one another."* This is the Account which some People (1) give us of the inward Constitution of human Nature.

AND

* See Append.

(1) Eorum qui de rebus publicis aliquid conscripserunt, maxima pars, vel supponunt, vel petunt, vel postulant, hominem esse animal aptum natum ad societatem, Græci dicunt ζῷον πολιτικόν. Quod axioma, quamquam a plurimis receptum, falsum tamen; errorque a nimis levi humanæ naturæ contemplatione profectus est. Causas enim, quibus homines congregantur, & societate mutua gaudent, penitus inspectantibus, facile constabit, non ideo id fieri, quod aliter fieri natura non possit, sed accedente. Hobb. de Civ. Cap. 1. Videmus civitates omnes, etiam si cum vicinis pacem habeant, fines tamen suos præditiis militum, urbes mœnibus, portis, vigiliis tueri. Quorsum hæc si a vicinis nihil metuerent? Videmus etiam in ipsis civitatibus,

ubi

AND indeed, since *Fear* is a Passion of the human Mind that is deeply laid in our Nature, whereby we employ our natural Powers in defending ourselves from Evil, or in maintaining our Peace and Well-being, and which never stirs or works within us, but upon the Apprehension of Evil, or when our Minds have the View of some Object that threatens to oppress us; 'tis very certain, that if the bare Sight of our Fellow-men naturally excites our *Fears*, they must necessarily appear to us under the Notion of *Evil*, as Persons that are about to invade our Well-being; or we must apprehend something or other in the human Nature, that disposes every Individual that partakes of it, to disturb his Fellow, or to involve him in Misery. Accordingly 'tis pretended, that *all Men have, in their inward Constitution, a mischievous Propension to hurt one another.* And this being given out, as Matter of Fact, or as a *Thing* really existing in the human Frame; I should

B 4

think,

ubi leges sunt, & poene in malos constitutae, cives tamen singulares neque in itinere esse sine telo sui defendendi causa, neque dormitum ire nisi obseratis, non modo foribus contra concives, sed etiam arcis capsulisque contra domesticos. Possintne homines sibimet invicem, omnesque omnibus diffidere sese, apertius significare? Id. ibid. in Praefat. Causa metus mutui consistit partim in naturali hominum aequalitate, partim in mutua laedendi voluntate. Ex quo fit ut neque ab aliis expectare, neque nobismet ipsis securitatem praestare valeamus. — Voluntas laedendi omnibus quidem inest in statu naturae. Id. ibid. Cap. 1.

Sect. II.

think, that the surest Way we can take to understand whether such a malevolent Disposition is a real Quality actually inherent in human Nature, is for every Man narrowly to watch his own Mind, and carefully to observe the secret Movements of his Soul, as they shall happen to affect him, upon the Sight of the Individuals of the human Race. For whatever a Man always finds necessarily stirring within him, when he looks on his own Species, may, in my Opinion, be counted essential to human Nature. And I am willing to put the whole Matter upon this Issue, or to leave it to the inward Sense and Experience of all Mankind.

There are
no malici-
ous Affec-
tions in hu-
man Nature,
against the
Individuals
of our own
Species.

For my own Particular I must confess, when I set before me my *Fellow-men*, and consider them as intelligent Beings, partaking of *that* Nature, wherein I share with them, I find myself moved with kind Dispositions towards them. And let any Man look upon one of his *own Species*, and a brute Creature, and consider these two Individuals, only as they are of *different Natures*; I am much mistaken, if he does not find himself very differently affected, and sensibly feel that his Heart strongly leads him with kind Affections towards the one, as his *Fellow* and Companion, and not at all towards the other. *Who is the Man*, says *Arian*, (1) *that,*

when

(1) Τὰ παιδία τὰ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ὁμοειδῆ, καὶ ἐκ ἐκείνων
πρὸς τὸ συμπάσαις αὐτοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς, καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμπάσαις
αὐτοῖς.

when he sees sprightly Boys at their Sports and Diversions, is not tempted to join them? But who ever found himself dispos'd to run about with an Ass sporting and braying? For, by a natural Necessity, as I have already hinted, every Creature that is able to distinguish Things, is powerfully attracted by its own Image, and cannot but seek to cohabit or associate with its Second-self, or its own Likeness. And therefore, whatever Affections the Sight of the Individuals of my own Nature may excite in me, I am quite insensible to any malevolent Dispositions that can be supposed to prompt me to do them Mischief. On the contrary, I am delighted in seeing Multitudes of my Fellow-men. The Sight of a Herd of Cattle, says Arian, (1) pleases us; we are glad when we see a Fleet of Ships; was ever any Man pained and uneasie at the Sight of Numbers of his own Species? So that, in a Consistency with Truth, or Matter of Fact, I can never represent malevolent Affections as a Part of my Constitution; nor can I affirm they enter into the Nature of any of the Individuals of the human Species, who retain the native Turn of their Minds, and are not perverted in-

Sect. II.

ζον; ὅθω δὲ πῆς ἀποδυμνήτου συμπαιζεν, ἢ συνοχεσθαι;
Arian. L. 2. C. 24.

(1) Τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἡδονὴν δεύουσα τῇ φιλανθρώπῳ, ἢ ἀνθρώποις πολλοί; ἰσπῶν ἀγέλης ἢ βοῶν ἡδῶς ὁρώμεν· πολλὰ πολλὰ ὅταν ἰδωμεν, διαχόμεθα· ἀνθρώπους πολλὰς βλέποντες πῆς ἀνιάται;
Ar. L. 4.

Sect. II. to something monstrous, into a Savageness of Temper, fiercer than ravening Tygers.

Sævis inter se convenit urfis, &c.

The Mis-
chief that is
done in the
World, arises
not from an
inbred Ma-
lice, but
from some
other Causes.

It is true there are many Things every where committed, whereby People seem to express a malicious Cast of Mind, with respect to one another: But, as I apprehend, if we enquire into the true Springs of our Actions, we shall find, that these Mischiefs, whereby one Man oppresses another, do not come from any wicked Propension in our Nature to hurt our Fellow-men, as they appear to us the Individuals of the human Species, but only as they interfere with us, or stand in our Way, while we are, beyond the Bounds of Reason, pursuing some present Enjoyments. And who is there, or was there ever a Man, says Cato, (1) however furious in his Passions, and so violently bent upon a Thing, that he will stick at no Wickedness to carry it, that would not much rather chuse to gain his End without the Guilt of oppressing his Neighbour, than by doing him Mischief, though he should be assured of Indemnity? Nay, to me it appears manifest, that these very Pursuits, wherein we are mischievous

(1) Quis est enim, aut quis unquam fuit, aut avaritia tam ar-
denti, aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem,
quam adipisci scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit
ad sese, etiam omni impunitate proposita, sine facinore, quam
illo modo pervenire? Cic. de finib. L. 3.

chievous to each other, do originally come from kind benevolent Affections towards our Fellow-men: For I suppose we are thus hurtful and noxious to one another, while we are engaged in the Pursuit of *Riches*, or *Preferments*, or *Power* and *Dominion*. And all these several Pursuits, if you run them up to their Original, will plainly appear, as I shall shew by and by, to have their first Rise from the Desire of *Esteem*; which, as Mr. *Hobbes* himself confesseth, involves, in its Nature, kind benevolent Affections. In short, whoever uses any Reflection, may be fully satisfied, not only from the inward *Touches* of his own Soul, but likewise from observing what passes among his Species, that a malicious Turn of Mind is no Ingredient in the human Constitution.

AFTER what particular Manner other Minds are affected by Things without them, I know not; but 'tis obvious from Experience, that the different Passions of the human Mind do very much follow the *Mechanism* of our Bodies, according to the different Impressions they receive from external Objects. Thus a *doleful Tone* hanging on one's Voice, will throw a Man in a gay Temper into a sorrowful Fit; and a *melancholy Face*, coming among cheerful Company, will dash their good Humour, and give them Uneasiness. *Spinoza*, in his Way, demonstrates, That

We are naturally formed to Compassion and Sympathy.

(1) according

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(1) according as we see any of our own Species affected, either in Point of Joy or Sorrow, so we likewise naturally take on, and are affected in the same Manner. In Consequence of which he observes (2), That the Person who is moved, neither by Reason nor Pity, to assist his Fellows in Distress, is inhumane, and not like a Man. But People will understand, from the Representation of a well-wrought Tragedy, where the Action is just, much better than from any Words, how the different Passions of the human Mind, Joy, Sorrow, and the like, do alternately rise and fall, according to the different Situations in which our Fellow-men are set before us, without our being able to prevent it. And from what passes, especially on these Occasions, one may easily understand, that Man, in his natural Constitution, is so far from having an inward Propension to grieve and oppress his own Species, that the very Sight of human Miseries (affecting the Mechanism of our Bodies, though not to the same Degree, yet somewhat after the same Manner, that the Suffering it self affects the Body of the miserable) strikes us to the Heart, and gives us a quick Fellow-feeling.

— Mollif.

(1) Ex eo quod rem nobis similem, & quam nullo affectu profecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur. Eth. Par. 3. Prop. 27.

(2) Qui nec ratione, nec commiseratione movetur, ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur. Nam per Prop. 27. Par. 3. homini dissimilis esse videtur. Ibid. Par. 4. Prop. 30.

Mollissima corda

Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,
 Quæ lachrymas dedit. Hæc nostri pars optima sensus.
 Plorare ergo jubet causam lugentis amici,
 Squaloremq; rei, pupillum ad jura vocantem
 Circumscriptorem, cujus manantia flens
 Ora puellares faciunt incerta capilli.
 Naturæ imperio gemimus, cum finus adultæ
 Virginis occurrit, vel terra conditur infans,
 Et minor igne rogi. Quis enim bonus, aut face dignus
 Arcana, qualem Cereris vult esse sacerdos,
 Ulla aliena sibi credat mala? Separat hæc nos
 A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli
 Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces,
 Atque exercendis capiendisq; artibus apti,
 Sensum a cœlesti demissum traximus arce,
 Cujus egent prona & terram spectantia. Mundi
 Principio indulgit communis conditor illis
 Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos
 Affectus petere auxilium, & præstare juberet.

*Compassion proper to Mankind appears;
 Which Nature witness'd when she lent us Tears.
 Of tender Sentiments we only give
 Those Proofs: To weep is our Prerogative;
 To shew by pitying Looks, and melting Eyes,
 How with a suff'ring Friend we sympathize:
 B' Impulse of Nature (though to us unknown
 The Party be) we make the Loss our own;
 And Tears steal from our Eyes, when in the Streets
 We some betroibed Virgin's Hearse we meet;*

Or

An Enquiry into the

Or Infant's Fun'ral, from the cheated Womb
 Conveyed to Earth, and cradled in a Tomb.

Who can all Sense of others Ills escape,
 Is but a Brute at best in human Shape.

This nat'ral Piety did first refine

Our Wit, and rais'd our Thoughts to Things divine:

This proves our Spirit of the Gods Descent,

While that of Beasts is prone and downward bent.

To them but Earth-born Life they did dispense,

To us, for mutual Aid, celestial Sense.

DRYD. JUVEN. Sat. 15.

So that a
 malicious
 Propension
 to do Mis-
 chief, is as
 inconsistent
 with the
 Frame of
 our Nature,
 as a natural
 Disposition
 to study our
 own Misery.

And therefore since the human Constitution
 lays every Man inevitably open to Sympathy and
 Fellow-feeling, so that no Man can afflict his
 Fellow, without being himself a Sufferer; it ap-
 pears evident, that a malicious Turn of Mind,
 to do Mischief to the Individuals of our own
 Species, is as great a Contradiction to the Frame
 of our Nature, as an inborn Propension to involve
 our selves in Pain and Misery. Nay, from our
 being cast in such a Mould, that there is no evit-
 ing of Sympathy and Compassion, it follows be-
 yond Dispute, in a Consistency with what Spi-
 nosa observes (1), That we are so little turn'd by
 Nature, to hate and oppress one another, that on
 the contrary, the Biass of our Nature, or the in-
 ward

(1) Rem cuius nos miseret, odio habere non possumus, ex
 eo quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit. *Eth. Par. 3. Prop.*
 27. *Corol. 2.* Rem cuius nos miseret, a miseria, quantum
 possumus, liberare conabimur. *Ibid. Corol. 3.*

Original of Moral Virtue.

31

ward Make of our Constitution necessarily sways us, tenderly to affect all our Fellow-men, and to do all we can to relieve them, when we see them oppressed and in Misery.

Sec. II.

W

And these

fore Man-

kind have

naturally no

Fears or Je-

lousies of

each other :

Nor can an

Equality of

Power ever

excite them.

Now, since the Individuals of human Kind can have naturally no malicious Propension to hurt and afflict one another, as this must prevent their being naturally disturb'd with mutual *Fears* and *Jealousies* *; so that *Equality* of Power, which Mr. *Hobbes* supposes all Men to have in Relation to one another, can never possibly occasion them: For *Power* consider'd precisely by itself, is quite incapable of exciting any of our Passions. It is only a *Faculty* whereby we are enabled to put ourselves in Motion, or to direct and imploy the Members of our Body; nor does it ever stir within us, but as it is mov'd and directed by the Passions of the Mind: So that our *Fears*, or our *Hopes*, so far as they depend on the Conduct of other Beings towards us, must be rais'd according to the Nature of those Passions, whereby their Power is exerted and imploy'd. And therefore, there being in the Mind of Man no natural *Disaffections* to his own Species, whereby his Power may be imploy'd to bad Purposes, 'tis impossible that Power, whether equal or superior, can make Mankind, as Mr. *Hobbes* alledges, naturally dread and suspect one another.

Obj. II. But to shew that we have no kind Affections in our Nature that incline us to associate

Mankind can have no kind Dispositions in their Nature

* See Appendix.

Sect. II. sociate together, Mr. *Hobbes* argues further (1),
 That if we lov'd Mankind under the Notion of
 toward their own Species, otherwise we should love all Men
 equally.

This is
 highly ab-
 surd.

If such Things were not so frequent in the
 World, I should think it odd, how a Man's
 Prejudices, in Matters so easy to be compre-
 hended, could have imposed upon him so very
 grossly. Manifest it is, that Man is a Creature
 made up of various Desires, Appetites, or Pas-
 sions, and always finds himself less or more
 happy, according to the Number, or Sort of
 Appetites he has gratify'd, and in Proportion
 to the Measure wherein they are indulg'd. And
 this being the Case with human Nature, must
 not every Man like those of his Fellows best,
 who entertain the greater Number, or the pre-
 vailing Sort of his Appetites, and indulge them
 in the highest and fullest Manner? One should
 think that the Nature of Things cannot well
 suffer it to happen otherwise. But it can no
 more be said that we have no kind Affections
 in our Nature towards our own Species, be-
 cause we thus differently affect Mankind, than
 it can be said that a Man does not *naturally* love
 him.

(1) Nam si homo hominem amaret naturaliter, id est, ut
 hominem, nulla ratio reddi posset, quare unusquisque unum-
 quemque non æque amaret, ut æque hominem; aut cur eos fre-
 quenter potius, in quorum societate ipsi potius quam aliis de-
 ferretur honor & utilitas. Non socios igitur, sed ab illis honore
 vel commodo affici, natura querimus; hæc primario, illos se-
 cundario appetimus. De Civ. Cap. 1.

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himself, because he does not at all Times love himself *equally*; but while he is highly delighted with his own Society, and the Enjoyment of himself in some Instances, he is at other Times strongly bent to run away from himself, was it possible.

Obj. III. 'Tis urged however, *It can never be judged that Mankind associate from any kind Dispositions towards each other; for Experience openly shews that they assemble together with no other View, but either to acquire Honour, or to make Profit: So that we incline to Society, or affect Companions, only secondarily and by Accident, or because we cannot any otherwise meet with Esteem, or find Advantage, which are the Things that we affect and pursue primarily and by an Impulse of Nature.* So far as I can understand Things, it appears to me, that our first Propension to Society springs directly from our viewing of one another under the Notion of Men, or as Individuals of the same Species, whom our *Self-love* immediately prompts us to embrace with kind tender Affections. And our associating together with the Hopes of *Honour* or *Profit*, is so far from disproving this, that nothing, in my Opinion, serves more effectually to establish it; as will appear manifest to every Man that looks a little narrowly into the Nature of our Desire after *Honour* or *Esteem*.

Mankind associate together, not from any kind social Dispositions, but from a natural Desire after Honour or Profit.

I suppose every Body is sensible, that the *Esteem* or *Honour* we are seeking after, does not ly in our selves, but in those Persons of whom

The Desire of Honour is nothing else but the Desire of Companions or of Society.

C

We

Sect. II. we desire it. We always seem to mean in-
 deed (for the most Part very confusedly) that
 it should arise from the Apprehension and Ac-
 knowledgment of some good or valuable Quali-
 ties in us, that excite and awaken it. But, I
 say, as to the *Esteem* itself, it certainly lies in
 the Mind or Affections of other People, who
 bear a kind respectful Sense of our *Worth* and
Merit. And in this Opinion Mr. *Hobbes* goes
 along with the rest of Mankind: *Honour*, says
 he (1), lies not in the Person that is honoured,
 but in him that pays it. So that our desiring of
Honour from our Fellow-men, must necessarily
 signify our desiring to have their Minds and
 Affections influenced with Good-will and Re-
 spect towards us. And this being the natural
 Disposition of all Men, it necessarily follows,
 that all Men, from the Frame of their Nature,
 do mutually desire to enjoy each others kind
 and respectful Affections. And when we far-
 ther consider, that *Society* particularly expresses
 Peoples corresponding together in a mutual In-
 tercourse of kind Affections and Actions, it ap-
 pears convincingly, that all Men do naturally
 desire *Society* one with another: For since it is
 agreed, that *Honour* lies in the friendly Affec-
 tions of intelligent Minds, I cannot conceive
 how a Man can naturally desire *Honour*, and not
 as

(1) Honor non in honorato, sed in honorante est. De
 Civ. Cap. 15. Δὲ καὶ τὸ [τιμὴ] ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἢ
 ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ. Arist. Eth. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.

as naturally desire *Companions*, or to have human Minds conversant with him, in whom the Honour he seeks is lodged, or whose *kind and respectful Affections* towards him, make up the Honour he is wanting.

So that, I say, since Mr. *Hobbes* maintains that every Man naturally desires Honour, he must of Necessity likewise allow, that every Man naturally desires *Society*, or, which is the same Thing, to have human Minds conversant with him under the Influence of benevolent respectful Affections. And since human Minds thus conversant with us, are the only Companions of our own Species we can desire, it is plain that the Desire of Honour, and the Desire of *Companions*, are only different Expressions signifying the same Thing, or the self-same Thing set in different Lights. And therefore Mr. *Hobbes* must talk most absurdly, when he affirms, that we desire Honour *primarily*, or from a Propension of Nature, and *Companions* only *secondarily*, or by Accident.

HERE likewise it is to be remarked, that the Desire of Honour being natural to all Men, this necessarily implies that all Men have naturally a *Good-liking* for one another. For as to the Motions and Affections of other human Minds, considered in any Relation towards us, if either we regarded them with *Indifference*, or *despised* and *contemned* them, or bore them *Ill-will* and *Malice*; 'tis manifest, that, in any of these Cases, we should have no Thought or Desire of any

And it involves in its Nature kind benevolent Affections.

Sect. II. Honour or Esteem from them. For, as I have just now hinted, *Honour* lying in the Mind that pays it, and we desiring it as a *valuable Enjoyment*, which makes us highly *grateful* to ourselves, and raises or declares our *Worth* and *Merit*; 'tis impossible we can either be regardless of, or despise, or hate that Mind from which we seek to receive so much Happiness, or in whose Affections towards us we want to enjoy ourselves in so agreeable and delicate a Manner: On the contrary we must, and do esteem and value that Mind. And every Man in his own Breast is sensible, that the *Honour* he has done him, is, in his own Thoughts, *greater or less* in Proportion to the *Value* he sets upon the Person from whom he receives it. In all which we have Mr. *Hobbes* to agree with us; for he observes (1), That the *Love of Praise or Esteem* prompts People to laudable Actions, such as will be grateful to those Persons whose Judgment or good Opinion we set a Value on: But as for those of our Fellows, whose Persons we despise, we despise likewise their Commendation. So that I say, the Desire of Honour being natural to all Men, this necessarily implies, that all Men have naturally a *Value* and *Good-liking* for each other. And therefore when Mr. *Hobbes*

(1) Amor laudis disponit ad actiones laudabiles, quales p'acitura illis sunt, quorum judicium magnificimus; quorum utem personas, eorum etiam laudes spernimus. Lev. Cap.

affirms, that the Desire of Honour prompts People to associate with one another; 'tis in the main to maintain, inconsistently with himself; that Mankind associate together from mutual Love and Benevolence. Sect. II.

AND thus, in taking a just View of our natural Desire after Esteem, we have, I should think, a full Demonstration, that all Men have a natural Propension to associate together, or that we seek Society one with another, from our being mutually well affected to each other.

NOR does it involve any Thing in Contradiction to this, that we cannot incline to mix among those Persons, whose Measures go cross to our worldly Interests; or that People generally affect those Societies, where they have their external Enjoyments of Life advanced: For, as this cannot at any Rate imply the Want of a mutual Desire after each others Good-liking and Esteem, or a natural kind Propension to each others Society; so, in the present Condition of Humanity, we find this Sort of Conduct absolutely necessary, since that no Man can maintain his Existence, or enjoy any of the Conveniencies of human Life, without a continued Supply of the Necessaries and good Things of this World, which cannot now be acquired unless we keep Commerce with one another. But, I say, Peoples assembling together, each Man with a View to preserve or better his Fortune, can involve nothing in Contradiction to our having natural kind Affections toward

As for the Desire of Profit, or of Riches; we cannot relish or enjoy such Things without Companions.

Sect. II. each other, that give us a powerful Propension
 to meet and keep Company together; nor can
 it ever import we are wanting our Fellow-men,
 only to assist us in our Pursuits after *Profit* or
Riches: For, (1) amidst the greatest Affluence
 of worldly Enjoyments, a Man is quite indis-
 posed to relish any Thing, nor can he find him-
 self happy in all the Entertainments they are
 capable of affording, without he has some *Com-*
panions of his own Species to share with him.
 And this, I should think, makes it pretty e-
 vident that we affect the *Society* of our Fellow-
 men, under some other View, than that of
 their being capable to assist us in acquiring the
 outward

(1) Nec verum est, quod dicitur a quibusdam, propter ne-
 cessitatem vitæ, quod ea quæ natura desideraret, consequi sine
 aliis, atque efficere non possemus, idcirco istam esse cum ho-
 minibus communitatem & societatem; quod si omnia nobis,
 quæ ad victum cultumque pertinent, quasi virgula divina, ut
 aiunt, suppediarentur, tum optimo quisque ingenio, negotiis o-
 mnibus omissis, totum se in cognitione & scientia collocaret.
 Non est ita, nam & solitudinem fugeret, & socium studii qua-
 reret, tum docere, tum discere vellet, tum audire, tum dicere.
 Nor is it true what some People alledge, namely, because
 we cannot otherwise be provided in the *Necessaries of Life*,
 and relieve our natural *Desires and Appetites*, that there-
 fore we associate and unite together; but that if Providence,
 in a miraculous manner, would, without our Care, supply
 us with whatever relates to Food and Raiment, then every
 Man of a fine Genius, laying aside all other Business,
 would give himself wholly up to the Pursuit of Knowledge
 and Wisdom. The Matter is quite otherwise, for even such
 a Man would flee Solitude, and seek to have a Companion
 in his Studies; he would want to teach, and to learn, to
 hear, and to discourse, Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

outward Conveniencies of Life, or that we mutually entertain, one towards another, benevolent kind Dispositions, and affect each others Society, independently of any Regard to the Increase of our yearly Income. Nay, (1) if there be any Man of so savage and monstrous a Temper, that he flies and hates human Converse and Society, yet he will not be able to keep himself from making up to one or other of his own Species, in whose Society he may ease his Heart, and spue up his Gall and Malice. And from this especially one may judge, if it could so happen, that some superior Being snatched us away from the Company of our Fellows, and disposed of us amidst Plenty and Affluence of all Things that Nature desires, only not allowing us the Sight of a Man; who would be so

C 4

hard.

(1) Quinetiam si quis ea asperitate est, & immanitate naturæ, ut congressus & societatem hominum fugiat, atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus; tamen is pati non possit, ut non acquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitalis suæ. Atque hoc maxime judicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos Deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleretur, & in solitudine uspiam collocaret, atque ibi supeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam & copiam, hominis omnino adspiciendi potestatem eriperet; quis tam esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? Verum igitur illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum, nostros senes commemorare audivi, ab aliis senibus auditum: Si quis cælum ascendisset, naturamque mundi, & pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tanquam adminiculum anpnitur. Cic. de Amicit.

Sect. II. *hardned, that he could endure such a Life, and to whom this Solitude would not quite spoil the Enjoyment of all Pleasures? Certain therefore is that, continues Cicero, which I have heard from some old Men, who had it from others of an advanced Age, concerning, as I remember, Archytas of Tarentum, who was wont to say, If a Man should go up to Heaven, and there contemplate the Nature of the World, and the Beauty of the Stars, he would find the Entertainment quite tasteless, which, had he a Companion to whom he might impart it, would prove highly delightful. And thus human Nature is utterly averse to Solitude, and is always inclined towards Society as its Support.*

*It is excited
by Emula-
tion.*

IN short, a Man's wanting or desiring those Things that are now called the Necessaries or Comforts of Life, and in which People generally make their Interest and Happiness to consist, seems plainly to arise from his being mixed with others, among whom there has happened an *Emulation*, and where every one would be well thought of, or perhaps have the Pre-eminence. *For as Bees (1) do not gather into Swarms upon a Design to make their Cells, but Nature leading them*

(1) *Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur, sed, cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt favos; sic homines, ac multo etiam magis, natura congregati, adhibent agendi cogitandique solertiam. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1. Cumque corporis facibus inflammari soleamus ad omnes fere cupiditates, eoque magis incendi, quod iis æmulemur, qui ea habeant, quæ nos habere cupiamus; profecto beati erimus, &c. Id. Tuscul. Q. Lib. 1.*

them to congregate, they work their Combs; so *Sec. II.*
 much rather human Kind being brought together by
 Nature, do imploy their Skill and Industry in con-
 sulting and pursuing their common Interest. And
 however 'tis commonly our bodily Appetites that
 [carry us off from the common Interest, and]
 inflame our Minds into almost all our Passions; yet
 'tis very certain that we pursue them with the
 greater Keenneſs, and to a higher Extent, that we
 emulate thoſe Persons who are poſſeſſed of thoſe
 Things which we wiſh to enjoy. From which it
 ſhould ſeem, that as our Purſuit of Riches is
 ſubſequent to our being associated together; ſo
 our being thus engaged is wholly owing to our
 Deſire after *Eſteem*. And that this is the Prin-
 ciple that excites the World to ſuch Purſuits,
 will be obvious to any one who traces out the
 true Springs of our Actions.

I ſhall allow that every Man naturally deſires ſuch worldly Accommodations as will enable him to live eaſy, without being put to Toil and Labour for his daily Subſiſtence: But after we have got our *Hunger* and *Thiſt* relieved, and have ſecured ourſelves againſt the *Inclemency* of the Weather; (all which may be done at an eaſy Rate: For Nature (1) is ſoon contented, its Riches lie in narrow Bounds, and are eaſily acquired.) Whence comes it to paſs, that in our
 Care

And comes
 originally
 from the
 Deſire of
 Honour.

(1) *Ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta eſt, & parabiles, & terminatas habet. Cic. de Finib. Lib. I.*

Sect. II.

Care about our present Situation in the World, we go beyond our native Desires, whose Gratification is fully sufficient to preserve our Constitution, and to spread a cheerful Health through our Bodies? And that we want some other Enjoyments, that are only the showy Parts of Life, and with Respect to the maintaining of our Existence, the preserving of our Health, and the deriving a sprightly Vigour to our animal Functions, are wholly superfluous? I can hardly think that a Man in *Solitude*, who was never conversant with his own Species, and so never saw such Appearances as are now among Mankind, will ever find himself prompted with an Appetite to have magnificent Palaces, and such other grand Enjoyments, as necessary to the Support and Conveniency of Life: Nor do I see how it is possible that any such Appetite can ever stir in his Nature, while he lives thus solitary. For one should think he can relieve his Hunger without sumptuous Entertainments, and fence himself against the Injuries of the Weather, tho' he neither wears Brocade, nor is lodged in a Palace; and no doubt, he will sleep soundly, tho' his Apartment be not richly furnished: And when he finds himself warm, and his Hunger provided for, he can have no Notion of that costly *Apparatus*, which, as the World goes, attends the gratifying of those Appetites, that are set to guard the Preservation of the Individual. So that I say, from whence comes it to pass, that we go beyond the relieving

ing of our native Desires, and seek to have our selves disposed of in that Situation of Things, which, in the Respects I have mentioned, are wholly superfluous? For my Part, I see nothing in the Frame of our Nature that can be supposed to give Rise to such Pursuits, but our Desire after *Esteem* and *Honour*. And this indeed I take to be the great Spring that powerfully prompts People to the making of Money (1).

Now that Mankind have form'd themselves into *politick Societies*, 'tis universally judged necessary to the preserving of Order in the World, that People be *distinguished* into higher and lower Ranks or Stations, whereby they are severally entitled to suitable Expressions of *Respect* and *Honour*. This, in some Measure, is brought about by some particular *Titles*, and by the publick *Posts* to which some in every Commonwealth must be advanced, for the right Administration of *Church* and *State*. However, since these publick *Characters* only distinguish a few, and set them up to be regarded among one another, and by the other Members of the Society, according to the Nature and Degree of their *Titles* and *Office*; it seems requisite, that some other Standard should be fixed on, according to which others, not thus distinguished, are to be

(1) Αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις αἱ ὁ πόλις διὰ τὴν μὴν εἰν αἰρετά·
 οἱ γὰρ ἔχοντες αὐτὰ, πρῶτος δὲ αὐτῶν βέλονται. Arist. Eth.
 Lib. 4. Cap. 3.

Sect. II. be honour'd. And indeed it could be wished, that the *publick Good* were this common Standard; so as that People should be regarded, in Proportion to their promoting the Interest of the Community: But, however Reason may declare thus much, every Body is sensible it cannot possibly be obtained. By common Consent it has happen'd, that *Riches*, or the outward *Appearances* which they enable People to make in the World, are the common Standard or Rule, whereby we are govern'd in our Expressions of Respect and Reverence one towards another: So that an Estate in civil Society is the Foundation of civil Respect; a stately House, rich Furniture, a good Table, demand Regard to the Owner; and fine Clothes, and handsom Equipage, are Badges we carry about us, whereby we mean to let others know we want they should respect us. And thus we look upon *Riches*, and those Enjoyments of Life they afford to us (that are more than sufficient to derive Health and Vigour to our Bodies) as Means to acquire *Honour*, or as Instruments whereby we lift our selves up to the Respect and Esteem of other People.

INDEED *Socrates* was of Opinion, (1) That the Man is a Fool who values himself upon his *Riches*,

(1) Τὸς δὲ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ ὁρῶντας, καὶ νομιζόντας εἶναι προσ-
δίδαι παιδείας, ἐξαρκίσιν δὲ σφίσιν τὸν πλεονεξίᾳ ὁρῶντας
τὸ διαφραγεῖν τὸ ὅ, πᾶν βέλονται, καὶ πᾶσαι ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀνδρῶπων, ἱερὴν ἀλγὴν, ὅτι μωροὶ μὲν εἰσι, εἰ τις σιγᾷ, καὶ
μαθῶν

Riches, and thinks he needs not cultivate and improve his Mind; for Money will procure him every Thing, and gain him Esteem in the World. But be the Folly of this Conduct what it will, Poverty almost never failed to bring along with it Neglect and Dishonour. Sect. II.

*Nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se,
Quam quod ridiculos homines facit.* —

“ Want is the Scorn of ev’ry wealthy Fool ;

“ And Wit in Rags is turn’d to Ridicule.

Dryd. Juv. Sat. 3.

There is nothing, says Theognis, (1) that crushes a Man more than Poverty; ’tis more grievous than the Infirmities of old Age, or the Burning of a Fever; it puts a Man quite out of Countenance, that he has no Courage either to speak or act; one had better be dead, than live oppressed with it. And therefore People travel Sea and Land, and expose themselves to all Dangers, to avoid it. And so sensible

μαδών, τὰ τε ἀφιλια καὶ τὰ βλαβερά τῶν πραγμάτων δια-
γνώσας. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 4.

(1) Ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν πνίη πάντων δάμνησι μάλιστα,

Καὶ γῆρας πολὺ, Κόρη, καὶ ἡ πάλυ.

Ἦν δὲ χεὶρ φαύροντα καὶ ἐς μαχάτητα πότον
Ρίπην, καὶ πατρῶν. Κύρη, καὶ ἡλιβότων.

Πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πνίη δαδμμένος ἐπὶ πείπῃ,

“Οὐδ’ ἔρξαι δύνατ’ ἡλῶσα ἢ οἱ Νηλεΐ.

Χεὶρ δ’ ὁμῶς ὅππῃ γῆν τε καὶ ἑσθία γῶτα θαλάσσης

Δίξας χαλεπῆς, Κύρη, λύσιν πνίης.

Ταδύναται, φίλα Κύρη, πνιχρῶ βέλτερον ἀνδρὶ,

Ἦ ζῶειν χαλεπῇ πνιέμενον πνίη.

Theog. Sent.

Sect. II. sensible are we that the World will measure our their Regard to us, according to the *Figure* we make in the external Enjoyments of Life; and so excessively fond are we of being respected by our Fellow-men, that in our Houses, Furniture, Table, Clothes, and Equipage, we very often go beyond our Income, and so, at long Run, come to reduce our selves to those Circumstances, wherein we lose that Honour and Respect we are pursuing, and fall under that Neglect and Disgrace we are avoiding, to the Ruin of our selves and Families, and so much to the Hurt and Detriment of the Commonwealth, that civil Governors have found it necessary to enact sumptuary Laws, or Laws against *Excess* in the Use of external Enjoyments.

And is
wholly regulated by that
Passion.

NAY, so much is our Desire after the outward Accommodations of Life, regulated by our Desire after *Esteem*, that a Man will renounce all Entertainments whatsoever, even those that are necessary to maintain his Existence, and chuse to abandon Life it self, rather than *forfeit* the Esteem of his Fellows, and live an Object of universal Contempt and Derision. And from this, methinks, one may well be assured, that if our exceeding such a particular Standard in our Estates, or in the sensible Figure we make among Mankind, laid us open to Neglect and Contempt, we would carefully stop, every Man at that *Extent* of Fortune, and appear in that outward Equipage, which should entitle us

to Respect, and beyond which we could meet with nothing but Contempt and Infamy. And of this we have daily Proof from the *Humour* that universally prevails among People, to change and vary their Dress, and whatever belongs to one's external Situation, in Compliance with the *Mode*, and in order to appear *fashionable*.

So that, upon the whole Matter *, it would seem manifest that we pursue *Riches*, or the showy Parts of Life, from a Desire after *Esteem* and *Honour*; and that if we did not find these Things to serve as an Engine, whereby one raises himself to Respect and Reverence in the World, we would never undergo the Trouble of pursuing them, nor imploy any of our Fellow-men as Tools to acquire them.

AND since I have already shewn, that the Desire of *Esteem* coincides, or is the same with the Desire of *Companions*, to whom we stand well affected; it necessarily follows, that we desire *Riches* only by Accident, while we desire *Companions* or *Society* from a Propension of Nature.

So that even the Desire of Profit proves Man-kind to be social Creatures, and that, in the Frame of their Nature, they are kindly affected one towards another.

So far therefore is the Pursuit of *Riches* from implying the *Want* of kind Affections towards our own Species, that it intimates the clean contrary, and seems originally to flow from them. And beyond Question, so long as Men have inherent to their Nature, a Desire after the *Esteem* of their Fellows (which Mr. *Hobbes* easily allows we must always have) we shall have our Minds naturally moved and influenc'd with

* See Appendix.

SECT. III. with kind Affections towards each other, and a friendly Disposition to associate together.

S E C T. III.

'Tis not the bare living among others we desire only.

BUT how much soever all Men may naturally agree and conspire together in their mutual Desires and Appetites for each others Society (1); yet it is not the bare living among our Fellow-men, that will content us, and make us easy (2). The human Nature is quite different from that of brute Creatures: So that we cannot, like them, be satisfied with feeding together, as it were, in the same Pasture: But we want to communicate or correspond together in a mutual Inter-
course

(1) οὕτω τ' ἐνυτάρχειν ἴσους [ἢ φιλία] πρὸς τὸ γεννημένον τῷ γενέσασθαι, καὶ ἔμμενον ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀρνέοις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοιοῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὃ δὲν τὰς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινεῖται. ἴδοι δ' ἂν πῶς καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάταις, ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων καὶ φίλον. It should seem, that every animate Being has naturally kind Affections towards its Offspring; for this is manifestly the Case not only among Men, but among Birds, and most Part of Animals. Nay, all the Individuals of the same Species do likewise naturally affect one another; and this particularly seems to be an Ingredient in the human Constitution; so that we highly commend those Persons that are Lovers of Mankind. And one may plainly see in Peoples Conduct toward each other, when they happen to meet from Home, or in foreign Countries, how that all Men are naturally Friends and Companions to one another. Arist. Eth. Lib. 8. C. 1.

(2) Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὅς τις ἐξαιρέται ἐρμίας, ἀλλὰ πῶς αἰσθημένος, καὶ ὁφελίμην. For 'tis not the bare Sight of a Man that

course of Thoughts, Affections, and Actions (1), for which the great Former of our Nature has fully qualified us, by enduing us with the amazing and useful Faculty of Speech. Nor is it every whatever Sort of Affections and Actions, that can make us relish human Society (2). For as a Man can have no Pleasure amidst the greatest Affluence of worldly Enjoy-

D

ments,

that frees us from the Uneasiness of Solitude; 'tis the Society of a Man who is faithful, mild and beneficent. Arian. Lib. 3. Cap. 13.

(1) — Συνοικισσάμεθα ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὅτι. τῷ τῷ δὲ μοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συνῶν. καὶ κοινωνεῖν λεγόντων καὶ διασώας. ἴταρ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν τὸ συζῆναι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λεγέσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ὡς ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων, τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἵμεσθαι. Arist. Eth. Lib. 9. Cap. 9.

(2) Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ζῶον, πάσης μελίτης καὶ παντὸς ἀρχαίου ζῶου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. ὅθεν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μέτρηται ἢ φύσει ποιεῖ. λέγει δὲ μόνον ἀνθρώπος ἔχει τὴν ζῶον. ἢ μὲν ἐν σὸν, τὸ ἢ ΝΟ, καὶ λυτῆς ἐστὶ σημεῖον. διδ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς πέρχεται ζῶοις. μέλει γὰρ τῷ τῷ ἢ φύσει αὐτῶν ἐλλήλουν, ὡς. αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ λυτῆς καὶ ἢ ΝΟ, καὶ ταῦτα σημεῖον ἀλλήλοις. ὁ δὲ λέγει ἐπὶ τῷ δῆλον ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν ὡς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον. τῷ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔχειν. ἢ δὲ τῶν κοινωνία, ποιεῖ δικαίαν καὶ πόλιν. 'Tis plain that Man, much rather than Bees, or any other Species of Creatures that congregate together, is naturally form'd to Society; for Nature, as we say, makes nothing in vain; and, of all Animals, Man alone is endued with Speech. Indeed a Voice serves to express Pleasure and Pain; and other Animals being made susceptible of these Sensations, they are likewise thus far enabled to signify them to one another. But Speech and Reason serve to explain what is profitable and hurtful, good and evil, just and unjust, which Man alone is capable of distinguishing: And in the Communication of these Things consists human Society. Arist. Polit. Lib. 1.

SECT. III. ments, except these Things be adapted to his *Taste* and Appetite; so there is no Man that can enjoy himself among whatever Number of his own Kind, unless they and he, in their *Affections* and *Actions*, mutually *correspond* and agree to each other. This, I suppose, is what has ever been agreeable to the universal Experience of Mankind. And indeed our Pleasure or Happiness of any Sort, flowing from the Fitness and Agreement that any particular Object bears to our Taste of Things, or to these Desires whereby we are actuated, 'tis impossible in Nature it can be otherwise.

So that ere a Man can be happy in Society with other People, their *Behaviour* towards him must necessarily correspond to his Taste, and be *grateful* to those Appetites wherewith he is inspired.

AND all Men, according to the original Frame of human Nature, being absolutely govern'd by *Self-love*, we must necessarily entertain a *Value* and *Good-liking* for ourselves, and as necessarily pursue the Gratification of this Principle; bearing always an invincible *Aversion* to all such Instances of any Man's Conduct towards us, as do not conspire and agree with it (1).

Nor

(1) φύσις δ' αὕτη παντός, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐ γὰρ τὸ κακόν· τὸν ἀραιοῦμεν θατέρω, καὶ πειβάλλοντα τῷ ἰκανίῳ, τῶτον ἡμεῖς πολέμων, ἐπιβέλον, καὶ ἀδελφός ἢ καὶ υἱός καὶ πατήρ· τὴν δὲ ἀγαθὴν συγγένεσσι εὐδιν. 'Tis the Nature of every Being to pursue its own Happiness, and to avoid Misery.

Nor is there any Thing that can suit or corre Sect. III.
spond with this natural Taste or Turn of our Mind, but such a Deportment in others, as expresseth their Love, their Good-liking, and Esteem of us (1): For very manifestly, in all other Instances of their Behaviour, there is a plain Dissonance and Contrariety, which one cannot but find very uneasy and offensive. Certain it is that Hatred, Contempt, and Neglect, and such like, are directly contrary to this Good-liking, which every Man cannot but have for himself (2), and are as opposite and hurtful to our Self-love, or our social Appetite, that flows from it, as Wormwood or Gall itself is to an exquisite Palate. For while Love and Friendship not only faithfully nourish and maintain, but effect

D 2

and

Misery. And whoever interferences with us in the Pursuits and Aversions, let him be Brother, Son, or Father, we look upon him as our Enemy; for there is nothing so dear to us as our Happiness. Arian. Lib. 4. Cap. 5.

(1) Ος δ' ἐν φιλήται δῆμι ὑπὸ πῶν, ἡδὼς μὲν τῶτον οὐ φιλήντες παρὲντα ὁρῶσιν, ἡδὼς δ' ἢ ποῦσι, ποδῶσι δ' ἂν περ ἀπὺ, ἡδὼς δ' ἂν πάλιν προσόντα λήγονται, συνήδοντα δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶς, συνεπιχερῶσι δ' ἂν πσφαλλόμενον ὁρῶν.
We are glad to see the Man whom we love, we delight in promoting his Happiness, we miss him when he is absent, and when he returns we most kindly receive him; we rejoice with him in his Prosperity; and when any Misfortune befalls him, we assist him towards his Relief and Recovery. Xenoph. de Regn.

(2) Οὐδεὶς ἀγαπῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀμελεῖδ' ἑδὼς.

Τιμωμένοι δ' πάντες ἑδόνται βεγδοί.

There is no Man who has any Touches of Self-love, that cares to be neglected. For every Mortal is delighted with Honour. Menand.

Sec. III. and procure Pleasure and Happiness both to a Man's self and to his Friends, which one enjoys not only at present, but cheerfully hopes to continue in for the future. People's Hatred, their Envy, Contempt, and Neglect, are quite inconsistent with one's Safety and Well-being (1). So that as a Man who lives in Society, cannot but, from the Love he bears to himself, heartily hate all contemptuous Treatment, and necessarily shun having any Commerce with those Persons that deal with him in this Manner; so, from the same Principle, he cannot but passionately desire the Esteem and good Opinion of those People among whom he is mixed, as that which is absolutely necessary to render his social Life easy and comfortable, and without which all other Enjoyments can minister to him no Satisfaction. For, in the Name of Wonder! who is the Man, says Tully, that would accept to swim amidst all Plenty, to live in the Affluence of all Enjoyments, provided that he should love no Body, and that no Body should love him (2)?

AND

(1) *Atque ut odia, invidiæ, despicationes, adversantur voluptatibus; sic amicitia, non modo faultrices fidelissimæ, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum presentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteræ temporis. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 1.*

(2) *Nam quis est, prohi Deum fidem atque hominum, qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam, nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis, atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Cic. de Amicit.*

AND as the Desire of being well lik'd and esteem'd by those Persons with whom we live and entertain a social Correspondence, flows necessarily from the inward Make and Constitution of human Nature: So, if we will examine into the Conduct of all Sorts and Ranks of Men in the World, we shall find it undeniably true in *Fact*, that the Desire of *Esteem*, or of being regarded, is an Appetite that universally prevails over all Mankind; for where is the Man that likes Disgrace and Infamy, and sets no Value on the good Opinion of others? There are indeed some who condemn this Principle, and would have us to believe, that they are by no Means under its Influence. But, from what I have said, it appears, they must first divest themselves of human Nature, and of all its most essential Principles, before they can possibly get rid of it; for it is nothing but Self-love exerting it self. Besides that, when a Man goes about to propose Arguments to the World against this Principle, or is taking any Course whatsoever, to express his Dislike to, or Contempt of it, 'tis a shrewd Evidence of his being thereby strongly actuated (1). And in particular

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ticular

(1) *Quonquam non habeo propositum illum reprehendendi, sed huic tuendi — meo quidem judicio neuter culpandus, quorum uterque ad gloriam, pari cupiditate, diverso itinere contendit, alter dum expetit debitos titulos, alter dum mavult videri contempsisse. In the mean while, I have no Intention to condemn the former, but to defend the latter*

This is plain, not only from the Nature of Things, but from universal Experience.

Sect. III. Particular 'tis justly observed by *Cicero*, That those very *Philosophers*, even in those Books they write concerning the Contempt of Glory, do inscribe and publish their Names; whereby, at the very Time that they pretend to despise Fame and Renown, they propose to have themselves celebrated (1).

Nor do we incline to have social Correspondence with those Beings, whose Love and Esteem we neglect and despise.

Thus, I think, it is manifest, that with our natural Desire of Society, (which directly springs from our natural Principle of Self-love) there is necessarily connected a natural Desire of Esteem, or of being lik'd and regarded by those other rational Agents, among whom we are mixed, or with whom we chuse to have any Sort of social Intercourse. And it is very certain, that whatever particular Persons or Beings there are, whose Good-liking and Commendation we do not care for, or desire, these are not the Companions with whom we incline to live, or to have any social Correspondence. For, according to what I have hinted above, it is much more impossible for the Desire of Esteem to be separated from the Desire of Society, than for the

ter — and indeed in my Opinion neither of them ought to be blam'd, for that both, with equal Passion, in a different Manner, sought after Glory: The one by claiming the Honours he deserv'd; and the other by chusing rather to put on the Appearance of despising them. *Plin.* L. 9. Epist. 19.

(1) *Ipsi illi philosophi, etiam in illis libellis quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt: in eo ipso in quo prædicationem nobilitatemque despiciunt, prædicari se ac nominari volunt. Cic. pro Archia.*

the Light and Heat of the Sun to be parted from one another. And I am very confident, that every Man will have full Conviction of this in his own Breast, if he reflects how he stands affected to those Persons whose good Opinion he neglects and undervalues. Though, in the mean Time, I cannot but here take Notice, that whatever Master has no Manner of Concern for what Opinion his Servants and Dependents have of him, or what they may say and talk about him, he thereby certainly betrays that he does not own or consider them as Members of a rational Society, whereof he himself makes One; but that, to the Reproach of his own Nature, he looks upon them no otherwise than he does on his *Horses*, or other brute Animals he may have about his House (1). It ought

D. 4.

how.

(1) *Libenter ex his qui ad te veniunt cognovi, familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere; hoc prudentiam tuam, hoc eruditionem decet. Servi sunt? immo homines. Servi sunt? immo contubernales. Servi sunt? immo humiles amici. Servi sunt? immo conservi, si cogitaveris tantundem in utrosque licere fortunæ. Itaque video istos qui, &c. Alia interim crudelia & inhumana prætereo, quod nec tanquam hominibus quidem, sed tanquam jumentis abutimur.* I was glad to hear from those who frequent your House, that you live in so easy a Manner with your Servants. Such a Conduct well becomes a Person of your Prudence and Learning. Are they Servants? Nay, they are Men. Are they Servants? Nay, they are Companions. Are they Servants? Nay, they are Friends of a lower Rank. Servants are they? Nay, they are Fellow-servants, if you reflect that Providence has Power equal

SECT. IV. however to be observed, that one should certainly have a Reverence towards all Men, of what Quality or Rank soever; for to be regardless of what People say of us, is the Character of a Man not only arrogant, but altogether dissolute (1).

'Tis propos'd to consider the Wideness and Extent of that Society to which we naturally belong.

THIS, I say therefore, is very certain, with whomsoever we are engaged in any social Correspondence, we cannot but desire to have their Esteem and Good-liking, as necessary to our Well-being in their Society: So that when we consider the *Wideness* and Extent of that Society to which we belong, and whereof we cannot but own ourselves Members, we shall thereby understand how far this Appetite, or Desire of Esteem, ought to spread and stretch itself.

S E C T. IV.

We are naturally associated to all our own Species.

AND as the World is now situated, we find all Mankind to be distributed into a great many Communities, that are not indeed intirely separated, and absolutely independent of one another, but that, in many Instances, are mutually knit together, and keep Commerce with one another,

ly over you all. So that I see those People, who, &c. I forbear to mention other Pieces of Cruelty and Inhumanity, wherein we treat them not indeed as Men, but as Beasts of Burden. Senec. Epist. 47.

(1) Adhibenda est igitur quædam reverentia adversus homines, & optimi cujusque & reliquorum: nam negligere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1,

Original of Moral Virtue.

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Sect. IV.


nother, and are only distinguished from each other by their particular Governments, and some particular Customs and Usages. And as to all the particular Individuals that make up those distinct Communities, I do not see a more rational Account that can be given of their Original, than by supposing them to have sprung from one Family, which, by branching out into other Families, that were likewise still spreading themselves by a continued Intercourse of Matches, grew up at length thus, by Degrees, into great Numbers of the *same Blood* and Kindred; and so, in Time, came to form large Cities and Commonwealths: From which again Colonies going off, these erected other Communities, and by this Means came to be *diffused* all over the World. So that, at this Rate, *all Nations of Men that dwell on the Face of the Earth are of one Blood*, and so are linked with one another by natural Ties and Relations (1). And indeed, there is so near a Resemblance of one Man to another, both in the Make and Structure of his Body,
and

(1) Prima societas in ipso est conjugio, proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis, & quasi seminarium reipublicæ. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum, sobrinorum, quæ cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos, tanquam in colonias, exeunt. Sequuntur connubia & affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quæ propagatio & soboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem conjunctio, & benevolentia devincit caritate homines. *Human Society begins in one married Couple; it branches*

out

Sect. IV. and in all the Powers and Faculties of his Mind; and there is so irresistible a Propension that all Men are under to associate themselves with one another, that one cannot help looking upon all Men as having come originally from the same common Parents, and to be *Brothers* to one another (1).

BE-

out in Children, and becomes one Family, where all Things are common. This is the Original of a City, and, as it were, the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The Relation of Brothers comes next, and then of Brothers and Sisters Children; who, when they are too many for one House, are transplanted into others, as into Colonies. Upon this follow Matches and Alliances that produce an Increase of Kindred; which, continuing to be multiplied, give Rise to Commonwealths. And there is no Doubt but the Relation of Blood, and the Kindness that springs from it, must endear Men to one another. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(1) Sed omnium, quæ in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto præstabilius, quam plane intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos; neque opinione, sed natura constitutum esse jus. Id jam patebit, si hominum inter ipsos societatem conjunctionemque perspexeris: nihil est enim unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus. Quod si depravatio consuetudinum, si opinionum vanitas non imbecillitatem animorum torqueret, & flecteret quocunque cœpisset, sui nemo ipse tam similis esset, quam omnes sunt omnium. Itaque quæcunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet: quod argumenti satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere; quæ si esset, non una omnes definitio contineret. Etenim ratio, qua una præstamus belluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refellimus, differimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus, certe est communis, doctrina differens, discendi quidem facultate par. Nam & sensibus eadem omnia comprehenduntur, & ea quæ movent sen-

BESIDES that, we all live upon the same little *Globe*, at a Distance, as it were, from the rest of the

Sect. IV.



sus, itidem movent omnium: quæque in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, inchoatæ intelligentiæ, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur: interpresque est mentis oratio, verbis discrepans, sententiis congruens. Nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus, ad virtutem pervenire non possit. Nec solum in rectis, sed etiam in pravis actibus insignis est humani generis similitudo. Nam & voluptate capiuntur omnes, quæ etiâ est illecebra turpitudinis, tamen habet quiddam naturalis boni; lenitatis est enim & suavitatis: id enim, ut suavitate delectans, sic ab errore mentis, tanquam salutare aliquid, asciscitur. Similique inscitia mors fugitur, quasi dissolutio naturæ; vita expetitur, quia nos in quo nati sumus, continet; dolor in maximis malis ducitur, cum sua asperitate, tum quod naturæ interitus videtur sequi. Propter quam honestatis & gloriæ similitudinem, beati, qui honorati sunt, videntur; miseri autem, qui inglorii. Molestiæ, lætitiæ, cupiditates, timores, similiter omnium mentes pervagantur: nec si opiniones aliæ sunt apud alios, idcirco, qui canem & fœlem, ut deos, colunt, non eadem superstitione, qua cæteræ gentes, conflictantur. Quæ autem natio, non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum, & beneficii memorem diligit? quæ superbos, quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos non aspernatur, non odit? Quibus ex rebus cum omne genus hominum sociatum inter se esse intelligatur, illud extremum est, quod recte vivendi ratio meliores efficit. *But of all the Subjects that have been handled by learned Men, there is no one of greater Value and Consequence, than that wherein they give us to understand that we are naturally form'd to Virtue; and that Justice or Virtue itself is founded, not in Opinion, but in Nature. And the Truth of this will appear, if you consider the Society and Union there is among Mankind: For there are not two Things that are more like, or that more nearly match each other, than we all do one another. And were it not for the Depravity of our Customs, and the Vanity of our Opinions, that prevail over the Weakness of our Minds, and distort us, and carry us*

dis.

Sect. IV. the Creation; we have all, less or more, the same Conveniencies and Comforts of Life, and are all incident to the same Troubles and Miseries

different Ways; there is not one Man that would be more like himself, than all Men are like one another. From hence it is, that the Definition of Man equally agrees to every Individuall: Which is a plain Proof, that there is no Difference in the Kind; for otherwise the same Definition would not include us all. Thus Reason, which is our great Excellency above brute Creatures, whereby we wisely forecast Things, we examine and canvass an Argument, we expose and refute Error, we explain and establish Truth, and bring Things to a Conclusion, is certainly a common Principle, and however different in its Improvements, is yet the same as to its Original. Thus likewise, all the same Things fall under our Senses; so that whatever affects the Senses of any one Individual, affects likewise the Senses of the whole Species. And as for those first Notices of Things, which, as I have before hinted, are imprinted in our Minds, they are equally imprinted in the Minds of all Men. And Language is every where the Interpreter of our Thoughts, different, I confess, in Words, but agreeing always in Sense. Nor is there any Man, of whatever Nation, that follows the Conduct of Nature, who may not arrive at Virtue. But there is a wonderful Likeness among Mankind, not only in relation to Things worthy and laudable, but even with respect to our Weaknesses: For all Men have a quick Sense of bodily Pleasure; and though we are thereby betray'd into Vice, yet it has some natural Good in it; for being pleasing and delightful, we therefore embrace it, through a Mistake of the Mind, as something solid and substantial. By a common Mistake too, Death is avoided, as if it were the Extinction of our Being; Life is desir'd and supported, because it keeps us in our present Existence; and Pain is reckon'd among the greatest Evils, both on account of the Smarting it has in it, and because it seems to threaten our Dissolution. And for-
as

ries (1). We are all governed and kept together by the same fundamental Rules and Principles, in our several distinct Communities (2), that have likewise, from one to another, a continued Correspondence through the whole World: So that all Men having so many Things in common, and particularly, thus nearly resembling one

asmuch as Glory bears a certain Likeness to Virtue, therefore those Persons are esteem'd happy, who are honoured; and such as are involv'd in Contempt and Reproach, are counted miserable. Thus likewise, Sorrow, Joy, Hope, Fear, have an universal Influence over the Minds of all Men; and however People may differ in their Opinions, yet this does not binder those who worship a Dog, and a Cat, as Deities, from being over-run with the same Superstition that prevails in other Parts of the World. At the same Time, what Nation is there that does not kindly affect and value Gentleness, Benignity, a grateful Mind, and one who remembers the Favours that are done him? Where is the Nation that does not despise and hate the Proud, the Malicious, the Cruel, the Ingrate? Since from all this we understand that the whole human Species are united and associated together, I shall only further observe, that a right Scheme of Life improves us, and makes us better. Cic. de Legib. Lib. 1.

(1) Οὐκ ἔν ἡ τοῦ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία συνδέει. One having the same common Joys and Sorrows knits and unites us to one another. Plat. de Rep. Lib. 5.

(2) Δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν, ἢ στρατόπεδον, ἢ λῆσταις, ἢ κλέπταις, ἢ ἄλλοις πᾶσι, δουλοῦν ὅτι πᾶσι ἔρχεται ἀδικία, πλεονέχει δὲ πᾶσι, καὶ ἀδικοῦν ἀλλήλους; Do you imagine that either a State, or an Army, or even a Gang of Robbers and Thieves, or any other Band of Men that combine together to do Mischief, will be able to perform any Thing, if they prove unjust to one another, and do not observe the Rules of Virtue and Righteousness? Plat. de Rep. Lib. 1.

Sect. IV. one another (1), and strongly affecting each others Society; and there being no Man, who stands not, in a Sort, actually connected to the rest of Mankind, by Means of that Correspondence, which, from one Man, and from one Nation to another, is propagated all over the inhabited Earth, every Man ought to consider himself as a Citizen of the World, or as a Member of that great Community that comprehends all Mankind (2).

And to
God the
great Head
of the hu-
man Socie-
ty.

BUT we have here farther to observe; This great human Society that is spread through the World,

(1) Ἡγούμεαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκεῖς, καὶ πολῖτας πάντας εἶναι φύσει ἢ νόμῳ. τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν. For my Part, I look upon you all to be Kinsmen, Friends, and Citizens, not indeed by civil Law, but by Nature; for all Things of a like and common Nature, are ally'd and of Kin to one another. Id. in Protag.

(2) Socrates quidem cum rogaretur cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit; totius enim mundi se incolam & civem arbitrabatur. When Socrates was ask'd of what Country he was, he answered, Of the World; for he judg'd himself an Inhabitant and a Citizen of the whole World. Cic. Tusc. Q. Lib. 1. Τί ἄλλο ἀπελεύπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τὸ τῷ Σωκράτει, ὑπερῶς τοῦ πυνδύμενον ποταμὸς εἶναι, εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος, ἀλλ' ὅτι κόσμιος. And what else should People do, but follow the Example of Socrates, and answer, when one is ask'd of what Country he is, not that he is of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the World? Arian. L. 1. C. 9. Ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ. πῶς καὶ πατεῖς, ὡς ἔφυ' Ἀντωνίνῳ μοι ἢ Ρώμῳ, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ κόσμος. As for my Nature, it is rational and social; so that however my Town and Country, as I am Antoninus, is Rome, yet as I am a Man, it is the World. M. Ant. Lib. 6. § 44.

World, is not independent, but in the whole, Sect. IV: and in all its particular Parts, is under the Government of one supreme *Head* and *Sovereign*. For as all Men did at first derive their Existence from *God* (1); so do we all continue to live under the Care and Protection of the same eternal Being, who cannot be suppos'd to neglect any of those Works he has made, and which he has dispos'd and put together with so much Wisdom and Contrivance; but especially must be conceived, as the great *Parent* of *Mankind*, to take a particular Care of us his Offspring and *Children*, and to superintend and direct all our Affairs and Concernments, according to his infinite *Wisdom* and *Goodness* (2).

AND

(1) Ζῷα δὲ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ, ὅσα τ' ὄντι γῆς ἐκ σπερματικῆς καὶ ῥιζῶν ἐνέεται, καὶ ὅσα ἀψυχα ἐν γῇ ἐνίσταται σώματα περὶ καὶ ἀπηκτὰ, μὴν ἄλλοι πιδί ἢ διὰ δυνάμειν ὅσων ἐστὶν γένεσις, ὅσων ἐκ ὄντος; As for all Animals that are mortal, and all Vegetables whatsoever, that spring from Seeds and Roots, and all lifeless Bodies upon Earth, whether Minerals, or whatever other Sort; shall we say that by any other Power than that of God the Creator, they were in Time fetch'd into Being, when at first they were not? Plat. in Sophist.

(2) Τὸ δ' ἔμοι δοκεῖ πρὸ λέγειν, τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπων τὰς ἀντιλήψεις, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὰς ἀνθρώπων ἐν τῇ κτηματικῇ τῇς θεοῦ εἶναι. This, in my Opinion, is a fine Observation. God is the Being who takes Care for us, and we Men are among his Possessions. Id. in Phæd. Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a diis confuli & provideri solet. Licet enim contrahere universalitatem generis humani, eamque gradatim ad pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos. Nam si omnibus hominibus, qui ubique sunt, quacunq; in ora ac parte terrarum, ab hujusce terræ, quam

SECT. IV. And indeed, to instance in nothing else, the diurnal and annual *Motions*, whether of Earth or Sun, that produce these steady uniform *Revolutions* of Day and Night, Spring-time and Harvest, Summer and Winter, whereby we are all bountifully provided of the *Necessaries* and

quam nos incolimus, continuatione distantium deos consulere censemus, ob eas causas quas ante diximus: his quoque hominibus consulunt, qui has nobiscum terras ab oriente ad occidentem colunt. Sin autem his consulunt, qui quasi magnam quandam insulam incolunt, quam nos orbem terræ vocamus; etiam illis consulunt, qui partes ejus insulæ tenent, Europam, Asiam, Africam. Ergo & earum partes diligunt, ut Romam, Athenas, Spartam, Rhodam: & earum urbium separatim ab universis singulos diligunt, ut Pyrrhi bello Curium, &c. *Nor indeed does God in his Providence only concern himself with the human Race in general; but he likewise takes Care of the Individuals. For we may contract the whole Body of Mankind, and by Degrees bring them into small Parcels, and come at last to particular Persons. And if for the Reasons before mentioned, we are assur'd that God is concern'd in all Men every where, in whatever Part of the World, and at any continued Distance from this Spot of Earth which we inhabit: He has likewise a Concern for those, who, together with us, inhabit these Parts that lie from East to West. So that if God interests himself in whatever relates to those Men, who live, as it were, in a great Island, which we call the World; he likewise takes Care for those who possess the several Parts thereof, Europe, Asia, and Africa. And, by the same Reasoning, he also looks after the smaller Parts of these Divisions, as Rome, Athens, Sparta, Rhodes. And besides his being concerned with the publick Affairs of these several Communities; he further condescends to interest himself separately in their particular Members, such as Curius in the War with Pyrrhus, &c. Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. 3.*

and Comforts of Life, are convincing Evidences Sect. IV.
 of a kind and powerful *Providence*, which is
 imploy'd about this large Community of Man
 kind, and all the several Individuals whereof
 it is constituted (1).

“ But, says *Socrates* to *Euthydemus* (2), did
 “ you never bethink yourself and reflect, with
 E “ what

(1) Cum videmus vicissitudines dierum atque noctium, commutationesque temporum quadripartitas, ad maturitatem frugum, & ad temperationem corporum aptas, eorumque omnium moderatorem & ducem Solem, &c. Hæc igitur & alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt, ut Platonem videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis, & muneris? *When we see the Vicissitudes of Day and Night, and the Revolutions of the four Seasons of the Year, that are fitted to the ripening of Fruits, and the tempering of Bodies; the Sun also that moderates and directs the whole, &c. When we see these and innumerable other Things, can we doubt but they are under the Government of some great Being, who either made them, if they were brought forth in Time, as Plato thinks; or, if they were from Eternity, as Aristotle imagines, who superintends the mighty Fabrick?* Id. in *Tuscul. Q. Lib. 1.*

(2) Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἦν ποτὶ σοὶ ἐπιδὼν ἀνδρῶν μὴ θῆναι ὡς ἐπιμαλὲς οἱ θεοὶ ἀνδράποισι νοῦται χερσικωδῆσαι; καὶ ὅς μὲν τὸν Διὸς, ἔφη, ἔκ τῆς γῆς. ἀλλ' εἰδὼς γ', ἔφη, ὅτι πρῶτος μὲν φῶτος ἐβόησεν, ὃ ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ παρέχουσιν; καὶ Διὸς, ἔφη, ὃ γ' εἰ μὴ ἔρχομεν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς τυφλοῖς εἴημεν, ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ὁφθαλμῶν. ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀναπνεύσας καὶ διομένους ἡμῖν νύκτα παρέχουσιν, ἡμέρας ἀναπνεύσειον. πάλιν δ', ἔφη, καὶ ὅτε χάριτος ἀξίον. ἔκον καὶ ἐπιδὼν ὁ μὲν ἡλιος ὥς τινας ὡς τὰς τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμῶν, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα σφηνίζει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, διὰ τὸ σκοπεῖν ἔχει, ἀσπερίσας ἔστιν, ἄσπερος δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνέσταναι, καὶ ἡμῖν τὰς ὥρας τῆς νυκτὸς ἐμφανίζει, καὶ διὰ τὸτο πολλὰ ὡς δόμοισι πρὸς τὸν νοῦν. εἰς ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡγέσθην ὅτι μόνον τῆς νυκτὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τὰ μέγα φανερὰ ἡμῶν ποιεῖ, αὐτοματῶς

Sect. IV. " what exact Care God hath provided us of all
 " Things that are requisite to the Support and
 " Conveniency of Life?—Never I, says Eu-
 " thydemus.—Why, you surely know that, first
 " of all, we need Light, which God hath af-
 forded

πάντων ἐν, ἴση. πὶ δὲ, ἐπὶ τερφῆς δόμιδα, ταύτην ἡμῶν ἐκ
 τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδέναι, καὶ ὅρας ἀρμαθῆσαι πρὸς τὸτο παρέχων, αἱ
 ἡμῶν ἡ μόνον ὦν δόμιδα πολλὰ καὶ παντῶς παρὰσκυαζον,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱς ὑπερβαίνοντα; πάνυ, ἴση, καὶ ταῦτα φιλεῖνδρωπα.
 τὸ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἡμῶν παρέχον ὅτω πολλὰ ἀξίον, ὥς καὶ φυτεύον
 πὶ καὶ συναυξάνει τῇ γῇ καὶ ταῖς ὅραις πάντα τὰ χηρίσμα ἡμῶν,
 συντρέφον δὲ καὶ αὐτὲς ἡμᾶς, καὶ μὴ γινώσκον πῶς τοῖς σφίσι
 ἡμᾶς, ὑπερβαίνοντα; τι, καὶ ὡφελιμώτερα, καὶ ἡδῶ ποιῶν αὐτά.
 καὶ ἐπιθεῖν πλείονος δόμιδα τῶν, ἀφρονέστων αὐτὸ παρέχον
 ἡμῶν; καὶ τὸτο, ἴση, περιουσιάζον. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ ποιεῖσαι ἡμῶν
 ὁπότερον μὲν ψυχῆς, ὁπότερον δὲ σκότους, συνεργῶν δὲ πρὸς
 πᾶσαν τέχνην, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ὡφελίμα ἐνεκα ἀνθρώπων κα-
 τασκευάζονται, ὥς ὅδε συνελθόντι ἐπιτεῖν, ἐδὲν ἀξίολογον ὡς πρὸς
 ἀνθρώπων πῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον χηρίσμων κατασκευάζονται. ὁπ-
 ράλλει, ἴση, καὶ τὸτο φιλεῖνδρωπα. τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπιθεῖν ἐν
 χημῶνι σφάπτει, σφαιρῶναι τὰ μὲν ἀδρύνοντα, τὰ δὲ ξη-
 ραίνοντα, ὅτ' ἡμεῖς διελήλυθον καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένους
 μηκέτι ἐγγυτέρω σφαιρῶναι, ἀλλ' ἀποσφαιρῶναι, σφαιρῶναι μὲν
 πὶ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ δόμιδος θερμαίνον βλάψῃ καὶ ὅταν αὖ πάλιν
 ἀπὸ τῶν γίνηται, ἔνθα καὶ ἡμῶν ὅλγον ἐστὶν ὅτ' ἐπὶ σφαιρῶν αἱ πῶν,
 ἀποπαρῆσθαι ὅτ' ὅτ' ψυχῆς, πάλιν αὖ σφαιρῶναι καὶ περισφαιρῶν,
 καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔσθ' ἀνασφαιρῶναι ἔνθα ὡν μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ὡφελόν;
 οὐδὲ τὸν Δι', ἴση, καὶ ταῦτα παντῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκα
 γινώσκοντα. τὸ δὲ αὖ, ἐπιθεῖν καὶ τὸτο φανερόν, ὅτ' ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ γ-
 νοίμην ὅτ' τὸ καὶ ὅτ' ψυχῆς, ἐπὶ ἐξ ἀπὸ γίνονται, ὅτ' ὡν μὲν
 κατὰ μικρὸν σφαιρῶναι τὸν ἥλιον, ὅτ' ὡν κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπὸναι ὅτ'
 λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς οἱς ἐκάστης τὰ ἰσχυρότατα κατασκευάζον; ἐγὼ μὲν,
 ἴση, ὁ Εὐδοκίμης, ἡ δὲ τὸτο σκοπῶν, ἐπὶ ὅτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς Διοῖς ἔργον,
 ἡ ἀνθρώπων σφαιρῶναι ἐκείνο δὲ μόνον ἐμποδίζει με, ὅτ' καὶ
 πᾶσα ὅσα τῶν μὴ γινώσκον. ἐγὼ καὶ τῶν, ἴση ὁ Σωκράτης, φανερόν,
 ὅτ' καὶ ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκα γίνονται πὶ καὶ ἀνασφαιρῶναι; πὶ ὅτ'
 ἄλλο ζῶν, αἰγῶν τε, καὶ ὄντων, καὶ ἰππῶν, καὶ βοῶν, καὶ ὄντων, καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ζῶν, ποσὺν ταχέως ἀπολαύει, ὅτ' ἀνθρώπων; ἐμοὶ μὲν ὅτ'
 δικαί πλείον τῶν φύσιν σφαιρῶναι γινώσκον, καὶ χηρίμαζοντα ὅτ' ἡμῶν

"forded us.—Yes truly; and if we had it not, Sect. IV.
 "we should, for all our Eyes, be like blind Men.—
 "And since our State likewise requires Rest,
 "he hath given us the Night, a most conve-
 "nient Time for Repose.—It certainly deserves
 "our most grateful Resentments.—But while the
 "Sun diffuses its Light, points out to us the
 "Hours of the Day, and lays open every Thing
 "to our View: We find the Night covers all
 "Things in Darkness; and therefore in this
 "Season God hath appointed the Stars to shine,
 "whereby we distinguish the Hours of the
 "Night, and are enabled to do many Things
 "for our Comfort and Benefit; the Moon par-
 "ticularly serves these Purposes, and besides,
 "lets us know the several Periods of the Month.
 "And whereas we need also Nourishment for
 "our Bodies, and God hath supply'd us from
 E 2 " the

ἀπὸ τούτων, ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνων. πολὺ δὲ γένος ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μὲν ἐκ
 τῆς γῆς εὐομένους εἰς τροφὴν ἢ χεῖνται, ἀπὸ δὲ βοτανισμάτων
 γάλακτι, καὶ πυρὶ, καὶ κρέασι τριφόμενοι ζῶντες. πάντες δὲ πιδάτ-
 τειν οὖν καὶ διαμάζοντες τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ζώων, εἰς τι πλάσμα
 καὶ εἰς ἄλλα πολλὰ συνιργαίει χεῖνται. ὁμογενεστέον οὖν καὶ τούτ'
 ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἰσχυρότερα ἡμῶν, ἕως ὑποχείρια
 γινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἴ τι χεῖνται αὐταῖς, ὅ, πᾶν βέλτερον
 τὸ δὲ, ἐπιπλεονεχῶν μὲν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, διακρίνοντα δὲ ἀλ-
 λήλων ἐστὶν. περιττεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰδήσεις ἀρμοστέους πρὸς
 ἕκαστα, εἰ δὲ ἀπολαύμεν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τὸ δὲ, καὶ λογισ-
 μὸν ἡμῖν ἀμφότεροι ὅτι πλεονεχῶν αἰσθανόμεθα, λογισόμενοι τι καὶ
 μνημονεύοντες παταμάνδανομεν, ὅτι ἕκαστα συμφέρει, καὶ πολλὰ
 μηχανώμεθα, εἰ δὲ τῶν τι ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύσομεν, καὶ τὰ κακὰ
 ἀναξιδόμεθα; τὸ δὲ, καὶ ἐρμηνεύειν δύναται, εἰ ἢ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 μεταδίδομεν τι ἀνέλοις διδάσκοντες, καὶ κοινωνούμεν, καὶ νόμους
 πιδάμεθα, καὶ πολιτευόμεθα; παντὰ πᾶσι εὐοχέειν, ὡς Σωκράτης,
 εἰ θεοὶ πολλὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσιν. Xenoph.
 Memorab. Lib. 4.

Sect. IV “ the Earth, and adapted the Seasons of the
 “ Year to this Purpose, whereby we are pro-
 “ vided not only in Plenty and Variety of Ne-
 “ cessaries, but in such Things as tend to cheer
 “ and delight us: Have we not in all this a
 “ manifest Proof of the Care and Bounty of
 “ Heaven towards us?— *Indeed these Things*
 “ *do plainly express a tender Concernment for the*
 “ *Good of Mankind.*—And our being furnish-
 “ ed with Water, which is of so great Con-
 “ sequence, that, together with the Earth and
 “ the Seasons of the Year, it causes every Thing
 “ of Use to us to grow up and improve, and
 “ even nourishes our Bodies; and being mixed
 “ with our Food, makes it easier to prepare,
 “ more wholsom, and of a finer Relish; to
 “ which you must add, our having it in such
 “ great Abundance, when it is so universally
 “ necessary: Do we not herein evidently see,
 “ that God takes Care for us?—*It certainly*
 “ *points out a provident Being that looks after hu-*
 “ *man Kind.*—And our being provided in Fire,
 “ which protects us against Cold, relieves us
 “ from Darkness, and assists us in every Art,
 “ and in all Things that People do for their
 “ Benefit; for, in short, without the Help of
 “ Fire, nothing of any great Service in Life is
 “ effected: Has not the Deiry herein shewn
 “ us that he studies our Happiness?— *With-*
 “ *out Question, 'tis a great Instance of overflow-*
 “ *ing Goodness towards Mankind.*— See like-
 “ wise the Sun, when it turns its Course in
 “ the

“ the Winter-season; as it approaches towards
 “ us, it trains up some Things to Maturity,
 “ and other Things, whose Season is past, it
 “ dries up, and they wither; and after it hath
 “ performed thus much, it comes no nearer us,
 “ but recedes and declines, lest by an Excess
 “ of Heat it should do us Mischief; and after
 “ it has returned to that Part of the Heavens,
 “ where ’tis manifest, if it should go to a
 “ greater Distance, we should all be starved to
 “ Death with Cold, it again alters its Course,
 “ and comes back to that Point, where it does
 “ us the greatest Service: And have we not
 “ here convincing Evidence, that we are un-
 “ der the Protection and Care of a most bene-
 “ ficent Being?—*It must be confessed, that all
 “ this seems to be managed with a View to pro-
 “ mote the Interests of Mankind.*—Again, as
 “ a sudden Change of Heat and Cold would
 “ certainly prove fatal to us, the Sun makes its
 “ Approaches towards us gently and by De-
 “ grees, and in the like manner recedes from
 “ us; so that we come insensibly into those
 “ Seasons, that have the greatest Measures of
 “ Heat and Cold: And does not this further
 “ express a tender Concernment for our Well-
 “ being?—*Indeed, my dear Socrates, I am
 “ now bethinking myself, whether God concerns him-
 “ self in any Thing but the doing Good to Man-
 “ kind; and nothing hinders me from being assured
 “ of it, but that other Animals do likewise share
 “ in the same Blessings.*—But is it not mani-

Sect. IV. “ fect, that these very Animals are brought
 “ forth and maintain’d for the Sake of Man?
 “ For what other living Creature reaps the Ad-
 “ vantages that Man enjoys from the different
 “ Tribes of Animals? It should seem to me,
 “ that they are more useful to us than the
 “ Fruits of the Ground; for they no less serve
 “ us for Food and Profit. Besides, a great many
 “ People make no Use of Herbs and Plants, but
 “ live upon Milk, Cheese, and Flesh. And
 “ such as tame and break useful Animals, they
 “ imploy them in War, and to many other
 “ Purposes.— *You are certainly in the right,*
 “ *and herein also I go along with you; for I ob-*
 “ *serve that several of those Animals that much*
 “ *exceed us in Strength, are so entirely under our*
 “ *Subjection, that we use them to what Purposes*
 “ *we please.*—But there are likewise in the
 “ World many Things beautiful and advanta-
 “ gious, that differ from one another; and
 “ God hath provided us of Senses that are a-
 “ dapted to these different Objects, whereby we
 “ are enabled to enjoy all their various Enter-
 “ tainments: Nay, he hath made Reason an
 “ Ingredient in our Nature, whereby we make
 “ a Judgment of their several Qualities and
 “ Powers; and bearing in Mind their different
 “ Effects, we hence learn to what particular
 “ Uses they will contribute, and thus effect
 “ many Things whereby we promote our Hap-
 “ piness, and guard ourselves against Evil.
 “ Besides, we are endued with the Faculty
 “ of

“ of Speech, whereby, in our mutual Instructi-
 “ ons, we communicate every Thing valuable
 “ to each other, we confer together, we esta-
 “ blish Laws, and manage the publick Interests:
 “ And do not all these Things loudly proclaim,
 “ that our Well-being is the peculiar Care of
 “ Heaven?—*Beyond all Question, my dear So-
 “ crates, God is deeply concerned in our Happiness.*
 So that as all Men derive their Existence from
 this infinite Being, as the first Cause of all
 Things, and thus continually live under his
 Protection and Government, and receive from
 his Hands our Food and Raiment, and all the
 Sweets and Comforts of Life: (1) We are all
 likewise in Society with God, as our common
 Head, our great and sovereign Benefactor.

FROM all which it appears, that *that* Commu-
 nity, whereof we are all Members, is so very
 wide and extensive, as to comprehend God and
 all Mankind (2). For as the World, says Cicero,
 E 4 by

And there-
 fore, accord-
 ing to Na-
 ture, we
 ought to
 desire the
 Esteem of
 God, and
 of all Man-
 kind.

(1) Φοβέσθων δὲ μοι, τίς ἡ ἀρέσκεια τοῖς θεοῖς ἔσται καὶ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων, ὧν παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; αὐτὸ μὲν δὲ διδασκῶνται πάντες διδασκῶν
 ἔστιν ὃ δὲ εἶναι ἡμῶν ἀγαθὸν ὅ, πᾶσι μὲν ἐκείνῳ δίδωσιν. I would
 gladly know, what does God profit by those Gifts we offer
 up to him? 'Tis obvious to every Man what good Things he
 bestows upon us; for there is no one comfortable Enjoy-
 ment in our Lot, but comes from him. Plat. in Eutyph.

(2) Θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ οὐρανός, καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄν-
 ὁθρωποι τὴν κοινότητα συνέχουσιν. 'Tis observed by wise Men,
 that Heaven and Earth, the Deity and Mankind are asso-
 ciated together. Id. in Gorg. Est enim mundus quasi com-
 munis deorum atque hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque.
 For the World is, as it were, one House or Town that
 belongs in common to God and Man. Cic. de Nat. Deor.
 Lib. 2.

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by having all its Parts mutually proportion'd to each other, naturally makes up one complete System, which remains constant and uniform, so all Mankind are naturally associated and blended together, and never break or differ from one another, but by the Prevalency of Corruption. Nor do Men consider that they are all of Kin to each other, and are all the Subjects of one common Head and Governor: For had we this in our Thoughts, we would all of us live like the Inhabitants of Heaven (1). And therefore, every Man being thus naturally joyn'd in Society to all his own Species, and to God himself, as the great Author of our Being, our supreme Head, and kind Benefactor; if his social Appetite be not miserably perverted, he cannot but necessarily seek for and desire the Esteem and Good-liking of all Mankind, and particularly of God, under whose Government we all live, and upon whom we are all depending.

FOR, as I have above hinted, it being very certain, that every Man's social Appetite as necessarily requires Esteem and Regard from those Persons with whom we chuse to associate ourselves, as our Hunger or Thirst do the common Necessaries of Life; it plainly follows, that
what

(1) Sicut una eademque natura, mundus omnibus partibus inter se congruentibus cohæret ac nititur; sic omnes homines inter se natura confusi, pravitate dissentiunt; nec se intelligunt esse consanguineos, & subjectos omnes sub unam eandemque tutelam. Quod si teneretur, Deorum profecto vitam omnes viverent. *Fragm.*

whatever particular Person or Being there is, **Sec. IV.** whose good Opinion we neglect and despise, we withdraw ourselves from such a one's Society, and are utterly averse to any social Correspondence with him; which, from what I have said, must be counted very *unnatural*. And therefore, as a Man cannot but desire the Esteem of his Family, to whose Society he is confin'd by his Circumstances; so, being a Citizen of the World, or a Member of that great rational Community, which is spread through the World, under one supreme Head and Sovereign, the first Cause of all Things, he ought likewise, according to the Nature and Reason of Things, to desire the Love and Esteem of the Neighbourhood where he lives, of all the several Members of that particular Commonwealth to which he belongs; and, in a Word, of all Mankind; but more especially of God our great Lord and Sovereign (1), and of all such intelligent Beings as resemble him, and form their Conduct towards others upon the Perfections of his Nature, or according to the Nature of Things (2). **AND**

(1) Οὐκ ἄρα, ὁ βέλπτε, πᾶν ἡμῶν ἔτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμῶν ἀγ' ἔ, π' ὁ ἱππίας οὐκ ἔστι θεός, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπων, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀληθινός. We ought not therefore much to regard what the Multitude shall say of us, but how he may affect us, who fully understands what is just and unjust, the one supreme God, who is Truth itself. Plat. in Criton.

(2) Δόξας δὲ οὐκ ἔσθ' ἀνθρώπων ἀνδραγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμολογημάτων τῇ φύσει βίοντων μόνον. We should not seek after the Praises of the Multitude, but only of those Persons who live agreeably to Nature. M. Anton. Lib. 3. § 4.

SECT. IV. AND one cannot but here observe, that, according as this Desire of Esteem happens to be placed, or to *spread* and diffuse itself, the social Appetite is proportionably less or more natural, and thereby lets us see the Scantiness and Narrowness, or the Greatness and Openness of every Man's Mind. Upon which I will beg Leave to make the following Reflections.


This is highly natural, and speaks an open and generous Mind.

1. WHEN this Desire of Esteem goes on from our immediate Companions, and spreading itself all over the Face of the Earth, is stretched up particularly towards the great *Father* of Mankind, it is then natural to the highest Degree, and shews plainly that we comprehend in our Society the great Head of the rational Creation, and all our Fellow-men; which distinctly speaks an Openness and Greatness of Mind, divinely noble and glorious, and which, with good Reason, may be deem'd the Desire of true Glory.

But when this Desire of Esteem is contracted, it is very unnatural, and shews the Depravity of the human Mind.

2. BUT if in this Desire of Esteem we leave out God, and *confine* ourselves to Mankind, it is then manifestly less natural; the social Appetite begins to be vitiated, and the Mind to grow narrow and contracted. And must not every Body own, that, in thus confining this natural Appetite, we expose ourselves to just Reproach and Infamy? For, what can be more dishonourable, than to live under the Protection and Government of one infinitely wise and good Being, of whose Bounty and Munificence we are daily partaking; and yet neglect his Esteem,

or

or not value what Opinion he may have or Sect. IV.
conceive of us, and so break off from his Society? 

3. AGAIN, if in this Desire of Esteem we leave out God, and all our own Species, except that particular Commonwealth to which we immediately belong, it is then yet less natural; the social Appetite becomes more vitiated, and the Mind is manifestly more contracted. And in this, and the other Instance last mentioned, consists particularly what we understand by *Vain-glory*, or popular Applause. Though this Passion frequently exerts itself, among some trifling Spirits, within a much narrower Compass.

4. IN the last Place, if, in this Desire of Esteem, we not only leave out God, and the Bulk of Mankind, but that particular Commonwealth likewise where we live, and confine ourselves, for the Gratification of this Appetite, to a *Party*, or a particular Set of Men in it, or to our Neighbourhood; or perhaps leave out these, and *pen up* ourselves within our own Families, it is then still less and less natural; the social Appetite is still more and more depraved, and the Mind is still more and more contracted. And a Person in this Light, cannot but appear, to the last Degree, mean and despicable.

So that, according as the Desire of Esteem spreads and dilates itself, the Mind in Proportion acts more naturally, and clearly shews it self more open and generous. Which plainly lets us see that the Desire of true Fame and Glory,

Sect. IV. ry, which is nothing else but *universal unlimited Esteem*, with which all Men ought to be inspired, can be found only in great and elevated Minds, that are open, generous, and aspiring, according to the original Frame of human Nature. For as we are all covetous of Praise (which we should have the Honesty to confess, without attempting to dissemble what cannot be concealed) so every fine Genius particularly aspires after Glory: For there is nothing that Nature more values, nothing that it more affects and pursues, than Honour, Praise, Esteem, and Glory (1).

We ought likewise, according to Nature, to desire eternal Esteem.

Thus, methinks, it appears there can be no Bounds set to our Desire of Esteem; but that, according to Nature and Reason, it ought to be diffused over all that large Community whereof we are all Members. And as it is thus unbounded with respect to its *Extent* and *Wideness*; so must we likewise own, that there is no Period of Time to which it can, or ought to be limited, with regard to its *Duration*.

For we are to mix with other rational Beings in another World.

I suppose, it cannot be deny'd, that, in all Ages of the World, Men have had a strong Hankering after *Immortality* (2), and have all along en-

(1) Neque enim est hoc dissimulandum, quod obscurari non potest, sed præ nobis ferendum: trahimur omnes laudis studio, & optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur. Cic. pro Archia. Nihil enim habet (natura) præstantius, nihil quod magis expectat, quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus. Id. in Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. 2.

(2) Maximum vero argumentum est, naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus cura fuit.

Original of Moral Virtue.

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entertain'd an inward Perswasion, that they shall not be quite extinguished at the Dissolution of their Bodies, but that they shall exist beyond the Grave, and be disposed of in another World,
by

sunt, & maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sunt. Serit arbores, quæ alteri sæculo profint, ut ait Statius in Synephebis, quid spectans, nisi etiam postera sæcula ad se pertinere? Quid procreatio liberorum, quid propagatio nominis, quid adoptiones filiorum, quid testamentorum diligentia, quid ipsa sepulchrorum monumenta, quid elogia significant, nisi nos futura etiam cogitare?—Nescio quomodo inhaeret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum: idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis & existit maxime, & apparet facillime: quo quidem dempto, quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus & periculis viveret? loquor de principibus. Quid poetas? nonne post mortem nobilitari volunt?—Sed quid poetas? Opifices etiam post mortem nobilitari volunt. Quid enim Phidias sui similem speciem inclusit in clypeo Minervæ, cum inscribere non liceret? Quid nostri philosophi? nonne in his ipsis libris, quos scribunt de contemnenda gloria, sua nomina inscribunt? Quod si omnium consensus naturæ vox est, omnesque qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui e vita cesserunt; nobis quoque idem existimandum est.—Sed ut Deos esse natura opinamur, qualesque sunt ratione cognoscimus: sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium; qua in sede maneant, qualesque sint, ratione discendum est. *The particular Care that all Men seem to have for Things that are only to happen after their Death, is a strong Evidence, that Nature secretly gives it for the Immortality of our Souls. Thus a Man, when he plants Trees that can be useful no sooner than the next Age, what can he have in View, but the Interest he thinks he has in Futurity? The procreating and adopting of Children, the deriving one's Name to Persons and Things, the Care that People have to make Testaments and bequeath Legacies, the erecting of Monuments over our Graves, and the making Inscriptions, what is the Meaning of all this, but that*

Sect. IV. by the supreme God, the great Author of our Being, among other Spirits, either good or bad, honourable or infamous, according to our several Qualities and Complexions, to Eternity (1).
And

that we are possessed with the Thoughts of Futurity?— I know not how it is, but a certain Forecast of future Ages is inherent to our Minds, particularly to such Souls as have a Greatness and Elevation of Thought; and in these it easily appears. And indeed if you take away the Thoughts of Futurity, who would be the mad Man to live always amidst Toils and Dangers? I speak of Princes. And as for Poets, what is their Aim? Do they not want to be celebrated after their Death?— But what need I mention Poets? Even Mechanicks themselves affect to perpetuate their Memory; for what else did Phidias mean, when not being at Liberty to inscribe his Name, he engraved an Image like himself in Minerva's Shield? Nay, our Philosophers, do they not publish their Names in those very Books which they write concerning the Contempt of Glory? So that if the Consent of Mankind is the Voice of Nature, and all Men every where do agree, that there is still surviving some Part of those Persons who have departed this Life; herein likewise we should rest ourselves satisfy'd.— And as Nature teaches us the Existence of God, and we know from Reason what sort of Being he is: So by the Consent of all Nations, we believe the future Existence of our Souls; and we must learn from Reason what becomes of them hereafter. Cic. Tusc. Q. Lib. 1.


(1) Ἀλλὰ τὸ δ', ἔρη, ὃ ἄνθρωποι, διακρίνον διακρίναι, ἐπὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἔστιν, ἐπιμαρτυρεῖται δὴ δῶται ἐκ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τέττα μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλεῖται τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάντων καὶ ὁ κῆρυξ τῆς νῦν δὴ καὶ δέξεται ἀν μαλίστα δευδὲς ἔστι, οἱ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀμαλῶσιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ δῶναι τῆς πάντων ἀπαλλαγῆς, ἔρμαιον αὖν ἢν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποδανῶσι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀμα ἀπαλλαγῆς, καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθανάτος φαίνεται ἔσθαι, ἰδεῖν αὖν αἶν αὐτῇ ἀλλή ἀπορῶν κακῶν. ἰδεὶ σωτηρία, πάλιν τῆ βελτίστῃ τῇ καὶ φρονιμωτάτῃ γινέσθαι.

And indeed, the *Belief* of a future State is so essential a Principle of natural Religion, that there is no Man who allows the one, but must likewise admit the other; there being so necessary a Connection between them, and both being jointly

ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν, ὅλως δὲ παύσασθαι
 πρὸς τὴν τέχνην, ἢ δὴ καὶ λέγειν μὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ βλάστησις δὲ
 πλάττωσις, διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοίαν. λέγεται δὲ
 ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἔχουσαν, ὡς ἡ καὶ δαίμων ὁμοίαν
 ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔχουσαν οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖσι, οἱ δὲ τοῖς
 ἑλλήνων διαδικοσμοῦται. ἢ μὲν ἐν κοσμοῖς
 πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν, πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρώπου τὴν παύσασθαι. ἢ δὲ
 ὁμοίαν πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν, — βία καὶ μόλις ἐπὶ τῇ
 πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν δαίμων ὁμοίαν ἀνθρώπου. ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἔστιν
 αἱ ἄλλαι, δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖσι, ἢ ὁμοίαν
 ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ἄλλα ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου, ὡς
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι αὐτὴν
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώπου. — οἱ δὲ οἱ
 δὲ αὐτῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἔστιν. ἢ δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὴν καὶ μὴ οὐκ ἔστιν
 βία δαίμων, καὶ ὁμοίαν καὶ ὁμοίαν δαίμων πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν,
 ὡς αὐτῇ ὡς αὐτῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν. But, my Friends,
 you would likewise do well to consider that the Soul be-
 ing immortal, stands in Need of cultivating and Improve-
 ment, not only in relation to this present Time which we
 call Life, but with respect also to Eternity. And if you
 think justly upon this Point, you will find it extremely dan-
 gerous to neglect the Soul. Indeed if Death were the Dis-
 solution of the whole Man, it would be a great Advantage
 to the Wicked in their dying Moments, to be rid at once of
 their Body, their Soul, and their Vices; but forasmuch as
 the Soul is immortal, there is no possible Way to avoid Mi-
 sery and obtain Salvation, but by becoming in all Respects
 good and virtuous. For it departs into the other World
 with nothing upon it, but its Virtues or Vices, which, it
 is thought, do immediately affect the Soul, so as to render
 it happy or miserable, from the first Moment of its Separa-
 tion. The Manner wherein it is represented is this: So
 soon as any Man breathes his last, the Demon that wair

Seft. IV. ly supported by ſuch irrefragable Arguments:
 So that all Men, except ſuch (if there be any
 Monſters of this Kind in the Univerſe) as are
 degenerated into downright Atheiſts, having the
 Prof.

ed on him in his Lifetime, conducts the Soul to a certain Place, where departed Spirits are aſſembled in order to be judged, and from whence they are led away into Hades, under the Conduct of that Guide who is appointed for that Purpose. — Now the Soul that is adorned with Virtue and Goodneſs, follows cheerfully, and well knows what is to become of it. But the Soul that is fill'd with bodily Paſſions, is forcibly and with Difficulty dragg'd away by the Demon who has it in Charge, and when it arrives, every other Soul ſhuns and avoids it, becauſe of its Impurity and Uncleanneſs, its being polluted with Murder, or any of thoſe atrocious Crimes which ſuch deſperate and loſt Souls are commonly guilty of. — Of Neceſſity it falls into a Place that ſuits its Condition. Whereas the Souls that have liv'd in the Body ſoberly, righteouſly, and godly, have celeftial Beings to lead and guide them, and ſhall inhabit Mansions of Glory, each one according to its Capacity. *Pla.* in *Phæd.* Itaque tam egregiis eximiisque factis, non infixis plumbo ſtatuas, non areſcentes triumphorum coronas ſatis diuturna perſolvere poſſe præmia judicatum eſt; ſed florentiora, ſtabilioraque munera quaſita ſunt, quibus ornarentur ii, qui virtutem, honeſtatem, gloriam, otio, libidini, voluptati, vitæ denique prætuliffent. Tamque id æquum eſt, quam illud decorum, maximeque probandum, non eaſdem improbis ſedes, quas bonis atque integris, poſt mortem eſſe propoſitas. Intellexerunt enim ex majoribus noſtris complures, qui ſapientia præſtiterunt, cum in Diis æquitas præcipue vigeat, eaque in eorum gubernatione appareat maxime, fieri non poſſe quin nequitiam ſceleraque averſentur, quique ea in vita exercuerunt, eos a ſeipſis longiſſime ſejungant. Quod in vulgus edi, verumque exiſtimari, non modo rationi conveniens, ſed utile quoque in primis eſt ſitutum. Nam ſi quid in hominum animis pietatis, ſi quid religionis inerit, certe ob hanc potiſſimum cauſam

Prospect, that this *Society*, though in other Cir- Sect. IV.
cumstances, with the same, or other rational 
Beings, under the Government of the same ever-
living God, who, as our supreme Judge, has
the absolute Disposal of our Futurity: I say, all
Men having the Prospect, that this Society,
though in other Circumstances, shall hereafter
be continued to everlasting Ages, 'tis impossible
but we must wish for, and desire the *Esteem* and
Good-liking of this new-modell'd Community,
whenever it shall happen that we *change* our
Place, and enter in among them. O glorious
F Day,

causam se a flagitiis ac facinoribus abstinebunt, quod impios ac
nefarios homines a Deorum consilio ac societate arceri judica-
bunt. Nec enim omnibus, idem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt, e-
undem cursum in cœlum patere. Nam vitiis & sceleribus con-
taminatos, deprimi in tenebras, atque in coeno jacere docue-
runt; castos autem animos, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis
etiam studiis atque artibus expositos, levi quodam ac facili lapsu
ad Deos, id est, naturam sui similem, pervolare. Quod si ita
est, certe nobis, quantum conniti animo possumus, quantum
diligentia consequi, contendendum atque elaborandum est, ut
ne ab iis segregemur, quorum est proprium vita fœui sempi-
terna ac beata. *And therefore it was thought, that neither
Statues fix'd in Lead, nor triumphal Crowns that fade
away, could be Rewards lasting enough for such noble
and illustrious Deeds, so that a Recompence more splen-
did and durable was sought for, whereby those should
be adorned, who had preferred Virtue, Honour, and Glo-
ry, before Sloth, Lust, Pleasure, and even Life itself.
And indeed, that is as just and equitable, as it is fit-
ting and highly to be approv'd, that the same Abodes
in another World, should not be allotted to the Wicked after
Death, into which Men of Virtue and Integrity are receiv-
ed. For many of our Forefathers, who were famous for*
Wif.

Sec. IV. Day, when I shall ascend to that divine Company and Assembly of Spirits, and leave this Hurry of Things, this State of Impurity! For I shall ascend not only to those Persons I have already spoke of, but to my Cato, than whom a better Man was never born, a Man more eminent for Goodness and Piety

Wisdom, did well understand, that since Righteousness reigns gloriously with God and all the celestial Beings, and appears conspicuously in the Administration of the World, it is impossible but the heavenly Inhabitants must bear an Aversion at all Sort of Wickedness, and keep those Persons who practise it in this Life, at the greatest Distance, excluded from their Society. And that this Doctrine should be preach'd among the People, and entertain'd as an undoubted Truth, not only stands to Reason, but, beyond every Thing else, tends to promote the Peace and Happiness of Mankind. For if there be any Sparks of Piety and Religion in the Minds of Men, they will certainly abstain from all Vice, on this Consideration especially, that they know all ungodly and wicked Persons are shut out from the Society of the Blessed above. Nor were these same wise Men of the Opinion, that every whatever Course of Life would lead People to Heaven: For they maintain'd, that such as are polluted with Sin and Vice, are thrust down into thick Darkness, and are condemn'd to be oppress'd under Shame and Infamy; but that chaste, pure and immaculate Souls, polished by all the Arts and Measures of Goodness, do, by an easy and gentle Ascent, go up to the Inhabitants of Heaven, that is, to a Nature similar and like their own. And since Matters stand thus, we ought certainly to exert all the Powers of our Mind, with the utmost Diligence and Application we should vigorously endeavour and strive, that we be not shut out from the Society of those Beings, to whom it peculiarly belongs to enjoy a blessed Life and Immortality. C. C. Consol.

Piety (1). This is old *Cato* looking into a World Sect. IV. of happy Spirits, and hoping *there* to mix with his virtuous Friends and Acquaintances, and among them to enjoy that immortal Glory, to which (as we shall hear him telling us by and by) every prudent and wise Man eagerly aspires.

FOR as our natural Appetite of Hunger and Thirst, shall never but be craving, while we have an animal Life to be supported; so our social Appetite, or our Desire of Esteem shall always want to be gratified, while we are in Society with others. And therefore, as every Man, in whom human Nature is not sadly depraved, cannot but desire the Esteem of that whole Community whereof he is a Member; so he cannot but necessarily wish to continue in the Possession of this Esteem, through all the several Stages of his Existence, and during the whole Course of his Duration, while he is associated with others, which shall be, without Intermission, for ever and ever. For, as *Cicero* says (2), *I by no Means go along with those, who*

F 2 have

(1) O præclarum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium cœtumque proficiscar, & cum ex hac turba & colluvione discedam! proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi, sed etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate præstantior. Id. de Senect.

(2) Neque enim assensior iis, qui hæc nuper differere cœperunt, cum corporibus simul animas interire, atque omnia morte delesi. Plus apud me antiquarum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum majorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa jura tribuerunt, quod

Sect. IV. *have lately begun to argue, that the Soul perishes with the Body, and that after Death nothing remains. The Authority of the Ancients is of greater Weight with me, particularly that of Socrates, whom the Oracle declared to be the wisest of Men; for he never vary'd in his Judgment upon this Article, but always gave it as his fixed Opinion, that the Souls of Men come from God; that when they leave the Body, they return to him again; and that such as excel in Goodness and Righteousness have an Entrance ministred unto them abundantly into Heaven. And indeed he clearly asserts, " That*
" there is a future Judgment, that impure and
" vicious Souls shall be thrown headlong into
" Tartarus or Hell, a Place of Pain and An-
" guish, or Disgrace and Infamy, where they
" shall be kept Prisoners for ever; but that the
" Pious and Virtuous shall be taken up into the
" pure Mansions above, whereof the Glory and
" Happiness cannot well be described, and there
" live to Eternity; upon which this wonderful
" Man exhorts us, to lay out all our Endeavours
" to acquire Virtue and Righteousness while
" we

quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitra-
 rentur: vel eorum qui in hac terra fuerunt, magnamque
 Graciam, quæ nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis
 & præceptis suis erudierunt: vel ejus, qui Apollinis oraculo
 sapientissimus est judicatus; qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in
 plerisque, sed idem dicebat semper, animos hominum esse di-
 vinos, iisque, cum e corpore excessissent, reditum ad cælum
 patere, optimoque & justissimo cuique expeditissimum. Cic.
 de Amicit.

"we are here;" for that the Prize is noble and illustrious, and the Hope is great. And the Man, says he, that in the Course of his Life has renounced the Pleasures and Ornaments of the Body, as Things of a foreign Nature, and a pernicious Tendency, but has given up himself to the Pleasures of true Knowledge, and made it his Business to beautify his Mind with its proper Ornaments; such a Man ought to have good Hopes concerning his Soul, and peaceably to wait the Hour of his Departure, so as always to be ready for the Voyage, whenever he is called to it (1).

F 3

AND

(1) Ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκων οἱ παιδικάτις αἰς τὸ τέλος, οἱ δὲ δαίμων ἔκαστον καμίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν φύσιν οἷον καλῶς καὶ ἰσχυρῶς βίωσαι, καὶ οἱ μὴ. — οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσι ἀνίστασθαι ἔχοντες τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ἀμαρτυμάτων, ἢ ἰσχυρίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, ἢ φθίνας ἀδίκας καὶ ὀδυνηρὰς πολλὰς ὑπερμαρτυρίας, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα πύχυνται ὁρίᾳ τιναυτά, τέττοις δὲ ἢ πλεονέκτους καὶ ῥιπίται αἰς τὸ Τελείον, ὅταν ἔσται ὁκαίνοισιν. — ἢ καὶ δὲ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως σπεῖν τὸ ὅπως βίωσαι, ὅταν οἷον ἢ ἔσται ἢ καὶ ἔσται τῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθεριώμενοι τὴν καὶ ἀπαλλαγόμενοι, ὅπως διαμαρτυρίαν, ἂν καὶ οἱ τινὲς καὶ ἀμαρτυρίαν ἀφικνέμενοι, καὶ ὅταν γὰρ οἱ καὶ ἀμαρτυρίαν τέττοις καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ φιλοσοφία ἔχοντες καὶ ἀμαρτυρίαν, ἂν καὶ τὴν σωματικὴν ζῶσι τὸ ὅπως αἰς τὸ τέλος καὶ ἔσται, καὶ οἱ οἱ καὶ ἔσται ἐν τέττοις καὶ ἀμαρτυρίαν. αἰς ἔσται ἔσται ὁκαίνοισιν, ἔσται δὲ καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῇ παρῇ. ἀλλὰ τέττοις δὲ ἔσται καὶ ὅταν ἀμαρτυρίαν, ὅτι Σιμώνα, πᾶσι ποιῶν, ὅτι ἀρετῆς καὶ ὁκαίνοισιν ἐν τῇ βίᾳ ματαχρῶν. καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἔσται καὶ ἢ ἔσται καὶ ἔσται. — ἀλλὰ τέττοις, δὲ ἔσται ὁκαίνοισιν καὶ ἔσται τῇ αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ βίᾳ τῆς καὶ ἔσται ὁκαίνοισιν τῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τῆς κόσμος ἔσται καὶ ἔσται, καὶ ἔσται τῆς καὶ ὅταν, καὶ πλείονος ἀμαρτυρίαν καὶ ἀμαρτυρίαν. τῆς δὲ καὶ τὸ καὶ ἔσται ἔσται τῆς καὶ καὶ ἔσται τῆς καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἔσται ἀλλοτρίαν ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτῇ κόσμῳ, σφραγισμένη καὶ ἔσται ὅταν, καὶ ἀνδρία, καὶ ἐλευθερία, καὶ ἀληθεία, ἔσται καὶ ἔσται τῆς καὶ ἔσται, ὅτι καὶ ἔσται ὅταν ἢ ἔσται καὶ ἔσται.

When

mated with this Principle, while they had the Honesty to own they were indeed under its Influence? That I may take the Liberty my Age gives me (says old Cato) and boast of myself a little; do you think that Day and Night, at Home and Abroad, I would have undergone so much Fatigue and Labour, had I thought that my Honour and Glory was to end at the same Point, wherein I must conclude my present Existence? Had it not been much better to have liv'd an idle and easy Life, without any Toil and Contention? But I know not how my Mind, still raising itself, had always such a View of Futurity, as if then indeed it were to live, when it shall have left this World. And in Truth, if it were not so that our Souls are immortal, it could never happen that the Mind of every

F 4

great

bring them to a happy Issue, were animated by nothing more than an Ambition to acquire Honour in the Pursuit of virtuous and laudable Actions. For, in my Opinion, it is but just, that Men of real Worth and Integrity, who thus contribute to the publick Good, should be esteem'd and regarded as their Actions deserve. Plat. in Epist. 4.

Me autem nihil æque ac diurnitatis amor & cupido sollicitat, res homine dignissima, qui nullus sibi conscius culpæ, posteritatis memoriam non reformidet. Itaque diebus ac noctibus cogito,

— Si qua me quoque possum

Tollere humo.

Id enim voto meo sufficit: illud supra votum;

— Victorque virum volitare per ora,

Quamquam o —

For my Part, there is not any Thing I am more sensible of, than a Desire and Passion for Futurity, a Thing most worthy a Man, who conscious of no Guilt, does not fear to be

Sect. IV. great and wise Man should particularly aspire to immortal Glory (1).

If our
Author will
call this
Pride, one
needs not
contend
about
Words.

Now, if the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* will needs have this Desire after the Esteem and Commendation of God, and of all Mankind, to be *Pride*, I will by no Means contend with him about Words; I have above sufficiently explained my Meaning. And as this Gentleman has said nothing yet in Condemnation of this Principle; so when he, or any one else shall be pleased to go about to disapprove it, or to make it appear, that it is not natural to Mankind, and that it ought not to be indulged; I shall then consider the Arguments that may be proposed for that Purpose: And I have good Reason to hope that I, or any Man who governs his Judgment by the Nature of Things, shall be able to defend and vindicate what I have hitherto maintained.

IN

remembered by Posterity. Therefore Night and Day my Mind is looking out, How I may raise myself on some distinguish'd Ground; for such a Situation bounds my Wish: While this is beyond it, And have my Fame spread far and wide. But oh — Plin. Lib. 3. Ep. 8.

(1) An censes (ut de meipso aliquid more senum glorier) me tantos labores diurnos nocturnosque, domi, militiaeque suscepturum fuisse, si iisdem finibus gloriam meam, quibus vitam, essem terminaturus? Nonne melius multo fuisset, otiosam ætatem, & quietam, sine ullo labore & contentione traducere? Sed nescio quomodo animus erigens se, posteritatem semper ita prospiciebat, quasi cum excessisset e vitam denique victurus esset. Quod quidem ni ita se haberet, ut animi immortales essent, haud optimi cujusque animus magne immortalem gloriam niteretur. Cic. de Senect.


IN the mean time I shall here observe, that though this Word *Pride* is sometimes taken in a good Sense, yet since, for the most Part, it bears an ill Meaning, and is therefore apt to raise in one's Mind the Ideas of a Passion very mean and infamous, and clean contrary to the social Appetite, and so to mislead the unwary Reader into very wrong Conclusions, one would not willingly chuse to make Use of it. And I cannot but take Notice, that our Author seems to have a strange Jumble of Ideas, some agreeable, and others disagreeable to the Nature of Things, which he affixes to this Word. However, I have already apprized my Reader of what I understand by it, when I would admit it with Approbation in this Argument. And, I say, if our Author shall judge, that this Passion, or Desire of Praise and Esteem, as I here take it, is no good or worthy Principle, but of that Nature as to reduce *moral Virtue*, when influenced by it, to a mere *Chimera*, I shall be glad to know upon what Reasoning he supports his Opinion, for all that he has done yet, as I shall shew afterwards, is, in my Judgment, only to affix commonly a very bad Name to a very good Principle, and from thence to deduce very false Consequences.

Sect. IV.

Mean
while it is
but a very
improper
Use of the
Word *Pride*.

SECT.

Sec. V.



S E C T. V.

This Desire
of Esteem
necessarily
requires
some Mo-
tives to
excite it,
which our
Author
abusively
calls Flattery.

HAVING thus taken Notice, that the Desire of Esteem is inseparable from human Nature, and that, according to the Nature of Things, it ought to be universal and eternal; what next occurs to us, in our examining into the Frame of an intelligent Mind, is, that this Passion, as well as every other Principle, necessarily requires, before it can exert itself, some *Motives* to be apply'd to our Minds, that shall be able to excite and awaken it; and this, no doubt, may be done either by ourselves, or Philosophers, or others. And as to those Arguments that may be employed to this Purpose, or as to the applying of suitable *Motives* to excite this Principle, or this Desire of Esteem, it may be thought perhaps somewhat trifling, to contend by what Name we shall call such Things, or such Sort of Application: And therefore, if our Author will have every Thing of this Nature to go by the Name of *Flattery*, I will not debate about this neither; only it is here likewise to be remarked, that the Word *Flattery*, being almost always made use of to signify one Man's treacherously imposing upon another, or basely raising a silly Vanity in his Mind, whereby he is betray'd into some unworthy Conduct, quite inconsistent with the social Virtues, 'tis not so very safe, with Respect to indiscreet Readers, to use it in this
Argu-

Argument, since it must here bear a Sense **SECT. V.**
quite different from that in which it is com-
monly taken. But I hate to be contentious a-
bout Words, and since our Author has so great
a Mind to it, he shall have leave from me, to
call it *Flattery*, or what he pleases, when an
Address is made by proper Motives to our na-
tural Desire of true Glory, and thereby we are
prevail'd upon, or determin'd to Action: So
that, thus far, this Gentleman and I are pretty
well agreed; we have the same Notion of hu-
man Nature, in regard that both of us main-
tain, that all Men have *Pride*, as he calls it,
i. e. a Desire, or Passion for Esteem; and that
Philosophers use *Flattery*, as he speaks, i. e.
they can apply suitable Motives to work upon
this Principle.

In the next Place, according to the natural
Order in which Things may appear to one's
Mind in his Searches into the Nature of ratio-
nal Agents, I might here consider, what are
those Motives that are proper to work upon this
Desire after universal and unlimited Esteem:
But this, I conceive, is not, in the present Case,
so very necessary. I shall only observe, that our
Author has mentioned so many, which, as I
shall take notice of afterwards, are certainly ve-
ry just and laudable; and every Man may easi-
ly imagine to himself, the great Safety, the
elegant Delights, and the sublime Joys that
will arise to him from the *Love*, the *Good-*
will

'Tis not
necessary to
enquire
what those
Motives are:

Sect. VI. will and Applauses of God, and of all the rational
Creation.

SECTION VI.

That which we are particularly to enquire into, is, after what Manner must this Principle be exerted, that we may successfully approve our selves to the Esteem and Commendation of God, and of all Mankind. And I suppose, every Body will allow in general, that this can be done no other-wise, than by some Series or other of our Affections and Actions imploy'd about those Beings to whom we are associated: For it is plainly obvious to every Man's natural Sense of Things, that we can never possibly gain the Good-liking and Esteem of those intelligent Agents, among whom we are mixed, if we withdraw our selves from their Society, and have no Sort of Communication with them. So that I shall here examine what Sort of Affections and Actions seem absolutely necessary to lift us up to this universal Love and Commendation.

'Tis carefully to be observed, that they ought to be of that Nature as will make us acceptable to the whole Community, especially to God, both here and hereafter.

AND upon this, I hope the Reader will all along bear in mind, that as our Desire of Esteem is not to be confined to any particular Persons, but ought in Reason, and according to Nature, to be universal, so our Endeavours, or those Affections and Actions we imploy to acquire it, must not be such as agree only to some few, or many, of that Society whereof we are Members; but

but ought to be of that Nature that will make Sect. VI.
us acceptable to the whole Community (1), and
gain us their Good-liking and Approbation, both
here and hereafter. Above all, we must have
a very special, and indeed, the chief Regard to
the great Head of the human Society, and
herein follow the Example of Socrates, concern-
ing whom Xenophon gives this noble Testimo-
ny: One, says he (2), would have sooner per-
suaded Socrates to turn off a Guide with Eyes, and
who has perfect Knowledge of the Way, and to
make choice of one blind and quite ignorant, than
prevail'd with him to act contrary to what he un-
derstood to be the Will of God. He condemned the
Folly of those Persons, who from Baseness, or for
Fear

(1) Θεός γὰρ τὰς ἀνθρώπων ὄντας, καὶ πάντα ἰσχυρόντας, καὶ πάντα
δυναμένους, οἱ καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων τὴν διὰ τὴν συνέχουσαν ἀρχὴν, καὶ
ἀγέαντες, καὶ ἀναμεικτοί, καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀδυνα-
μιῶν, τέτοις φεβόμενοι, μήτε ἀσεβεῖς μηδὲν, μηδὲ ἀνοστον, μήτε
ποικίλοντες, μήτε βυλίσκοντες μετὰ μιντι θεῶν, καὶ ἀνθρώπων
τὸ πᾶν γένος τὸ ἀπὸ ἐκφυγόμενον αἰδέσθαι. Stand in Aw of
God, who is immortal, who beholds all Things, is Almighty,
and who preserves this inexpressibly great and glorious Fa-
brick of the Universe from all Waste, Decay, and Error; I
say, fear this God, and neither design, nor commit any
Thing that is impious or wicked. And next to God, let it
be your Care to reverence and respect the whole Body of
Mankind. Xenoph. de Instit. Cyr. Lib. 8.

(2) Εἰ δὲ τίς δέξεται αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ θεῶν, ἢ παρὰ
ἀνθρώπων ὅτι καὶ σημαίνεσθαι ποιῶσι, ἢ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν ἱπ-
πῶν ὁδὸν λαβεῖν ἡγεμόνα ποιῶν, καὶ μὴ αἰδῶν τὴν ὁδόν, ἀντι-
βλέποντες καὶ οἰδότες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ μωρίαν κατηγάρτοι, ὅτι
περὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν σημαίνεσθαι ποιῶσι, φυλακί-
μοι τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁδοῦσαν αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντας ἀν-
θρώπους ἡγεμόνα ποιῶν τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν θεῶν συμβαλῶν. Xenoph.
Memorab. Lib. 1.

SECT. VI. *Fear of Reproach at the Hands of Men, do, in any Instance, fergo their Obedience to God. As for him, he undervalue'd every Thing human, in Comparison of his Duty to the Deity. So that, I say, we must apply our selves in a particular Manner to the gaining of the Esteem and Applauses of God: For as we derive our Existence, and all good Things we are in Possession of, from him (1); so we cannot but be satisfied, that he is the only Being, who has the Power and Goodness to express his Love and Esteem of us, in such Instances as are fully proportioned to our natural Principle of Self-love, and can make up our Well-being in the Gratification of our fondest Wishes, and our highest Desires that are truly reasonable, and best suited to our largest Capacities, and greatest Happiness, whereof he is undoubtedly the best Judge. And, according to Socrates, the Man is a Fool, and out of his Senses, that expects greater Happiness any where else than from*

(1) Non dat Deus beneficia! unde ergo ista quæ possides? quæ das? quæ negas? quæ servas? quæ rapis? unde hæc innumerabilia, oculos, aures & animum mulcentia? unde illa luxuriam quoque instruens copia? Neque enim necessitatibus tantummodo nostris provisum est, usque in delicias amatur, &c. God bestows on us no Benefits! From whence then come those Things which you possess? which you give away? which you refuse? which you lay up? which you destroy? Whence those innumerable Things that delight our Eyes, Ears, and Mind? From whence that Plenty and Abundance that ministers even to Luxury? For not only have we our Necessities provided for; but we are indulged in the finest Entertainments, &c. Senec. de Benef. Lib. 4.

SECT. VI.



THUS, I say, we are to consider, what *Measures*, or what Sort of Affections and Actions must necessarily be imploy'd, that we may gain the *Esteem*, not of a particular Set of Men, but of *God*, and of all *Mankind*, while we are here in this State of Mortality, and that we may thereby approve our selves to their Good-liking and Approbation, whenever we shall happen to mix with them in another World. And the great Question here, is,

The great Question here, is, Whether are they of a fix'd and steady Nature, or do they depend on arbitrary Will?

WHETHER are those *Measures* of a fix'd, steady, and *unalterable* Nature? Or do they depend, as Things merely *precarious* or indifferent, upon our own, or the *arbitrary* Will of those Beings with whom we live in Society?

So as that God, without being *restricted* to this, or that particular Set, may prescribe to us any *indifferent* Course of Affections and Actions, for gaining of his Esteem, and acquiring the Good-liking of Mankind? Or,

So as that our Fellow-men, suppose Law-givers and Philosophers, without being under a *Necessity* to follow a certain Series of Things, may propose to us *what Course soever* of Behaviour towards the World, in order to recommend our selves to their Approbation? Or,

So as that we our selves have it in *our Power*, by *Flattery*, or any other Way, to *perswade* those with whom we are associated, to give us their *Esteem* and Good-liking for any Sort of Usage we may have a strong Inclination, or Humour to treat them with?

THIS

THIS, I say, is the great Question upon this **Sect. VI.** Point, whereof the true Solution will sufficiently shew us, what Measures we must necessarily pursue, or what Sort of Affections and Actions we must necessarily imploy about God and our own Species, that we may raise our selves up, in both Worlds, to their Esteem and Commendation. And this Matter, I think, will be set in a true Light, and finally decided when once these two Things shall be determined.

First. WHETHER all those Beings to whom we are associated, have one *common Taste*, or are actuated always by one common Principle; upon our gratifying of which their Esteem of us *absolutely depends*, and which neither they themselves, nor we can possibly *alter, suspend, or extinguish*. And,

Secondly. WHETHER there is only one *particular determin'd Series* of our Affections and Actions, that *corresponds* to this one common Taste or Principle, so as that any opposite, or *contrary Course* is, in its own Nature, quite *inconsistent and contradictory*.

THESE are the two Things, the Determination whereof will, in my Opinion, entirely *settle* this Matter.

AND as to the *First* of them, I am well perswaded, there is no Man, who impartially attends to the Nature of Things, but will own it to be evidently true beyond all Contradiction, that God himself, and all other intelligent Agents whatsoever, can relish nothing but Pleasure

To determine this, two Things must be enquired into.

1st. Whether those Beings to whom we are naturally associated, have one common Appetite that must be gratified, before we can gain their Esteem.

And, 2dly. Whether there is only one Set of our Affections and Actions, that can gratify this one common Appetite.

1st. God and all Mankind are governed by one common Principle, viz. Self-love.

Sect. VI. *sure or Happiness, and are universally governed by one common Principle, namely, that of Self-love, whereby they can never but necessarily desire and pursue their own Well-being (1).*

In the mean while, I hope no Body will take it amiss, that, in this Argument, I all along represent the *Deity*, an infinitely perfect Being, to be under the absolute Government of *Self-love*, or an irresistible Desire to preserve his own Happiness, or what is agreeable to his Good-liking, and the Perfections of his Nature: From the Consideration of which, *Antoninus* (1) thinks

(1) Πέρυκι δὲ πάσα ψυχὴ ὥσπερ τῷ ἀληθεῖ ὁμιλεῖν, ὥς τοι ψεύδους ἀνανδύειν· ὥς τῷ κακῷ ἐκλιπῆναι, ὥς τῷ καλῷ ἀναστῆναι. ὥς γὰρ τὸ τῷ Καί πρὸς νόμισμα ἔκ ἐξουσίας ἀποδιδίχαί τῳ σραπξίτῳ, ὥς τῷ λαχανοπωλῇ, ὅμῳ ἂν δέξῃς, δέλει ἢ δέλει, προέδῃ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πολέμενον ὥς τῷ καλῷ καὶ ὅπῃ τῇ ψυχῇ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαίειν, ἀδύνατον ἐκίνησιν ἐφ' αὐτὸ, τὸ κακὸν ἀφ' αὐτοῦ. ὥς δὲ ποῖς δὲ ἀγαθὸν φαντασάμενος ἐργῇ ἀποδιδίχαί τῳ ψυχῇ ἢ μάλλον ἢ τὸ Καί πρὸς νόμισμα. ἔνθεν ἐξήρτη) πάντα κινήσεις καὶ ἀνδράτι καὶ Θεῷ. διὰ τὸ τοῦ πάσης οἰκειότητος προκρίνεται τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὥς ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ὥς ἐν σκληρῷ; ὥς γὰρ πύρρι. τὸ τοῦ νόμισμα δέδωκεν ὁ Θεός. διὰ τὸ τοῦ εἰ τῷ καλῷ καὶ δικαίῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑτέρῳ ὅτιν, ὅτι καὶ) καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ ἀδελφός, καὶ πατέρες, καὶ πάντα τα σπράγματα. As it is the natural Constitution of all intelligent Beings, to give their Assent to Truth, and to withhold it from Error; so it is equally natural to them, to pursue Good, and avoid Evil. For as no Dealer whatsoever is at Liberty to refuse Cesar's Coin, but of Necessity must accept of it, when it is offer'd him in Exchange of what he has sold; so, in like Manner, the Mind is attracted by Good, and repelled by Evil; and can no more reject a fair Offer of Pleasure, than a Man can refuse the current Coin. Upon this depend all the Motions both of God and Man;

(1) thinks it reasonable, that we cheerfully submit to every Event however afflicting.

THERE is no Doubt, but this great Head of the rational Creation is absolutely independent; and there are no Impressions of Pleasure or Pain, that can in any Degree be derived to the divine Mind, which is infinitely and immutably happy in the Enjoyment of his own infinite Perfections (2). But as the Parts of a human Body are commonly ascribed to this immense Spirit, out of Condescension to the Weakness of our Understanding, that we may the better conceive, or bear in Mind the Excellencies of his Nature, and be thereby influenced more steadily to pursue the Paths of Piety and Vir-

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tue

nor can any Kindred or Relation be preferred before it; in short, I am not concern'd with my Father, but with Happiness. — Art thou so wretchedly barden'd? Yes, it is my natural Frame; so God will have it. Pleasure or Happiness is the Deity's Coin, and must not be rejected. Hence it is that if one's Good or Pleasure does not coincide with Virtue and Righteousness, then Father, Brother, Country, and every Thing else go to Ruin. Arian. lib. 3. cap. 3.

(1) Ασπάζου πάν τὸ γινώσκον, καὶ ἀπερίεργον δοκῶν, διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀγεν, ὅτι ἢ τῷ κόσμῳ ὕμινον, ἢ ἢ τῷ Δίῳ διόδῳ καὶ ἀφωραζῶν. M. Anton. Lib. 5. Sect. 8.

(2) Θεὸν μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸν τίλθον ἔχοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας, ἔξω τῶν ἑῶν, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς τῷ ἰερόνῳ καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι καὶ πάντα μεταλαμβάνει. God being possessed of all Perfection, is out of the Reach of Pleasure and Pain; and cannot be disturb'd in the Enjoyment of his infinite Wisdom and Understanding. Plat. in Epinom.

Ὁ Δεὸς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ συνῆσι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἷα δοκῶν, καὶ ἐν ἐπιδοταῖς γινεῖσθαι ὁπτιοῖς ἑαυτῷ. The Deity is with himself, and is happy in his Self-

Se& VI. tue (1); so, for the like Reason, we here take the Liberty to speak of the supreme Being, as if the Gratification of his *Self-love* depended upon us, or as if any particular *Course* of our Behaviour had a real and sensible *Influence* upon his Happiness. I therefore beg Leave to say, with Regard to all intelligent Agents whatsoever, That

This is inseparable from their Nature, and prevails in every Instance.

THIS Principle of *Self-love* is so essential an *In-gredient* in their inmost Nature and Constitution, that they may sooner lose their very Being, or suffer an utter Extinction of their Existence, than be

Self-enjoyment: He contemplates his own Administration in all its Beauties, and dwells in Thoughts worthy himself. Arian. Lib. 3. Cap. 13. 'Ο Θεός αὐτὸς μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν. His Happiness never changes; it is always one, simple, uniform Enjoyment. Arist. Eth. Lib. 7. 'Ο [Θεός] δὲ δαίμων μὴ ἔστι καὶ μακροχρόνιος, οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐδ' τῶν ἑταίρειων ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ οὐδ' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῶν πᾶσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. He is blessed and happy, not from any foreign Possessions, but in himself, and in the Perfections of his Nature. Id. Polit. Lib. 7. Cap. 1.

(1) Quis tam cæcus in contemplandis rebus unquam fuit, ut non videret species istas hominum collatas in Deos, consilio quodam sapientum, quo facilius animos imperitorum ad Deorum cultum, a vitæ pravitate converterent? Was ever any Man so stupid and blind in the Contemplation of the Nature of Things, as not to perceive, that wise Men have only attributed those human Parts and Figures to the Deity, for this Purpose, viz. that they might thereby the more easily withdraw the Minds of the Unlearned from the Corruptions of Life, and gain them over to the Service and Worship of God? Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. 1.

be stript or divested of it (1): Nor is it really possible, that in any one particular Instance of our Conduct, or Intercourse with one another, we can ever act but under its Influence. For it must be own'd, that *Self-love* lies always at the Bottom of every rational Mind, and is universally the *first Spring*, as I have before hinted, that awakes her Powers, and begins her Motions, and carries her on to Action. And as no Being can any more suspend the commanding Influence of this Principle, than he can *annihilate* himself; so there is no Being that can extinguish it in another, but by putting an *End* to his Existence. So that Self-love is absolutely *inseparable* from God, and from human Nature; and therefore, very manifestly, is a fixed, steady, and *unalterable* Principle, whereby our great Head and Governor, and all the human Race, are absolutely and *necessarily* govern'd.

AND as it is thus evident, that all rational Agents are irresistibly, in all Instances, under the prevailing Power of *Self-love*; so, in consequence of this, 'tis very certain, that we can *no otherwise* value or esteem either Persons or Things, with which we have any Correspondence, than according as they *gratify this Principle*, and serve

They
favour or
esteem no
other Being,
but as they
gratify this
Principle.

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to

(1) Nam prius poterit a se quisque discedere, quam appetitum earum rerum, quæ sibi conducunt, amittere. *For a Man will be sooner able to run away from himself, and desert his Nature, than lose his Desire after those Things that tend to his Interest.* Cic. de Finib. Lib. 5.

Sect. VI. to promote our Interest or Happiness (1). For a rational Soul, in all its Motions and Actions, being still egged on by its *Self-love*, or an irresistible Desire to compass its own *Well-being*, whatever Objects it meets with in its Pursuits, that contradict this Principle, and give it Pain or Uneasiness, this immediately shocks and alarms it; so that it cannot but fly off from such Persons, or Things, with Hatred and *Aversion*. And thus, by an absolute Necessity of Nature, all intelligent Agents being still in pursuit after their own *Well-being*, they love and embrace, and value and esteem, whatever Objects they have any Commerce with, no otherwise than as they favour their *Self-love*, and entertain them with Pleasure and Happiness. From which it unavoidably follows,

THAT

(1) Καθόλου ὅτι, μὴ ἑξαπατᾶσθαι, πᾶν ζῶον ὕδινι ὅπως ὠ-
κεῖται, ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συζεύγνῃ. ὅ, π ἂν ἔν τῷ πρὸς τὸ πρὸς αὐτοῦ
αὐτὸ ἐμποδίζων, ἂν τ' ἀδελφός ἢ πατήρ, ἂν τε πατήρ, ἂν τε
τέκνον, ἂν τε ἐρωμένη, ἂν τε ἐραστής, μισοῖ, σπυδαῖσιν, κα-
ταπαύσῃ. ὅθεν ὁ ἔπος εἰλεῖν πικρὸν, ὡς τὸ αὐτῷ συζεύγνῃ. ὅτο
πατήρ, καὶ ἀδελφός, καὶ συγγενής, καὶ παῖς, καὶ θεός. Do not
mistake it; for in the whole System of animate Beings,
there is not one to be found, that is so strongly attach'd to
any Thing, as to its own Interest. Whatever therefore in-
terrupts a Man in his Pursuit after Happiness, that is
the Thing which he hates, which he detests, and imprecates,
let it be Brother, or Father, or Child, or Friend. For that
in the Frame of our Nature, we are determin'd to affect
nothing so much, as our own Interest or Happiness: This
is Father, and Brother, and Kinsman, and Country, and
God. Arian. Lib. 2. Cap. 22.

THAT, to gain the *Esteem* and Good-liking of *God*, and of all *Mankind*, there is a Necessity for us, in all the Parts of our Conduct towards them, to *suit* and *adjust* our Affections and Actions to this great *common Principle*, whereby they are all absolutely govern'd; and according to our gratifying of which, they necessarily *proportion* to us their Esteem and Approbation: And I am apt to believe that all the World will allow, that 'tis quite impossible, either for God or Man, to prescribe any other Method to us. For I would fain know, can God, or any other rational Being, cease to love himself? And if he cannot (which, I dare say, the Reader will own to be an absolute Truth) how is it to be conceived, that he can ever make Choice of any Series of Affections and Actions, that run *counter* to this Principle, or approve and value that Person who goes about to offer Violence to his Nature, or to act Things directly inconsistent with his Perfections? Or, can we flatter or persuade a Man out of his *Self-love*, or bring him to like and esteem us for thwarting and opposing it? This is all utterly *inconsistent* with the very innermost Principles of Things.

AND therefore Matters thus far do by no Means depend upon *arbitrary Will* or Humour, but are fixed, eternal, and *unchangeable*. Which gives us plainly to understand, that if ever we expect to have the Favour and Commendation of those Beings with whom we are joyned in *Society*, we must necessarily adapt our Behaviour

And therefore to gain the Esteem of God, and of all Mankind, we must necessarily adapt our Affections and Actions to this great commanding Principle.

So that Matters thus far are fixed, and do not depend on arbitrary Will.

Sect. VI. to the Gratification of their Self-love, or their natural Desire of Well-being. This is the Method we must needs take; and there is manifestly no other Course whatsoever, which we can invent our selves, or that can be proposed to us by others, that can at all serve our Purpose. So that I shall now consider,

2. There is only one determin'd Series of our Affections and Actions, that suits with the Self-love of all intelligent Beings.

In the second Place, Whether there is only one particular *determin'd Series* of our Affections and Actions, that corresponds to this one *common Taste* or Principle; so as that any opposite or contrary Course is, in its own Nature, quite inconsistent and contradictory.

AND here it is to be observed, that in determining this particular Series of our Affections and Actions, we are to have no Respect to any particular *Turn* of Self-love or Interest which may be found in one Man, or any Set of Men, besides that which they have in common with the rest of Mankind, and which is commonly so prevalent, that unless we apply ourselves to its Gratification in particular, we cannot well expect that those who indulge it will be apt to esteem us; but are only to consider this Principle, as it *universally prevails* over all the Individuals of this large Community. Thus, *for Instance*, we are not to regard how Self-love, or the Desire of Well-being, peculiarly operates on any Set of Men, who live upon *Rapine* and Violence, but only as it *affects* such Persons in common with the *rest* of the Society. And that this infamous Set of Men, are in some Measure influenced

influenced by the same Principle, and after the Sect. VI. same Manner, that the rest of Mankind are, is evident from hence; that *they will immediately break up and fly asunder, if, within the Compass of their own impious Combination, they do not entertain one another with the same Affections and Actions, that all rational Agents in their Commerce with each other must necessarily observe, in order to keep together in a State of social and friendly Correspondence* (1). And the great Cause of all the Enormities that those human Plagues are guilty of, is their *confining* of this Principle, or their contracting it within the narrow Bounds of

(1) Atque iis etiam qui vendunt, emunt, conducunt, locant, contrahendisque negotiis complicantur, justitia ad rem gerendam necessaria est; cujus tanta vis est, ut nec illi quidem, qui maleficio & scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula justitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuiuspiam qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid, aut clam eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum: ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequaliter praedam disperiat, aut occidetur a sociis, aut relinquetur. Quinetiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus parent, quas observent. *As for Men of Commerce, or any Sort of Business, they can have no Dealing together without Justice. Nay, so universally necessary is the Influence of this Virtue, to preserve any Body of Men united together, that common Highway-men, and those who live upon Rapine and Violence, cannot yet subsist without it: Insomuch that if one Thief, does but steal from another of the same Troop, he shall not be suffer'd to live even among Robbers. And if the Captain of the Band shews but any Partiality, in the Distribution of the Booty, he is at least deserted by his Party, if it does not cost him his Life. For there is a Discipline even among Pirates themselves, and their Laws are duly executed and obey'd.* Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2.

SECT. VI. of their own Gang, and not suffering it to exert itself according to *Nature*, and to take that wide and diffusive Course that extends to all these intelligent Beings with whom they are naturally associated. *Rest assur'd*, says *Antoninus* (1), that every Action becomes you that is agreeable to *Nature*, and let not the Reproaches of any particular Set of Men discourage and mislead you; but value yourself upon having said or done that which is worthy and laudable. As for those Persons who may censure you, they have their own particular Cast of Mind, and are govern'd by their own particular Taste of Things, which you must not regard; but go straight on, following your own and the common Nature of intelligent Beings, for they run into each other, and bend their Course one and the same Way: There being, as *Plato* observes (2), one Appetite or Principle that is common to all Mankind.

For universal Love, and such Affections and Actions as flow from it, can alone gratify this common Principle.

AND it is so very apparent, what particular Course of Affections and Actions are adapted to this universal Principle of this one great Community, that it is impossible for any Mortal, who gives any Sort of Attention, to fall into any Mistake upon this Point. 'Tis very evident, that

(1) Ἀξίον ἑαυτὸν κείνῃ παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ μὴ σὺν προσηπάτῳ ἢ ἐπακολουθεῖν πινὼν μέμψιν ἢ λόγον. ἀλλὰ εἰ καλὸν πεπεσχαῖται, ἢ εἰρήνη, μὴ σταυτὸν ἀπαξίῃ. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχουσιν, καὶ ἴδια ὁρμὴν ἔχουσιν. ἃ σὺ μὴ σέβῃς, ἀλλὰ δὴ δὴ δέξαι πείσῃ, ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ φύσει τῇ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ· μία δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἡ οὐσία. *M. Anton. Lib. 5.*

§ 3.

(2) Πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὅτι κοινὸν ἐπιθυμῖμα ἐστὶν π.

Plat. de Leg. Lib. 3.

that all the several *Affections* of our Mind may be reduced either to *Love* or *Hatred*; and that all our *Actions*, of whatever Sort, do originally spring from one or other of these two Principles. And can any Man be at a Loss to imagine, which of these bears a Suitableness and Correspondence to the common *Taste* and *Appetite* of God, and of all Mankind? It lies certainly obvious to the lowest Understanding, that our *Love* only, with those particular *Affections* and *Actions* that necessarily flow from it, can have this *Fitness* and *Congruity*: For since all those Beings with whom we are associated, and whose Esteem we cannot but naturally wish for, and desire, are themselves still seeking after the Gratification of their *Self-love*, and cannot possibly value or affect any Thing, but as it suits with, and favours this *Appetite*, manifest it is, that when we meet, and sincerely embrace them with *Love* and *Esteem*, and entertain them with all the genuine Expressions of such friendly Passions; this exactly corresponds with their commanding *Taste* and *Appetite*, cannot but give them secret Joy and Pleasure, and render us, who are the Authors thereof, very acceptable (1). One cannot but observe, that

(1) Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη, ὅταν ἔν, ὃ Κεῖτόβουλος, φίλος πρὸς βίαν γινώσκῃ, ἔασιν με κατεῖπεν οὐ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι ἀγαπᾷ τὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐπιθυμῆς φίλος αὐτῆς ἔστι. κατηγόρει, ἔφη ὁ Κεῖτόβουλος, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα μυστήρια τοῦ ἐπαυνοῦντος, ἔας δὲ οὐ πρὸς κατηγόρησιν,

SECT. VI. that Things, in this Case, are as well adjusted, and cannot but as necessarily produce their Effects, as the gentle Motion of the Rays of the Sun is proportioned to our animal Oeconomy, and cannot but spread through our Bodies an uniform Diffusion of the most pleasing and kindly Warmth.

So

παρηγοῦν, ἔφη, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. καὶ συννοῶντες ἔχουσιν πρὸς αὐ-
τὸν, ἔφη, καὶ διαβάλλουσι δόξαις καὶ ἑμῶν; ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι,
ἔφη, ἐγγίγνεται εὐνοία πρὸς ἕως ἂν ὑπολάβω συννοῶντες ἔχουσιν πρὸς
ἑμὲ. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔξισται μοι λέγειν περὶ
σοῦ, πρὸς ἕως ἂν βέλαι φίλος ποιήσῃς. ἴαν δὲ μοι ἐπὶ ἔξουσιν
ἀφ' ἑλθῇς πρὸς σοῦ, ὅτι ἐπιμαλῆς τε σοὶ φίλων εἶ, καὶ ἑδὴ ὑπο
χαίρεις ὡς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ τα τοῖς καλοῖς ἔρῃς σοὶ
φίλων ἀγάλλῃ ἢ ἢ ὅτι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
σοὶ φίλων χαίρεις ὑδὲν ἢ ὅτι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. ὅπως τε ταῦτα
ῤῥῆναι τοῖς φίλοις ἐκ ἀποκρίσεως μηχανώμεθα. καὶ ὅτι ἔγνω-
καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν ἔδ, νικῶν τὸν μὲν φίλος ἀποκρίνεται, καὶ
δὲ ἢ ἔχου κακῶς πάντῃ ἂν δέμας σοι ἐπιτήδειον ἔδ μὲν σοῖ.
Σπερον σοὶ ἀγαθῶν φίλων. *Why, my dear Critobulus, says*
Socrates, when you would have any Man to take you into
his Friendship, will you give me Leave to tell him, that you
highly value him, and would be mightily fond of his Friend-
ship? With all my Heart, says Critobulus; for I know no
Body that bears Ill-will to those Persons who speak well of
him. And if I further tell him, says Socrates, that from the
great Value you have for him, you are kindly affected to-
wards him; do you think, that thereby I will expose you to his
Aversion? Not at all, replies Critobulus; for I am myself
sensible, that I love those Persons whom I know to be well-
affected towards me. And if I should be indulg'd further,
and have Leave to say, You are a Man that takes Care
for your Friends, that delights in nothing so much, as
their Good and Prosperity; that their worthy Actions af-
ford you no less Joy than your own; that you are as much
pleased to see them happy, as your self; and that you are
never regardless of their Interests, but always heartily con-
cern'd

So that *universal Love* and Benevolence is *Sect. VI.*
 the great Affection of our Minds, that is adapted
 to this universal Principle of *Self-love*, which
 hath the prevailing Influence over all that large
 Community whereof we are Members (1):
 And when we come to be united by a sincere
 and

cern'd to promote their *Happiness*; in short, that your Prin-
 ciple is, 'tis a many *Virtue* to outdo one's Friends in
 kind Offices, and to restrain the Injuries of other People;
I say, had I Leave to represent you in this Manner, I am
apt to think, I might greatly assist you in making of Friends.
 Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 2.

(1) Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quædam dicunt,
 parenti se, aut fratri, nihil detracturos commo sui causa:
 aliam rationem esse civium reliquorum; hi sibi nihil juris, &
 nullam societatem communis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum
 civibus: quæ sententia omnem societatem distrahit civitatis.
 Qui autem civium rationem dicunt esse habendam, exterorum
 negant: hi dirimunt communem humani generis societatem:
 qua sublata, beneficentia, & liberalitas, bonitas, justitia funditus
 tollitur: quæ qui tollunt, etiam adversus Deos immortales impii
 judicandi sunt: ab iis enim constitutam inter homines societatem
 evertunt. 'Tis absurd what some People advance, namely,
 that, to serve their own Purposes, they would not in any In-
 stance take away what belongs to their Father, or their near
 Relations; but that as to the other Members of the Com-
 munity, the Case is quite different: For with them, they al-
 ledge, they are under no Bond, in no Association to pro-
 mote the publick Interest; which is an Opinion that totally
 ruins all living together under civil Government. And
 as for those who allow, there are particular Measures to
 be observed in relation to one's Fellow-citizens, but none
 with respect to the rest of the World; they again entirely
 destroy the common Society of Mankind, which is follow'd
 with an utter Extirpation of all Beneficence, Generosity,
 Good-nature, Justice; and such as prevent the Exercise
 of

Sect. VI. and hearty Love to our great Lord and Sovereign; and to all our Fellow-men; this leading Passion of the Mind, will necessarily connect our Hearts and Lives, in the steady Exercise and Pursuit of all those Actions, that have a Proportion to, and Correspondence with, all those particular Instances that make up their *Well-being* and *Happiness* (1). For (2), when we thus reverence that universal, rational, social Nature, of which God and all Mankind do partake; or when we thus heartily fall in with that Love which the great Head, and all the Members of this Community bear for themselves, we all move together, as social Beings, in one Body, or we are all carried along by the same

very

of these Virtues, that are the Foundation of human Concord and Amity, must be counted the Enemies of the ever-living God, since they overthrow that Union and Society, which he hath established among Mankind. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3.

(1) Quid autem est amare, ex quo nomen amicitiae ductum est, nisi velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis? What is it to love a Man (from which the Roman Word for Friendship takes its Name) but heartily to wish him possess'd of all happy Enjoyments? Id. de Finib. Lib. 2.

(2) Ο ὅς ποτε λογικῶς, καὶ δολικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς φύσις, ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ ἅλ' ἄλλων ἐπιστρέζει. οὗτος ἀπάντων ὃ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ λογικῶς καὶ κοινωνικῶς ἔχουσιν, καὶ κινεῖσθαι διασώζει, καὶ τὸ ὁμογενεῖ εἰς τοῦτο συνεργεῖ. He that reverences the universal, rational, and social Nature, has little Concern in other Matters, but is careful, above all Things, to keep himself under the Influence of rational and social Dispositions; and by this Means amicably conspires and co-operates with his Fellows, in the Pursuit of their common Happiness. M. Anton. Lib. 6. Sect. 14.

Original of Moral Virtue.

III

very Principle; and cannot therefore but in all the **Sect. VI.**
Parts of our Behaviour, agree and correspond with 
them, so as to please them on all Occasions, and
promote their Good and Interest. And thus,

With respect to God, our Love of him, as our
almighty Creator, our all-wise and gracious
Governor, our most bountiful Benefactor, and
the supreme Disposer of our Futurity, cannot
but be accompany'd with an inward deep Sense
and Acknowledgment of all the glorious Perfections
and Excellencies of his Nature (1), with a
profound

The parti-
cular Affec-
tions and
Actions
flowing
from Love,
that are
acceptable
to God.

(1) Τὸς θεὸν καὶ θεὸς ἀποδείκναι, ἵδι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεί-
νι εἶναι, ὅθεν αὐτὸς ἀπολόγους θεὸς αὐτῷ ἔχει, ὡς ὄντων καὶ διού-
των τὰ ὅλα καλῶς καὶ δικαίως καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τὸ το κατὰ ἀρχαίαν,
τὸ θεοῦ αὐτοῖς, καὶ εἰκὼν πάντοτε νομοῖς, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν
ἐκείνῳ ὡς πρὸς αἰεὶς γνώμης ὁπταλμοῖς. You must
know that the principal Branch of Piety towards God, is,
to have just Conceptions of this exalted Being, viz. that he
is, and that he governs the Universe in Wisdom and Rig-
teousness; and likewise to hold thyself in Readiness to o-
bey him, to submit to all Events, and cheerfully to acquiesce
in them, as brought to pass by the best and wisest of Beings.
Epict. Cap. 38. Primus est Deorum cultus, Deos credere,
deinde reddere illis majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine
qua nulla majestas est. Scire illos esse qui praesident mundo,
qui universa ut sua temperant, qui humani generis tutelam ge-
runt, interdum curiosi singulorum. Hi nec dant malum, nec
habent. Caeterum castigant quosdam, & coercent, & irro-
gant poenas, & aliquando spe boni puniunt. The first Article
of Religion is, to believe there is a God; then to ascribe to
him his Glory and Majesty; to confess his Goodness, with-
out which there is no Majesty; to know that he governs the
World; that he disposes of all Things as his own; that
he takes Care of the human Race, and is sometimes fond,
as it were, of Individuals. As for God, he neither does
Evil,

Sect. VI. profound Worship and Adoration of this exalted Head of the rational World (1); with a devout and cheerful Submission and Resignation to all the Dispensations of his Providence (2); with hearty

Evil, nor is it to be found in his Nature. In the mean While, he chastises, restrains, and afflicts the Wicked, and punishes them sometimes for their Good. Senec. Epist. 96.

(1) *Esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, & eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum coelestium cogit confiteri. The Beauty of the World, and the Order of the heavenly Bodies, oblige us to confess there is some excellent eternal Being, whom Mankind ought to reverence and adore. Cic. de Divin. Lib. 4.*

(2) Ἰπτάξεν ἐν τῇ ᾧ ὁλῶς περίοδῳ τῇ κλήσιν, τὰ σκῆψιν, τὰ οἰκίας, τὰ τέκνα, τὰ γυναῖκα· τί ἐν διομαχῶ; — ἡ λήρη ὅπῃ ἡλίδις ἵσταται τῇ ἰοχρότερον βιαζόμενῳ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικῶν πόθιν ῥά τ' ἔχον αὐτὰ ἡλίδος; ὁ πατὴρ μοι αὐτὰ ἔδωκεν ἑκάστη δὲ τίς; τῇ ἡλίδος δὲ τίς ἀποπέμνη; καὶ καρπὸς δὲ τίς; καὶ δ' ὅρας τίς; τῇ δὲ ὅρας ἀλλήλους συμπλοκὴν καὶ κοινωνίαν τίς; εἴτα σύμπαντα ἀλλήλους παρ' ἄλλων, καὶ αὐτὸν σαυτὸν, ἀναγκαζέας καὶ μέμφοι τ' ὄντα, ἀν' οὗ π' ἀφέληται; τίς ὦν; καὶ ὅτι τῇ ἡλίδος; ἔχ' ἑκάστης οὗ εἰσηγαγὴν; ἔχ' το ὅς ἑκάστης σοὶ ἔδωκεν; ἔστυργες ἔδωκεν; ἔκ αἰδύσεις; ἔλδον; ὡς τίνα δὲ εἰσηγαγὴν; ἔχ' ὡς ἐν τῇ δὴν; ἔχ' ὡς μετὰ ὀλίγου σπεκιδίου ζήσονται ὅτι τῇ γῆς, καὶ δεικνύμενον τῇ διοίκησιν αὐτῇ, καὶ συμπληρούμενον αὐτῷ, καὶ συνορτάσσοντα πρὸς ὀλίγον; ἔδωκεν ἔν, ὡς δὲ δὴ σοὶ δεασάμενος τὴν πομπὴν καὶ τῇ πανήγειν, εἴτα ὅταν σ' ὕψι γὰρ πορδ' ἔδωκεν προσκυρήσας; καὶ ἐν χαλεπότητι ἰσχυρῶν ἡκούσας καὶ εἰδώς· It hath pleased God to subject my Estate, my Goods, my House, my Children, my Wife, to the common Changes and Vicissitudes of the World. Why then do I fight against God? — I do not say it shows me a Fool, to oppose this more powerful Being; but it renders me highly unjust and unrighteous. For how came these Things into my Hands? They were left me by my Father. But how came he by them? Who made the Sun? Who makes the Fruits of

heartly Praises and Thanksgivings for all the Blessings and good Things we enjoy and hope for

Sect. VI.

H

for

the Earth to grow? who distinguishes the Seasons? and who hath brought Mankind thus to mix and associate together? Since therefore thou hast received every Thing, even thy self from God, dost thou fret and find Fault with the Giver, when he is pleased to take any Thing from thee? What art thou? and for what Purpose hast thou come into this World? Was it not God who introduc'd thee? who brought thee forth into the Light? who has provided thee in Companions for your mutual Happiness? who has given thee Senses to relish every comfortable Enjoyment, and Reason to prevent thy making a bad Choice? And in what Character has God introduc'd thee? is it not as a Mortal? to live in a little Body of Flesh upon Earth? here to contemplate the Administration of his Providence, to bear the Part of a Subject of his Kingdom; and for some short Time to assist in the Affairs of his Government? And after thou hast attended the Service of this pompous Assembly, during the Pleasure of the great Director and Governor, wilt thou not retire, when he is pleased to lead thee off, adoring and blessing him for what thou hast seen and heard? Arian. Lib. 3. Cap. 26. Τόλμουν ἀναλίσ-
ξας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἱππῶν, ὅτι καὶ μοι λοιπὸν οἷς ἢ εἰ δέλας
ἐμμενόμενῳ οἷς, ἵσθ' αἰμ. ἵδ' ἐμμενόμενῳ οἷς δούλων
ἐμ δέλας εἰ, καὶ δέλας ἵδ' ἐμμενόμενῳ οἷς εἰ. ἀρχὴν μοι δέλας, ἵδ'
αἰμ, μίμω, φέρον, πένεξ, πλετῶν. ἵδ' οἷς καὶ εἰμμενόμενῳ
τέμω πρὸς καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀπολογήσους. Look up to
God, and say, Make use of me to what Purpose thou
thinkest fit, I submit, I refuse nothing that seems good
in thy Sight. Lead me whithersoever thou wilt; put on
me what Rayment thou pleasest; wilt thou have me to
bear a publick, or a private Character, to stay at Home,
to go into Exile, to be poor, to be rich? In all these
Things I will vindicate thy Providence to the World,
Id. Lib. 2. Cap. 16.

3ea. vi. for (1); with humble *Prayers* for his Favour
 and Protection, both here and hereafter (2);
 With a sincere *Trust* and Affiance in his Power
 and

(1) Εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχομεν, ἄλλο τί ἔσται ἡμᾶς τὰς ἐν κοινῇ καὶ
 ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμῶν ἢ θεῶν, καὶ δυνάμεν, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔχουσιν τὰς χάρι-
 τας; καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ ἀρῆτας, καὶ ἐδιδόναι ἄλλοις ἢ
 ὑμῶν ἢ εἰς τὸ θεῶν; Μεγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέχων ὄργανα
 ταῦτα διὰ τὸ γλῶττα ἐργασώμεθα. Μεγας ὁ θεός, &c. οὐκ ἔστι
 λογικὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὑμῶν μὲν δὲ τὸ θεῶν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μὲν τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶν. καὶ
 αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀποδοῦναι τὸ πλεονέκτημα τῶν ἐν ὅσῳ ἂν δίδωται.
 καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ταῦτα ὡς ἂν ἐργασώμεθα. Did we not
 all reflect, could we otherwise be employ'd either in publick
 or private, than in praising God, in blessing him, and offer-
 ing up to him our Thanksgivings? Ought we not, while we
 are digging, plowing, eating, sing his Praises? Great is
 the Lord, who hath given us these Instruments, whereby
 we labour the Ground. Great is the Lord, &c. As I
 am a rational Creature, 'tis my Duty to praise God; this
 is my Work, this is my Employment; nor will I give it up
 so long as I live: And I invite you all to joyne with me,
 Arias. Lib. 1. Cap. 16.

(2) Θεὸς τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν μέγα κείμενον ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὁ θεὸς
 ἐν ὅσῳ ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῶν. Pray to God who is possess'd
 of great Power; for without his Providence neither
 Good nor Evil befalls Mankind. Theog. Πάντες ἡμεῖς
 καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ ὅσα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αὐτοῖς
 ἐστὶν, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν. All that have any
 the least Degree of Sense or Modesty, before they engage
 in any Thing, whether of great or small Consequence, do
 never fail to call upon God. Plat. in Tim. Ἀλλὰ πᾶν
 τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ, καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν γῇ, καὶ ἐν ὕδατι, καὶ ἐν ἀέρι, καὶ ἐν
 πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοντι, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχοντι ἰσχύος, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχοντι
 νοῦν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχοντι ἰσχύος, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχοντι νοῦν.
 Indeed, Socrates, you pre-
 scribe to us a most excellent Rule, when you command us
 to begin with God in every Thing; for that he has the Di-
 rection and Disposal of all Things, whether they relate to
 the common Affairs of Life, or the more important Matters
 of War: And we shall endeavour to observe it. Xenoph.
 Memorab. Lib. 5.

and Goodness, for whatever can contribute to our real Happiness (1); with a holy and reverend Use of all his Names, Titles, and Attributes, and whatever belongs to the Deity (2);

H 2

with

(1) Ἐλπίεν δ' αἱ πῆς γὰρ ἀγαθούς τ' Θεὸν ἃ δυνάμει, πρὸς τὸν ὅσον ἐπιπρόβουλον, ἀλλ' ἰμεζόντων ἐλπίαι ποιήσονται, ἥ τ' αὖ τὸν παρόντων ἐπὶ τὸ βέλπον μεταβολῆς. οὗτος δ' ἐπὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐκ ὧν τὰς τῶν, αἰεὶ πάντ' αὐτοῖς ἐπαγαγήσεται μετ' ἀγαθῆς ἡ-
 γης. ταύταις δὲ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἔχουσιν χρὴ ζῆν, καὶ ταῖς ἀπο-
 μνήσεσι πάντ' ἥ τ' αὐτοῖς, μηδὲν φοβούμενον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τῇ
 παιδείᾳ καὶ ἀπειθείᾳ ἀναμνηστικὰ ἐπιτείνῃ καὶ ἑαυτὸν σφραγίσ-
 Good Men ought to expect from God the Blessings of his
 Providence, that he will lessen and mitigate their Troubles;
 that he will cause them work together for their Good; and
 that, in due Time, he will bring them to the lasting Enjoy-
 ment of all Happiness. In these Hopes ought every Man
 to live; we should never fail to cherish our Minds with
 them; and not only in our serious Affairs, but in our Di-
 versions and Amusements, we ought to promote such cheer-
 ful Reflections in our selves, and in one another. Plat. de
 Leg. Lib. 5. Πῶς ὅν ἂν τις ἄλλου καὶ ἐυπρόσπερον πρὸς
 Θεῷ, ἢ ὡς αὐτοὶ κινεῖται ὑπὸ ποσῶν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς αὖ δυνά-
 μως ἀλλοτρίᾳ ὑφείκεται. ἵταν γὰρ τις τῶν ποιῶν, φανεροῦς δὲ πρὸς
 τῇ ἐπὶ πρῶτον Θεῷ. Χρὴ ὅν μὴ ἐλλοπίοντα καὶ δυνάμει ἡ-
 μῶν τῶν Θεῷ, ἀποδοῖναι καὶ ἐλπίαν τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ὅ γὰρ
 πρὸς ἄλλων γὰρ π. μείζων ἐλπίων σφραγισθῇ, ἢ οὐδ' ἥ τ' αὖ
 μέγιστα ἀποδοῖναι δυνάμεων. How can a Man, in a more be-
 coming and religious Manner, serve and honour God, than
 by observing the Rules he hath given us for that Purpose?
 But we must discharge our Duty in those Things, to the ut-
 most of our Power; for otherwise, 'tis plain, we do not
 honour him. Let us therefore glorify and honour God, as
 far as we are able; and with Confidence and Assurance
 look for the greatest Blessings at his Hands. Nor is the
 Man right in his Senses, who looks for greater Happiness
 from any other Hand, than the Hand of God, who alone
 is able to bestow the greatest. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 4.

(2) Πάντως μὲν δὲ καλὸν ἐπιπρόβουλον Θεῷ ἐνδύματα καὶ χρυσί-
 ον παρὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐκδοῦναι τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν πλεονε-
 κτεῖν.

severance through all the Designs and Actions *Sect. VI.*
of our Lives, in a close *Imitation* of his moral
Perfections, and in co-operating with him in
the Pursuit of all those Measures he takes and
proposeth for the real Good and Welfare of all
the human Species, *whom he made to be happy* (1).

H 3

I

ἀλλ' ἰδμεζουσιν ὅτοι μὲν ὁ θεὸς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιμετρεῖται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃς οὐκ ἴσκει τὰς ἀνθρώπων πράξεις. Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἠγνοῖτο θεὸς ἰδμεζουσιν, καὶ τὰ
λογισμένα καὶ ἀποφασισμένα, καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βυλόμενα, πάντα καὶ
περιεποιεῖτο καὶ ἐμελεῖτο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥς ἂν ἀνδραποῖαν πάν-
των. Socrates had a far greater Regard to the Sacredness
of his Oath, than the gratifying of the People at the Ex-
pence of Justice, and the saving himself from that Ruin,
with which not a few great Men had threatened him. For
he was assured that God concerns himself with Mankind,
not in the Manner that the Multitude fancy; for they ima-
gine, that while God knows some Things, he is ignorant of o-
thers. As for Socrates, he believed, that God knows all
Things, our Words, and Deeds, and secret Purposes; that
he is every where present, and teaches Mankind concern-
ing the whole of their Duty. Xenoph. Memorab.
Lib. 1.

(1) Τίς ἐν δὲ ἀρεταῖς φίλος καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ; μετὰ καὶ ἵνα
λόγον ἔχουσιν ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὁμοίων τὸ ὁμοίον ὄντι μετέωρον
εἶλον ἀνέειν, τὰ δ' ἀμειψόμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὥς τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ὁ
δὲ θεὸς ἡμῶν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐν ἑνὶ μάλα, καὶ πλεον
μᾶλλον, ἢ πᾶσι, ὡς φασιν, ἀνδραποῖαν. ὅτι ἐν τῇ ταύτῃ
μετρίᾳ γνησιώδους, οἷς δύναμις ὅτι μάλα καὶ αὐτὸν ταύτην ἀ-
ναγκαῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ τὴν τούτων δὴ τὸν λόγον, ὁ μὲν σφόδρως ὁμοῖος,
θεῷ φίλος, ὁμοῖος καὶ ὁ ὅτι μὴ σφόδρως, ἀνέμοιός τι καὶ διὰ το-
ῦ καὶ ἀδικῶ. καὶ τ' ἄλλα ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸν λόγον ἔχει. What
is the Sort of Actions that is pleasing and grateful to the
Deity? Only this one particular Sort, which is express'd
in the old Saying, viz. Like is grateful to its Like; when
the Things themselves have each of 'em its own natural
Powers well proportion'd and adjusted: For as to Things
of another Nature, they are neither grateful to one another,

aer

SECT. VI. I say, our *Love of God* cannot but be accom-
panied with those *inward Affections* of our
Souls, and such *outward Actions* of our Lives.
And does not the *Delight* of God (if I may
speak so) as he is our great Head and Governor,
depend

Only such
Things can
correspond
to his Na-
ture, or to
his Self-
love.

not to those Things that have in themselves a due Fitness
and Symmetry. Now the Nature of God is so far from
being disproportion'd in its inward Powers, that on the con-
trary, he, in an eminent Manner, and far beyond any
Man (to whom some People would bring the Matter) is
the Measure and Standard of all Things. So that whoever
would become acceptable to God, he must of Necessity use
his utmost Endeavours to become like him. Thus a Man
of Goodness and Probity is grateful to God, for he is like him;
but he that is void of these Qualities, is unlike, different,
and unjust. And after the same Manner it holds with
respect to other Instances. Plat. de Legib. Lib. 4. Μαδὴν
ὅτι ἀρετὴν τῷτο, ὅτι ἐστὶ Θεός, καὶ ἀπορετὴν ὅτι "ολων, καὶ ἐκ τῆς
ἀρετῆς αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐκείνου ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διανοούμενον, ὃ ἐσθιμὲν ἄλλοι
ἐστὶ ποῖος πῆρες εἶναι. οἷοις γὰρ αὖ ἐκείνοι ἀρετῶδες, καὶ ἐκείνους
ἀρετῶν καὶ περὶ ἡσυχασμον ἀνάσκει περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ δυναμὶν ἔχουσιν
ἐκείνοις. εἰ πρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τῦτον ἴδι πρὸν. καὶ ἀλλ' ἴδμεν,
καὶ τῦτον ἐκείνους, εἰ ἐνερμακδόν, καὶ τῦτον ἐνερμακδόν. καὶ μεγαλ-
όφρον, καὶ τῦτον μεγαλόφρονα, καὶ οὐκ τοίνυν ζῶντι καὶ πᾶσι
πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. First of all we must know, there is
a God; that he governs the World; and that no Man,
not so say in his Actions, but in the Thoughts and Purposes
of his Heart, can lie conceal'd from him. Then we must
learn what Sort of Being God is: For whatever he is
found to be, the Man who would please and obey him, must
necessarily do all he can to resemble him. So that if God
be true and faithful; if he be free, not subject to unruly
Passions; if he be beneficent; of a noble and exalted Mind;
in all these Qualities and Virtues, we must endeavour to
be like him; and, through the whole Course of our Life,
speak and act every Thing, as Imitators of God. Arim.
Lib. 2. Cap. 14. Vis Deos propitiare? bonus esto. So

Sect. VI. like a covetous Usurer, whose Favour is to be purchased by Bribes. This indeed would be a most unworthy Thing, should God have a Respect only to our Gifts and Sacrifices, and not regard our Souls, whether they are pious and righteous. For my Part, I am well assured, that he values the virtuous Dispositions of the Mind much more than he does the most profuse and pompous Processions and Sacrifices; For 'tis very much in the Power of the most ungodly and wicked upon Earth, to perform such external Acts of Devotion, or to make such Offerings. But God, who cannot be bribed by Presents, despises all these Things. And therefore only Wisdom and Righteousness can successfully recommend us to the Favour and Esteem of the Deity, and of all Men that can pretend to a rational Soul. Nor are the Wise and Righteous any other than such as know how to adjust all their Words and Actions, so as to please both God and Man. And I am very confident, there is no Man that understands any Thing of the Nature of God, but clearly sees, and will accordingly own, that any Series of Affections and Actions, which are contrary to these I have just now named, is directly contradictory to the divine Nature, and such as he cannot but reject with Abhorrence and Indignation. If there be a God, if there be a Providence, as most certainly there is (1); does not the
great

(1) Ὅτι δὲ γὰρ φανερόν λέγω, καὶ σὺ γινώσκεις, ὅτι μὴ ἀναμάρτητος ἔστι ὁ Θεὸς ὁμοιωθεὶς τῷ θανάτῳ ἰδού, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἦν ἡ ἁμαρτία αὐτοῦ.

great Author of our Being recommend him. Sect. VI.
 self to our Love, our Esteem, and Wor-
 ship

αὐτῶν ἐκὼν τιθεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὰς θεάς. ἐνθάδε δὲ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ
 οἱ θεοὶ ὡς ὑποδεικνύουσιν. οἷον γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόν-
 τες, ἔδωκεν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόντων καὶ ὁ πὺν ὅλον
 κόσμον συντάττων τὸ καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
 ἐστὶ, καὶ αἰεὶ μὴ χρωμένους ἀπορίσκειν, καὶ ὕμνῃ, καὶ ἀγῶνισιν παρ-
 ἔχων, θεῶν δὲ τοῦματ' ἀναμνησκόμενοι ὑπακούοντα, ἔτι τὰ
 μέγιστα μὴ ἀπαύτων ὁρᾷ, πόθεν δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀβυστ' ἡμῶν ἐστίν.
 ἐνθάδε δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ πᾶν φανερός δοκῶν εἶναι ἡλιος, καὶ ἐκτείνεται
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυρὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾷν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνα-
 ῥῆς ἐγχαίρειν διδόναι, τὴν ὅλην ἀραιοῖ. καὶ τὴν ὑπερίστα δὲ
 τῶν θεῶν ἐν ὁρίσιν ἀφανῆς ὄντας, κατανόους τε γὰρ ὅτι μὴ ἀνθρώπων
 ὁρίσιν, δὲ ὅλον, καὶ ἐπὶ οἷς ἐν ἐντύχῃ, πάντων κρατῇ ὁρᾷ δὲ
 ἔτι ἐπὶ ὅλῳ, ἔτε κατασκήψας, ἔτε ἀπὸν. καὶ ἀνέμοι αὐτοὶ μὴ
 ἐκ ὁρῶν. αὐτὸ δὲ ποιῶσι φανερὸν ἡμῶν ὅτι, καὶ οὐρανῶν αὐτῶν
 εἰδανόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γὰρ ψυχῇ, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλο
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ θεῶν μαρτυρεῖ ὅτι μὴ γὰρ βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῶν,
 φανερόν, ὁρᾷ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ. αὐτὸ καὶ κατανοῶντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν
 τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν κατα-
 νοοῦντες, πρὸς τὸ δαυμάσιον. You will easily be convinced
 that what I have told you concerning the Providence of God,
 and his tender Care for Mankind, is true, if you do not
 wait till you see the Deity with your bodily Eyes. In the
 mean time, one should think that his Works which you be-
 hold, are Arguments enough to persuade you to worship and
 honour him. Do but consider, that the celestial Beings dis-
 cover themselves no otherwise. For those ministering Spirits
 that attend our Happiness, do us kind Offices without
 shewing themselves. And as for the supreme God, who
 form'd and supports the Universe, wherein every Thing
 beautiful and good is comprehended; and who preserves
 the World (that regularly obeys his Will more swiftly than
 Thought) from all Waste and Decay, whole and entire
 for our Uses and Purposes; I say, this supreme God is
 seen in his wonderful Works, while himself is invisible.
 Nay, the Sun, which seems visible to every Man, does not
 suffer us to look steadfastly at it; and if any Man rashly at-
 tempt it, it strikes him blind. But you will observe, that
 even

Sect. VI. ship (1)? And does he not, in all Instances, express a fatherly Concern for the Welfare and Prosperity of all his Creatures? He is certainly more studi-

even the Ministers of God's Pleasure are invisible. Thus the Thunder comes, we know, from above, and prevails wherever it breaks; but we perceive it not, neither when it comes, nor when it strikes, nor when it goes. Thus likewise the Wind is invisible; and yet we are sensible when it blows, and its Effects are manifest. In short, the Mind of Man, if any Thing humane, has something divine in it: And we see, that it governs the Body, and itself is invisible. So that upon these Accounts, one should not make a Jest of invisible Things, but discerning their Power in the Effects they produce, we ought to reverence and honour the Deity. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 4. See above, the Quot. P. 65. from Xenoph. whereof this is the Continuation.

(1) Ἐν ᾧ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸν θεὸν γίνετο τόδε.

Τῶν μὲν καὶ χαίρειν ἀνθρώπων ἵνα.

'Tis natural to the Deity to be delighted with being honoured and adored by Men. Eurip. Οὐρανὸς δὲ δάκν' ἀπὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτεν ἡγῆτο καὶ τοῖς πῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων θύειν. ὅτε δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἔαν, καλῶς ἔχον, καὶ τῶν μεγάλων θύειν καὶ μὲν καὶ τῶν μικρῶν ἔχον, πολλὰ καὶ δὲ ἀν' αὐτοῖς τὰ ὅσα τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ὅσα τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι καχαισμένα· καὶ ἀν' τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιον εἶναι ἔαν, εἰ πὲρ ὅσα τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ καχαισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς, ἢ τὰ ὅσα τῶν χρηστῶν. ἀλλ' ἐνὸς τὸς θεοῖς τὰς ὅσας τῶν εὐσεβέστερον πᾶσι μᾶλλον χαίρειν. It was the Judgment of Socrates, that the offering up of small Sacrifices out of one's small Estate, is no less valuable in the Sight of God, than the offering up of expensive and numerous Sacrifices out of a large and plentiful Fortune. For, says he, 'tis unworthy of God to be more pleased with greater than lesser Sacrifices; since the Wicked, at this Rate, would frequently become more acceptable to God than good Men: Nor would it be worth Living, if the Offerings of the Vicious were more pleasing to God, than those of the Virtuous. His Opinion was, That God is particularly delight-

ed

studious of our Happiness, than we are ourselves (1). Sect. VI.
 And can it ever be imagin'd (2), that our Contempt and Neglect of this infinite Mind, and our opposing the Designs of his Goodness with respect to ourselves, and the rest of his Creatures, are in any Sort consonant or grateful to his Nature? No, there is Nothing here but the greatest Disproportions and Inconsistencies, that cannot but expose a Man to the divine Displeasure and Aversion. So that there can be no Series of our Affections and Actions, proportioned and adapted to the Self-love of the great Lord and Governor of the human Society, but such as I have above mentioned.

In the next Place, With respect to our Fellow-men.

OUR

ed with the Reverence and Esteem which pious and good Men entertain and express towards him. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 1.

(1) Charior est illis homo quam sibi — Juven.

(2) Θείς ἀτίζων τίς βροτῶν, δῶσαι δίκην.

What Mortal soever dishonours God, shall not escape his righteous Judgments. Æschil. Καὶ αἰεὶς δὲ ἡ θοοῖα τῶν θεῶν εἶναι, ἐν μὲν γαργία, τὸς πὲρ γαργίας ἐν περὶ πόντου, ἐν δὲ ἰατρικῇ, τὸς πὲρ ἰατρικῆς, ἐν δὲ πολιτικῇ, τὸς πὲρ πολιτικῆς. ἢ δὲ μὲν ἐν περὶ πόντου, ἢ ἐν γαργίᾳ, ἢ ἐν πολιτικῇ. These Men, says Socrates, are the best, and the most acceptable to God, who in the particular Employments of Life, as Husbandry, Medicine, the Administration of the Publick, do act their several Parts to Purpose. Whereas the Man, says he, that does nothing right, is a worthless Creature, of no Consequence to his Fellows, and is far from being grateful to the Deity, Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 3.

Sect. VI.



The particular Affections and Actions flowing from Love, that are grateful to our Fellow-men.

OUR Love of them, concurring with that Love which they bear for themselves, will give us a *hearty Concern* for their Interest, and powerfully carry us on, as being all moved by the same common Spring, in *promoting* their Welfare and Happiness. So that,

WE will not live *retir'd*, or stand alienated from the rest of Mankind, or indulge an *Indifferency*, and appear quite unconcerned with them, minding only our own private Business (1): Nor will we *rob* or dispossess any Man, either by Fraud or Violence, of any Branch of his Liberty or Property, or of any of those comfortable Enjoyments in Body, Fortune, or Reputation, that make up his Well-being; and apply, what we may happen to conceive fit for ourselves, tho in the Possession of other People, to our own Uses and Purposes (2). But
on

(1) Sunt etiam, qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendæ, aut odio quodam hominum, suum se negotium agere dicant, ne facere cuiquam videantur injuriam: qui dum altero injustitiæ genere vacant, in alterum incurrunt. Deserunt enim vitæ societatem, quia nihil conferunt in eam studii, nihil operæ, nihil facultatum. *Some there are, who either from a Passion to secure their own Fortune, or from a certain Hatred and Aversion to Mankind, do pretend to mind only their own Business, for fear they should seem injurious to other People. But in avoiding one sort of Injustice, these People fall into another; for that contributing none of their Care their Labour, and Fortune, towards the Good of their Fellows, they plainly desert the Society of Life.* Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(2) Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas uniuscujusque & universorum: quam si ad se quisque

on the contrary, we will bear and express an affectionate Regard for their Persons, and a warm Concernment for their Interests; and be so far from disturbing them in any of their Enjoyments, as to do all we can to assist them in their Pursuits after Happiness, and to gratify their commanding Principle of *Self-love* or Interest, with Relation both to their Bodies and Minds, in all Instances whatsoever (1). And particularly,

We

que rapiat, dissolvetur omnis humana consociatio. Atque si etiam hoc natura præscribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam quod is homo sit, consultum velit: necesse est secundum eandem naturam, omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes, & eadem lege naturæ: idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur. *All Men therefore ought so to form their Views and Schemes of Life, as that the Interest of every Individual may coincide, and prove the same with that of the whole Body: For if every Man should seize it for himself, all human Society shall be dissolved. And if Nature also commands, that one Man shall have a tender Concernment for another, whoever he be, upon this very Account, that he is of human Kind; then, according to the same Nature, there must of Necessity be one common Interest belonging to all Mankind. From whence it follows, that we are all of us under the Authority of one common Law of Nature; and are therefore certainly forbid to do Harm to any of our Species.* Id. ibid. Lib. 3. Detrahere autem alteri sui commodi causa, magis est contra naturam, quam mors, quam dolor, quam cætera generis ejusdem. Nay, to spoil another for one's own Advantage, is more contrary to Nature, than Death, than Pain, than all other such like Evils. Id. ibid.

(1) In omni autem honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre, nec quod latius pateat, quam conjunctio inter homi-

SECT. VI. We will behave ourselves towards all Men with *Meekness* and *Gentleness*, *Easiness* of *Access*,

homines hominum, & quasi quædam societas, & communicatio utilitatum, & ipsa caritas generis humani: quæ nata a primo sætu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, & tota domus conjugio & stirpe conjungitur, serpit sensim foras cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiiis, post vicinitatibus cum civibus, & iis, qui publice socii, atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanæ. Quæ animi affectio suum cuique tribuens, atque hanc, quam dico, societatem conjunctionis humanæ munifice æque tuens, justitia dicitur; cui adjunctæ sunt pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quæque sunt generis ejusdem. Arque hæc ita justitiæ propria sunt, ut sunt virtutum reliquarum communia. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam innatum quasi civile, atque popolare, quod Græci πολιτικὸν vocant; quidquid aget quæque virtus, id a communitate, & ea, quam exposui, caritate, atque societate humana, non abhorrebit: vicissimque justitia, ut ipsa se fundet usu in cæteris virtutes, sic illas expetet. *In the whole Compass of Virtue, of which we speak, there is nothing so illustrious, or that is more extensive, than the Friendliness of Men one towards another, a certain Society and Communication of Interests, and the very Love of Mankind. For this Friendliness or Humanity, springing up with one's Offspring (when Children have the tender Affections of their Parents, and the whole Family is united together in Wedlock and Blood) it creeps abroad, and stretches itself, first to one's Kindred, next, to those that are ally'd to us; then, it spreads among Friends; after that, among those that live in the Neighbourhood, and such as are Friends and Allies to the State; and last of all, it widens, and takes within its Compass the whole Race of Mankind. Now that Affection of the Mind which gives to every Man his own, and nobly and uniformly preserves this Union of human Society, is called Justice; which is always accompany'd with Piety, Goodness, Liberality, Sweetness of Temper, Gentleness, and every other Disposition of the like Nature:*

But

cess, Courteousness and Affability (1). We will be candid, open and Ingenuous in all our Discourses, our Dealings, and Transactions with them (2). We will be true and faithful to our

But these Things are not so united to Justice, as not likewise to go along with the other Virtues. For human Nature being so framed, that in its inward Constitution it has something mild, civil, and popular, which the Greeks call *παιειναι*, 'tis impossible that the Influences of any Branch of Virtue, can ever be repugnant to human Society and Fellowship, or to that Love of Mankind which I have explained. And Justice again, as it diffuses itself in its Exercise into the other Virtues, so it affects and desires them. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 5.

(1) Sed quoniam in omni vita rectissime præcipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est, motus animi nimios, rationi non obtemperantes: sic ejusmodi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira existat, aut cupiditas aliqua, aut pigritia, aut ignavia, aut quid tale appareat. Maximeque curandum est, ut eos quibuscum sermonem conserimus, & vereri & diligere videamur. But so farasmuch as we are excellently directed to shun, upon all Occasions, all Perturbation, or the violent Motions of the Mind that are not govern'd by Reason; so our Speech in particular ought to be so temper'd and manag'd, as not to betray any Anger, any unsocial Appetite, any lazy and indolent Disposition, or any Thing of the like Nature. And we should especially endeavour, in our Manner of expressing ourselves, to shew that we are influenc'd with Good-will and Esteem towards those Persons we converse with. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1. Difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliat animos hominum comitas, affabilitasque sermonis. One cannot well tell, how much a courteous and affable Deportment recommends us to the kind Affections of other People. Id. ibid. Lib. 2.

(2) In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio, atque investigatio——Ex quo intelligitur, quod verum, simplex, sincerumque sit, id esse natura hominis aptissimum. To

SECT. VI. our Words and Promises (1). We will sympathize and condole with them in all their Afflictions and Miseries, and contribute our Help seasonably and kindly, as we have it in our Power, to comfort and relieve them (2). We will

enquire and search after Truth is a Thing peculiar to Mankind—— From whence we learn, that whatever is true, upright, and sincere, is most consonant and agreeable to human Nature. Id. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(1) *Fundamentum autem est justitiæ fides, id est, dictorum conventorumque constantia & veritas. The Foundation of Justice is Faith, that is, Truth and Constancy in our Words and Contracts. Id. ibid.*

(2) *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto. I am a Man, and there is nothing that affects my Fellow-men, wherein I do not count myself concerned. Terent. Certe enim non e marmore sculpti, aut e robore dolati sumus; est in nobis quiddam, quod pietate, misericordiaque moveatur, nec extinguere finit illam, qua Diis proximi sumus, juvandi, ac benefaciendi voluntatem. Idque insitum homini, atque innatum videtur, ut, quoties alium hominem, quamvis alienum, premi calamitate atque ærumna videat, crucietur animo, nec, si facultas suppetat dimittendam putet illius sublevandi occasionem. Quam enim ipse si eo loco esset, benignitatem sibi impartiri optaret, ea ut in alium utatur natura, tacita quadam voce, monere ac præcipere videtur. For certain it is, we are not hewn out of Marble, nor are we cut out of Oak; there is something that makes us sensible of Tenderness and Compassion, and that prevents our losing that Propension in our Nature to assist and do good to human Kind, whereby we nearly resemble the Deity. And it is interwoven in the Nature of Man, that whensoever he sees another Man, though a Stranger, oppressed with any Affliction or Misery, he is vex'd at the Heart, and cannot think of letting slip the Opportunity, if he has it in his Power, to comfort and relieve him. For what Tenderness and Humanity he would*

wish

SECT. VI Abilities will allow us (1), ever delighting, as *Antoni* (2) directs us, to go on from one social Duty to another, with a just Regard to the Duty.

* Only such Things can correspond to their Self-love.

Thus, I say, will infallibly be our Conduct (3) towards all our own Species, when our Affections

contra sensum quemdam, voluptatemque percipio, si ea, quæ non denegantur, amicis video superesse. Plin. Lib. 1. Ep. 10.

(1) Sed quoniam (ut præclare scriptum est a Platone) non nobis solum nati sumus, ortusque nostri partem patriæ vindicat, partem parentes, partem amici: atque (ut placet Stoicis) quæ in terris gignuntur ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se, aliis aliis, prodesse possent: in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, & communes utilitates in medium asferre, mutatione officiorum, dando, accipiendo: tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. Since we are born (as has been wonderfully well observ'd by Plato) not for ourselves only, but our Country, our Parents, our Friends do all claim a Share in us: And since all the Productions of the Earth (as the Stoicks affirm) were created for the Use of Man; but Men are brought into Being for the Sake of one another, that they may all contribute, every one towards another's Well-being and Happiness: In this we ought to follow Nature as our Guide, and appear in the World as common Blessings to each other, in an Exchange of kind Offices, by mutually giving and receiving; and do all we can by Arts, Industry, and whatever we are Masters of, to unite and knit Mankind in Society together. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(2) Εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ κοινωνίαν, τὸ δὲ πλεονέκτην κοινὸν ἀνταλλάττειν ὅτι πλεονέκτην κοινωτικῶν, οὗ μὴ μόνον ὄν. M. Anton. Lib. 6. § 7.

(3) Hominiбус prodesse natura jubet; ferve, liberive sint hi, ingenui an libertini, justæ libertatis, an inter amicos data quid refert? ubicunque homo est, ibi beneficio locus. Nature commands us to communicate Happiness to Mankind.

fections and Actions have a Suitableness and *Sect. VI*
 Connection with their natural Desire of Well-being. And as all these Things are nothing else, but the genuine and necessary Expressions of our Love to Mankind, when it corresponds with, and answers to that with which they all irresistibly embrace themselves; so there is no other Course of Behaviour, that can have this Fitness and Agreement, with their great commanding Principle of Self interest: For, can there be a greater Inconsistency betwixt Light and Darkness, than there is betwixt a Man's Self-love, or his passionate Desire after his own Well-being, and our shewing an Indifference and Unconcernedness toward him, so as to refuse to help or relieve him in any of his Affairs (1)? Our treating him with Disdain and Haughtiness, or with Rudeness and Inhumanity (2)? Our imposing

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posing

kind. And it matters not what Peoples Rank or Station is in the World; for wherever there is a Man, there it is you have a proper Object for the Exercise of Kindness and Beneficence. Senec. de Vita Beat. Cap. 24.

(1) Quæ omnes artes [astrologia, geometria, &c.] in veri investigatione versantur: cuius studio a rebus agendis abduci, contra officium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit. All these several Sciences (Astronomy, Geometry, &c.) are concern'd in the Investigation of Truth. But if by such Enquiries we are led away from pursuing those Actions that tend to the Good of Mankind, we then trespass upon our Duty. For the Excellency of Virtue consists wholly in Action. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(2) Quæ autem natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum, &c. Beneficii memorem diligit? quæ superbos,

SECT. VI. *posing upon him by Lies and Falshoods; and breaking our Word, and disappointing him when we gave him Ground to depend on us (1)? Our traducing and defaming him (2)? And our carrying away from him, either secretly or openly, by Trick and Cunning, or Oppression and Violence, those Necessaries and Comforts of Life he is possessed of, whereby he is exposed*

to
bos, quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos, non aspernatur, non odit? *What Nation is there that does not highly value Gentleness, Benignity, a grateful Mind, and one that remembers the Favours that are done him? Where is the Nation that does not hate and despise the Proud, the Malicious, the Cruel, the Ingrate?* Cic. de Legib. Lib. 1.

(1) Et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi, quod facillime apparet, cum vacui curis, etiam quod in cælo fiat, scire avemus: his initiis inducti, omnia vera diligimus, id est, fidelia, simplicia, constantia; tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem, perjurium, malitiam, injuriam. *And since the same Nature has implanted in the Mind of Man a Desire after Truth, which is evident from hence, that when we are free from Cares and Business, we are fond to know even what is passing in the Heavens; hence it is, that as we love and value all Things that are true, that is, honest, upright, constant; so we hate and abhor all Things that are vain, false, treacherous, such as Deceit, Perjury, Malice, Injustice.* Id. de Finib. Lib. 2.

(2) Οὐ θαυμάζω ὅτι οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὐκ ἐστὶν μέγιστον κακὸν διαβολὴν ἢ ὅτι αὐτοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κακῶν ποιοῦντες; ἢ ποῖν τοῦ μὴ ἀδολογῆσαι εὐδοκίμουν, τοῦ ὅτι μὴ ἀνὴρ ἡδονοκότας δοκεῖν ἀδικεῖν; ἢ ὅτι μὴ ἀλλόθεν ἀφαιρῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ὅτι δόξας ἀφαιρῆσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδικῶς ἀποδιδόναι. *I do not much wonder at People's maintaining, that Calumny is a great Evil; for what can be more mischievous? It causes such as deal in Falshood, to make a fair Shew in the World,*

to Want, Shame, and Misery (1)? I say, does Sect. VI.
Light bear a greater Contradiction to Darkness, 
than a Man's Self-love, or his natural Concern
for his own Well-being, does to such a Series
of Affections and Actions? Every Body will

I 3

own,

World, while it blackens the innocent with the Appearance
of Injustice. In a Word, it banishes Truth, and making
wrong Impressions upon the Hearers, it basely ruins Peo-
ple without Distinction. Isocrat. de Permut. In primis pro-
videat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse moribus: quod
maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiose de absentibus, detra-
hendi causa, aut per ridiculum, aut severe, maledice, contu-
melioseque dicitur. Above all Things we must be careful
that our Discourse may not betray some Vice or Defect in
our Morals. And this happens most commonly, when a
Man talks spitefully of the Absent, and either in Jest or
in Earnest maliciously exposes them to Ignominy and Re-
proach. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(1) Οὐτ' ἔμοιγε δοκῶ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐν ἐλπίδι αὐτῶν
ζῆναι καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὐτῶν συνιστάμενα, καὶ τὰ τὴν πόλιν
ἵπας διανοομένων παρῆσαι καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ μακάριον μέλλοντα
ἵστασθαι. ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἔκ δευτέρου ἡρώτα ἀκολούθως εἶναι, καὶ
ταῦτα ἐπιχειρήσεια πληρῶς ἀντιτύπον χαλκόν, ληστὴ βίον ζῶντα.
ἔτι γὰρ ἐν ἀλλῷ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνης εἶναι ὁ πῦτος, ἔτι διὰ
κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδωάτω. ὅτι καὶ μὴ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ φίλος ἔκ αὐτοῦ εἶναι.
This, in my Opinion, is what the Man who would incline
to be happy, must always have in View, and towards
which he must direct all his Actions of whatever Sort,
namely, that he may acquire Righteousness and Tempe-
rance: I say, he must live in the Exercise of these Vir-
tues, and not suffer his Passions to grow headstrong and
insatiable, nor, like a common Robber, attempt to fulfil
them: For this he would find an infinite Evil, since that
in this Course of Life, he can never be grateful either to
God or Man, it being impossible for him to correspond and
agree with them: And where there is no Correspondence
and Agreement, there can be no friendly Intercourse. Plat.
in Gorg.

own, 'tis impossible there can be in Nature greater Contradictions and Inconsistencies (1). 'Tis a very just Observation of Antoninus (2).

As

(1) Detrahare igitur aliquid alteri, & hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum, magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accedere, aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum, & societatem, si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum, spoliet, aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. Ut, si unumquodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset; debilitari, & interire totum corpus necesse est: sic si unusquisque nostrum rapiat ad se comoda aliorum, detrahatque quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum, communitasque evertatur, necesse est. *To take away any Thing wrongfully from any Man, and to make one's Fortune by the Losings of another, is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Beggary, Pain, and whatever else can besal a Man's Body and outward Enjoyments: For at first Dash it destroys all Neighbourhood and Society. And indeed if we should come once to entertain an Opinion, that one Man for his own Advantage, may assault, or make a Prey of another, the utter Ruin and Dissolution of human Society, which is most consonant to Nature, cannot possibly be prevented. For if you put the Case, that every one of our Members has the Conceit, it would thereby promote its own Health, if it should draw to itself the Health and good Blood of the Member next to it; as the whole Body must then of Necessity consume and perish: So in like manner, if every Man should judge it for his Interest to take from another what he can get, and to apply his Neighbours Goods to his own particular Uses; this would as necessarily totally ruin all Friendliness and Fellowship among Men.* Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3.

(2) Κλέψῃς τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ δὲ ἀποκοπῇς, ὡς δὴ καὶ μὴ δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν ἀποκοπῇς: ἅτω δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὡς ἑαυτοῦ ἀνδρῶν

As a Branch, says he, cut off from its neighbour-
 ing one, is at the same Time likewise cut off from
 the whole Body of the Tree; so a Man alienated
 from but one single Person, is cut off from the
 whole Community: And this he does himself, by
 the Hatred and Aversion which he bears at his
 Neighbour, however little he may think, that
 he thereby lops off himself from the whole Body of
 the Society. In short, one cannot but conclude,
 that only such Expressions of Love to our Fellow-
 men, as I have just now mentioned, can have
 a Correspondency and Agreement with that uni-
 versal Principle of Self-love, whereby all Man-
 kind are, in the Frame of their Nature, irresist-
 ibly actuated (1).

I 4

AND

ἀποχρίσεις, ὅτις ἡ ἐχθρότης ἀπορίσσει. ἀνδρῶν δὲ ἡ αὐτοῦ
 αὐτὸν τὸ πλεονέκτην χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀποχρίσις ἀντὶ τῆς
 ἐν τῇ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ πλεονεξίας ἀμα ἀπορίσσει αὐτὸν. M.
 Anton. Lib. 11. § 8.

(1) Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν χαίρεις με παρ' ἑμαὶ αὐτὸς (δοκίμῃ) πλε-
 ονέκτην οὐκ ἀπορίσσει τὸ δὲ αὐτὸς ἡ πλεονέκτης — ἐγὼ δὲ
 ὑπερῶν μὲν τοῖς δικαίς, ἡ ὀρίσσει αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην, ἐπὶ αὐτὸν δὲ
 ἐχθρότης, αὐτὸν δὲ ἰδὼν πλεονέκτην οὐκ αὐτὸν ἀπορίσσει, τὸν
 πλεονέκτην τὸν ὀρίσσει αὐτὸν ἐχθρότης, ἡ πλεονέκτην ἡ ὑπερῶν
 ἀνδρῶν ἡ ὑπερῶν αὐτὸν ἐχθρότης ἡ ὀρίσσει αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην, ἐπὶ αὐτὸν
 ἐχθρότης ἀπορίσσει αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐχθρότης, ἐπὶ αὐτὸν
 πλεονέκτην αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην. ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐχθρότης ἐπὶ αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην, πλε-
 ονέκτην ἡ πλεονέκτην ἡ πλεονέκτην αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην, πλεονέκτην
 δὲ ἡ πλεονέκτην αὐτὸν πλεονέκτην πλεονέκτην. You would
 have me to hold up Money, whereby I should only expose
 my self to Envy and Hatred. — For my Part I worship
 God, and beg of his Providence an Increase of my For-
 tune; and when I obtain it, whatever I find is more than
 I can make use of. I therewith supply the Wants of my
 Friends. By which Means enriching others, and doing
 them

Sect. VI.

The Proportion and Agreement of these Affections and Actions severally to the Self-love of God, and of all Mankind, is absolute and independent.

AND here it is to be remarked, that as those Things which I have represented upon both Points, do correspond and agree severally, to that universal Principle of *Self-love*, wherewith God himself, as our great Head and Governor, and

them kind Offices, I gain their Benevolence and Friendship, wherein I have both Safety and Glory, that are Enjoyments which cannot be eaten up with Rust, nor spoiled by too much Abundance: Nay, the more extensive one's Glory is, it is so much the greater, the more splendid, and the easier to be carried; and very frequently those who possess it do thereby become more nimble and expeditious in their worthy Pursuits. Xenoph. de Instit. Cyr. Lib. 8. Aut opera benigne fit indigentibus, aut pecunia. Facilior est hæc posterior, locupletati præsertim: sed illa lautior, ac splendidior, & viro forti clarioque dignior. Quamquam enim in utroque inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca, altera ex virtute depromitur: largitioque quæ fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit; ita benignitate benignitas tollitur, qua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis. At qui opera, id est, virtute & industria, beneficii & liberales erunt; primum quo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adjuutores habebunt: deinde consuetudine beneficentiae paratiores erunt, & tanquam exercitationes ab bene de multis promerendum. We oblige those that stand in Need of our Help, either by our Labour, or by our Money. The latter is the easier Way, especially where the Benefactor is Master of an Estate; but the other is the more honourable and splendid, and better becoming a clear and generous Mind, For tho the Will may be frank enough in both, yet the one Obligation is rather a Debt to his Fortune, but the other to his Virtue. And then by these pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountain is drawn dry; for this Sort of Bounty wastes and fails in the Exercise, so that the more People you oblige this Way, the fewer you shall be capable of serving. But he that is liberal of his Pains, that is to say, of his Industry and Virtue, the more Good

and all the human Race are inspired, and upon which they necessarily act in all Instances whatsoever; so 'tis exceedingly manifest, that this Congruity and Proportion to that universal Principle, is antecedent to any Act of the arbitrary Will of any Being whatsoever, and that it directly and immediately flows from the very Nature, or essential Properties of Things, as they stand related, compar'd, or apply'd to one, another. For,

THIS one universal Community being once constituted, or, God having made so many rational Agents to live together in Society, under himself as our supreme Governor; and it being

be has done already, the more Friends will be find to assist him toward the doing of more: And then by the Custom and Practice of doing good Offices, a Man does not only learn the Way of obliging, but gets the very Habit of it. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2. Ζεύς ἔν δίκῃς καὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπρὸ τοῦ παρ Ἑρμῶν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τὸ καὶ δίκην, ἵνα ἕαν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοί, φιλίας συντηγῇ. ἐρωτᾷ ἔν Ἑρμῇ, διὰ τίνα ἔν πρόσωπῳ δίδῃ δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις πότιον ὥς αἱ τέχναι γενέσθω. ὅτω καὶ ταύτας νοίμω; γενέσθω δὲ καὶ εἰς ἔχον ἱερὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ἱερὰς ἰδούταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὴ μνηστοί: καὶ δίκην δὲ καὶ αἰδῶ ὅτω δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; ἢ ὅτι πάντας νοίμω; ὅτι πάντας ἱερὰ ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων. ἢ καὶ ἂν γένοντο πόλεες οἱ δὲλοι εὐσῶν μετέχοντες ἄλλων τεχνῶν. καὶ νόμον γὰρ θεὸς παρ' ἡμῶν τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδέσθαι καὶ δίκης μετέχον, κταίμεν ὥς νόμον πόλεως. To prevent the Ruin of human Kind, God has laid in the Minds of all Men the Principles of Modesty and Righteousness, that thereby we may live with Honour in Society with one another, and unite together in mutual Love and Amity. Nor is it possible for Mankind without these Principles, to live associated together. Protag. apud Plat. in Protag.

Seft. VI. being naturally impossible, but that we must all be so absolutely under the Influence of Self-love, that we can relish nothing, but as it favours this our essential Appetite: Let us suppose, there is Nothing particularly determin'd with Respect to our Behaviour towards one another. And in this Case, the Question is, "Is it a Matter of *Indifferency* what Sort of Conduct we observe toward each other? Or, is every Series whatsoever of Affections and Actions, when apply'd to our common-Principle of Self-love, capable enough to please and gratify it? So as that Hatred and Contempt may be fully as *acceptable* as Love and Esteem? And does all the *Difference* among Things now, and the Reasons why we like and pursue *this*, and hate and avoid *that*, proceed only from some Act of an *arbitrary* Will, which is *subsequent* to our being form'd in all our natural Principles, and to our being mixed with one another? In a Word, does our sincere and hearty Love and Esteem of another Being, with all the genuin and necessary Effects thereof, when apply'd to that Love and Good-liking he has for himself, bear a *natural* and absolute Congruity and Correspondence to that Principle? Or, does this Suitableness and Proportion arise only from the *arbitrary* Will of some Being, that made it so, when it might have been quite otherwise?" This is the very Point. And I shall answer it by this other Question.

Does

DOES the Equality and Agreement of two *Triangles*, that stand upon the same or equal Bases, and between the same Parallels, depend upon any arbitrary Will? Or, is it founded in the very Nature of Things, so as that it cannot possibly be otherwise? As to this, I suppose, all the World are satisfy'd. And if, from the disposing of two *Triangles* in this Manner, there necessarily resulteth this Proportion and Correspondence betwixt them, independently of the Will of any Being whatsoever; is it not equally manifest and certain, that from our being joyn'd in Society with another Being, and comparing our Love of him with that Love he bears for himself, there ariseth a Fitness and Congruity in as absolute and independent a Manner?

AND as those Proportions are, in their Original, absolute and independent; so are they naturally steady, fix'd, immutable, and eternal. For, being all founded in the Things themselves, and not depending on the arbitrary Will of any Being whatsoever, they must necessarily continue always the same, equal, and uniform, while those Things, to which they belong, have any Sort of Existence, were it only in the Mind of the Deity, with which, Cicero tells us, *Virtue is coeval* (1). As the *Triangles* in the

And fix'd
immutable
and eternal,

(1) Hanc igitur video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingenio excogitam, neque scitum aliquod

SECT. VI the Case above-mentioned, can never to Eternity, by any Power or Ordinance whatsoever, alter, or lose their Proportion and Agreement: So that most evidently there is only *one particular Series* of our Affections and Actions, that *corresponds* to this one universal Principle of *Self-love*, whereby our supreme Head and Governor, and all the human Species, are, in all Instances,

quod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam, & ultimam, mentem esse dicebant, omnia ratione cogentis, aut verantis Dei. — Nec si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sext. Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ attulit, erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura, & ad recte faciendum impellens, & a delicto avocans. Quæ non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est; orta autem simul est cum mente divina. *This I find therefore to have been the Opinion of Men of the best Sense and greatest Wisdom, namely, that moral Virtue is not framed at human Pleasure, nor is it the Decree of the People, but something Eternal, that governs the whole World by its wise Commands and Prohibitions. So that they represented that chief and supreme Law, to be the Mind of God commanding and forbidding the Actions of intelligent Beings, according to Reason, or in a Consistency with the Nature of Things. — Nor can it be said, that because, in the Reign of Tarquinius, there was no written Law at Rome concerning Adultery, therefore Sext. Tarquinius did not, in Contradiction to this eternal Law, ravish Lucretia. For there was then a Principle of Reason, or a Rule of Life flowing from the Nature of Things, that directed People to Righteousness, and call'd them off from Iniquity. Nor did this Rule then only begin to be a Law when it was committed to Writing; but its Authority must be dated from its Original, which is no later than the divine Mind. Cic. de Legib. Lib. 2.*

Original of Moral Virtue.

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stances, absolutely govern'd ; which is that SECT. VI.
 which naturally springs from our *universal Love*
 and Benevolence: And any opposite or con-
 trary Course, is, in its own *Nature*, quite *incon-*
sistent and contradictory.

FROM all which it inevitably follows, that
 those *Measures* we must necessarily pursue in or-
 der to gain the Love and Esteem of God, and
 of all Mankind, do not depend, as Things
 merely precarious, or indifferent, on our own,
 or the *arbitrary Will* of any of those Beings to
 whom we are associated.

AND as only this particular Set of Affections
 and Actions, which flows from universal Love,
 can bear a Proportion and Correspondence to the
 Self-love of all those Beings that make up this
 one universal Community, whereof we are Mem-
 bers ; so there is nothing more manifest, than
 that the steady Pursuit of such a Series of Things
 in all the Parts of our Conduct towards God,
 and our Fellow-men, shall most successfully
 procure us their Esteem and Commendation
 both *here* and *hereafter* (1).

They re-
 commend
 us most
 effectually
 to the Love
 and Esteem
 of God, and
 of all Man-
 kind in
 Time.

FOR

(1) Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν ἴδεν ἀνὴρ ποτε καὶ ἐπι-
 μελείαι διδοὶ δὴδασθαι ἀνθρώποις. ἀλλ' ἔτι τὰς διὰς ἰλασθεὶς ὁ
 οὐ βύλοι, διαπραπτὸν τὰς διὰς. ἔτι ὑπὸ οἰκονομίας ἀγα-
 θῶν, τὰς οἰκονομίας ἐνεργιστῶν. ἔτι ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐνδο-
 μῆς πᾶσαι, τὴν πόλιν ἐνεργιστῶν. ἔτι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας πᾶ-
 σις ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ δαυμάσθαι, τὴν ἐκκλησίαν πᾶσαν ἐν
 πᾶσι. Such is the Appointment of Heaven that we can-
 not acquire any good and worthy Enjoyment, without La-
 bour and Application. So that if we would have God to
 favour

SECT. VI. For as all rational Agents whatsoever are intirely under the absolute Government of Self-love, and can favour Nothing, at any Rate, but as it serves to gratify this Principle, or to assist and relieve their natural Desire of Well-being; so it is very obvious, that by our Love of God, and of all Mankind, and in all those genuin Effects that cannot but flow from it, we directly strike in with their Self-love, and immediately conspire and co-operate with them in a joyn't hearty Pursuit after their Happiness; whereby we become the same, in a Manner, with themselves, having our Hearts sincerely united to theirs, and our Lives steadily devoted to their Interest. From whence it unavoidably comes to pass, that by the same Necessity, whereby they love themselves, they must love us, or, that they cannot but love us, as they do themselves (1); and highly esteem and

favour us, we must serve and worship him; if we would have our Friends to love and esteem us, we must study their Happiness; if we would be honoured by any particular Body of Men, we must serve their Interests; and if we would gain the Affections, and purchase the Applauses of the rest of Mankind, we must labour to do them good, and to promote their Well-being. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 2.

(1) In quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eademque voluntates; in his fit, ut æque quisque altero delectetur, ac seipso: efficiuntque id, quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas est, quæ conficitur ex beneficiis utroque citroque datis acceptisque: quæ mutua & grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma devinciuntur societate.

Among Persons who have the same Inclinations,

the

applaud us (1). And it cannot be denied, Sect. VI
that,

THE same Course of Affections and Actions
pursued to our *Lives End*, will effectually re- And to
Eternity.
commend us to the Good-liking and Approba-
tion of God, and of all those rational Beings
among whom we shall happen to be mixed in

the same Desires and Pursuits, every one cannot but be
delighted with another, as much as with himself. So that
here we meet with that which Pythagoras requires in Friend-
ship, viz. the making One of many. And indeed this must
be a close and strong Association, that is contracted by the
Reciprocation of Benefits, that pass forward and back-
ward in Exchange; for the Intercourse being mutual and
grateful, it cannot but create a firm and extraordinary
Friendship, and unite People intimately together. Cic. de
Offic. Lib. 1.

(1) Fundamentum enim perpetuæ commendationis & fa-
mæ, est iustitia; sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile. The
Foundation of a perpetual Fame and Commendation, is
Righteousness or Virtue; without which there can be no-
thing laudable. Id. ibid. Lib. 2. Quid enim majori laude
dignum, ex omnibus rebus humanis commemorare possumus,
quam eum qui vitam ducat cum virtute conjunctam, ad Deo-
rum cultum atque honorem, perpetuum in homines studium,
ac pietatem aggregare? nec quidpiam tantulum modo in ejus
animo existere, quod non vel pietati, vel humanitati, vel deni-
que virtuti sit consentaneum. And of all Things human,
what can we mention that deserves more highly to be com-
mended, than that the Man who leads a virtuous Life,
bath his Devotion and Reverence towards God, always
accompany'd with perpetual Good-will, and a kind tender
Regard towards his Fellows? and that in his Mind there
is not any the least Thing to be found, that does not cor-
respond with Piety, or Humanity, or, in a Word, with Vir-
tue? Id. in Consol.

SECT. VI. *another World* (1). For, as I have already hinted, the Proportion and Suitableness of this particular Series of Affections and Actions, to the Self-love or Interest of God, as the supreme Head of the human Society, and of all our own Species, or all rational Agents whatsoever, is *immutable*, and eternal; and cannot therefore but uniformly produce the *same Effects* to everlasting Ages. And if we observe what I would recommend to us all, says the great and the wise

Socrates

(1) *His præcipue dolendum nihil esse contendam, quos mors cum laude oppetita consolari potest. Satis enim diu vixisse putandi sunt, qui vitam honeste clausurunt: eosdemque a vita abeuntes non modo laus, sed etiam perpetua voluptas delectatioque prosequitur: quæ sane eo major in animo exoriri ac vigere solet, quo latior alicujus in colendo officio, vitæque honesta ducenda, manavit industria. Certe enim, cum ad recte agendum natus homo sit, ideoque mentis & rationis munere, præ cæteris animantibus ornatus atque instructus, unde potius laudem, ac voluptatem, quam ab honestis actionibus, petat? an unde ortum duxerit, obliviscatur? Ille vero nec sui oblitus est, qui recte vixit, nec iniquo animo mori potest, cum multos relinquat suæ testes memoresque virtutis. Quanto autem gaudio exultare credendus est illorum animus, qui corporis admistione solutus, in cælestes ignes, sempiternasque domos, unde exierat, revertit? profecto enim ex divina mente delibatos habemus animos, qui hac mole inclusi tanquam terræ gravitate, sic ipsi nimio pondere corporis opprimuntur: ubi autem soluti corporibus, ad proprias sedes evolaverunt, tum vere vivunt, nec libidini, voluptati, dolori serviunt: sed sui compotes, nulla re anguntur, nihil requirunt, omnibus imperant. I will maintain, there is no Cause of Grief, where there is the Comfort of one's having left the World with Applauses; for such are to be thought to have liv'd long enough, who have ended their Days honourably. Nor is it*

Praise

Socrates (1), Remembering that our Souls are im- Sect. VI.
mortal, and that they are to be rewarded or pu-
nished in another World; we will constantly pursue

K

Praise alone that attends those Persons into another Life; they are possess'd of everlasting Delight and Joy, which, questionless, is the more lively, and rises the higher in one's Mind, the more wide and diffusive one's Care and Industry has been in the Discharge of his Duty, and in the Pursuit of Piety and Virtue. For, to speak freely, since Man is born to pursue the Paths of Virtue and Honour, and, for this Purpose, is endued and adorn'd, beyond other Animals, with Reason and Reflection; from whence can one rather seek to have Praise and Happiness, than from honest and worthy Actions? Will he be unmindful of his Original? This can never happen to that Man, who has liv'd virtuously; nor will he die with a Grudge, since he leaves many behind him to witness and celebrate his Virtues. But how shall the Souls of such Persons triumph, and be transported with Joy, when, freed from their Body, they return to those celestial Mansions of Light, and those eternal Abodes from whence they came! For our Minds are certainly the Offspring of God, which by their being pent up in these lumpish and earthy Bodies, are grievously oppress'd; but so soon as they are set at Liberty, they straight fly away to their proper Seats: And then it is that they truly live; for no longer are they subject to Lust, sensual Pleasure, or Pain; but having the entire Command of themselves, they are above Sin and Sorrow, out of the Reach of Want; they have all Things to attend them, and to minister to their Joy and Happiness. Id. ibid.

(1) Ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς μετὰ θάνατον πομπαῖς ἀδύνατον τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ θανάτου πάντα μὲν καταλείπειν, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθὰ, τὰς ἀποιδεῖν αἰεὶ ἐξέχειν, καὶ διακρίνειν μετὰ συνέσεως κατὰ ἑκάστην ἐπιτηδεύουσαν; ἢ καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς οἷοις ἀμύβη, καὶ τῆς Θούης, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδύμεντος ἐν δαίμονι, καὶ ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον οὐ καμψόμεθα ἀπὸ τοῦ οἰκτιρομένου θεοῦ, καὶ ἐν δαίμονι καὶ ἐν τῇ χαλεπῇ πομπῇ τοῦ θανάτου, ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. Πλάτ. de Repub. Lib. 10.

SECT. VI. *the Paths that lead up to the Mansions above, and by all Means exercise ourselves in all Virtue and Righteousness; that while we are here we may live in Friendship with God, and with one another; and being assembled together hereafter, may receive the Rewards of Virtue in Glory, Triumph, and Happiness.*

We must always be careful to keep our selves in a fit Condition to pursue these Measures that gain us the Esteem of intelligent Beings.

BUT farther, as these are the only Measures we can possibly imploy to acquire the Esteem of all those Beings, to whom we are joyn'd in Society; so it is absolutely necessary, that we keep ourselves always in such Circumstances, or in such a Condition of Mind and Body, as will enable us to pursue them, otherwise we shall never compass our End, but stand excluded from this great Community, and lie involved in Neglect and Infamy: Both which are quite contradictory to the Order of Nature, I mean; to those two prevailling Passions of our Mind, viz. the Desire of Society, and of being universally lik'd and esteem'd; which are no other than Self-love diversify'd. This, I conceive, is undeniably plain. And therefore, that we may always be at Liberty, and have it in our Power to follow after those Things, that are adapted to the Self-love of our Almighty Sovereign, and of all our Fellow-men, and consequently absolutely necessary in order to approve us to their Love and Esteem.

What Affections and Actions, with respect to our selves, necessary to this Purpose.

WE must not abandon the Society of Mankind, and retire into a monkish and solitary Life, pretending to give up our selves to the

Con.

Contemplation of the Nature of Things, or to Sect. VI.
 converse only with God in divine and heavenly
 Exercises (1): We must not desert this
 K 2 great

(1) Illa autem scientia quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia, in qua continetur Deorum & hominum communitas, & societas inter ipsos. Ea si maxima est, ut certe necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio, contemplatioque naturæ, manca quodam modo, atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio consequatur. Ea vero actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur: pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani, ergo hæc cognitioni anteponenda est. Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa ostendit, & judicat. Quis est enim tam cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas, subito sit allatum periculum, discrimenque patriæ, cui subvenire opitularique possit; non illa omnia relinquat atque atjiciat, etiam si denuerare se stellas, aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? Atque hoc idem in parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit. Quibus rebus intelligitur, studiis, officiisque scientiæ, præponenda esse officia justitiæ, quæ pertinent ad hominum utilitatem, qua nihil homini debet esse antiquius. *As for this Knowledge, which I represented at the Head of all the Virtues, it is the Knowledge of Things divine and human, wherein we are taught concerning the Society of God with Men, and of Men with one another. Now if this Knowledge be the most excellent, as certainly it is; so must that likewise be the most eminent Course of Life, that flows from the Principles of Society, or a Regard to the common Happiness. And whereas the Knowledge and Contemplation of Nature, is but lame and imperfect, if it be followed with no Action; and those Actions, which attend this Knowledge, are particularly concern'd in promoting the common Interests of Mankind; it plainly follows, that those Actions of Life, which relate to the Good of human Society, are not only the most excellent, but that they are likewise to be preferred before the bare*

Sect. VI. great Community of God and our own Species, by endeavouring to put an End to our present Being, or to *extinguish* our Existence on any Account whatsoever (1). We must not indulge
Sloth

bare Knowledge, or the naked Understanding of Things, And this indeed is what every good and wise Man judges, and makes appear in his Conduct: For where is the Man that is so transported with a Thirst after Knowledge, or a Desire of piercing into the Nature of Things, who, while he is engag'd in contemplating Things most worthy to be known, if he be suddenly alarm'd with the Danger of his Country, which he is capable to assist and relieve, does not immediately quit his Studies, and throw them all aside, even tho' he should think he is able to number the Stars, or to measure the Magnitude of the World? And this same very Course would he follow, should his Father, or his Friend be in Danger. From which we see, that to the Study and Pursuit of Knowledge, we ought to prefer the Exercise of Virtue, or the Offices of Justice, that relate to the Good and Happiness of Mankind, than which nothing should be dearer to us. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(1) Ἐκδέξατε τὸ Θεόν, ὅταν ἐμὴν σμῶν καὶ πολλῶν ὑμᾶς ταῦτις ὑπηρεσίαις, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ οὗτος αὐτῶν. ὅτι καὶ ἐν πολλῷ ἀνδραδί, οὐκ ἔστιν ταῦτις καὶ χρόνῳ, εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ὑμᾶς ἵσταται. ὁλίγοι ἀπὸ χρόνου καὶ τὸ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἐν διακονίαις. ποῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ ποῖ κλήρης, ἢ ποῖα διακονία φοβερά, τοῖς ὑπὸ πᾶσι πεποιμένοις τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰ τέτα κτήματα; μοίρατε, μὴ ἀλγίζετε ἀπλῶς. Wait patiently upon God, and whenever he shall be pleased to give you the Signal, and to discharge you from your present Service, then go cheerfully off to him. But in the mean while, continue in this World, where in he has plac'd you. The Time of your Stay, you know, is but short, and it is easie to those who are so well disposed. For what Tyrant, what Robber, what Courts of Justice, can be frightful to these Persons, who are thus indifferent with respect to the Body, and its Enjoyments? Stay, and do not depart foolishly. Arian. Lib. 1. Cap. 9.

Sloth and Idleness, or sleep away our Lives in Sect. VI
a drowsie Inactivity (1): We must not squander

K 3

der

(1) Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι κινήσει παύσαι, τὸ δὲ
μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπολλύει, ἡσυχία. — Τὶ δὲ, ἢ τῶν
σωμάτων ἔξισ' ἔχ' ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυ', ὑπὸ γυμ-
νασίων δ' καὶ κινήσεων αἵς ὅτι πολὺ σκεῖ; καὶ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
ἔξισ' ἔχ' ὑπὸ μαθήσεως αἵ καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτεταί
τὸ μαθήματα, καὶ σκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ, ἐπαίων; ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας,
ἀμελεσιπείας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας ὑπὸς, ὥστε πῖ μανθάνει, ἀπὸ αὐ-
μῆδος ἐπαλόνδαν. Motion gives Birth and Life to every
Thing, while the Want of it occasions the quite contrary Ef-
fects. — Nay, is not the Health and Vigour of the Body
quite ruin'd by Sloth and Idleness, but greatly promoted by
Motion and Exercise? And as for the Mind, does it not,
by Study and Meditation, which are certain Motions, ac-
quire Knowledge, improve its Life, and become better? Whereas by Indolence and Negligence, which is the Want
of Thought and Application, it is so far from gaining any
Wisdom or Knowledge, that it forgets and loses those
Things which formerly it had acquired. Plat. in
Theæt.

Λιμὸς γὰρ τοὶ πάμπαν ἀεργῶ σύμφορος ἀνδρὶ.

Τῷ δὲ Θ. οἱ νεμεσιπῖ καὶ ἀνέρες, ὅς κεν ἀεργός

Ζῶν, κηφήνεται καθ' αἰετος ἀκαλὸς ὄρμη.

Οἱ τε μελισσῶν κέματα ὅσ' ἔχουσιν ἀεργοί,

ἔδοντες. σοὶ δ' ἔργα φίλ' ἔστω μέγιστα κοσμοῖν,

ὡς καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι βίοντες πλήθοντι χαλίζῃ.

Ἐξ ἔργων δ' ἀνδρες πολὺ μῆλοι τ' ἀφρονεῖ τε.


Καὶ τ' ἐργάζεσθαι πολὺ φίλτερος ἀδανάτοισιν

ἔσται ἢ δὲ βροτῶν· μάλα γὰρ συλάσθαι ἀεργῶς.

Ἐργον δ' ἔδ' ὄνειδος· ἀεργίη δὲ τ' ὄνειδος.

A slothful and idle Man is always in Company with
Want and Famine; he is hateful in the Sight both of God
and Man, and may well be compar'd to those lazy Drones,
that, doing nothing themselves, eat up and consume the Labour
of the other Bees. But let it be your Pleasure, to pursue some
laudable Business of Life, whereby you may provide your
self

Sect. VI.



der away our Time in Sports and Diversions, or give up our selves to vain and trifling Amusements (1): We must not weaken and effeminate our Minds and Bodies, by Luxury, Softness, or Delicacy (2): Nor must we in any Degree

Self in every Thing necessary and convenient; for it is by Labour and Industry that Men become rich and opulent. Besides that, by applying your self to Business, you will prove much more acceptable both to God and Man; for they greatly hate the slothful and idle. Nor is there any useful Business that can be call'd dishonourable; 'tis only Idleness that is shameful and odious. Hesiod. Lib. 1.

(1) Neque enim ita generati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum & jocum facti esse videamur: sed ad severitatem potius, & ad quædam studia graviora atque majora. Ludo autem, & joco, uti illis quidem licet, sed sicut somno, & quietibus cæteris, tum cum gravibus seriisque rebus satisfecerimus. *For Nature has not so framed us, that we seem to be made for Levity and Pleasure, but rather for the Severity of grave and weighty Studies. Not that we are to be debar'd the Freedom of Frolics and Divertisements, provided that we use them only as Sleep, and such other Ways of Repose, after the Discharge of our serious and more important Affairs. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.*

(2) Indurandus est animus, & a blandimentis voluptatum procul abstrahendus. Vina Hannibalem solverunt, & indomitum illum nivibus atque Alpibus virum enervaverunt fomenta Campaniæ. Armis vicit, vitiis victus est. Nobis quoque militandum est, & quidem genere militiæ, quo nunquam quies, nunquam otium datur: debellandæ sunt in primis voluptates, quæ, ut vides, sæva quoque ad se ingenia rapiunt. Si quis sibi proposuerit, quantum operis aggressus sit, sciet nihil delicate, nihil molliter esse faciendum. *The Mind ought to be harden'd against Temptations, and should be kept far remov'd from the Allurements of Vice. It was Wine that soften'd and dissolv'd Hannibal; and the Delicacies*

Degree load our selves with Riot, Excess, or Sect. VI.
Intemperance (1)

K 4

FOR

cacies of Campania enervated that Man, whom the Snows and rugged Mountains of the Alps could not tame. By his Arms he conquer'd; by his Vices he was overcome. Now we likewise have a War upon our Hands, and indeed of that Nature, wherein there is no Rest, no Respite for us. Our sensual Pleasures particularly must be subdued, which, as you see, have reduced under their Power, the most rough and masculine Spirits. And if a Man will reflect what a vast Work he is engaged in, he will find, that nothing is to be set about with Softness and Delicacy. Senec. Epist. 32.

(1) ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ πολέμῳ ἡμῶν γυναικῶν βυλόμεθα ἐλπίδι, ὅς ἐστι μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν οὐλομένη, καὶ δὲ πλεονεχίας χυ-
βινομένη, ἀρ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ αἰδανόμεθα ἡμῶν γυναικῶν ὅτιν, ἡ ἀρε-
τῆς, ἡ πόρνη, ἡ ὄρνις, τὸν αἰσχρολόγον; καὶ πῶς ἐν ὁμοθυ-
μῳ τὸ τοῦτο, ἡ ἡμῶν οὐσία, ἡ τοῦ πολέμου κρατοῦσα;
οἷός ἐστι τὰ δὲ τῶν βίῃ γυναικῶν βυλόμεθα τῷ ὁμοθυμῳ, ἡ
οὐσία, ἡ ἀρετῆς παιδαγωγία, ἡ θυγατέρα παρθένη διαφυλάττει,
ἡ χυμῶν διασπῆλαι, ἀρ' ἀξιοῦσιν εἰς ταῦτ' ἐγχεσθῆναι τὸ
ἀκρατῆ; δὲ ἄλλο δ' ἀκροῦται ὁμοθυμῶν ἐν ἡ βοσκῆματι, ἡ
παιδαγωγία, ἡ ἐργῶν ἐπίστασις; διακονοῦν δὲ καὶ ἀπορροῶν τοῦτον
ἐκδομένην ἐν ποταμῷ λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ οἷον ἐν ἄλλῳ
ἀκρατῇ διασπῆλαι, πῶς ἐκ ἀξίου αὐτὸν γὰρ φυλάττει τὸ
τοῦ γυναικῶν; καὶ γὰρ ὅσπερ οἱ πλεονεχῆς ἡ ἄλλων ἀφαιρέσεις
χυμῶν αὐτοῦ δοκῶσι πλεονεχῆς, ὅπως ὁ ἀκρατῆς τοῖς μὲν ἄλ-
λοις βλαβερὸς, αὐτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακῶς μὲν ὅτι ἄλ-
λων, αὐτῷ δὲ πολὺ κακῶς ὅτι οὐ κακῶς τῶν ὅτι, μὴ
μόνον τὸ δίκον τὸ αὐτῷ φθόρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυ-
χὴν. ἐν συνόλῳ δὲ πῶς ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ τοῦτο, ἐν οἷον τῷ
ὅτι τὸ καὶ τῷ οἷον χαίροντα μάλιστα, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ πῶς πῶς
ἐν ἀγαθῶντα μάλιστα, ἡ τοῦ ἐπίστασις; ἀρὰ γὰρ ὁ καὶ πάντα ἐν-
δεῖα ἐγχεσθῆναι τῷ ἐγχεσθῆναι ἀρετῆς ἐν χρησίμῳ, ταῦτα
αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατακιδεύουσι; πῶς γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο ἡ
ἡδονή, τὴν ἀγαθόν, ἡ μεταστροφὴν ἀξιολόγους; ἡ πῶς ἐν τῷ
πῶς ἡδονῆς δὲ δὲ ἀρετῆς διακιδεύου καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυ-
χὴν; Were we to enter into a War, and to chuse a General,
by whose Conduct and Courage, we hop'd not only to pro-
tect

Sect. VI. For, as these Things do, either render a
 ~~~~~ Man unfit for the Discharge of any laudable Office,

rect our selves, but to subdue the Enemy; do you think, my Friends, we would make Choice of that Man, who, to our Knowledge, is inflav'd to Intemperance, or Lewdness, or who can endure no Fatigue, or lose an Hour's Sleep? But how could such a Man ever be capable either to defend us, or to subdue our Enemies? And were we, at our Death, to leave a Tutor for our Sons, or a Guardian for our Daughters, or one to manage our Estate, would we think, that a riotous and intemperate Man is qualified to have such Things committed to his Trust? Or would we commit the Care of our Cattle, or the Oeconomy of our Family, or the Oversight of our Works, to a Servant given to Excess and Intemperance? Nay, would we receive such an one into our Family, was he to serve us for nothing? And if we would not at any Rate employ a riotous and dissolute Servant, is it not worth a Man's While to take Care not to be led away himself, by such shameful Vices, that are rather worse than any other? For in the Case of Covetousness, a Man govern'd by this Passion seems to increase his own Stock, by picking his Neighbour's Pocket: Whereas a Man addicted to Riot and Intemperance, is not thus profitable to himself, while he is hurtful to other People; but besides his injuring of others, he is most mischievous to himself; for what can be more mischievous than to ruine, not his Family only, but, together with it, his Body and Soul? And who would like the Company of such a Man, whom one knows to have greater Pleasure in Riot and Excess, than in the Society of Friends; and to like his Whores better than his Companions? Being therefore assured, that Temperance is the Foundation of Virtue, should not every Man be particularly careful to have it established in his Mind? For without it, who can acquire or pursue any Thing good or laudable? Or who is the Man, a Slave to his Pleasures, that is not in a wretched Situation, in relation both to Body and Mind? Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 1.



fice, or expose him, by the natural Influence Sect. VI.  
 they have over our Minds and Passions, to the  
 committing of such Actions as are quite *contra-*  
*dictory* to the Self-love or Interest of that ratio-  
 nal Community, whereof we are Members (1);  
 so 'tis very evident, that, in themselves, they  
 are quite *disproportioned* to this Principle, ac-  
 cording to which, as every particular Being  
 finds it gratified, he naturally dispenses to  
 others his Esteem and Good-liking: And are  
 so

(1) Quemadmodum igitur temperantia sedat appetitiones,  
 & efficit ut hæ rectæ rationi pareant; conservatque conside-  
 rata judicia mentis: sic huic inimica intemperantia, omnem  
 animi statum inflamat, conturbat, incitat. *As Temperance*  
*bridles and tames the Appetites, and makes them obedient*  
*to Reason, and thereby enables us to think and reflect*  
*coolly, and to form a right Judgment of Things; so its E-*  
*nemy Intemperance inflames, disturbs, and enrages the*  
*whole Soul.* Cic. Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. 4.

Τρεῖς γὰρ μόνος κρατῆρας ἐγχαρυνύω  
 Τοῖς ἐν φρονήσει καὶ μὲν ὑγιῖαι ἔνα,  
 Ὅν' αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ δὲ δευτέρου  
 Ἐραῖος ἡδονῆς τε καὶ τρίτου δ' ἵππου,  
 Ὅν' εὐαρίοντες οἱ σοφοὶ καλῶς  
 Οἶκα δὲ βασιλέως· ὁ δὲ τρίτατος ἐκείν  
 Ἡμέτερος ἐς, ἀλλ' ὕβρις· ὁ δὲ τέταρτος, βόη.  
 Ἐκτός δὲ μανίας, ὅτι καὶ βάλλων ποιεῖν.  
 Πολὺς γὰρ εἰς ἐν μικρὸν ἀγῶν χυδαῖς  
 Ὑποχάλῃσι ῥᾶτα τοῦ πτωχότητος.

I would recommend to every Man of Sense and Pru-  
 dence, not to drink more at any Time, than what may serve  
 to refresh or cheer him; for whatever is beyond this has  
 nothing manly in it: It produces, in Proportion to its Ex-  
 cess, either Rudeness and Insolence, or Bawling and  
 Noise,

**SECT. VI.** so far from having any Sort of Fitness or Agreement with it, that, on the contrary, they inevitably expose us to the *Neglect* and Contempt of God, and of all the rational Creation, who cannot but look upon us, while we are in such Circumstances, as *unworthy* of their Society, and, at the best, as shamefully *useless* and insignificant (1).

AND

Noise, or Fury and Madness, whereby People come to be involved in Contentions and Quarrels. But a wise Man carefully avoids every Thing so outrageous; he keeps seasonable Hours, and goes Home in good Time, with, at most, his cheerful Glass, that disturbs neither Body nor Mind, but makes him sleep sound and easie. Eubul.

(1) Contemnantur ii, qui nec sibi, nec alteri profunt, ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. Admiratione quadam vero afficiuntur ii, qui antequam ceteros virtute putantur. They are despis'd and contemned, who are useful neither to themselves, as we say, nor to other People; in whom there is no Action, no Industry, or Care. Whereas those are held in Admiration, that appear eminent in the Paths of Virtue. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2.

Τὸ δὲ ἰατρικὸν δοῦν, ὅτι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔσται, ἀ πρὸν ἰπτοίων νοσημάτων ἀπαρτίζων, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀρτὰς τὴ καὶ διαταγὰς διὰν διήλδοιμι, ἰδμάτων τὴ καὶ πονημάτων ὅσπερ λίμνα ἔμππλαμύς, οὕτως τὴ καὶ κατὰ τὴν νοσήσαντων νόματα πείδω, ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομῆς ἀσκληπιαδῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ δοῦναι, Is it not a shameful Thing, that People should need the Physician, not to cure their Wounds, or some periodical Distempers, but to relieve them from those Diseases which they have contracted by Idleness and Intemperance, and for which the learned Sons of Aesculapius have been oblig'd to invent new Names? Plat. de Repub. Lib. 3.

Τὴν γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀσμελὲς ἀρτὴς τὴ, ὅν ὁ πινυτὶς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰατρικὸν ἀσκληπιαδῶν ἐρασκαὶ πῶς, γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ πινυτὶς ἀσμελὲς; What Concernment have any of us with an ef-  
feminat

AND we may here take Notice, that this Sect. VI. *Disproportion* and *Incongruity*, which an utter *Alienation* from Mankind, *Swicide*, *Idleness*, *Vanity*, and *Lewdness*, or *Luxury*, do manifestly bear to this universal Principle of *Self-love*, whereby all Beings are animated, is as absolute and independent, as steady, firm, and unalterable, as that Principle it self is: So that, if we would gain the Esteem of this one universal Community, to which we belong, we must entertain, even in our most solitary Retirements, a *Correspondence* both with God, and our own Species (1): We must maintain our present

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*feminate, beedless, lazy Creature, whom the Poet particularly resembles to idle Drones?* Id. de Legib. Lib. 10.

(1) Placet igitur aptiora esse naturæ ea officia, quæ ex communitate, quam ea quæ ex cognitione ducantur: idque hoc argumento confirmari potest; quod si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis ditetur, quamvis omnia, quæ cognitione digna sunt, summo otio secum ipse consideret & contempletur, tamen si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. — Atque illi, quorum studia vitæque omnis in rerum cognitione versata est, tamen ab augendis hominum utilitatibus & commodis non recesserunt. Nam erudierunt multos, quo meliores cives, utilioresque in rebus & suis & publicis essent. *'Tis my Opinion, that one's Pursuits, in promoting the Happiness of Mankind, are more consonant to the Frame of our Nature, than all our Enquiries after Knowledge. And this may be made good from hence, that though we should suppose a wise Man to have every Thing in Life, that is delightful and entertaining, and that, amidst full Ease and Leisure, he can employ his Thoughts, and contemplate all Things whatsoever that are worth the knowing; yet even in these* Circum-



Sect. VI. present *Station* in this World, so long as we can, in a Consistency with those Measures that are pleasing to God, and to all Mankind (1): We must apply our selves to some *Business*, wherein we may be best useful to Mankind, and

*Circumstances*, he would have no Relish of Life, but would rather give it up, if he were to spend his Time wholly in Solitude, and without a Companion. — And those very Men whose Study and whole Life has been employ'd in the Pursuit of Knowledge, have not however neglected to promote the common Interests of Mankind; but have trained up many, and, by their Instructions and Discipline, made them better Citizens, and more serviceable to themselves and the Publick. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

(1) Nisi enim Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omne quod conspicis, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, huc tibi aditus patere non potest. — Quare & tibi, Publii, & piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis: nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vira migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum a Deo depigisse videamini. Sed sic, Scipio, ut avus hic tuus, ut ego qui te genui, justitiam cole, & pietatem — quia ea vita via est in cælum, & in hunc cætum eorum, qui jam vixerunt, & corpore laxati, illum incolunt locum quem vides. For unless that God, whose Temple all this is which you behold, shall relieve you from your Body, hither you cannot come. — Wherefore, my dear Publius, both you and all good Men must suffer your Minds to live in the Body; nor without his Permission, who is the Author of your Spirits, must you leave the Society of Men, lest you should seem to have deserted that Station and Business of Life, which God hath assigned you among your Fellows. But, my dear Scipio, as your Grandfather, and I your Father have done before you, follow Righteousness, and indulge every kind Affection. — For that Course of Life, is the Way to Heaven, and to this Society of those happy Spirits who were

and pursue it with *Diligence* and *Contentment* (1): *Señ. VI.*  
 And by *Moderation*, *Temperance*, and *Sobriety*, we must keep our selves always in a fit  
*Temper* of Mind and Body, to fall in with the  
*Self-love* of all those Beings or Persons that  
 make up this rational Society, and to go along  
 with

were in the *World*, but being now freed from the *Body*, in-  
 habit this glorious Place which you see. *Id. Somn. Scip.*  
*Frag.*

(1) Ἐργάζου, μοχθῶν ὡς ἐξ ἰδίων βιοτεύσεις.

Πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ ζῶν ἐκποίμῳ ἀπὸ χειρῶν,  
 Μηδ' ἄλλῃ ὧς δαίτῃς ἔσθῃς σκυδάλισμα τραπέζης.

Ἄλλ' ἀπὸ δικαίων βιότων φαγίοις ἀνύβειστοι.

Ἐὶ δὲ πρὶ δολιχῆς τέχνης, σκεπτοίτο δικάδην.

Ἐστὶ βίη τῶν ἔργων, ἵπταν μοχθῶν ἰδέλῃδα.

Ναυτίλῳ δὲ πλάην ἰδέλῃς, εὐρεῖα δάλασσα.

Ἐὶ δὲ γεωπονίῳ μεδέων, μακροὶ τοὶ ἀγροί.

Οὐδὲν ἀνευ χειρῶν πέλει ἀνδράσιν ἐμπνέει ἔργον,

Οὐδ' αὐτοῖς μακρόντι πόνος δ' ἀγροίῳ μεγ' ὄφελος.

You must work, that you may be able to sustain your self:  
 For a Man that follows no *Business*, must live either by  
 Theft, or upon the Scraps of another Man's Table. Let  
 it therefore be your Care to eat your own Bread, without  
 exposing your self to Contempt and Insults. And tho' one  
 has been brought up to no *Business*, yet if you incline to  
 work, you will not want *Employment*. You may dig; or if  
 you like to go to Sea, it is sufficiently wide; or if you affect  
 Land-labouring, the Fields are large enough. Nor can  
 Men, or even the celestial Beings themselves, succeed in  
 any Thing without Labour; it greatly promotes *Virtue*.  
*Phocyl. Τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ ἡμάδις, οἶον, τέτθ γεωπονίῳ.*  
 Be satisfied with your *Business*, and learn to love what  
 you were bred to. *M. Anton. Lib. 4. § 31.*

**Sec. VI** with them, in a hearty Pursuit after their Interest and Happiness (1).

likewise are absolute and independent.

THESE Things have evidently an absolute and unchangeable Suitableness and Proportion to the *Self love* of all those rational Agents, to whom we are associated. And every Body will

(1) Ὡστερ' οφθαλμοὺς εἶναι καρμὰς ἐ δὲ σπινθηρίον ἰδόντες,  
εἴ τι καρμάλῳ εἶναι κρίμασθε, οὕτως ἐδὲ σῶμα εἶναι ψυχῆς.  
ὅθεν τούτο καὶ αἵτισι διὰ τοῦ Διακρίνου του θεοῦ τοῖς ἑλλήσιν  
ἐπαρεῖς ταύτῃ νοσήσαντα, ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀμελεῖεν, καὶ λίαν τὸ πᾶν  
σπινθίλαια ποιεῖν. καὶ μὴ μελέει κρονοῖ, ἀνιναίου ὡς τὸ μέ-  
γθ' εὐχόμενοι. παρ' ἧα γὰρ ἔστι ὁ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀρχηγός, καὶ τὰ γενητά  
καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁμοθυμῶν  
ἐπαρέουσαν ὥστερ' ὅταν τὸ καρμάς εἶναι τὰ ὀφθαλμοῦ. Δὲν ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ  
προϋπαν καὶ μαλακοῦ διακριθείης, ὅτι μέλλει καὶ τὸ τὸ καρμάλος, καὶ τὸ  
ἐν ὅλοις σώματι πάλως ἔχει. Διακριθέντος δὲ τὸ ψυχῆς, ἔστι δὲ  
μακρότερον, ἀποδοῖται πᾶσι. τὰς ἐπινοίας ταύτας, τὸν λόγον δὲ τὸν  
μελέεις. ὅτι δὲ τὸ πᾶν τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ ψυχῆς συνεσταυρωμένον ἔργι-  
σέναι, ὡς ἐρησυνώσης καὶ παρέσει, βέλτοιον ἢ δὲ τὸ ὑπόκειναι καὶ τῇ κα-  
ραλί καὶ τῷ ὄψιν σώματος ποιέω. As no Man should attempt to  
cure the Eyes, without examining the Condition of the  
Head, nor yet the Head, without understanding the State  
of the Body; so neither should one pretend to cure the Bo-  
dy without considering the Situation of the Mind. And,  
no Doubt, the Reason why the Physicians in Greece find  
so many Diseases too hard for them, is their not attending  
to the whole Constitution, which ought particularly to be re-  
garded. For where the Whole is out of Order, 'tis impos-  
sible that a Part can be well; and certain it is, that all  
Good and Evil take their Rise in the Mind, and come  
from thence to the Body and the whole Man, as from the  
Fountain to the Eye: So that if we would have the Head,  
and the whole Body healthy and vigorous, we must in a  
particular Manner, and beyond every Thing else, cultivate  
the Mind; and this we do effectually, by attending to those  
fine Thoughts and Principles that serve to inspire us with  
Temperance; for upon once Temperance is rooted in the  
Mind.





Sect. VI. great Corruption and Degeneracy. And, continues he, there are other treacherous Dames that pretend to be Pleasures, such as the Dice, and vain unprofitable Meetings and Assemblies, which those that are deceived by 'em, come at length to understand are no other than Sorrows under the Bait of Pleasure, that prevail'd over them, and prevented their pursuing Things useful and advantageous. Indeed, says Socrates, there are some People that are not thereby hindred from Business; but do rather vigorously exert themselves, and keenly endeavour to encrease their Revenues: Nevertheless they ruine their Families, and bring themselves into great Straits and Perplexity. For those People likewise are Slaves, and, in Truth, under the Dominion of the cruellest Masters; for some

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐργῶν κρατῶσι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅτε ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ ἐκωλύοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντες σπουδῇ ποιεῖν τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἔχουσιν, καὶ μηχανάζονται ποιεῖσθαι. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὸς οἴκους καταστρέβουσιν, καὶ ἀμυχανίαν συνέρχονται. δούλοισι γὰρ οἷσι καὶ ἑτοίμοι, ὅτε ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ πάντες γὰρ χαλεπῶν διαβολῶν, οἱ μὲν λιχνῶν, οἱ δὲ λογιῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐμπορευμάτων, οἱ δὲ φιλοπρωτίων, οἱ δὲ μαθημάτων, οἱ δὲ διαπαιρημάτων, αἱ δὲ χαλεπῶς ἀρχοῖν τῶν ἀνδράπων, ὡς δὲ ἔως μὴ ἀνδρῶν ἡβόντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ δυναμῶς ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀναγκάζουσιν οἷον ἄλλαν αὐτοῖς ἐργασθῆναι, καὶ τελεῖν αἷς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατοι εἶδον, ὅταν ἐργάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ γῆρας, ἀπολείπουσιν τέτοις κακῇ γρηγορίᾳ, ἄλλοις δὲ αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν δούλοισι χεῖρ. ἀλλὰ δὲ ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ὅτε πάντες ἐχέουσιν διαμάχας πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, καὶ ὅτε πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις πειρωμένοις καταδεδεμένοι. πολέμοι μὲν ἔστιν ὅταν καλῶς κ' ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καταδεδωκῶσι πρᾶς, πολλοὶ δὲ βελτίους ἡνέγκασαν εἶναι σφραγισμένους, καὶ ἄλλοι βιοτεύοντες ἢ λοιπὸν χρόνον ἐποίησαν αἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα δέχονται ἀμυχανίᾳ τὰ σῶματα τῶν ἀνδράπων, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ πᾶσι οἴκους ἔπειτα λήγουν, ὡς δὲ ἀρχοῖν αὐτῶν. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 5.

of 'em are Slaves to Gluttony, some to Lewdness, Sect. VI. some to Drunkenness, and others to foolish and expensive Ambitions; which are all of 'em Tyrants, that bear so unmercifully hard upon those they have got under their Power, that, whilst they see them young and vigorous, and able to do Business, they compel them to devote all their Labours to their Service, and to spend what they make, in gratifying their infamous Demands; but when they find they have grown old, and can no longer be serviceable, they leave them in their gray Hairs, to Sorrow and Misery, and look out for other Slaves, that shall be capable of supporting them. Why, my dear Critobulus, we ought to defend our Liberty against these cruel Invaders, with more Firmness and Resolution, than against an armed Force set up to enslave us. For a brave generous Enemy, by reducing People under their Power, have done good Service to many, and contributed to make them live more happily for the future. But as for these base Tyrants, they never leave off shamefully wasting Peoples Bodies, Souls, and Fortunes, till they have quite ruin'd and oppress'd them. So that, I say, People of such Dispositions and Practice, are far from being in a Situation, wherein they can be acceptable to God, and to their Fellow-men; only the contrary Course of Life, as I have hinted, can serve this Purpose.

I suppose, I need not here observe, that our steadily directing our Affections and Actions towards the Gratification of the Self-love of our

The Affections and Actions that correspond to the Self-love of our own Species,

OWN



Sect. VI. own *Species*, is likewise most agreeable to the *Self-love* of the Deity.

are likewise agreeable to the *Self-love* of the Deity.

I have all along represented the Supreme Being, particularly as the great Head and Governor of the human Society; from which one cannot but infer (after our Manner of apprehending Things) that he is animated with all those Passions and Affections that belong to a Being of that *Character*, and that powerfully determine him to desire, consult, and pursue the *Welfare* and Prosperity of all his Subjects. And therefore when a Man adapts his whole Conduct to the promoting of the Good and Happiness of Mankind, who are the Property and Subjects of Heaven, and whom God made to be happy, as I have observ'd above from *Arian*; that Man favours the Designs of the Deity, he co-operates with him, and thereby gratifies his *Self-love*, and cannot but on that Account approve himself to his Acceptance (1): Whereas when

(1) τοῦτο ἔστιν περὶ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς μὴ λίπεσθαι αὐτῷ προσαι; τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ λείπηται, τοῖς ἡγελοῖς ἢ λείπηται· λείψουσιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ; ἢ εὐεργετῇ ἢ ἀγαθῷ ἢ λείπει ὁ μισοῦσιν, ἢ δ' ἐργάζηται, ἢ δὲ σκευτῇ· τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ λείπει; ὅπως ὁ Θεὸς ἀμύλει ἢ αὐτῷ ἐπιτιυμάτων, ἢ διακρίων, ἢ μαρτυρῶν, δις μόνως ἔστιν ἐργασίαν περὶ τὸ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅτι καὶ ἔστι, καὶ καλῶς δοικῇ τὰ οὐα, καὶ ἢ ἀμύλει ἢ ἀδραστῶν ἐργασμάτων, καὶ ὅτι ἀδρὶ ἀγαθῷ ἔστιν ὅτι καλῶν, ὅτι ζῶντι, ὅτι ἀποδοῦναι τι; Is any good Man afraid he shall want Bread? The Blind, and the Lame are provided for. Will a good Man be suffer'd to starve? A brave Soldier, a Day-labourer, a Tradesman shall not want Employment, and a Reward for their Service. Will no one take Care of a good Man?

It

when we neglect the Interests of our *Fellow-men*, Sect. VI.  
 or go about to disturb the Peace of the World, or to injure any of our Neighbours, we, in this, run directly cross to the *Self-love* of the Deity, as he affects and intends the *Well-being* of the human Species, and cannot but be accounted *impious* against God, for thus invading his Property, oppressing his Subjects, and counter-acting the Designs of his Goodness (1). *The Man,*

L 2

as

Is it thus that God neglects his Inheritance, his Ministers, his Witnesses, the only Persons he employs to instruct the Ignorant, and to convince them, that he is, that he governs the World in Wisdom, that he interests himself in human Affairs, and that no Evil shall befall a good Man, either in Life or Death? Arian. Lib. 3. Cap. 26.

(1) Hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt: incolumem esse civium conjunctionem; quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exilio, vinculis, damno coercent. Atque hoc multo magis exigit ipsa naturæ ratio, quæ est *lex divina* & humana: cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam volent vivere) nunquam committet, ut alienum appetat, & id quod alteri detraxerit, sibi assumat. Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam celsitas animi & magnitudo, itemque comitas, justitia, liberalitas, quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiæ: quæ quidem contemnere, & pro nihilo ducere, comparantem cum utilitate communi, magni animi & excelsi est. It is the express Care, Will, and Intent of all Laws, to maintain the Union of human Society safe and inviolate; and they punish those that break and disturb it, with Death, Banishments, Prisons, and Fines. And much more are we bound to study the Preservation of this Union, in Compliance with the Nature of Things, which is the Law of God, and the Standard of all human Institutions. So that whoever obeys the Dictates of Nature (as all Men will, that propose to live in a Conformity to the Principles of a reasonable

**Sect. VI.** as Aristotle finely observes, who exerts his inward Powers, and cultivates his Mind, and forms it to Virtue and Goodness, is questionless most acceptable to the Deity. For if God concerns himself, as it appears he does, in human Affairs, we have good Reason to be assured, that he delights in that which is best and next of Kin to himself, that is to say, in the human Mind; and that he rewards those who particularly love and honour their Minds, as Persons that study the Good of his Friends, and act a fair and honourable Part (1). And assure  
your

reasonable Being) will never agree to the coveting of what is another Man's, and to the taking away from his Neighbour, that he may thereby add to his own Stock. For Greatness of Mind, Gentleness, Justice, and Liberality, are much more consonant to Nature, than sensual Pleasure, Life, or, Riches; which in Comparison with the common Good, are, by all Men of brave and exalted Minds, neglected and despised. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3. *Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀδικεῖ. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὁλοῦ ἐνόςτης καὶ ἀσυνδυαστικὴ τὰ λογικὰ ζῶα ἵκεται ἀλλήλων, ὥστε ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀξίαν, βλάπτειν ἡ ἀνδραγαθία: ὁ πὲρ βέλημα ταύτης ἐξελθὼν, ἀδικεῖ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπεσφύταται τοῦ Θεοῦ.* He that is injurious and hurtful to his Fellows, is a Rebel against Heaven. For since God hath made rational Creatures, for mutual Service and Support, and that without doing any the least Hurt to each other, they should reciprocally assist one another in their Pursuits after Happiness, according to the Regards of Circumstance and Merit: Manifest it is, that he who crosses upon this Appointment and Design of the Deity, is profane in his Contradiction, and outrages the first Cause of all Things. M. Anton. Lib. 9. § 1.

(1) *Ὁ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τῶν ἀνελκόμενος ἀεὶ καὶ διοριζόμενος ἵκεται εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζῴων καὶ πρὸς θεοῦ ἀνδραγαθία, καὶ οὐκ ἀνδραγαθία.*



your self, says Isocrates, that the most pleasing Sa-  
crifice to God, and the best Service you can render  
him, is to pursue Goodness and Righteousness all you  
can; for there is good Reason to hope, that such a  
Course of Life will far more effectually recommend a  
Man to the divine Grace and Favour, than the of-  
fering up of many Sacrifices (1).

Now, this our devout Love of God, the  
great Head of the human Society; and those  
several Affections and Actions, that necessarily  
flow from it: This sincere Love of all our  
Fellow-men; and those genuin and necessary  
Effects it naturally produceth: This Moderation  
with respect to our selves, or this (σοφροσύνη. 2)  
sound, and vigorous, or well proportion'd  
Temper of Mind and Body, that qualifies us to  
assist all the Individuals of this large Communi-  
ty in their Pursuits after Happiness: All which

All these  
Things are  
what we call  
Virtue.

L 3

Things

χαίρειν τι αὐτὸς τῷ ἀεὶ καὶ τῷ αὐξάνειν. τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ  
ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν μάλιστα τὴν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς  
οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελόμενος, καὶ ἐρᾷς τι καὶ καλῶς ποιεῖν  
ταῦτα. ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα τῷ σφίσι μάλιστα ὑπέρχει, ὅτι ἀδύνατον  
ὑπομένειν αὐτῶν. καὶ αὐτὸν δ' αὖτις καὶ ἐυδαίμονες εἶναι. ἀπὸ  
αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐδὲ μάλιστα ἐυδαίμων. Arist. Eth. Lib.  
10.

(1) Ἡ γὰρ δὲ τῷ εἶναι δύναμις καλλίστη, καὶ διακεκολλημένη  
ἐστὶν, ὅτι αὐτὸς βίβλητος καὶ δικαιοσύνην σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ  
ἐλπίς καὶ τοῦ πόνου, καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρὰ πολλὰ καταβάλλειν, καὶ οὕτως  
ὅτι οὐδὲ θάνατον ἀγαθόν. Isocrat. ad Nicocl. Orat. 2.

(2) Διὰ τὴν Περικλέα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων. ὁμοίως οἰοῦμαι  
εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται  
δοῦναι. αὐτοὶ δὲ τοῖς τοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ πολιτεία.  
ἔστιν καὶ τὸν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ὁμοίᾳ, ὡς  
καὶ οὕτως τῶν ὁμοίων. Arist. Eth. Lib. 6. Cap. 5.

**Señ. VI.** Things are, in their own Nature, absolutely and independently, without the interposing of any Act of any arbitrary Will whatsoever, and consequently, firmly and steadily, without the Possibility of any Change or Alteration for ever, proportion'd and adjusted to this universal Principle of *Self-love*, whereby all those Beings, to whom we are naturally associated, are, upon all Occasions, and in every Instance, absolutely and irresistibly govern'd and determin'd; I say, all these Things are what we call *Piety* and *Virtue*, or universal Justice, Equity, and Righteousness (1).

So

(1) Φρόνιμοι ὧ καὶ δίκαιοι, ἢ καὶ ἄλλοι τίνας εἰσὶν. ἢ τῶν εἰδῶτων  
 αὐτοῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ θεῶν, καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων.  
 Men of Prudence and Righteousness are no other, than  
 those who understand how to behave in all Instances,  
 both towards God and towards Man. Plat. in Alcib. 2.  
 Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἢ καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσιν, κοσμίᾳ. ἢ δὲ καὶ κοσμίᾳ σὺ-  
 φρον. — καὶ μὴν ὅτι σὺφρον τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ θεῶν καὶ  
 περὶ θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων. καὶ ὅτι σὺφρον τοὺς μὴ προσή-  
 κοντα περὶ θεῶν. καὶ μὴν περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ θεῶν,  
 δίκαιον ἀνθρώπων περὶ θεῶν ὅσα. καὶ δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσα  
 προσήκοντα, ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσον εἶναι. καὶ μὴ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώ-  
 πῳ ἀνάγκη. καὶ ὅτι σὺφρονος ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ὅτι δίκαιον, ὅτι φρόνι-  
 μον καὶ σὺφρον, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ θεῶν, καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ  
 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπων.  
 καὶ δὲ. ὅτι πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὅτι καλὴ καὶ ὅτι σὺφρον καὶ ὅτι  
 δίκαιον καὶ δίκαιον ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὅσον, ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώ-  
 πῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπων. τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ καὶ καλὸν περὶ θεῶν, καὶ ἀνθρώ-  
 πῳ. καὶ δὲ δὲ περὶ θεῶν, μακαριὸν τὸ καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. τὸν  
 δὲ πορνὴν καὶ κακὸν περὶ θεῶν, ἀδύνατον. The beautiful Soul is  
 that which is adorn'd with Temperance. — And he  
 who is possessed of this Virtue, does those Things that are  
 suitable and pleasing, both to God and Man; for other-  
 wise

So that, from the Evidence of the Things Sect. VI. themselves, it convincingly appears, that *Virtue*, in its own *Nature*, is proportion'd and adapted to the *Self-love*, or the natural *Taste* and *Appetite* of all *rational Agents* whatsoever (1); is the great and the only *Instrument*, that can advance us to universal and immortal *Fame*, to *Joy unspeakable and full of Glory* (2); is e-

And there-  
fore *Virtue*  
is no arbitra-  
ry Thing,  
but is fix'd,  
immutable  
and eternal.

L 4

very

wife be would not be temperate. Now that which suits with, and is agreeable to our Fellow men, is *Righteousness*; and that which is grateful and pleasing to God, is *Holiness*: And the Man who studies and pursues these Things, is, without Doubt, righteous and holy. Besides that, a temperate Man cannot but be inspired with *Fortitude*; for he neither pursues nor avoids those Things which he should not; but in all his Pursuits and Aversions, with respect to Things, Persons, Pleasures, and Pains, is always govern'd and carried on as he ought to be. So that this temperate Man, being endued with *Righteousness*, *Piety*, and *Fortitude*, is certainly a good Man, and perfect in all his Ways; and cannot therefore but be blessed and happy. But the Wicked are miserable. Plat. in Gorg.

(1) *Virtus & conciliat amicitias & conservat*; in ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia. *Virtue* not only unites People to one another, in a mutual Intercourse of kind and friendly Affections, but it preserves us in that happy Situation. For there is in *Virtue* a Suitableness and Congruity of Things, a Stability, and Constancy. Cic. de Amicif.

(2) *Deus est mortali juvare mortalem*; & hęc ad æternam gloriam via. He is a God to Mankind, who imparts Happiness to his Fellow-mortals; and this is the Way to eternal Glory. Plin. Hist. Lib. 2. Cap. 7. Omnibus qui patriam conservaverint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in

calo



**Sect. VI.** very where the same all over the Universe, and is subject to no Change, but is immutable, uniform, and eternal, in respect both of its Original and Duration (1).

AND

caelo ac definitum locum, ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruuntur. Nihil est enim illi principi Deo, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius, quam concilia cætusque hominum, jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur: harum rectores hinc profecti, huc revertentur. — Quæsiwi tamen, viveretne ipse pater Paullus, & alii, quos nos extinctos arbitremur. Immo vero, inquit, ii vivunt, qui ex corporum vinculis, tanquam e carcere, evolaverunt: vestra vero quæ dicitur vita, mors est. *Be assured, that all who have contributed to the Preservation, the Support, and Advancement of the common Happiness of their Fellow-citizens, have a certain and particular Place allotted to them in Heaven, where they are blessed and happy to Eternity. For of all Things upon Earth, there is nothing more acceptable to the supreme God, who rules this whole Universe, than the Assemblies and Societies of Men, that are founded and live together upon the Principles of Justice. I ask'd however, whether my Father Paullus, and others whom we reckon among the Dead, were alive. Nay, says he, these are truly alive, who have made their Escape from the Body, as from a Prison; whereas that which is called Life with you, is only Death in comparison. Cic. in Somn. Scip. Frag.*

(1) Est quidem vero lex recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet, aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogare ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator, aut interpret ejus alius: nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac: sed &



SECT. VI. we should not be able to hinder our Souls from being raviſh'd, and our Affections from being all engag'd in a cloſe Purſuit after it. All the Glories, as Aristotle obſerves (1), that appear in the Heavens at the Riſing and Setting of the Sun, are not ſo grand and magnificent. So that, in the Opinion of Xenophon (2), had the World a juſt View of Moral Virtue, they would not ſo ſhamefully neglect it; but we would all of us reſolutely go on through whatever Hardſhips lie in our Way, till we ſhould arrive at the glorious immortal Prize. And who can forbear crying out with Cicero (3),

(1) Καὶ ἔθ' ἑσπερος, ἔθ' ἑως ἔτι δαυμασός. Arist. Eth. Lib. 5. Cap. 1.

(2) Ης [αρετῆς] ὅτι μὲν ἐρῶσι πάντες ἑυδολον, ὅτι δὲ διὰ πόρων ἐστὶ πυχὴν αὐτῆς, οἱ πολλοὶ ἀφίσταν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατεργασθεὶς αὐτὴν, ἀδολον· οἱ δὲ πόροι, οἱ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνδόντες, φανεροί. ἴσως μὲν ἐν τῇ τῷ σῶμα αὐτοῖς δούλον, ἥπλον δὲ ἡμέλει οἱ ἀνδραποὶ ἀρετῆς, εἰδότες ὅτι ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐκείνη ἐμφανὴς ἔστιν, ἔτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς ἐκείνης ὁρῶν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τίς ὁρᾷ ὡς τὴν ἐραμένην, ὥς ἐαυτὴν ἐστὶ βελτίον, καὶ ἔτι λέγει, ἔτι ποιεῖ αἰσχρὰ, καὶ κακὰ, ἵνα μὴ ὁρᾷ ὡς ἐκείνην. ὡς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκείνην οὐκ ἐπισκοπεῖ, πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἐραστὴν ποιεῖ, ὅτι αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ἔχ' ὁρῶν. ἡ δὲ πανταχὲ παρῆσσι, διὰ τὸ ἔῃ ἀδαινατῶ, καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν, τὴν δὲ κακὴν ἀπμάζου. εἰ ἔν ἐστὶν εἰδὼν ἴστω, ὅτι διὰ αὐτὴν, ἵστω δὲ ὅτι τὴν πόρεν, καὶ τὰς παιδείους αἰς ἀλίσκα) μέλις, καὶ κατεργάζοντο αὐτὴν. Xenoph. de Venat.

(3) O vitæ philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum; quid non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset? Tu urbes peperisti; tu dissipatos homines in societatem vitæ convocasti; tu eos inter se primo domiciliis, deinde conjugiiis, tum literarum & vocum communione junxisti; tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum & disciplinæ fuisti: ad te confugimus; a te opem petimus; tibi nos, ut antea magna ex parte, sic nunc penitus, totosque tradi-



O glorious Virtue! Thou Guide of Life, the Beauty Sect. VI.  
of our Souls, and the Spring of all our Happiness!   
What would human Life be without thee? One Day  
well spent under the Influence of thy Precepts, is  
preferable to a sinning Immortality. For Virtue,  
says Plato (1), is the Beauty, the Health, and  
Vigour of the Soul; but Vice is its Deformity, its  
Disease, and Ruin. And if it is not likely that  
a Man, when his Body is plagued and distempered,  
would desire Life, though attended with Plenty and  
Affluence of all sensual Enjoyments; is Life to be  
desired, when the Soul, the very Fountain of Life,  
is corrupted, even though a Man should have every  
Thing at Command, only he does nothing to free  
himself from Vice and Wickedness, and to acquire  
Righteousness and Virtue? The Bulk of Mankind,  
as the same Philosopher remarks in another Place,  
have certainly very wrong Notions of Happiness;  
they imagine it is made up of Health, Beauty,  
Riches, Power, and a thousand other Things, with

an

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tradimus. Est autem unus dies bene, & ex preceptis  
tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponeendus. Cujus  
igitur potius opibus utamur, quam tuis? quæ & vitæ tran-  
quillitatem largita nobis es, & terrorem mortis sustulisti. Cic.  
Tuscul. Quest. Lib. 3.

(1) Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἁγία καὶ ἰσχυρὰ, ὁμοία τῇ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν  
καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἰσχυρίαν καὶ ἀδύναμιν. —  
οἱ δὲ μὲν οὐκ αὖτε τῆς οὐσίας διαφθορῆς, ἀλλὰ ἡ βιωτὴν  
ἐν, καὶ μετὰ πάντων οὐσίαν τὴν καὶ πῶς, καὶ πῶς πᾶσι καὶ  
πάντων ἀρχὴν. τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας οὐσίας καὶ ἀδύναμιν  
καὶ διαφθορῆς, βιωτὴν ἁγίαν καὶ ἰσχυρὰν καὶ πῶς καὶ πῶς ὡς  
ἡδὴν ἀλλοτρίαν τῇ, ὁμοίαν καὶ ἀδύναμιν καὶ ἀδύναμιν  
οὐσίαν, διαφθορῆς καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀρετῆς. Plat. de Repub.  
Lib. 4.

**Doct. VI.** on Acuteness of the Senses to relish them; and if Immortality were added to these Enjoyments, then they fancy the Happiness would be perfect. And I confess that such Things may prove most grateful Entertainments to righteous and holy Men; but as for a vicious Person, he can never be happy in them: Nay, an Immortality in these Circumstances, without Righteousness and Virtue, would be his greatest Misery; and the least Evil he could meet withal, would be a speedy Dissolution of his Being (1). So essential an Ingredient is Virtue in the Happiness of all rational Agents.

It unites  
rational  
Minds in  
the Enjoy-  
ment of the  
highest Fe-  
licities for  
ever.

AND here we have one great Community made up of God, the great Creator and Governor, and of infinite Numbers of rational Creatures,

(1) Τα δὲ ὅτι πῶς πολλὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ὁρῶνς λί-  
γῃ. λέγει δὲ ὅτι αἰσίων ἂν ὕμνων, ἄντικρυν δὲ καλῶ, ἡ-  
γῶν δὲ πλεονῶ, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἑκατὶ ἀγαθὰ λέγει. ὅτι δὲ ὅτι ἑλ-  
κίσιν, ἢ πάντα ὅσα ἔχει τῶν αἰσθησίων, ἐκαστὴν ἔχει.  
ἐπὶ δὲ ἢ τὸ ποιεῖν πρᾶξις, ὅτι ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ. ἢ τὸ δὲ τέλος  
ἀπίστος μαχεσίοντος ἔν, τὸ πάντα ταῦτα κακῶς, ἀδύνα-  
τον ἔν γινώσκον ὅτι τέλει. ὅμοις δὲ ἢ ἔγωγε πῶς λέγομαι,  
ὅτι ταῦτα ὅτι ἔχουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἢ ὅμοις ἀνδρῶν ἀεὶ  
ἐκαστὸν, αἰσίων δὲ καλῶς ἔχουσιν, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς  
ἐξουσίας. ἢ δὲ ἢ τὸ ὅτι ἢ τὸ ἀκούειν, ἢ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ τὸ ὁρᾶν  
ζῶν, μέγιστον μὲν καλὸν τὸν ἔχοντα πάντα ἔχον ἀδύνατον ὄν-  
τα ἢ κακῶς πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, πλὴν δικαιοσύ-  
νης τὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν ἀπίστος ἔλαττον δὲ ἂν ὅτι ἐλπίσιν ὁ ταῦτα  
ἔχοντα ἔν, ὅτι. Plat. de Legib. Lib. 2. Λογίζεται ἔν ὅτι  
ἐκ αὐτοῦ πῶς μέγιστος ἢ ἀνίσταται νοήματα ἢ τὸ σῶμα συμ-  
μετρῶν μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς, ὅτι μὲν ἀδύνατον ὅτι ἐκ ἀπείρου,  
ἢ ὅτι ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀνίσταται. ἐπὶ δὲ πῶς ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐματῷ  
ἡμῶν τῷ ἰσχυρῷ πολλὰ νοήματα ἔχει ἢ ἀνίσταται, τότε δὲ  
ζῶντος ὅτι; ἢ αὐτὸν ἀνίσταται ἂν τὸ ἐκ ἀλλοτρίου, ἂν τὸ ἐκ  
δικαιοσύνης, ἂν τὸ ἀλλοτρίον ἐκαστὸν σῶμα; ἀλλ' ὅτι ὅτι ἐκ  
αὐτοῦ ὅτι ζῶν τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀνδρῶν, καλῶς δὲ ἀνίσταται ὅτι  
ζῶν. Plat. in Gorg.

tures, that are all govern'd by one common *Principle*, whereby every Individual is continually seeking after his own Good and Happiness; and particularly, to be universally lik'd and esteem'd: Here likewise is *Virtue* gratifying to the full, this *one common Principle* of God, and of all Mankind, filling every Individual with *inward Joy* and Pleasure, and uniting infinite Numbers of rational Agents to one another, in the exactest Proportions, Fitnesses, and Agreements; and spreading all over this vast Community, universal *Delight* and *Harmony*, while they are all mutually applauding and praising one another, for the mutual Assistance they are all contributing in promoting each other's Welfare and Prosperity.

So that here is universal Symmetry and Proportion, universal Concord and Harmony, universal Joy, Triumph, and Happiness; and all this *fixt* and permanent, to continue, without any Possibility of Change, while those Beings have their Existence, to everlasting Ages. And thus does *Virtue* appear every Way charming, good, and profitable (1).

Of

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(1) Poetæ in magna varietate personarum, etiam vitiosis quid conveniat, & quid deceat, videbunt. Nobis autem cum a natura constantiæ, moderationis, temperantiæ, verecundiæ partes datæ sint; cumque eadem natura doceat non negligere quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus, efficitur, ut & illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, decorum, quam late fufum sit, appareat, & hoc quod spectatur in unoquoque genere



## Sect. VI.



genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos, & delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt; sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine, & constantia, & moderatione dictorum omnium, atque factorum. *In the accommodating of all Parts to the Variety of Persons, the Poets will observe a Decorum even in vicious Characters. And since Nature has assign'd us our Parts of Constancy, Moderation, Temperance, Modesty, and likewise teaches us not to be wholly careless how we demean our selves toward one another; it is clear to us, how diffusive that Decorum is which belongs to Virtue, and every particular Branch of it. For as the Beauty of the Body, in the apt Disposition of the Parts, proves the Eye, and delights us in the very View of the fine Symmetry and Proportion of all the several Members together; so this Decorum that illustrates Life, gains upon all those we converse with, by the Order, Steadiness, and Moderation of all our Words and Actions.* Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1. Etenim illud ipsum, quod decorum honestumque diximus, quia per se nobis placet, animosque omnium natura & specie sua commovet, maximeque quasi perlucet ex eis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus; idcirco illes in quibus eas virtutes esse remur, a natura ipsa diligere cogimur. *There is such a Charm in that Gracefulness and Decorum, which we have already treated of, that the very Nature and bare Appearance of it, does move us strangely. Besides that, as it receives its Lustre from the aforesaid Virtues, wherever we find those Virtues, we cannot but naturally conceive kind Affections toward the Person that possesses them.* Id. ibid. Lib. 2. Pervertunt homines ea, quæ sunt fundamenta naturæ, cum utilitatem ab honestate sejungunt: omnes enim expetimus utilitatem, ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui utilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur? sed quia nusquam possumus, nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia reperire, propterea illa prima & summa habemus: utilitatis nomen non tam splendidum, quam necessarium ducimus. *'Tis a subverting of the Fundamentals of Nature, when People go about to* di.

divide Profit and Virtue. For we do all of us de- Sect. VI.  
 sire Profit, we are hurry'd on after it, nor is it in  
 our Power to prevent it: For who is the Man that  
 avoids these Things that tend to his Interest? Or  
 rather, who is the Man that does not eagerly  
 pursue them? So that since Profit is no where to  
 be found, but in Praise, Honour, and Virtue; there-  
 fore do we account these Things as most noble  
 and excellent: Tho' I confess the Word Profit is  
 not so genteel as it is necessary. Id. ibid. Lib. 3.  
 Εὖ γὰρ ἰδὲ, ἔστιν, ὃ Σωκράτης. ἐν ἐπιστάτῃ τις ἔγγυς ἢ τῷ ὀνόματι  
 πλεονεκτημάτων, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ΝΟῦ καὶ εὐτυχίας καὶ ὅν ἐμπροσθεν  
 ἐκ εὐστροφίας. οἱ τε γὰρ λαγόμενοι μῦθοι καὶ τῶν ἐκείνων, ὡς τῶν ἐκ-  
 δάδ' ἀδικούντων δὲ ἐκείνους διδόναι δίκην, καταγλασκόμενοι τῶν,  
 ὅτι δὲ εὐφροσύνη αὐτῶν τῇ ψυχῇ μὴ ἀλλοθις ἐστίν. καὶ αὐτοὶ, ἥτοι  
 καὶ τῆς τῇ γῆρας ἀδυναμίας, ἢ καὶ ὥστε ἥδη ἐγγυτέρω ὅν τῶν  
 ἐκείνων, μάλλον πικρὰ αὐτῶν. ὑποψίας δ' ἐν καὶ διματω μετὰ  
 γινώσκου. καὶ ἀναλκίαν ἥδη καὶ σκοπιάν, ἡ πᾶσι πικρὰ καὶ ὀδυνηρά. οἱ δὲ ἐν  
 ἐνστάτῃ αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν βίβων πολλὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸντων,  
 ὥστε οἱ παῖδες, δαμά ἐχθροὺς διμαίνοντες, καὶ ὅτι μετὰ κα-  
 κίας ἐλπίδ' ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῶν ἀδικον εὐνοῦσθαι, ἡδονα ἐλ-  
 πὲς δὲ παρῆστι, καὶ ἀγαθὰ γινεσθαι, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει  
 κατὰ τὴν γὰρ τοὺς ὅς Σωκράτης, τῶν ἐκείνων ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς ὅν  
 δίκης, καὶ ὅτι τῶν βίβων διατάξεις, γλυκύτατα οἱ καρδίας ἀτάλ-  
 λουσι καὶ γινεσθαι συναρτῶν ἐλπίς ὃ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολὺ-  
 στροτον γινώσκων καὶ ἐν τῇ. You very well know, my dear Socrates,  
 that when a Man perceives he is a-dying, there is  
 a Fear and Anxiety concerning those Things which  
 he never before minded, that breaks in upon him.  
 The Accounts we have of another World, viz. that  
 he who is wicked here, shall there suffer Punishment,  
 how much soever they were formerly laugh'd at, do  
 now confound and perplex his Soul with an Appre-  
 hension of their Certainty. And whether it be that  
 Age has weakned his Body, or that he is at no great  
 Distance from them, he sees the Things of another  
 World in a stronger Light: So that, full of Fears  
 and Jealousies, he reflects and examines what Evil  
 he has committed; and finding his Sins are many,  
 he is greatly disorder'd, and frequently starting, as  
 Children do, in his Sleep, he is terrify'd, and lives  
 with melancholy Prospects. But the Man who has  
 the





# Original of Moral Virtue. 877

Of all Possessions, as Xenophon observes (1), Sect. VI.  
'tis the most splendid, and the richest. In

M the

Reason, that God will never be regardless of his own Image. But as for the Wicked, their Case is wholly different, and Things must happen to them quite otherwise. Most certainly. Such therefore is the Happiness that a good Man enjoys in this World at the Hands of God. And as to People's Success among their Fellow-men, if we will speak Things as they really are, does it not stand thus? The Treacherous and Wicked, are they not much like those in a Race who set out with full Speed, but are not able to hold on? These at length become ridiculous, they bang their Ears, and sneak away without Honour. Whereas such as are Masters of the Exercise, make the Goal, carry the Prize, and are crowned: And is it not for the most Part, much the same with Men of Righteousness and Virtue? At the Conclusion of every Action, of every Affair, and of Life itself, they appear in a beautiful Light, and are esteem'd and applauded by Men. — Now, besides the Pleasures that Virtue itself derives to the Mind, these are the Recompences and Rewards that a righteous Man enjoys in this World at the Hands of God and Man. But whatever Shame and Misery the Wicked are here involved in, and whatever Honour and Happiness the Righteous are here exalted to, these are all Nothing, either as to Number or Greatness, in comparison to those Things they shall severally meet withal in another World. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 10.

(1) Ἐγὼ δὲ εὖ εἶ, νομίζω καὶ ἀνδρὶ καλλίον εἶναι κτήμα, εὖ δὲ λαμπερότερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ δυνάμειότερον, καὶ γενναϊότερον. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἔχοντες πλεῖστοι οὐτοι εἰλῶν πολλῶν, πλεῖστοι δὲ ἄλλων βελονῶν γινώσκοντες. καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔχει τὰς συναντιουμένους ἀρετὰς καὶ πονηρίας καὶ ἀντιθέτει τὰς βέλους. Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. Lib. 7.

**SECT. VII** the Opinion of *Socrates*, it is more precious than much fine Gold (1).

Thus far  
the Hea-  
thens, from  
the Nature  
of Things,  
declare for  
Moral  
Virtue.

**THIS** is the *Conclusion* which the Search I have made into human Nature, has led me to. And I have good Reason to hope, that every impartial Reader will confess, I have said nothing but what the *Nature* of Things has necessarily oblig'd me to own: And from my marginal Quotations it appears, that the World may, thus far, look upon me, not as a *Jew* or a *Christian* (as these Characters imply some Improvements, not attainable by mere Men) but as a *heathen Philosopher*, who has taken his Ideas, as they offer'd themselves to him from the Nature of Things, or, who has collected and rang'd, into a particular Order, the avowed Sentiments of other *heathen Philosophers*, who liv'd, some of them, more than two thousand Years ago.

## SECT. VII.

Our Au-  
thor has laid  
down a  
quite con-  
tradictory  
Conclusion.

**I**NDEED, the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* has, from the View he has taken of human Nature, laid down a quite contradictory Conclusion: For he maintains that "the first Rudi-  
ments

(1) Μὴ γὰρ δὴ οὖν, εἰ μὴ χρυσίον ἐζητούντων, ἢ καὶ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκείναις ἢ ὑποκατακλινέας ἀλλήλοισι ἐν τῇ ζητήσει, καὶ διαφθεῖρην τῇ εὐρίᾳ αὐτῶν δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητούνται πλεονέκτημα παλαιῶν χρυσίου πμώτερον, ἐπειδ' ὅτι αὐτοῦτος ὑπὸ καὶν ἀλλήλοισι, καὶ ἢ ἀποδίδειν ὅτι μάλιστα φαῖναι αὐτὸ δίδω γὰρ ἐστίν. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 1.

ments of Morality, broach'd by skilful Politicians, to render Men useful to each other, as well as tractable, were chiefly contriv'd, that the Ambitious might reap the more Benefit from, and govern vast Numbers of them with the greater Ease and Security: And, that the nearer we search into human Nature, the more we shall be convinc'd, that the *Moral Virtues* are the *political Offspring* which Flattery begot upon Pride." By all which this Gentleman means we should understand, that the *Moral Virtues* are all a *Chimera*, a downright Trick, which *Politicians* and *Moralists* have impos'd upon the World, as an *Engine* of their own Invention, in order to promote their own ambitious Purposes. This, I say, is a Conclusion quite contradictory to that which I have been led into. And, no doubt, the Author of it pretends to have Reason on his Side; nay, he is very positive, that it is founded in human Nature. But as, I flatter my self, I have made the contrary of this evidently to appear, from what I have been hitherto insisting on: To set this Matter in a stronger Light, I shall now consider our Author's Reasoning on this Argument.

AND, as I have above hinted, I will not debate with this Gentleman, about what he here attributes to human Nature. I frankly own, that every Man has (what he abusively calls) *Pride*, that is, as he himself explaineth it, a *Desire of being prais'd and commended*: And

Our Author's Reasoning consider'd, and confuted.



Sect. VII without Dispute, this Pride is wrought upon by such Objects as are proper to excite and gratify it; which when it happens, we shall, if you please, as our Author does with no great Propriety, likewise call *Flattery*. But now what of all this! I hope there is no Harm in a Man's having a Principle of Action deeply laid in his Nature, that always exerts itself, when it happens to be worked on by suitable Motives. But, says our Author, *Pride is one of those Frailties or Weaknesses of human Nature, which that which Philosophers call real Virtue never suffer to be gratified*. I confess indeed, there are some human Passions, which commonly, and very justly, get the Name of *Pride*, that are very great Weaknesses, and whereof the Gratification is most unworthy and odious. But, according as *Pride* ought to be understood in this Argument, "is it a Piece of Weakness, or any Thing blameable in a finite Creature, to pursue after Happiness, or to desire the good Opinion and Applauses of God, and of all the rational Creation, through all the several Stages of our eternal Existence (1)?"

Or,

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(1) ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἡμεῖς. Honour is a divine Enjoyment. Plat. de Legib. Lib. 5. Vera enim virtutis merces, gloria est: nec quidquam est aliud, quo magis ad recte honesteque agendum, præstantis animi homines incenduntur. The true Reward of Virtue is Glory. Nor is there any other Motive whereby the Mind of a worthy Person is more powerfully animated in the Pursuit of Honesty and Virtue. Cic. Consol.

Or, can any Man that understands any Thing of *Sec. VII*  
 a human Soul, or that believes there is a God,  
 a Providence, and a future State of Rewards  
 and Punishments, ever disapprove of this Prin-  
 ciple, or condemn our pursuing the Gratifica-  
 tion of it?

WELL, but *Lawgivers* and *Philosophers* (1)  
 have made use of *Flattery*, a bewitching Engine  
 M 3 (where-

(1) Animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, me-  
 mor, plenum rationis & consilii, quem vocamus hominem,  
 præclara quadam conditione generatum esse a supremo Deo.  
 Solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus, atque naturis,  
 particeps rationis & cogitationis, cum cætera sint omnia ex-  
 pertia. Quid est autem, non dicam in homine, sed in omni  
 cælo atque terra, ratione divinius? &c. *This Creature we*  
*call Man, who has Forecast, Sagacity, Penetration, Me-*  
*memory, Reason, and Conduct, and can turn himself a great*  
*many different Ways, was form'd in an exalted Condition*  
*by the supreme God. For of so many living Creatures and*  
*Existences, he is the only one that has Reason and Thought,*  
*when all others want the same. Now, what is there, I will*  
*not say among Men, but even in the whole System of Beings*  
*through the Universe, more divine than Reason? &c. Cic.*  
*de Legib. Lib. 1. Homo autem, qui rationis est particeps,*  
*consequentia cernit, principia & causas rerum videt, earum-*  
*que progressus, & quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudi-*  
*nes comparat, & rebus præsentibus adjungit atque annectit*  
*futuras; facile totius vitæ cursum videt, ad eamque degendam*  
*præparat res necessarias, &c. As for Man who is endued*  
*with Reason, he discerns the Consequences of Things, he*  
*sees into their Principles and Causes, and the Advances*  
*they make, and is acquainted with their antecedent Con-*  
*nections, he compares the like Appearances, and, as*  
*Things have happen'd before, passes the same Judgment on*  
*Things to come; by which Means he can easily represent to*  
*himself a complete Scheme of Life, and so prepare the Ne-*  
*cessaries*

**Sect. VII** (whereby our Author understands, some very powerful Arguments drawn from the Consideration of the Excellency of our Nature above other Animals, and of the Greatness of our Sagacity, and the Vastness of our Understanding, or the Rationality of our Souls, by the Help whereof we are capable of performing the most noble Achievements, that will support the Dignity of our Nature, and exalt us to the Esteem and Commendation of God, and of all Mankind) I say, Lawgivers, and Philosophers, as our Author complains, have made Use of this Sort of Flattery, this bewitching Engine, such powerful Motives and Arguments; and have thereby begot Moral Virtue on this Principle of Pride: So that the Moral Virtues are the political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride.

BUT, I would beg to know, what are we to understand by begetting of the Moral Virtues upon Pride by Flattery? If this Phrase has the good Fortune to bear any Sense; or if we are to take it in a Consistency with what our Author is all along discoursing of, it must questionless signify, that *Men are persuaded into the Practice of Moral Virtue, by some prevailing*

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*cessaries for it, &c. Id. de Offic. Lib. 1. Sed pertinet ad omnem officii questionem, semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque bestiis antecedit. In all our Enquiries concerning Duty, we should always have this in View, how much Man excels the Cattle and other Beasts. Id. ibid.*



ing Motives that are applied to their natural Desire of Praise and Commendation. And is it a Crime in any Lawgiver, or Philosopher, to awaken and raise our Appetite after just and due Praise, in the Sense I have explained it, and to prevail on us by proper Arguments (such as the above Considerations mentioned by our Author, most certainly are) to pursue after Virtue, as the only Means to acquire it? Or, does it follow from hence (let Pride and Flattery, the Principle and the Motives, be what they will, the most infamous Things in the Universe;) does it follow from hence, that the Moral Virtues have no Foundation in the Nature and Reason of Things, but are a mere Contrivance, a downright Chimera, without Truth or Being, an Invention of Moralists and Politicians?

THIS indeed is the Conclusion which our learned Author has been pleased to present us with; and I am much afraid, that some ill-natured People may from hence take Occasion to call, either his good Sense, or his Ingenuity in question. But what needs one make a rude Clamour about any Thing of this Nature? Is a little Piece of Sophistry, or an open Affront done to the common Understanding of Mankind; are such Events so very extraordinary and surprizing? Nay, but say some People, is it not provoking, that a Man should go about to put upon the World such wretched Stuff, in Matters of this Consequence! provoking! No;

§ 8. VII if it be not exceeding pleasant and diverting, it serves at least to entertain one with all the friendly Emotions of Pity, when we find one of our own Species setting up an Image, which all the World sees to be a Creature of his own making, and then with the warmest Zeal, mustering together all his Forces, to gain Credit to the dear Phantom, and to support its Reputation by perswading Mankind to bow down before it; besides that, I always reckon, that Truth is obliged to that Man, who maintains the Argument he undertakes to demonstrate, by the best and strongest Reasons that the Nature of Things can furnish him with. And is it not a mighty Blow which our Author gives Moral Virtue, when he thus argues after an irresistible Manner? Men, says he, have *Pride*; that is, a Thirst after Honour, a Desire of being praised and commended; but Philosophers and Politicians, by applying suitable Motives (which this Gentleman calls *Flattery*) have perswaded the World into the Practice of Moral Virtue: And therefore the Moral Virtues are the political Offspring which Flattery begets upon Pride, *that is*, they are all Trick and Invention!

— *risum teneatis amici.*


I would fain know, how any Man can withstand the Force of this Argument. The Gentlemen of the grand Jury of *Middlesex* have been strangely blinded, that they could not discern its convincing Evidence. And it is real-

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ly Pity that the Publick have not better reward-  
ed the ingenious Author of this almighty En-  
gine, that can be applied to all Purposes, and  
by the Help whereof one single Man may un-  
dertake to demonstrate, that every Thing in  
the Universe is mere Delusion and Imposture.

I suppose every Body will allow, that all in-  
telligent Beings whatsoever are excited to Acti-  
on by some Motives: And if you grant but  
this, which, I humbly conceive, cannot well  
be denied; with what Clearness shall this Argu-  
mentation demonstrate, that all the Productions  
of rational Agents, are downright *Chimera*! It  
might perhaps be thought impious, to try the  
mighty Power of this wonderful Engine, upon  
the Works of the Deity: But what can hin-  
der us from applying it to prove the Value and  
Certainty of those Arts and Sciences, that are  
the Product of the Study and Labour of poor  
Mortals? I tremble at the Fate of all our  
boasted Demonstrations; and it is really shock-  
ing to find in particular, that all the several  
Parts of *Geometry*, are without Truth or Being,  
and have no Foundation any where, but in some  
deluded Fancies. For, may not one well e-  
nough alledge, that the incomparable Sir *Isaac*  
*Newton*, or some other Mathematicians, have  
awakned, in some People, that *Pride*, or that  
Desire of Esteem, which they found laid in their  
Nature, so as to perswade them into the Study  
of that Science? And does it not follow from  
hence, that *Newton's Principia*, for Instance, are  
the

Sect. VII



It is base  
fac'd Sophis-  
try,



**SECT. VII.** the mathematical Offspring which Flattery begets upon Pride? Or, that those eternal Truths, which this great Man has, by his vast Skill in *Geometry*, found out and demonstrated to the World, are all mere Fiction and Chime-  
 ra? This indeed may be somewhat alarming to those Gentlemen that deal in *Demonstration*: But what have they to offer against the Justness of this Consequence? I am well assured, that the very same Considerations which our Author makes use of to prove, that the Moral Virtues are nothing more than the mere Contrivance of Politicians and Moralists, will lead us with as great Certainty to this, I own, a pretty odd Conclusion, or to whatever else one is inclinable to demonstrate.

NAY, to let you see the irresistible Force of this mighty Engine, and that no one Thing can stand before it; 'tis a most dangerous Weapon in the Hands of every School-boy, to ruine the Credit of the *Fable of the Bees* itself, and to make out to the World, that that curious Book is a Master-piece of false Reasoning, of Cavil and Sophistry: For how easy is it for any Novice dogmatically to affirm our Author has Pride, *i. e.* he wants to be taken Notice of; but some Flattery, or some powerful Motives have stirred up this Principle, and so persuaded him to publish *his private Vices, publick Benefits*? And therefore, this Book the *Fable of the Bees*, or, *private Vices publick Benefits*, is the sophistical Offspring which Flattery begot upon

upon Pride. Indeed our Author, for his part, *Sect. VII* needs not at all be concerned at any such Reasoning; for, in the Name of all my Fellow-Men, who pretend to some few Grains of common Sense, I do assure him, that what Execution soever such a precious Syllogism in the Hands of one who has been about six Foot high for so many Years, may happen to do against Moral Virtue, it can never, in the present Case, hurt his Principles; what is it but an indiscrete Attack of an insolent little Rogue, who deserves to be chastised, for daring to usurp the Province of his Betters? And who can help a raw saucy Novice his pretending to be as good at inferring Consequences, as one that has a longer Beard?

BUT this Argumentation of our Author's is of so very extraordinary a Nature, and seems capable of producing such miraculous Effects, with respect to every Thing to which it is applied, that some People, perhaps, may be apt to imagine, that the Invention of it is beyond the Reach of human Capacity. I own indeed, that was I to measure another Man's Powers by my own, which is but an ill Way to judge of Things, I should be tempted to believe, there is something here preternatural. But as our Author gives us no Hint of his being under the Influence of any Thing more than human; we are oblig'd, in Charity, to look upon his having found out so extraordinary an Engine, of such universal Use, as a Proof of the Vastness of his  
Capa-

**IV. Sect. VII** Capacity, and of his being blessed with an uncommon Genius. In the mean while, I must here arrogate to myself the Honour of having done Justice to his Invention: And I do appeal to the whole understanding World, whether I have not observed the whole Strength of his Argument, or if there be any Thing, from Beginning to End, in his whole Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, upon which the Decision of this Point depends, that is not comprehended in those two Principles I have mentioned, from which alone he draws his Conclusion. This, I perswade myself, every Body will observe who reads over his Enquiry with the least Degree of Attention. However, for the Reader's Satisfaction, I shall trace this Gentleman through some few Paragraphs, and impartially lay before you, what he all along advanceth, till he brings us to his Conclusion.

An impartial Account of it from himself.

In his first Paragraph he tells us, ' That Man being an extraordinary selfish and headstrong, as well as cunning Animal, however he may be subdued by superior Strength, it is impossible by Force alone to make him tractable, and receive the Improvements he is capable of; and therefore he observes, in his second Paragraph, ' that Lawgivers, and other Wisemen, that have laboured for the Establishment of Society, have imployed all the Wit and Eloquence they were Masters of, to perswade the World, that it is more beneficial for every Body, to conquer, than indulge



dulge his Appetites, and much better to mind the Publick, than what seemed his private Interest. But it being impossible to induce a Man to part with the Gratification of his own Appetites, for the Sake of other People, without proposing to him some Motives, that let him see he shall thereby reap more Advantage, or greater Happiness: This made it necessary for Politicians and Moralists, to think of falling upon some Arguments, (which our Author calls *imaginary*) that should universally take, and whereby all the World might be perswaded, that it is much more a Man's Interest, to cross his Inclinations for the Good of the Publick, than gratify them without any Regard to the Welfare of other People.' To which Purpose, as he tells us in his *third Paragraph*, 'having thoroughly examined all the Strength and Frailties of human Nature, they found that the Desire of Praise was an universal Passion or Principle, that very powerfully governed all Mankind; and therefore justly concluded, that *Flattery*, or that which serves to work upon this Principle, must be the most powerful Argument, that could be used to human Creatures: So that making use of this bewitching Engine, they extolled the Excellency of our Nature, and setting forth with unbounded Praises the great Wonders of our Sagacity, and the Vastness of our Understanding, bestowed a thousand Encomiums on the Rationality

**Sec. VII** ' onality of our Souls (1). And by this Means  
 ' having perswaded Mankind into an Opinion  
 ' of their own Dignity and Greatness, they  
 ' warmly ply'd them with such Representations,  
 ' as made them sensible how unworthy it was  
 ' such sublime Creatures, to live like Brutes,  
 ' in the Gratification of their sensual Appetites  
 ' (2), and not to keep their Rank in the Uni-  
 ' verse, and mind the Improvement of those  
 ' higher Qualities that give them the Pre-emi-  
 ' nence

(1) See Cicero quoted above, p. 181.

(2) Οἱ δὲ αὖτε φρονήτως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀπειροὶ, διαχόμενοι καὶ τοῖς  
 ταῖς αἰσθητικαῖς ἐξουσίαις, καὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ καὶ μὴ καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ  
 μεταξὺ φρονήτως καὶ τῷ ταύτῃ πλεονάζοντι διαβίον. ἡμετέρας δὲ  
 τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς αἰσθητικῆς ἀνέκλεσαν πάσας, καὶ ἡνίχ-  
 θισαὶν, ἡ δὲ αὖτε οὐκ ὄντι ἐκπληρωθῆσαν, ἡ δὲ βέλους τι καὶ  
 καὶ δαμάσκηον ἡδονῆς ἐχέουσιν. αἷμα βοσκυμάτων δίκην καὶ αἰ  
 βλαπτόντες, καὶ κακωρότεροι εἰς γῆν, καὶ εἰς τροπικὰς, βόσκουσι  
 χορτοφάγοι καὶ ὀχλοῦσι, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τέτων πλεονεξίας λαυλι-  
 ζοῦσι, καὶ κωλύοντες ἀνθρώποις πιδυροῖς κατέπ τι καὶ ὀπλοῖς, ἐκ-  
 λινύσας δὲ ἀπλυσίας, ἀπὲρ ἐχέ τοῖς ἔσθῃ, ἡ δὲ τὸ ὄν ἔπ τι  
 εἶναι ἰαυτῶν περιπλάνες. Such as are void of Prudence and  
 Virtue, having given up themselves to Intemperance  
 and other sensual Lusts, they are carried downwards,  
 and go astray in the Course of Life: For never rais-  
 ing themselves above the Objects of Sense, they nei-  
 ther discern nor pursue those real Enjoyments that  
 are above, nor do they entertain themselves with so-  
 lid Things, or ever taste pure and lasting Pleasures;  
 but, like brute Creatures always looking downwards,  
 and bending toward the Earth, and luxurious Feed-  
 ing, they pamper their Bodies, and indulge their  
 venereal Appetites, and in the Pursuit of such immo-  
 derate Lusts, push, and gore, and kill one another  
 with Horns or Weapons of Iron: Nor are they ever  
 satisfy'd, for they have no Appetite for those Things  
 that are real and substantial. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 9.

## Original of Moral Virtue:

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nence over all visible Beings.' Besides that, as **Sec. VI**  
he observes in his *fourth Paragraph*, 'they in-  
'troduced an Emulation amongst Mankind, by  
'dividing the whole Species into two Classes,  
'whereof the one consisted of poor, abject, gro-  
'velling Wretches, that care for nothing but  
'the Gratification of their own sordid and in-  
'famous Lusts; but the other was made up of  
'those noble elevated Souls, that are ambiti-  
'ous to maintain the Dignity of their Nature,  
'by embellishing their Minds with all those  
'Graces and Virtues that can render them beau-  
'tiful in themselves, and useful to others. And  
such powerful Motives having been thus ap-  
'plied to this Passion or Principle of Pride,'  
he takes Notice in his *fifth and sixth Paragraphs*,  
'that all Men were some how or other pre-  
'vailed on, either seemingly to approve of, or  
'heartily to embrace and pursue those Mea-  
'sures, or Lectures of Morality, that were pro-  
'posed to them by those Lawgivers and Philo-  
'sophers, as the great Means to raise them up  
'to the Esteem and Commendation of Man-  
'kind.' And so he comes to lay down his Con-  
clusion in his *seventh Paragraph*: 'This, says he,  
'was (or at least might have been; for he is  
'not so very sure, that it really was) the Man-  
'ner after which savage Man was broke. From  
'whence it is evident (that the Moral Virtues  
'have no Foundation in the Nature and Reason  
'of Things, but are mere Chimeras, without  
'Truth or Being, contriv'd by skilful Politici-  
'ans



**Sec. VII.** **W**ans and Moralists, as the best Engine they could invent, whereby to govern the World. For this is what he understands, when he tells us) That the first Rudiments of Morality be broach'd by skilful Politicians, to render Men useful to each other, as well as tractable, were chiefly contriv'd, that the Ambitious might reap the more Benefit from, and govern vast Numbers of them with the greater Ease and Security.

**T**his is a faithful Account of every Step of our Author's Argument; nor is there any Thing to be found in the following Part of his Enquiry, but what comes entirely to the same Purpose. And can any Man have the Face to say, that he must certainly have a very despicable Opinion of Mankind, or an extravagant Conceit of his own Worth and Authority, who can imagine, that the World is to be catch'd by such a fine Piece of Reasoning!

It is very  
shameful.

**I** shall suppose, I have half a Dozen wild rambling Boys, that can have no settled Thought about any Thing; this gives me a good deal of Concern, and I am apprehensive, they will all their Life long be good for nothing: However, I am to imploy all imaginable Arts, to break them of their Roving and Extravagancies, and to bring them to some Steadiness of Thought and Application. And, for this Purpose, I address myself particularly to that Passion of Pride, with which I find they are all inspired: And, in order to work upon this Prin-

Principle; having made them sensible of the Sect. VII  
 Dignity of their Nature, and let them know  
 for what noble Purposes they were made and  
 designed; I represent to them on the one Hand,  
 how their going on in their loose and ram-  
 bling Manner, will sink them below the Excel-  
 lency of their Nature, and expose them to  
 universal Contempt and Infamy: And on the  
 other Hand, I lay before them, how a Stayed-  
 ness of Mind, or a close and accurate Way of  
 Thinking, such as is to be acquired by the  
 Study of the Mathematicks, will recommend  
 them to the Applauses of all Mankind. Besides  
 that, I raise an Emulation among my Boys, by  
 setting Marks of Honour upon those that are  
 sedate, and apply themselves; and Marks of Dis-  
 grace upon others that rove, and are heedless:  
 By which Means I have had the good Fortune  
 to break them of their Rambling, so that now  
 they can closely pursue geometrical Demonstra-  
 tions, and are already Masters of *Euclid's* Ele-  
 ments. Now, I refer it to the Author of the  
*Fable of the Bees* himself, whether from this  
 (which is plainly his own Argumentation) it  
 is evident, that the Propositions of the fifteen  
 Books of *Euclid*, are all a Chimera, an idle  
 Fancy, without Truth or Being.

BUT I have said enough, I dare say, the  
 Reader thinks too much, to lay open the  
 mighty Force of our Author's Reasoning: And  
 all the World must be satisfy'd, that this Gentle-  
 man's Argument is so very curiously contriv'd,

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that

Sect. VII that the *Moral Virtues*, for ought he has said,  
 may, or may not, be the mere Contrivance  
 and Invention of *Politicians* and *Moralists*. So  
 that from this Scheme, there is Nothing that  
 can hinder a Man from being very positive,  
 that *Moral Virtue* is downright *Sham* and *Im-  
 posture*, a political Engine, invented by Law-  
 givers and Philosophers, to support themselves  
 in that Authority they have usurp'd over Man-  
 kind. It is true, some sage Gentlemen, who,  
 one is tempted to think, have some Knowledge  
 of Things, both in their Nature and Conse-  
 quents, may look upon such a Scheme of  
 Things as very impious, and to be well Rock'd  
 with Store of good Instruments to overthrow  
 all Religion whatsoever, to sap the very Foun-  
 dations of all Peace, Order, and Government,  
 and to pour in upon the World all the most  
 dreadful Confusions, Distractions, and Miseries:  
 But it better becomes us to regret, that this  
 notable Author made not one of those Philoso-  
 phers and Politicians, who, as he says, con-  
 triv'd, broach'd, and taught the first Rudiments  
 of Morality, which would have certainly blef-  
 sed the World with a System of *Moral Virtues*,  
 to the forming of which he had immediately  
 contributed his Assistance. We cannot indeed,  
 at this Time of Day, so well understand, how  
 much human Affairs have suffered by his ap-  
 pearing so late among Mankind: But from  
 this ingenious Fable, which, in all its Parts, was  
 so curiously wrought up some Years ago in a  
 Chri-



Christian Country, and which the Author has thought fit to christen by the Name of *private Vices publick Benefits*, one may make shift to form a tolerable Notion of what should have been the Complexion and Features, the Principles and Disposition of that moral or political Brat which his Flattery would have then begot, in a wonderful Manner, upon the Pride of his Species, and which, no doubt, he would have left behind him, to the great Joy and Happiness of all *Adam's* Posterity. I will not rake upon me to say, that such an Offspring of our Author's would have had the good Fortune to be universally well-lik'd: For some People, such is the Degeneracy of the Times! have so bad a Taste, as not to affect very much this Production of his, that is now Abroad in the World. But what signifies the Approbation of the *Many*, those vulgar Souls, that have not the Freedom of Thought, like generous Free-thinkers, to pursue their Principles beyond human Nature? 'Tis great Consolation to our Author, that he has the Applauses of the *Few*, those refin'd Spirits who can think abstractedly, whose Minds are elevated above the Vulgar, and who scorn to prostitute their exalted free-thinking Souls to *common Sense* and *Reason*; but, like Men of Honour, nobly pronounce with our Author, that *the nearer we search into human Nature, the more we shall be convinc'd, that the Moral Virtues are the political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride.*

**Se& VII** It is indeed my Misfortune, that the Principles, which I have above laid down, and explained, do cut me off from having any Pretension to appear among such honourable Company: But as every Man has his own Pleasure; so it here gives me a particular Satisfaction to declare, according to the *Vulgar*, the *common* Principles of human Nature, that the *Moral Virtues*, with respect to their *Original*, are all independent of the Will of any Being whatsoever, having their Foundation in the Nature and Reason of Things; and that, as to their *Duration*, they are all as *steady*, *fixt*, and *permanent*, as is the Principle of *Self-love* or Preservation, with which it is impossible but every animate Being must be inspired.

Moral Vir-  
tue natu al.

AND upon the whole, I will beg Leave to conclude, that as the further we search, and the nearer we look into the Nature of both God and Man, the more we shall be convinc'd, that *the Moral Virtues have their Foundation in the Nature of Things, or, are eternally proportion'd to that great commanding Principle of all rational Agents, whereby they never but necessarily pursue their own Interest or Happiness*: So 'tis very manifest from Experience, which, as our common Proverb observes, *teacheth Fools*, that Multitudes of People, who liv'd together without (what our Author calls) *Politicians* and *Philosophers*, to work upon their Pride by Flattery, have most religiously discharged, towards one another, all  
the

the several Parts of Moral Virtue (1). And in- Sect. VII  
deed, according to what I have above observ'd,  
as it is impossible for any Number of Men,  
whether great or small, to keep together with-

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out

(1) Sed primi mortalium, quique ex his geniti, naturam incorruptam sequebantur, eandem habebant & ducem & legem, &c. sed quamvis egregia illis vita fuerit, & carens fraude, non fuere tamen sapientes, quando hoc jam in opere maxime nomen est; non tamen negaverim fuisse alti spiritus viros, & ut ita dicam, a Diis recentes. *The first of Mortals, and their immediate Descendants, did all of 'em follow the pure Dictates of Nature, and had the same for their Guide and their Law, &c. but tho' their Course of Life was excellent, and full of Uprightness and Integrity; yet we are not to call them wise, since this is a Name that now rather belongs to an Art or Profession. I am far however from denying that they were Men of noble Principles, and if I may be allowed the Expression, like those who have newly come from the Deity. Senec. Epist. 91.*

Campestres melius Scythæ,

Quorum plaustra vagas rite trahunt domos.

Vivunt & rigidi Getæ:

Immetata quibus jugera liberas

Fruges, & Cererem ferunt;

Nec cultura placet longior annua,

Defunctumque laboribus

Æquali recreat sorte vicarius.

Illic matre carentibus

Privignis mulier temperat innocens,

Nec dotata regit virum

Conjux, nec nitido fidit adultero.

Dos est magna parentum

Virtus, & metuens alterius viri

Certo fœdere castitas;

Et peccare nefas, aut pretium est mori.

HOR. Od. 24. Lib. 3.

Happier



Sect. VII out (1) the *mutual Exercise* of Moral Virtue (for  
 ~~~~~ Vice, or Injustice sets even a single Person at  
 Odds with himself) so is every particular Man
 that inclines (and we all naturally do so) to
 aslo.

*Happier the wandring Scythians live
 Who all their House in one small Waggon drive,
 Where no unequal Bounds
 Do parcel out the Land in private Grounds,
 The Corn grows freely for the common Good;
 And when one Year their Fields they plow'd,
 They sit at Ease, whilst others toil;
 And equal Pains manure the publick Soil.
 There all the Cups the Step-dame's Hands present
 To unsuspecting Heirs, are innocent:
 No Wife confiding on her Dowre,
 Or rich Gallant usurps her Husband's Power;
 None there a lawless Sway pretends.
 Her Portion is the Virtue of her Friends,
 And cautious Modesty
 That closer draws the Marriage Tie,
 They fear to sin, or sinning doom'd to die.*

Creech, HOR. Od. 24. Lib. 3.

(1) Δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν, ἢ στρατόπεδον, ἢ λησείας, ἢ κλέπτας,
 ἢ ἄλλο τι εἶναι, ὅσα κοινὰ ὅππῃ τι ἔρχῃ ἀδίκως, παρῆσαι ἂν
 πὶ δύναδός, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀνθρώποι; ἢ δὴ ταῦτα. γὰρ οἱ οὗτοι
 ἀδικία, καὶ μίση, καὶ μάχαις ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρέχεται. ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη
 ὁμόνοια καὶ φιλία. ἀρα εἰ τὸτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μίσος ἐμποιοῖεν
 ὅππῃ ἂν εἴη, ἢ καὶ ἐλαθέρις. τε καὶ δούλοισι ἐξυνομένη, μισοῖεν
 ποιήσει ἀνθρώποις καὶ κατασφάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους ἐν κοινῇ μετ' ἀνθρώπων
 παρῆσαι; Τί δ', ἂν ἐν δούλοις ἐξήνη, ἢ διοίσον, καὶ μισήτους καὶ
 ἐχθροὺς ἔσονται ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; Ἐάν δ' ὅτι ἐν
 ἐξήνη ἀδικία, μὴν μὴ ἀπολεῖ ἢ αὐτῆς δύναμις; ἢ ἐὰν ἦτορ
 ἔξει; Οὐκ ἔν τινα δὲ πᾶσι φαί. εἰ ἔχουσιν ἢ δυνάμειν, οἷον ὅτι
 ἐξήνη, εἴτε πόλιν πνί, εἴτε γένει, εἴτε στρατόπεδον, εἴτε ἄλ-
 λω ὅτῳ, παρῆσαι ἢ ἀδυνάτον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ παρῆσαι μετ'
 αὐτῷ, διὰ τὸ κατασφάζειν καὶ διωθίμεν. ἐπὶ δὲ ἐχθρὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παρῆσαι καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ. Καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δὴ οἶμαι
 εἶναι,

associate himself with others, unavoidably led *See. VII*
by his own *natural Sense* of Things, without
any Sort of Instruction, to discharge all the
Offices of Moral Virtue towards those Persons
among whom he is mixed, or whose good O-

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pinion

ἐννοῶ, ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖν, ἀπὸ πεινῶν ἰσχυρῶν, καὶ
ἢ ἀδυνάτων αὐτῶν πεινῶν ποιεῖν, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἢ ἰσχυρῶν
ἐννοῶ αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῦ. ἔπειτα ἰσχυρῶν ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς.
Do you think that a State, an Army, or even a Gang of
Robbers or Thieves, or any other Band of Men that unite
together to do Mischief, will be able to execute any Thing,
if they prove injurious to one another? 'Tis impossible.
For Injustice creates Hatred, Seditions, and Tumults;
whereas Righteousness unites Peoples Hearts and Af-
fections to one another, and establishes Friendship among
them. And therefore if it be the Nature of Injustice,
wherever it is, to bring forth Animosities and Discords,
among whatever Set of Men it happens to take Place, will
it not make them hate one another, involve them in Dis-
ensions, and thereby render them incapable of doing any
Thing jointly together? And if it happens between two
Persons, will it not produce Discords and Hatred, and
make them Enemies to each other, and to all good Men?
But if it possesses one single Person, will it lose its mischie-
vous Nature, or will it still retain its Malignity? This
therefore seems to be the Nature of Injustice, in whatever
Body of Men it prevails, it first disables them, by the Dis-
cords and Dissensions it occasions, to act any Thing joint-
ly; and then it makes them Enemies to each other, and to
all good Men. And the same mischievous Effects does
it naturally produce in one single Person, for raising in-
ward Tumults and Disorders in his Breast, it renders
him unfit for Action, it makes him an Enemy to himself,
and to all Men of Probity and Virtue. Plat. de Repub.
Lib. 1.

Sec. VII opinion and Esteem he is seeking after (1). And
 certain it is, as Aristotle observes (2), That e-

(1) Est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur: ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur. Sunt enim prima elementa naturæ, quibus auctis, virtutis quasi carmen efficitur. Nam cum ita facti factique sumus, ut & agendi aliquid, & diligendi aliquos, & liberalitatis, & referendæ gratiæ principia in nobis contineamus, atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinemque aptos animos haberemus, a contrariisque rebus alienos: non sine causa, eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillulas videmus, e quibus accendi Philosophi ratio debet, ut eam, quasi Deum ducein subsequens, ad naturæ perveniat extremum. Such is the natural Constitution of Man, that he seems to have an inbred Power, whereby he discerns and relishes moral Virtue. And hence it is that Children, without any Instruction, are affected with the Appearances of Virtue; for they have the Seeds of Virtue laid in their Nature, nor is it any Thing but the first Elements or Principles of Nature, that by their being open'd and expanded, make up the whole of its Composition. So that since we are so fram'd in our Nature, that we contain within us these Principles, whereby we are led to do something, to affect some Body, to exercise Bounty, and to requite Favours; and have our Minds likewise form'd to Knowledge, Prudence, and Fortitude, with an Aversion to Things of a contrary Nature; 'tis no Wonder that we observe in Children these Sparks, as it were, of Virtue, at which a Philosopher ought to light his Reason, that following this Guide, as if God himself was leading him, he may come to the utmost Extent of Nature. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 3. Nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus, ad virtutem pervenire non possit. Nor is there any Man of whatever Nation, who takes Nature for his Guide, that may not arrive at Virtue. Id. de Legib. Lib. 1.

(2) Ὅτι μὲν ἐν ἡμετέρῃ τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅσοις ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ τῆς πραΰτης κατὰ ταύτας, ἔσται συ-

very Man is happy in Proportion to his Virtue, and Sect. VIII.
the Influence it has over him in the Conduct of Life.

SECTION VIII.

THE eternal and unchangeable Nature of Moral Virtue, has, to my Apprehension, been made so conspicuous in the Course of our Argument, that if the Reader is of the same Opinion, he will be apt to think, that this Point needs to be labour'd no further. However, as a Corollary from the foregoing Principles, I shall here observe, that Moral Virtue does in no Respect depend on the arbitrary Will of Civil Governors. Mr. Hobbes, and Spinoza, as well as our Author, are of a contrary Opinion, but without all Foundation in the Nature of Things.

Mr. Hobbes and others make Virtue to depend on the Will of the civil Magistrate,

ACCORDING to the Light in which I have set this Argument, it wou'd appear, that if those human Affections and Actions, which we call the Moral Virtues, do depend on the Will and Authority of the Civil Magistrate, it must be, either in Respect of their *intrinsic Goodness* and *Rectitude*, or of the *Obligation* that Men are under to observe them, or of both the one and the other: So that the making of Moral Virtue, or universal Love and Righteousness, to depend on the

If it has any such Dependence, it must be either with Respect to its intrinsic Goodness, or the Obligation Men are under to observe it.

SECT. VIII. the *Pleasure* of Civil Governors, must signify, either "that *universal Love* and *Righteousness* do "derive their *intrinsic Goodness* and *Rectitude* "from the *arbitrary Will* of the Civil Magistrate", or "that Mankind are *bound* to pursue them on *no other Account*, than because "they are commanded by the *Laws* of the "Land". This, I should think, brings the Matter into a narrow enough Compass. Nor do I see after what other Manner it can possibly be alledged, that *Moral Virtue*, or universal *Righteousness*, depends on the arbitrary *Pleasure* of Civil Governors. And I am willing to joyn Issue with any Man upon both these Points.

The intrinsic Goodness of Moral Virtue has no Dependence on the Will of the Civil Magistrate.

As for the *intrinsic Goodness* or *Rectitude* of *Moral Virtue*, or of *universal Love* and *Righteousness*, this, as I have explain'd it, lies directly in the *Fitness* and *Congruity* which such Affections and Actions bear to the *Self-love* and *Preservation*, or the *Well-being* and *Happiness* of Mankind, or of human Nature. And I can scarce think that any Man will incline to maintain that the only Reason why universal Love and *Righteousness* do so exactly suit and correspond with the *Self-interest* of human Nature, or are so well adapted to the *Happiness* of Mankind, is, because the *arbitrary Will* of Civil Governors hath so appointed it. Sure I am, *Spinoza* is of a quite different Opinion; for, without any Regard to the *Authority* of the Civil Magistrate, and however he would have *Moral Virtue* to depend on his arbitrary Will and Plea-

Pleasure, he expressly declares (1), *That the* **Sec. VIII.**
Actions of Men towards one another, are good or
evil, according as they conspire, or clash, with
their Self-interest, or their mutual Peace and Hap-
piness. And I should think he is very positive
(2), That only Love, and those Affections that flow
from it, are the Things that can correspond with
the common Principle of Self-preservation, or with
every Man's natural Desire after Happiness: For
Hatred, says he, and its Offspring can never be
good, they are always evil, and go perpetually cross
to one's Interest and Wellbeing (3). And hence

it

(1) Quæ ad hominum communem societatem conducunt, sive quæ efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, utilia sunt; & illa contra mala, quæ discordiam in civitatem inducunt. — Nam quæ efficiant ut homines concorditer vivant, simul efficiunt, ut ex ductu rationis vivant, atque adeo bona sunt, & illa contra mala sunt, quæ discordias concitant. Eth. Par. 4. Prop. 40.

(2) Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo, qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare, & sibi amicitia jungere. Eth. Par. 3. Prop. 59. Sch. Qui injurias reciproco odio vindicare vult, misere profecto vivit. At qui contra studet odium amore expugnare, ille sane lætus, & secure pugnat; æque facile uni homini, ac pluribus resistit, & fortunæ auxilio quam minime indiget. Quos vero vincit, ii læti cedant, non quidem ex defectu, sed ex incremento virium. Eth. Par. 4. Prop. 46. Sch.

(3) Odium nunquam potest esse bonum. — Hominem quem odimus, destruere conamur, hoc est, aliquid conamur, quod malum est. — Invidia, irrisio, contemptus, ira, vindicta, & reliqui affectus, qui ad odium referuntur, vel ex eodem oriuntur, mali sunt. Eth. Par. 4. Prop. 45. Quatenus homines invidia, aut aliquo odii affectu, in se invicem feruntur, eatenus invicem contrarii sunt; & consequenter, eo magis in-

mendi;

SECT. VIII. it is that he expressly declares (1), *That the Civil Magistrate would in vain command the Subject to hate their Benefactors, to love those that have done them Wrong, not to be offended with Affronts and Indignities, not to desire to be delivered from the Fear of Mischief, and many other such Things that necessarily flow from the Constitution of human Nature, and have no Dependence upon Civil Authority.* Nay, the Goodness, Equity, and Righteousness of human Actions, independently of all civil Constitutions, have so sensible a Congruity with the universal Law of Self-interest, or the common Principles of human Nature, that no Man can binder himself, in his own Thoughts and Reasoning, from perceiving them very distinctly; and far less is it in the Power of any Civil Magistrate, so to bend and govern Peoples Minds, that they shall be sensible of no Moral Goodness or Rectitude in human Actions, but what is derived from their arbitrary Will and Authority (2). So that

mendi, quo plus possunt, quam reliqua naturæ individua. Ibid. Cap. 10. in App.

(1) Frustra enim subdito imperaret, ut illum odio habeat, qui eum sibi beneficio junxit; ut amet qui ei damnum intulit; ut contumeliis non offendatur, & alia per plurima hujusmodi, quæ ex legibus humanæ naturæ necessario sequuntur. Theol. Pol. Cap. 17.

(2) Si æque facile esset animis ac linguis imperare, tuto unusquisque regnaret, & nullum imperium violentum foret. Nam unusquisque ex imperantium ingenio viveret, & ex solo eorum decreto quid verum vel falsum, bonum vel malum, æquum vel iniquum esset, judicaret. Sed hoc fieri nequit, ut scilicet

that the Moral Virtues, with Respect to their *Señ. VIII.*
intrinsic Goodness and Rectitude, do by no Means
 depend on the *Will and Pleasure* of Civil Gover-
 nors. And therefore,

IN the last Place, if they have at all any
 Sort of Dependence on the *Will* of the Civil
 Magistrate, it must be as to their *Authority*, or
 the *Obligation* that Men are under to observe
 them: But neither are they this Way depend-
 ing and precarious. Through the whole of our
 Argument it has appear'd, that the common
 Principle of *Self-preservation*, or the universal
 Law of Self-love and Interest, commands People
 to pursue the Moral Virtues, or all the Branches
 of *universal Love and Righteousness*, one towards
 another: Nor can it possibly happen otherwise;
 for the Moral Virtues, as I have shewn, are
 the only human Actions that are proportioned
 to the *Happiness* of human Nature, or that tend
 to People's Interest and Well-being in *Society*
 one with another. So that unless it be suppos-
 ed, that Mankind are under no *Obligation* to
 seek after their own Good and Happiness, ex-
 cept the Civil Magistrate, or the Laws of the
 Land *so command us*; it can never, with any
 Shew of Sense or Reason, be alledged, that
 Men are under no *Obligation* to pursue Moral
 Vir.

As little
 has the
 Obligation
 that Men
 are under to
 observe it.

scilicet animus alterius juris absolute sit; quippe nemo jus
 suum naturale, sive facultatem suam libere ratiocinandi, & de
 rebus quibuscunque judicandi, in alium transferre, neque ad id
 cogi potest. Id. ibid. Cap. 20.

Sec. VIII *Virtue, or universal Love and Righteousness,* but as the *Authority* of Civil Governors shall happen to injoin us. I confess, an Obligation is derived to People from the Authority of the Civil Magistrate, to observe the Laws of Nature: But then I contend, there is an *Obligation antecedent to, independent of, and unalterable* by all human Constitutions whatsoever, that cleaves close to human Nature, binding all Men to the Observation of *universal Love and Righteousness*. For why are Men bound to comply with Civil Authority, requiring them to observe the Moral Virtues? The Gentlemen of the other Side and I are agreed, that one's own *Safety and Happiness* must thus determine him. And is it not obvious, that the self-same Principle, *viz. Interest or Happiness*, universally obligeth us in all Circumstances, to pursue all the Branches of Morality? Certain it is, as *Spinoza* observes (1), *That People find their Situation uneasy and vexatious, clean contradictory to Self-interest, when they come to be involved amidst Contentions, Hatred, Malice, Wrath, Deceit, and Treachery; and cannot therefore but seek to be delivered from them.* And when our natural Principle of *Self-preservation* thus determines us to seek Deliverance from *Moral Vice, or Hatred and Treachery*; does not this manifestly imply, that

(1) Nullus est qui inter inimicitias, odia, iram, & dolos, non anxie vivat; quæque adeo, quantum in se est, non conetur vitare. Theol. Pol. Cap. 16.

Original of Moral Virtue.

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SECT. VII.

that the same Principle naturally binds and determines us to pursue *Moral Virtue*, or *universal Love* and *Righteousness*, wherein only we can secure our selves against all such Evils?

'Tis confessed that *Self-preservation* oblig'd People to form themselves into *politick Societies*, in order to have *Assurance* from each other of their mutually observing the *Moral Virtues*, or the *Laws of Nature*. And is it not from hence manifest, that *Self-preservation* obliges People mainly and especially to pursue *Moral Virtue*, and to erect *Civil Government* only as a *Means* towards the compassing of that great End? This to me is a plain Demonstration, that People's *Obligation* to observe the *Laws of Nature*, or to pursue *universal Love* and *Righteousness*, is *antecedent* to all human Authority, and cannot depend on the *arbitrary Will* of the *Civil Magistrate*. Nay, 'tis likewise confess'd, that *Civil Governors themselves* are bound by *Self-interest* to pursue the *Moral Virtues*, or to follow the *Dictates of Reason* in the whole of their Administration: And this again makes it clearly out, that the *Authority* of *Moral Virtue* cannot possibly depend on *arbitrary Will* and *Pleasure*, since it even commands the *Civil Magistrate himself*. So that one cannot in Reason but own, 'tis apparent that the *Obligation* which Men are under to observe the *Moral Virtues*, is *antecedent* to, *independent* of, and *unalterable* by the *Will and Authority* of *Civil Governors*.

AND

SECT. VIII. AND since I have likewise made it appear, that the *intrinſick Goodneſs*, or *Reſtitution* of Moral Virtue, is fully as *independent* of arbitrary Will and Pleaſure: From the Whole it neceſſarily follows, that Moral Virtue does in no *Reſpect* depend on the Authority of civil Governors, but is immutable and eternal.

BUT let us ſuppoſe, that the civil Magiſtrate forbids the Exerciſe of the Moral Virtues, *Love*, *Beneficence*, *Righteouſneſs*, &c. and, on the contrary, commands the Practice of *Vice*, *Hatred*, *Envy*, *Murder*, &c. I would gladly know, will this alter the *Nature* of ſuch Tempers and Diſpoſitions of Mind, and of the Actions of Life, that naturally flow from them, ſo as to render the Moral Virtues *hurtful* to the Good and Well-being of Mankind, and the contrary Vices effectual to promote their *Peace* and *Happineſs*? 'Tis evident to every Man of common Senſe and Underſtanding, that ſuch a Change in the *Nature* of Things is abſolutely impoſſible; and that *Virtue* and *Vice* will remain *inflexibly the ſame*, and ſteadily produce the ſame Effects, whether commanded or forbidden by civil Governors. And ſince *Virtue* and *Vice* will have each of 'em its own Tendency, and its own Effects, whether the civil Magiſtrate interpoſes his Authority, or no; muſt not every Man of ordinary Capacity be from hence fully ſatisfied, that neither the *intrinſick Goodneſs* of Virtue, nor the *intrinſick Evil* of Vice, nor our *Obligation* to purſue the one,

one, and avoid the other, can at all depend on the arbitrary Will of civil Governors? Sect. VIII.

It should seem however, that the representing of moral Virtue, as a Thing merely arbitrary and precarious, is no late Invention, but an old Conceit, that has been, many Ages ago, condemned and disproved by Men of the greatest Compass of Knowledge, and the finest Understanding. I shall therefore here transcribe the Sentiments of two of those great Philosophers, concerning this Article, and therewith conclude our present Argument.

The Opinion of the Ancients concerning this Matter.

“ SOME People (says Aristotle, as he is explained by Andronicus) are of Opinion, that
 “ there is nothing righteous in Nature, but
 “ that all Righteousness depends on human Institutions. For, say they, whatever is natural
 “ is invariable; as in the Case of Fire, it is hot at
 “ all Times, and in all Places, as well among us,
 “ as in Egypt: Whereas all Things that are
 “ counted righteous are inconstant and changeable;
 “ thus, among some Persons, ’tis esteem’d righteous to
 “ borrow, and not to pay back; and after the same
 “ Manner it holds in other Instances: So that all
 “ Things that are said to be righteous depend on human Authority, and have no Foundation in Nature.
 “ But to this we answer, That the Rectitude of
 “ Things cannot be absolutely uncertain and
 “ variable: For though Righteousness should
 “ change and vary among Men, yet with God
 “ it must be quite otherwise. And therefore,
 “ there is in Nature something righteous. But
 O “ what

sect. VIII. " what do I say! there is, even among Men,
" whose Senses are in good Order, something
" immutably righteous, which is call'd natural;
" and if such as are disorder'd in their Senses
" will not acknowledge thus much, it mat-
" ters not; for he that calls *Hony* sweet, is
" not therefore mistaken, because some sick
" People will not have it so. In short, the
" whole Matter comes to this, There are some
" who confess there is a *natural Rectitude* in
" Things, and there are others who deny it:
" But the former think according to Nature,
" and are sound in their Senses; and the lat-
" ter go beyond Nature, and are so many *Mad-*
" *men*. 'Tis therefore manifest, that some
" Peoples thinking otherwise, can never pre-
" vent there being something *righteous in Na-*
" *ture*. But then it may be ask'd, How shall
" one distinguish a Thing, whose *Rectitude* is
" founded in Nature, and does not depend on
" civil Authority? The Rule is plain and
" easie; *Whatever remaining fix'd, has an invari-*
" *able Tendency to promote the Happiness of human*
" *Nature, and whose Dissolution would prove mis-*
" *chievous to Mankind, that is the Thing that*
" *is naturally righteous, and every Thing else*
" *is only arbitrary (1)*".

But,

(1) Τινος δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ ὁμοιωτὶς ἢ φύσις, ἢ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν
καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ ὁμοιωτὶς, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ αὐτὸς ὁμοιωτὶς
τῇ

“ BUT, as Cicero observes, if *Virtue* be not *Señ. VIII.*
 “ founded in Nature, there can be no such
 “ Thing in the World: And where then
 “ shall we meet with *Liberality*, the *Love* of
 “ one's Country, kind *Affections*, an Inclination
 “ either to oblige others, or to requite the Fa-
 “ vours that one has done him? For all these
 “ Things take their Rise from our having a
 “ natural Propension to love Mankind, which is
 “ the Foundation of moral *Virtue*. Nay, if Vir-
 “ tue has no Foundation in Nature, this not
 “ only totally overthrows all the Offices of
 “ Love and Righteousness towards Men; but
 “ it likewise wholly subverts all *Piety* and De-
 “ votion

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τὰ δὲ δίκαια πάντα, μεταβάλλονται· τὸ γὰρ διατρέχει καὶ μὴ
 ἀποδιδέναι, ὅρα ποῖ δίκαιον δοκεῖ, καὶ τ' ἄλλα ὁμοίως ἔχει. καὶ
 ἡ πῶς δίκαια δοκεῖται αὐτὰ. ὥστε πάντα τὰ δίκαια νομοθε-
 ρεῖται, καὶ ἐστὶν φυσικόν. ὅρα δὴ τοιαῦτα ἔχουσιν λόγον, ὅτι ἐ-
 λευθερίαν κινεῖται πᾶν δίκαιον καὶ μεταβάλλει· εἰ γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἄν-
 ὁρων πᾶσι τὰ δίκαια μεταβάλλεται, παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς
 ἀνάγκη δίκαιον εἶναι ἀμετάβλητον. ὥστε εἶναι π. φυσικὸν δίκαιον·
 πῶς δὲ καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις, τοῖς δ' ὁμοῖως καὶ ὅμοιως ἔχουσιν, ὅτι
 δίκαιον ἀκίνητον, ὁ φυσικὸν λέγεται· εἰ δὲ τοῖς ἰσοῦσι τὰς
 ἡμέρας, καὶ διατεταμένους ἐν ἀρετῇ δίκαιον, ὅτι δὲ διατετα-
 μένους ὁ λέγων τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ εἶναι λυγρὸν, οἷον τοῖς
 περὶ τὸ τοῦτον δοκεῖ· τὸ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον τὸ φυσικὸν δοκεῖ μὴ
 πᾶν δίκαιον, δοκεῖ δὲ ἄλλοις μὴ δίκαιον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ
 φῶτος φυσικόν· ὅτι καὶ ὅμοιως ὡς καὶ ἀνθρώπων· π. δὲ δὴ
 ὅτι φῶς καὶ μαινομένων ἀνθρώπων. ὅτι μὴ ἐν ἐστὶν
 κωλύει φυσικὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, ὅτι ἔστι δίκαιον ἐν ὁμοίᾳ
 αὐτῷ, ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ νομοθετῶν δίκαιον κινεῖται καὶ τὸ
 φυσικὸν ἐν εἰρητῇ ὁρῶν, πῶς διακρίνεται καὶ ἀμετέωρον
 κινεῖται καὶ ἔστιν ἡ διακρίσις φανερά. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁμο-
 τῆς τὸ δίκαιον κατ' αὐτὸ, οἱ ἀμετέωροι πᾶσι ἀκίνητοι· ὅτι,
 καὶ ὁ καταλυθεὶς βαλεῖται ἐκτετακτὴν δύναμιν, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν
 φυσικὸν δίκαιον ὅτι· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτον, νομοθετῶν. Andion.
 Eth. Arist. Paraph. Lib. 5. Cap. 10.

Sect. VIII. " *otion towards God, which, in my Opinion,*
 " ought to be kept up, not from *Fear*, but
 " because of that *Union* and *Intercourse* we
 " have with the *Deity*. And if *Virtue* owes
 " its *Reſtitution* and *Eſtabliſhment* to the *Ordi-*
 " nances of the *People*, or the *Decrees* of
 " *Princes*, or the *Deciſions* of *Judges*, it would
 " be a righteous Thing to *rob*, to *commit Adul-*
 " *tery*, to *forg* *Testaments*, provided that theſe
 " Things came to be ſettled by the *Suffrages*
 " and *Appointment* of the *Multitude*. But if
 " *Fools* have ſo much *Efficacy* in their *Decrees*,
 " as by their *Voices* to overturn the *Nature*
 " of Things; why do they not enact, that ſuch
 " Things as are *pernicious* and *deſtructive*, may
 " be held for *good* and *wholeſom*? Or, ſince
 " the *Laws of the Land* can make that which
 " is *iniquous* to be *righteous*, why may they
 " not as well make that which is *bitter* to be
 " *sweet*? But let *People* think as they will,
 " certain it is, we can no otherwiſe diſtinguiſh
 " a good *Law* from an evil one, than by com-
 " paring them to the *Nature of Things*. And
 " not only is *Righteouſneſs* diſcern'd and diſtin-
 " guiſh'd by a *natural Rule*; but all Things ho-
 " nourable and baſe. For *common Senſe* gives
 " us the *Knowledge of Things*, and ſets them
 " before us in ſuch a *Light*, that the Things
 " that are *honourable*, are counted *virtuous*, and
 " the Things that are *baſe*, are reckon'd *vicious*.
 " And to imagine that theſe Things depend
 " upon *Opinion*, and are not founded in *Nature*,

“ is an arrant Piece of Madnefs. (For the Vir-
 “ tue of a Tree, or of a Horfe (as we are us’d
 “ to ſpeak improperly) does not ly in Opinion,
 “ but in Nature. And if ſo, then Nature is
 “ the only Standard whereby we can judge
 “ what is honourable and baſe, or virtuous and
 “ vicious (1).” In ſhort, Moral Virtue is ſo
 far from owing its Original to the civil Ma-
 giftrate,

O 3

(1) Atqui, ſi natura confirmatum jus non erit, virtutes omnes tollantur : ubi enim liberalitas, ubi pietas, ubi aut bene merendi de altero, aut referendæ gratiæ voluntas poterit exiſtere ? nam hæc naſcuntur ex eo, quod natura propenſi ſumus ad diligendos homines ; quod fundamentum juris eſt. Neque ſolum in homines obſequia, ſed etiam in Deos ceremoniæ religionesque tolluntur : quas non metu, ſed ea conjunctione quæ eſt homini cum Deo, conſervandas puto. Quod ſi populorum juffis, ſi principum decretis, ſi ſententiis judicum, jura conſtituerentur ; jus eſſet latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus teſtamenta falſa ſupponere, ſi hæc ſuffragiis aut ſcitis multitudinis probarentur. Quæ ſi tanta potentia eſt ſtultorum ſententiis, atque juffis, ut eorum ſuffragiis rerum natura vertatur ; cur non ſanciunt, ut quæ mala pernicioſaque ſunt, habeantur pro bonis ac ſalutaribus ? aut cur, cum jus ex injuria lex facere poſſit, bonum eadem facere non poſſit ex malo ? Atqui nos legem bonam a mala, nulla alia niſi naturali norma dividere poſſumus. Nec ſolum jus a natura dijudicatur, ſed omnino omnia honeſta ac turpia. Nam & communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, eaſque in animis noſtris inchoavit, ut honeſta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Hæc autem in opinione exiſtimare, non in natura ponere, dementis eſt. Nam nec arboris, nec equi virtus, quæ dicitur, in quo abutimur nomine, in opinione ſita eſt, ſed in natura. Quod ſi ita eſt, honeſta quoque & turpia natura dijudicanda ſunt. Cic. de Legib. Lib. 1.

sec. VIII. gistrate, (1) that not only is it older than political Societies, but it is as antient as that Being, who preserves and governs the Universe.

APPEN.

(1) Legis vis ad recte facta vocandi, & a peccatis avocandi, non modo senior est quam ætas populorum & civitatum, sed æqualis illius cælum atque terras tuentis & regentis Dei. Id. de Legib. Lib. 2.





APPENDIX.



INCE One's apprehending the Truth and Reality of Moral Virtue, very much depends upon the Notions that one forms of the inward Constitution of human Nature ; I beg Leave

"Tis propos'd to consider some other Principles of Mr. Hobbes.

here to consider some other Principles of Mr. Hobbes, which he gives out as Dispositions natural to Mankind.

THAT which Mr. Hobbes further lays down (besides what I have observed Page 22) as the Foundation of his *War of All against All*, and from which he still alledges it appears, " That Mankind are mutually ill affected, and " are not naturally form'd to *Society*, is their " differing in Opinion ; their settling their Appetites on one particular Object ; and their " affecting Dominion rather than *Society*.

He main-
tains that
Mankind in
their inward
Make are
form'd to
differ in Opi-
nion from
one another,
and that this
naturally
produces
Hatred and
Oppression.

But 'tis
plain from
the Constitu-
tion of
Things, that
Mankind are
naturally
form'd to
agree in Opi-
nion with
one another.

As to the first, Mr. Hobbes seems to main-
tain (1), that in our inward Constitution we are
so framed, that, in our Opinions and Sentiments,
we cannot but differ from one another, and, from
these Differences, be necessarily involved in mutual
Hatred and Oppression. But how does it appear,
that the inward Constitution of human Nature
makes Peoples differing in Opinion unavoi-
dable?—The clean contrary is evident to me;
and, as I apprehend, all Mankind are natural-
ly so framed and disposed, that they cannot but
conspire and agree together in all Things, espe-
cially those that are of Moment and Conse-
quence.

I suppose every Body is sensible, that one's
Thoughts and Opinions relate only to Objects
that are real or possible in their Existence,
whose Nature and Properties are not in our
Power,

(1) Præterea, cum maximum sit certamen ingeniorum,
necesse est oriri ex ea contentione maximas discordias. Ete-
nim non modo contra contendere, sed etiam hoc ipsum non
consentire, odiosum est. Nam non consentire alicui in re a-
liqua, est eum erroris in ea re tacite accusare; sicut in valde
multis dissentire, idem est atque pro stulto eum habere,
quod ex eo apparere potest, quod nulla acrius gerantur bella,
quam inter ejusdem religionis sectas, & ejusdem reipublicæ
factiones, ubi certamen est, vel de doctrinis, vel de scientia
politica. Cumque omnis animi voluptas, omnisque alacritas
in eo sita sit, quod quis habeat quibuscum conferens se, possit
magnifice sentire de seipso, impossibile est quin odium & con-
temptum mutuum offendant aliquando, vel risu, vel verbis,
vel gestu, vel aliquo signo; qua quidem nulla major animi est
molestia, neque ex qua lœdendi libido major oriri solet. Hobbes
de Civ. Cap. 1.

Power, but independently firm and steady in themselves, and always uniformly the same without any Variation. Now from hence it plainly follows, that one's Thoughts or Ideas are derived from Things independent of us; and one's Sentiments or Opinions can be only concerning their Causes, Properties, or Effects, their Relations and Proportions, how they agree or disagree, and what Ends and Purposes they serve, singly by themselves, or complicated together: So that if a Man enters into the Consideration of any one single Object, or of any particular System of Things, or of so many Things to be compared together; as he can have no Thoughts or Ideas, but what those Things afford to him, so he can have no Opinions, but what are founded in these Ideas, according as he perceives they are related and proportion'd to one another. And if a Man takes nothing up into his Thoughts and Sentiment, but what he finds in the Nature of Things (which is the only natural Way of thinking and judging) let him repete his Enquiries ever so frequently, though he may well have his Mind enlarged in several Cases, at every Examination, by an Accession of new Thoughts and Sentiments; yet he will always correspond with his former Ideas and Opinions, and can never be inconsistent with himself: For that the Things themselves, in which his Mind is conversant, do, in their natural Properties, Relations, and Proportions, continue

nue immutably the same; and the Enquirer's Faculties, whereby he perceives and understands them, are in their Nature as invariable, however we may at one Time be more capable of exerting them than at another.

AND therefore as a Man, who gives Attention, and thinks as Nature guides him, or in a Conformity to the Nature of Things, cannot possibly differ from himself, but must always go on, of the same Mind and Opinion; so, for the same Reason, one Man cannot, in a natural Way, differ from another, since all Mens Faculties are exactly of the same Nature, and differ only in Degree, or in their being less or more open in one Man than in another; by which Means indeed one Man may have a larger Stock of Ideas than another, but cannot, I say, naturally differ from another, so far as that other's Understanding is extended along with his, since that both the Things from which they have their Ideas, and the Faculties whereby they apprehend them, are of the same fix'd and invariable Nature: Of all this we have abundant Proof from Experience. Nay, without such a Constitution of Things, we should never be able to communicate our Knowledge to others; and all Endeavours to inform and improve one another, in any Argument whatsoever, would be absurd, and to no Purpose; nor could Mr. *Hobbes* ever have attempted to convince Mankind of the Truth of his Principles, without supposing it.

INDEED

INDEED we find many Differences, and great Variety of Opinions in the World; but, from what I have said, I should think it appears manifest, that these Differences cannot be natural, or come from the inward Make and Constitution of human Nature; but must be counted *unnatural*, or to arise from the Neglect or Abuse of our natural Powers and Faculties. And as when a Man happens to differ from himself, he comes to be sensible, that his Mistake was occasioned through Rashness, Negligence, Inattention, Byass, or Prejudice; so when one Man differs from another, 'tis certainly owing to one or other of the same Causes: So that, in my Opinion, all Men are naturally form'd to conspire and agree together in their Thoughts and Sentiments. And if we did not go beyond our Ideas (where empty Sounds are mistaken for real Sense; and where People, by an unmanly Reverence to some particular Words and Phrases, are shamefully betray'd into a vain Conceit of Knowledge and Learning, while they are only groping in thick Darknes; I say, if we did not go beyond our Ideas) but kept within the Compass of our Understanding, and founded our Opinions in clear and distinct Perceptions, I am well perswaded, however we might be found differing in the articulate Sounds, whereby we expressed our inward Apprehensions, that could we uncover our Breasts to each other, we should all

all appear possessed of the same Thoughts and Sentiments.

And any Being that apprehends our naked Thoughts, observes a far greater Agreement in human Sentiments, than is generally imagin'd.

AND, even amidst all the Negligence and Prejudices, to which People seem at present unnaturally to give up themselves, I am prone to think, that whatever Being looks immediately into our Minds, and sees the Conceptions of our Hearts without any Covering, he observes a far greater Agreement among Mankind, in their Thoughts and Opinions, with relation to all Subjects of what Nature soever, where a Man's Knowledge does not consist of *Words* but of *Ideas*, than is generally imagin'd. And ought not this to induce us to bear charitably with one another, in all our different Sentiments (as they appear to be) of whatever Sort, especially when, from the Way wherein we convey our Thoughts to each other, we are so liable to mutual Mistakes; an Imperfection, from which, no Doubt, we shall be freed in another World, when perhaps we shall have it in our Power, to lay open our naked Breasts each one to another's View (1). And this I observe, particularly with respect to Articles of *Religion*, in which it is most unmanly and highly offensive to God, that our different Apprehensions (as they seem to be) should inflame our Minds with Resentment and Malice, and

(1) Deorum animi, sine oculis, sine auribus, sine lingua, sentiunt inter se quid quisque sentiat. Cic. de Divin. Lib. 1.

and involve us in oppressing and devouring one another. If in any Thing, one should think, that the Thoughts and Sentiments (I do not say the Words and Phrases) of fair and honest Enquirers do certainly agree in all the important Points of Religion, that are of *common Concern*, and to which therefore it cannot be thought but the *common Parent* of Mankind has proportion'd the *common Understanding* of human Nature; without leaving the Knowledge of such Things (that are fix'd in their own Nature, and on which depend the Safety and Well-being of all the Individuals of the human Race) to be settled and determined by the subtil Distinctions of a few metaphysical Heads, whose Notions, if they understand them themselves, are generally beyond the Reach of common Sense, and are so far from being a Blessing to the World, that, in sad Experience, they are found to have been the Occasion of the utmost Confusion, and the greatest Mischief to the Bulk of Mankind. But whatever be the different Opinions that happen in the World, 'tis evident they do not spring from the inward Frame of human Nature: So that, thus far, Mankind in their natural Constitution must be counted *social Creatures*.

NOR can Difference in Opinion naturally produce these Contentions and Animosities, whereby People are engaged in mutually oppressing one another. *But, says Mr. Hobbes,*

since not only an open Contradiction, but even a

Nor does Peoples differing in Opinion naturally produce mutual Hatred and Contention.

bare

bare Not-consenting to one another's Sentiments, is odious, in so far as this is tacitely to reproach a Man's Understanding; and the former, if it happens in many Instances, is openly to proclaim one a Fool; how can such high Affronts be received without very keen Resentments? I confess I am not able to comprehend what it is in human Nature, that will make us feel a bare not-consenting, or even a downright Contradiction (void of malicious Passions in the Author) so heinous an Indignity, that we shall fall a quarrelling, and be bent on one another's Destruction. I hardly think, but every Man is sensible he has no Pretensions to Infallibility, and that there are numberless Things, whereof he either knows very little, or is altogether ignorant: And for a fallible Creature, so narrow in his Understanding, to have it told him, *You are mistaken, or the Matter lies at present out of your Reach,* can never be counted a Reproach, that will naturally provoke him into any malicious Passions. On the contrary, when we look into human Nature, we see that such Admonitions must naturally tend to produce in one's Mind the Pleasure of Gratitude, and to increase Peoples kind Affections one towards another: For as all Men have a natural Desire after Truth, which, as *Spinoza* (1) observes, is

(1) Schismata non oriri ex magno veritatis studio (*fonte, scilicet, comitatis & mansuetudinis*) sed ex magna libidine regnandi. Theol. Pol. Cap. 20.

the Spring of all Gentleness and Humanity: So all Men have likewise a natural Propension to communicate their Knowledge, or to inform and instruct other People; to which we are powerfully prompted from the Consciousness of its being a fair Way to become esteem'd and respected. So that when People meet together, their differing in Opinion, while they are under the Influence of these natural Dispositions, can only give Occasion to further Enquiries, whereby they cannot fail to gratify their natural Desire, mutually to give and receive Information; and so have their Breasts warmed with benevolent Affections, each one towards another. And therefore, as I apprehend, different Opinions, according to the natural Course of Things, are so far from deriving a malicious Turn to Peoples Affections, that they rather serve to enliven Conversation, to improve our Minds, and to give us a fine Relish of human Society.

INDEED, if a Man be contentious, of a proud haughty Temper, and will fly in the Face of whatever is advanced by another, I confess there is no corresponding with such a Person, he is really quite unfit for any social Intercourse. But at the same Time we must observe, that such a Man has gone wholly off from the original Constitution of human Nature; he seems dispos'd neither to seek after Truth himself, nor to impart it to other People; and I may venture to say, there are not many among

among Mankind so unnaturally affected. Thus far likewise Men appear naturally form'd to Society.

This only happens when different Opinions come to entitle a Man to some worldly Advantage.

BUT do we not see, says Mr. Hobbes, that Difference in Opinion produces, among the several Sects of the same Religion, and the several Factions of the same Commonwealth, the most stubborn Contentions, and the cruellest Wars that ever happened?

It is true, when Points of Doctrine and Speculation, or such a particular Set of Principles have, exclusive of all others, secular Advantages annexed to them; or when ambitious Men, that want to grasp at the Honours and Profits of civil Posts and Preferments, do form their own Models of Government, and Schemes of Politicks, crying out against the present Settlement or Administration; I say, I confess with Regret, that in such Circumstances the World have quarrell'd most heartily, and involved themselves in great Convulsions and Miseries. And I suppose, 'tis peculiarly with respect to such Opinions, whether they relate to Church or State, as draw along with them Honour and Profit, that People judge themselves most heinously affronted, and that they resent the Indignity with great Zeal and Keenness, when others have the Misfortune to differ from them: For, as to other Things of whatever Sort, Matters of Sense, or of abstracted Reasoning, Points of Knowledge or Learning, that have no Influence on a Man's present Circumstances, I am apt to believe, that

that People differ from each other, with a good Deal of Charity and mutual Forbearance. Unless People, says Spinoza (1), had the Hopes of gaining over to their Side the Laws, and the civil Powers, and of triumphing over their Adversaries, in the Applauses of the Multitude, and of possessing themselves of Honours, they would never differ with so much Malice in their Hearts, nor would ever their Breasts be inflamed with such furious Passions one against another.

Now from this one may easily observe, that these mischievous Contentions do arise, not from Peoples viewing one another possessed of different Opinions, but from their looking on each other, in these Circumstances, as mutually intending, each Sect or Faction, to keep out, or dispossess the other of those Honours, Riches, and Preferments of which they are ambitious; So that, in Truth, 'tis not Difference in Opinion that provokes Mankind to aim at each other's Destruction, 'tis only their invading one another's worldly Possessions and Enjoyments. And this, as I have shewn in the main Argument, is so far from excluding, that, however it may involve the World in mutual Oppressions, it certainly implies a natu-

P ral

(1) *Ni homines spe tenerentur leges & magistratum ad se trahendi, & de suis adversariis communi vulgi applausu triumphandi, & honores adipiscendi, nunquam tam iniquo animo certarent, nec tantus furor eorum mentes agitare.* Theol. Pol. Cap. 20.

ral Disposition, in the human Mind, towards affecting and esteeming every Man his Fellow, which is the great Spring and Support of human Society. Besides that, such Contentions can never prove universal; nor does Mr. Hobbes represent them so; he only speaks of them, as happening among the different Sects of Religion, or the different Factions in politick Societies, which can never serve to establish his *War of all against all*.

'Tis likewise false to alledge, that Mankind are naturally form'd to interfere in their Appetites towards one sensible Object.

THE great Cause however, in Mr. Hobbes's Reckoning (1), that produces in the World mutual Mischiefs and Oppression, is Peoples placing their Appetites on one particular Object, which can neither be enjoy'd in common, nor yet divided among them; for here no one yielding to another, the stronger must carry it, and who that stronger is, must be decided by Blows. Now in this Instance likewise, before Mr. Hobbes can make it serve his Principles, it must be found, that this Concurrence of Appetites is natural to Man, or that all Men, from the Frame of their Nature, cannot but conspire in fertling their Appetites on the self-same sensible Objects. But as this goes cross to the universal

Expe-

157

(1) *Frequentissima autem causa, quare homines se mutuo ledere cupiunt, ex eo nascitur, quod multi simul eandem rem appetant, qua tamen sapissime neque frui communiter, nec eam dividere possunt, unde sequitur fortiori dandum esse: qui autem fortior sit, pugna judicandum est. Hob. de Civ. Cap. 1.*

Experience of all Ages, so 'tis wholly repugnant to human Nature, as it is diversified in the several Individuals: For every Man's Taste and Relish of sensible Things, depending on the particular Texture of the Organs of his Body; and People, in this Respect, differing one from another so very widely, that it has passed into a common Proverb, *One Man's Meat is another Man's Poison*, it can never happen, that all Men will concur together in their Appetites, and keenly pursue, in Opposition to each other, one and the same sensible Object. In a Word, there are very few but have their own particular Taste of Things, wherein they differ from other People. And human Nature is thus turned into so great a Variety of Tastes, in the great Wisdom and Goodness of the first Author of all Things, with a View, we may safely believe, to establish Peace, to preserve Order, and prevent Confusions among Mankind. And Mr. *Hobbes* elsewhere particularly observes (1), That, *the Constitution of the human Body perpetually changing, 'tis impossible that the same Things should always excite the same Appetites and Aversions; and far less, says he, can all Men conspire together in affecting one and the same Object.*

P 2

NIT

(1) Quoniam in perpetua mutatione versatur humani corporis consistentia, impossibile est ut eadem res producant eisdem semper appetitus & aversiones; multo minus poterunt omnes homines consentire in appetitu unius & ejusdem objecti. *Lev. Cap. 6.*

Or that
this inter-
fering na-
turally pro-
duces Strife
and Oppres-
sion.

NEITHER does an *interfering* of Appetites naturally produce these Contentions that involve People in mutually oppressing one another: For if all Men should conspire together in affecting one sensible Object, every Man must stand convinc'd that their attempting with Violence, each one to possess it, in Contradiction to another, will inevitably involve them all in certain Destruction. And since such mischievous Contentions are highly condemn'd by Reason, and are quite inconsistent with Self-preservation, they cannot but be counted monstrously unnatural, with Reference to that Species of Beings, in whose Constitution *Reason* is the most considerable Part, and whose commanding Principle is *Self-preservation*. Nor does Mr. *Hobbes* here suppose all the Individuals of the human Species, he only represents so many of them thus involved. And indeed, not to speak of a Crown, we see that a civil Post, a Church-preferment, a Title of Honour, a small Spot of Ground, a Jewel, or some such other valued Trifle, will engage People in mutual Mischiefs and Oppression. But this is far from bearing the Face of universal Disaffection, or of hostile Dispositions naturally cleaving to the Minds of all Men, or of each Man against his Fellow; it is only one Faction or Party of Men (associated together) fiercely bent against another; and can never therefore be given out as the Ground of a War of All against All. So that hitherto I cannot but think it is evident, that Mankind, in their inward

inward Constitution, are mutually form'd to Society, or to live together in a mutual Intercourse of kind Affections and Actions.

BUT, in Opposition to this, Mr. Hobbes further alleges (1), That since the Advantages and Enjoyments of Life are much easier gain'd by one's having Dominion over others, than by being united with them in Society; it cannot be doubted, but that all Men, if Fear did not binder them, would, by a natural Propension, be more strongly carried to Dominion than to Society. That which Mr. Hobbes seems here to understand by our more keenly affecting Dominion than Society, is a Man's having a natural Passion of Mind to subdue and break his Fellow-men, that he may make use of them, like so many brute Creatures or Beasts of Burden, in serving his own Purposes, without bearing them any Sort of kind Affections that can incline him to regard their Well-being and Happiness. But I suppose every Body is sensible, that the pursuing of such a Passion, is so far from being a plain Path to the Conveniences of Life, that it is the broad Way to Ruin and Destruction. And Mr. Hobbes himself observes, that this natural Propension, which he says we have to treat our Fellows like brute

Nor can it be said that Mankind naturally affect Dominion rather than Society.

P 3

Crea.

(1) Quamquam autem commoda hujus vitæ augeri mutua ope possunt, cum tamen id fieri multo magis dominio possit quam societate aliorum, nemini dubium esse debet, quin avidius ferentur homines natura sua, si metus abesset, ad dominationem quam ad societatem. De Civ. Cap. 1.

Creatures, is counterbalanc'd by some natural Fears implanted in our Minds, and cannot therefore exert itself.

This is
contrary to
the Truth
of Things.

UPON which I cannot but take Notice, that since it is confess'd that any such mischievous Passions, suppos'd in our Nature, are counteracted by other Parts of our Constitution, we must certainly appear, upon a View of the Result of our whole Frame, to be naturally form'd to Society, or to live upon equal Terms with one another. And if it thus appears from a Balance settled in our inward Powers, that the great Former of our Nature intends we should live in *Society*, or like Companions together; is it to be thought that only some unsocial mischievous Passions, that must be bridled by some other inward Powers, to prevent our oppressing one another, are laid in our Nature; and no kind Affections that favour those Beings, with whom the Balance of our Constitution brings us, in the Issue, to be upon even Terms, and to live with them as our Fellows and Equals? To attribute such an odd Piece of Workmanship to God, is, in my Opinion, most impious; and, as I have shewn in the Body of the Enquiry, 'tis quite contrary to the Truth of Things. Besides that, the great Motive, whereby Mr. *Hobbes* alledges People are more strongly bent to Dominion than Society, being the easy Access a Man thereby has to Riches, or the Affluence of worldly Enjoyments; since the Pursuit of Riches, as I have before hinted, is real-

ly founded in social Dispositions, and implies kind Affections, and a Value and Regard for our Fellow-men; 'tis evident that our Desire of Dominion, as it is an Instrument whereby one may easily acquire Riches, and possess himself of the showy Parts of Life, is so far from intimating that naturally we no more value our own Species, than we do brute Creatures, and would employ them, if we had it in our Power, to no other Purposes, that it plainly expresses the clean contrary. And the Man who can laugh at the ridiculous Figure, *If a human Creature should be found stalking about by himself, in great Pomp and Magnificence of Dress, seeking the Admiration of the Beasts of the Field (1)*, will understand from what he feels in his own Breast, that we are affected towards our own Species quite otherwise than towards brute Creatures.

IN short, to maintain, that, if Fear did not hinder him, Man would go about to subdue and enslave his own Species, and treat them no better than we do Beasts of Burden, is openly to contradict the common Experience of all Ages. There are many Instances wherein

And to
Experience.

P 4

Peo-

(1) *Quis eam quam nulli ostenderet, induit purpuram? Quis posuit secretam in auro dapem? Quis sub alicujus rustice arboris projectus umbra, luxurie suae pompam solus explicuit? Nemo oculis suis laetus est, nec paucorum quidem & familiarium, sed apparatus vitiorum suorum pro modo turbae spectantis expandit. Itaque irritamentum est omnium in quibus insanimus, admirator & conscius. Senec. Epist. 95.*

Peoples Fears have not prevented their setting up for Dominion; and from these Instances it appears, that human Nature, notwithstanding any Lust after Power, which may prevail in some Tempers, is certainly influenc'd with friendly Affections, that dispose a Man to treat his own Species, not as brute Creatures, but as his Fellows and Companions. Of this the *Roman History* is a full Demonstration, and might afford us many notable Examples. But I shall here instance in *Cyrus*, a Prince who rais'd himself to vast Power and Dominion, and was at the same Time animated with the highest Benevolence towards his own Species. I do not indeed justify all his Wars, I only mean to observe that his Nature was strongly turn'd to Goodness and Humanity. And as this openly appear'd through the whole Series of his Conduct, so it broke out surprizingly in his last Commands to his Sons. *My dear Children*, says he (1), *when I am dead; do not lay my Body in a Coffin of Gold or Silver, but, as soon as possible, commit it to the Earth: For what can be a greater Happiness than to be mixed with that which produces and nourishes all Things that are beautiful*
and

(1) Τὸ δ' ἐμὲν σῶμα, ὃ πῶς ἐστιν ἔτι καὶ πᾶσι, μὴ ἐν χρυσοῦ ὀφείλῃ, μὴ ἐν ἀργύρῳ, μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ μανθῇ, ἀλλὰ τῇ γῇ ὡς πᾶσι ἀποδοῦναι. ἢ ὅτι τὸν μακροτέρως, οὗ γὰρ μὴ χθονί, ἢ πάντα καὶ τὰ καλὰ, πάντα δὲ τ' ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο; ἢ ὅτι ἄλλος φιλεῖν θάνατον ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων. Xenoph. de Exp. Cyr. Lib. 8.

and good. I have hitherto indulg'd all benevolent Affections towards my Fellow-men; and it now gives me Pleasure to reflect, I am going to be mingled with that which is so beneficent to Mankind. Such Sentiments could never come from a Mind that was not overflowing with Good-will and Humanity. So that one should think, it is still evident, that Men are social Creatures, and have kind Dispositions towards each other, laid in the Frame of their Nature.

To speak freely of Mr. Hobbes's Conduct in this Argument, I cannot but observe, that herein he shews himself either very unfair, or a very unskilful Philosopher: I mean, he picks out (as may appear from what I have said above, or as any Man that reads his Writings with Attention may understand; I say, he picks out) some particular Powers, Passions, or Properties in human Nature, and considering every one singly by itself, or so many together, that seem to have the same Tendency, or to which one may give the same Turn and Direction, without ever attending how they are in Truth temper'd and balanc'd among themselves, and by other Powers that are equally natural and essential, he gives his Judgment of the whole Constitution, and sets it forth as fit or unfit to such Purposes, according as those Powers, acting independently, and without any Balance, do seem to operate. Whereas in every Nature that is complicated, or made up of various Powers and Properties, one cannot possibly

Mr. Hobbes's Conduct in this Argument, while he only attends to some particular Powers in human Nature, is very absurd.

sibly understand what this Nature is adapted to, or what Effects it will produce, unless one has a complex View of the whole, wherein one perceives how the different Powers do mutually balance one another, and are compounded together in their Operations. This, I think, is obvious from every Thing whatever both in Art and Nature, and cannot escape the Notice of any Person that uses the least Reflection. And that Man, in the System of his inward Powers, as they are naturally balanc'd and adjusted, is a Creature perfectly adapted to Society, for his own and the Happiness of all his Fellows, is obvious to every thinking and impartial Enquirer; and appears, I hope, evident through the whole of this Treatise. Pag. 31.

Those Fears, Jealousies, Oppressions, which Mr. Hobbes speaks of, are peculiar to Mankind in civil Society.

As for those Fears and Jealousies, those malicious and mischievous Passions, which Mr. Hobbes represents as natural to Man, or interwoven in the human Constitution, they certainly come from those Apprehensions of Things, or that Situation of Mind, which People contract under Civil Government. And for a Man to form his Notions of the inward Frame and Constitution of human Nature, from the Tempers and Dispositions of the Individuals of politick Societies; and those especially who are Men of Intrigue and Faction, and are given up to the most luxuriant Appetites, cannot but be counted unfair, and an imposing upon the World. 'Tis true, the innate Powers and Affections of human Nature are in all Men every

where

where the same, and no Man can acquire any new Faculties, which every other Man is not possessed of. But, as in all complicated Machines, whose different Powers are mutually pois'd and adjusted to the producing of such particular Effects, the inward Frame is immediately alter'd, when the Balance among the Powers is changed, and other Effects must necessarily follow: So likewise in the human Constitution, where so many different Faculties and Affections stand mutually pois'd and in due Proportion to each other, in order to move us on in such a Series of Actions; if this natural Balance and Proportion chances to be broken, then the inward Frame comes to be altered, and another Course of Actions will follow, according to the Nature of those particular Affections that overbalance our other Powers and Faculties.

Now 'tis very certain, that, in politick Societies, where there are so many Distinctions of Life, and such powerful Applications made to some particular Powers and Affections; as People lie much exposed to have the Balance of their Nature spoiled, so in many Instances it is actually broken, and Multitudes grow up, especially in Courts and Cities, under the Influence of external Incitements, into a settled Disproportion of internal Powers, which becomes a *second Nature*, whereby they move and exert themselves very much in Contradiction to their original Constitution. But, as the disturbing of the *Equilibrium* in the Powers of any Machine,

natu-

naturally adapted to such Purposes, is certainly a Disorder in the Composition, and the Effects that flow from it, however necessarily happening, are yet unnatural; so the disturbing of the Balance in the Powers of human Nature, originally proportioned to such a Series of Actions, is certainly a Corruption or Depravity in the human Constitution, and the Actions that flow from it, however therewith necessarily connected, must be counted unnatural. And, I say, it seems to me not a fair Way of dealing, to take our Notions of human Nature from those Individuals in civil Societies, in whom the natural Balance of our Constitution is visibly most disturbed, or in whom human Nature is most depraved and corrupted, and with respect to whom it cannot well happen otherwise. Nor do I think that those Fears and Jealousies, which Mr. *Hobbes* attributes to the Frame of our Nature, are any otherwise occasioned than by this contracted Corruption and Depravity, which People come to observe in one another.

WE see under civil Government, that the Property being in the Hands of but a few, the *Many* are obliged to earn their daily Subsistence by their own Labour and Industry, in the Pursuit of some Business or other that tends to the Support of one another, and particularly to the providing of the *Few* in the neat and easie, or in the showy and splendid Enjoyments of civil Life. And as this Difference in Peoples Circumstances cannot well fail to alter the natural

natural Balance originally settled in the human Frame; so the Minds of all Sorts and Sizes of Men being here widened in their Desires and Appetites, much beyond what they are in the State of Nature, where one contentedly takes up with a few plain simple Things;

Ventre nihil novi frugalius.———

People are very apt to catch Advantage one of another, and, by Ways and Means, to draw off every Man from his Neighbour, what he imagines will conduce to his present Interest, and serve to gratify, not his strictly natural, but his civil acquired Views and Appetites. And this Course People generally follow, supplanting, defrauding, or oppressing one another, as far as they can, in a Consistency with their worldly Credit and Safety, and frequently to the forfeiting of both; not because they do not naturally affect one another, but from a *mistaken Sel-love*, or because every Man would incline to make a better, at least as good a Figure as his Neighbour. And when a Man is either conscious to himself that this is the Turn of his Mind, or is sensible from Experience that this is the Way of the World; 'tis impossible but Mankind must conceive mutual Fears and Jealousies, and find it prudent and necessary, every Man, and every politick Society, to look to themselves in all Things wherein their Interests any way interfere, and to take

Care

Care of their Dominions, their Houses, and Chests, and Cabinets.

BESIDES that, a good many in this State of Things, being so reduced that they are not able from their own Fortunes to satisfy the common Appetites of human Nature, or those much larger Desires to which they have been bred and indulged, or to which from common Example they have given up themselves; I say, a great many being thus involved either by Misfortunes, or Extravagancy, or by their not having been brought up to any Imployment, or by the Decay or Want of Business, or their not enduring to subject themselves to that continued Drudgery they must be put to, in the common Way of gaining a Livelyhood; hence comes it to pass that such People conceal themselves, particularly in large Towns, or venture abroad upon the High-ways, or wander about through the Country, and do their best, by secret Fraud or open Violence, to shift for themselves. This happens frequently to be the Case under civil Government, and it lets us see with what good Reason People will not take a Journey without being well armed, nor go to sleep without securing their Houses and Cabinets.

And do
not belong
to Individuals in the
State of
Nature.

FROM all which it appears, that these mutual Fears and Jealousies that now prevail so much in the World, take Place peculiarly in politick Societies, and, if at all, can belong but very little to the State of Nature, where we cannot meet with any of those exorbitant Passions
and

and Appetites, that prompt People to mutual Injuries, and betray Men into Thefts and Robberies.

Quippe aliter tunc orbe novo, cœloque recenti
Vivebant homines, qui raptō robore nari,
Compositique luto, nullos habuere parentes.
Multa pudicitiz veteris vestigia forsan,
Aut aliqua extiterant & sub Jove, sed Jove nondum
Barbato, nondum Græcis jurare paratis
Per caput alterius; *cum furem nemo timeret*
Caulibus, aut pomis, & aperto viveret horto.
Paulatim deinde ad superos Astra recessit
Hac comite, atque duæ pariter fugere sorores.
Antiquum & verus est, alienum, Posthume, lectum
Concutere, atque sacri genium contemnere fulcri.
Omne aliud crimen mox ferrea protulit ætas:
Viderunt primos argentea secula mochos.

*For when the World was buxſom, freſh and young,
Her Sons were undebauch'd, and therefore ſtrong;
And whether born in kindly Beds of Earth,
Or ſtruggling from the teeming Oaks to Birth,
Or from what other Atoms they begun,
No Sires they had, or if a Sire, the Sun,
Some thin Remains of Chſtity appear'd
Even under Jove, but Jove without a Beard;
Before the ſervile Greeks had learnt to ſwear
By Heads of Kings; while yet the bounteous Earth
Her common Fruits in open Plains expoſ'd,
Ere Thieves were fear'd, or Gardens were inclos'd.*

At

At length uneasie Justice upwards flew,
 And both the Sisters to the Stars withdrew;
 From that old *Aera Whoring* did begin,
 So venerably antient is the Sin.
Adulterers next invade the nuptial State,
 And Marriage-beds creak with a foreign Weight.
 All other Ills did Iron Times adorn;
 But Whores and Silver in one Age were born.

Dryd. *Juven. Sat. 6.*

I say, it should seem, that in the first Ages of the World, or (by Mr. *Hobbes's* Confession, as I shall remark immediately) in the State of Nature, before Peoples Appetites had shot out to that luxuriant Compass of Things, into which they are now widened, Mankind liv'd together in Peace and Amity, with mutual Trust and Confidence, and could not but promise themselves friendly Entertainment every where among their Fellow-men; and, being free from Fears and Jealousies, had no Need to use any Precautions to guard themselves and their Possessions: For, as *Virgil* observes,

Et belli rabies, & amor successit habendi.

NOR is this Account of Things a mere poetical Fancy, *Tacitus* gives out something like it in the Manners of the antient People of Germany; among

among whom, he tells us (1), "No Body e-
 "ver made Sport with Vice, or thought it
 "fashionable to be debauch'd. But friendly
 "and beneficent Dispositions were more effec-
 "tual with them in forming Peoples Lives to
 "Virtue and Righteousness, than good and
 "wholsom Laws among other People. And
 "as their Hearts were influenc'd one towards
 "another with mutual Love and Benevolence;
 "so they judg'd it highly criminal not to keep
 "open House, or to refuse kind Welcome to
 "any one of the Species, whether known or
 "not. So that every Man entertain'd Strang-
 "ers in the best Manner he could; and when
 "one's Provision happen'd to fail, that one could
 "not so well supply his Guests, he (thought it)
 "not enough to point at the next House,
 "where they might be better provided; but he
 "waited on them thither, where they were
 "likewise received with all Humanity. And
 "with such open and beneficent Hearts did
 "they

(1) Nemo enim illic vitia ridet; nec corrumpere & cor-
 rumpi, seculum vocatur. — Plurique ibi boni mores
 valent, quam alibi bonæ leges. — Quemcunque mor-
 talium arcere testis, nefas habetur; pro fortuna quisque ap-
 paratis epulis excipit. Cum defecerit, qui modo hospes fue-
 rat, monstrator hospitii & comes proximam domum non in-
 viti adeunt, nec interest, pari humanitate accipiuntur. Notum
 ignotumque, quantum ad jus hospitii, nemo discernit. Ab-
 eunti si quid poposceris, concedere moris; & postcendi invi-
 cem eadem facilitas. Gaudent muneribus, sed nec data im-
 putant, nec acceptis obligantur. Victus inter hospites comis.
 De Morib. German.

"they entertain one another, that if at parting
 "you ask'd any Thing, you had it with all
 "Readiness! And they in their Turn would
 "ask what they lik'd, or had Occasion for,
 "with the same Ease and Frankness. For they
 "had Pleasure in a mutual Intercourse of kind
 "Offices; nor did they impare the Favours
 "they bestow'd, or reckon Merit in those they
 "receiv'd. After so obliging a Manner, and
 "with such open Heartedness did those People
 "live together, and with the rest of human
 "Kind." And one should think that among
 such Dispositions, Fears and Jealousies can have
 no great Footing.

To conclude, Mr. Hobbes gives it as his
 Opinion (1), *That the State of Nature took Place
 in the Days of Cain and Abel.* And I am much
 of the same Opinion, tho not for the same Rea-
 sons. However, since we are agreed, that the
 World was then in the State of Nature, I must
 observe, it appears to me, that in those Days
 Mankind were so far from being universally car-
 ried away with mutual Fears and Jealousies,
 that they were under the Influence of kind be-
 neficent Affections, and a most tender Concern-
 ment for each other's Safety and Happiness. It
 is true, *Cain* seems to dread and suspect all

Man.

(1) Sed omnium in omnes, inquiet, aliquis, bellum nun-
 quam erat. Quid, nonne fratrem suum Abelem invidia inter-
 fecit Cain, tantum facinus non ausurus, si communis potentia
 quæ vindicare potuisset, tunc extitisset? Lev. Cap. 13.

Mankind; Every one, says he, *that findeth me shall slay me.* But these Apprehensions seized him, only after he had killed his Brother *Abel*. And as this appears to be the only Action that made him conscious to himself, all Mankind would pursue him as their common Enemy; so from hence it may well be allowed, that before he committed this Murder, *Cain* had no Jealousies of his Fellow-men, but look'd upon them as governed with benevolent kind Dispositions. Nay, from hence it would seem manifest, that all Men were so well affected to each other, had so strong a Propension towards universal Peace and Amity, and were mutually united together in so friendly a Concern for each others Interests, that whatever was done to the Prejudice of any one Individual, was highly resented by the whole Species.

FOR had the World at that Time, wher, by Mr. *Hobbes's* own Confession, they lived in the State of Nature, been under the Power of those malevolent Passions, which he attributes to Mankind in that Situation; the killing of *Abel* could not have been the Spring of *Cain's* becoming jealous of all Men: But when we conceive Mankind to have these friendly Affections, whereby, when one Individual suffers, all the rest of the Species are sensibly afflicted, and in this generous Sympathy, cannot but be powerfully bent, every Man to give a Check to the Author of the Mischief; then indeed we see that *Cain* had good Reason to be apprehensive

to think his Life was in Danger, and to express himself in the Manner he did. And by the by, this Situation of the World, wherein every Man is at Liberty to avenge the Injuries done to himself, or any of his Fellows, is the Thing which makes it plain to me, that Mankind in the Days of *Cain* were in the State of Nature, and had not yet form'd themselves into politick Societies, where the punishing of Crimes, especially those that are capital, was ever almost in every Instance, wholly under the Direction of the civil Magistrate. So that here we have a convincing Proof, that People in the State of Nature are strongly engaged by their natural Dispositions, in Friendship and Amity, and do mutually confide in one another.

AND I cannot but here observe, That even in the present Situation of Things, where all Degrees of Men have gone much off from the Simplicity of the State of Nature; when a Man who has led always a Country life, and minded only his rural Affairs, without meddling at all with any Thing that relates to Church, State, or Change, comes first abroad, as they say, into the World, he will believe every Thing that is told him, and depend on every Promise that is made him, and for his Pains be laugh'd at as a simple Fool (a strange Compliment, I must say, that the polite and stirring Part of our Species pay themselves, to laugh at a Man, because he seems to think well of them, and does not suspect them to be Villains) till he be.

becomes better acquainted with the Shifts, Tricks, and Artifice of civilized Mankind. And as this of a Country-life, remote from the Intrigues of Men of Business, comes the nearest to the State of Nature, so what I have observed of it, is a shrewd Evidence, that there is Trust and Confidence, and no natural Fears and Jealousies in the Mind of one Man with respect to another.

IN short, if we will trace the Dispositions and Conduct of the human Species from their first uniting together in civil Societies, we shall find, that, from great Innocency and Integrity of Manners, they have gone aside, and increas'd in mutual Mischiefs, from one Generation to another, in Proportion to the enlarging of their sensual Appetites. And this, I should think, is much the same with what Mankind have long since observed concerning those three Ages that are so famous among the Poets. The Account which *Plato* gives us of the Circumstances of Mankind after the *Deluge*, is very pertinent to our present Purpose; and his Reasoning seems convincing: "Those, says he
" (1), who escaped the Desolation that came
Q 3 " upon

(1) Οἱ τότε πειρουζόμενοι τὴν φθορὰν, καὶ οὐκ ὄντες ἀν-
εἶον νομίς ἐν κορυφαίς καὶ σμικρὰ ζώπυρα τῶν ἀνθρώπων
γένος διασωσμένα. καὶ δὲ τὰς ταύτας καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἀπίστευτον τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀστροῖς καὶ οὐρανό-
σκηπτῶν, εἰς τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοφροσύνην, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλα κακὰ
γῆματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὀφειλόμενα. — ἔκινον περὶ τὸ μὴ τῶν
ἄλλων.

14 human Race being multiply'd, Things have
 16 come to their present Pass, not indeed on the
 18 sudden, but by Degrees, and after many Ge-
 20 nerations. As for the People of those Days,
 22 their Fewness could not but make them
 24 mighty fond of seeing one another. —
 26 And Sedition and War could have almost
 28 no where any Place among them; for eve-
 30 ry Thing being desolate about them, this
 32 could not but greatly endear them to one a-
 34 nother. Besides, that they could have no
 36 Disputes in relation to their Subsistence; for
 38 if it was not perhaps in some Places at first,
 40 there was no Want of Pasturage, which was
 42 the Way of Life which People then for the
 44 most Part followed: So that they had Plen-
 46 ty of Milk and Flesh, and could likewise
 48 provide themselves in Variety of good Enter-
 50 tainment by Hunting. And as for Clothes of
 52 all Sorts, and Houses, and Vessels for Use
 54 upon the Fire and otherwise, they had such
 56 Things in great Abundance; for the Art of
 58 Weaving, and the Potter's Art, have no Need
 60 of Iron; and God hath imparted these two
 62 Arts to Mankind, that they might provide
 64 themselves in the aforesaid Necessaries, and
 66 thereby preserve and recruit their Species,
 68 when any such Calamity should befall them.
 70 Now, in these Circumstances, as Men could
 72 not be very poor, and be necessitated by their
 74 Wants to inroach upon one another; so
 76 neither could they be rich, there being then
 78 neither

neither Gold nor Silver. And in whatever Society of Men there are neither Riches nor Poverty, ~~there~~ People cannot but be endued with the greatest Temperance and Honesty; for they are free from Insults and Injustice, nor do they emulate and envy one another. On all which Accounts they were certainly Men of Virtue and Probity, to which, no Doubt, their good Nature and Simplicity did very much contribute. For being candid and human in their Dispositions, they had no Suspicion, as Things go now, that any Man, from a Pretence to Wisdom, would impose Falshoods upon them; but they believed Things to be virtuous or vicious as they were instructed; and thus being assured of the Truth of what they were taught concerning their Duty both towards God and Man, they governed themselves accordingly. So that, in all Instances, they were such as I have represented them." *Pag. 47.*

In short, Mr. Hobbes fairly owns, that Mankind are inwardly form'd to what I call natural Society.

I must here take Notice, That Mr. Hobbes seems plainly to give up the Question, and to yield all that is needful to shew the Inconsistency of his Principles, and to overthrow his whole Scheme.

Since Society, *says he* (1); does now actually prevail every where through the World,

(1) Cum societatem inter homines actu jam constitutam; cum extra societatem vivere neninem; cum appetere congressum,

" World, and no Body lives without Com-
 " panions, and all Men do mutually affect
 " mixing together, and to have Intercourse one
 " with another; it may seem an odd Piece of
 " Stupidity, to stumble People in the very En-
 " trance of this Treatise, by telling them,
 " that *Man is not naturally form'd to Society*. In
 " order therefore to make this Matter a little
 " plainer, it must be owned, that Man, up
 " from his very Birth, never but finds Solitude
 " grievous and afflicting; for Infants want
 " the Assistance of others, for the Preservation
 " of their Being; and adult Persons for their
 " Well-being: So that I do not deny, that
 " Men,

gressum, & colloquia mutua omnes videamus; mira quædam
 videri potest stupiditas, in ipso doctrinæ civilis limine, hujus-
 modi offendiculum legentibus opponere: hominem ad socie-
 tatem aptum naturam non esse. Itaque explicatius dicendum est;
 verum quidem esse, homini per naturam, sive quatenus est ho-
 mo, id est, statim atque est natus, solitudinem perpetuam mo-
 lestam esse. Nam infantes ad vivendum, adulti ad bene vi-
 vendum, aliorum ope indigent. Itaque homines alterum alterius
 congressum natura cogente appetere non nego. Societates autem
 civiles non sunt meri congressus, sed fœdera, quibus faciendis
 fides & pacta necessaria sunt. Horum ab infantibus quidem
 & indoctis vis; ab iis autem qui damnum a defectu socie-
 tatis inexpertum sunt, utilitas ignoratur. Unde fit ut illi, quia
 quid sit societas non intelligunt, eam inire non possint; hi
 quia nesciunt quid profit, non curent. Manifestum ergo est
 omnes homines (cum sint nati infantes) ad societatem inept-
 tos esse: permultos etiam (fortasse plurimos) vel morbo
 animi, vel defectu disciplinæ, per omnem vitam ineptos mane-
 re. Habent tamen illi, tam infantes quam adulti, naturam
 humanam. Ad societatem ergo homo aptus, non natura, sed
 disciplina factus est. De Civ. Lib. 1. § 2. Annot.

Men, from a Necessity of Nature, do mutually affect to assemble together. Only we should do well to observe, That civil Societies are not bare Meetings or Assemblies, but solemn Engagements, in the forming of which mutual Promises and Compacts are necessary. And since Infants, and Men of no Learning, do not understand the Force of such Engagements, and others that never were sensible of any Inconveniencies, from the Want of political Society, do not know their Advantage; it is evident, that the former cannot come under such Engagements, because they understand not what they are; and that the latter must be quite regardless of 'em, because they know not to what Purpose they serve. From which it plainly appears, that all Men (since all are born Infants) come into the World inept, or unfit for civil Society; and many (perhaps a great many) continue so all their Life long, either through some Defect in their Intellectuals, or the Want of due Discipline and Instruction. And yet, as well Infants, as adult Persons, do partake of human Nature: So that it is not Nature, but Discipline, that forms Men to civil Society."

To set Things in an open Light, I shall here explain the different Meanings of Society. And, as I take it, the World seem thereby to understand,

FIRST,

FIRST, Any Number of Men assembled or living together, without any common earthly Head or Governor, and corresponding one with another, in a mutual Intercourse of kind Affections and Actions. — This may properly be called natural Society.

SECONDLY, An Association of Men united together for their common Safety and Happiness, under one common Head or Governor, (whether simple or complex) of their own Species, who sets publick Rules to their Actions, and has Power and Authority to enforce them. — This is called civil Society.

Now it appears to me, that Mr. Hobbes, in the above Quotation, fairly owns, that Man is naturally form'd to the first Kind of Society; and every one must observe, that the yielding of this Point (which I have made good in the main Argument) totally ruins his whole Scheme, and overturns all that he has laid down to support his *War of All against All*. However, notwithstanding he seems to grant thus much, he still maintains, that Man is not naturally fitted to civil Society. But as an Intercourse of kind Affections and Actions, is the only Society, wherein (speaking strictly, or according to the Truth and Nature of Things) rational Beings can correspond, or be united together; so 'tis manifestly the great Foundation of civil Society, or the very Life and Soul whereby Men subsist in a Body-politick, and are kept together in any Degree of Peace and

and Happiness: From which it necessarily follows, that whoever confesses that Man is naturally fitted to the first Sort of Society, cannot, without great Absurdity, but likewise allow, that Man is *naturally form'd to civil Society*, or that the Frame of our Nature qualifies and fits us to live together under civil Government. And indeed the Reasons which Mr. *Hobbes* advances to shew the contrary, cannot but be counted shamefully trifling.

And as for civil Society, 'tis ridiculous to argue, that Mankind are not naturally form'd to it; for that Infants and Changelings are incapable of such a State.

POLITICK Societies, says he, being solemn Compacts or Engagements, neither Infants, nor People disorder'd in their Minds, can come under them.

And from this he concludes (especially from the sad Misfortune of our coming Infants into the World) that Mankind have no natural Fitness to civil Society! — Is this the mighty Man, of whom we are told, that *Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, &c.* are not to be compar'd with him, either in Point of the Clearness of Understanding, or the Depth of Knowledge! Indeed our learned Philosopher makes a silly enough Figure, when he goes to the Nursery, to Changelings, and to Bedlam, in order to find out what State of Life the Individuals of human Kind are naturally adapted to. I should affront my Reader, if I went about to shew the Meanness of this Reasoning: For every Body knows, that, to understand the natural Powers of any Species of Creatures, and to determine what they are naturally fit for, and adapted to, one is always to consider the Indi-

Individuals of that Species in their common Course, when they are full grown, and have come to Maturity, or when they begin, with some Degrees of Strength, to exert their inherent Powers and Faculties.

BUT 'tis alleg'd further, that *the Ignorant and Unlearned* are not naturally form'd to civil Society; but must be trained up to it by Discipline and Instruction. I suppose it will be granted, that Mankind are naturally free Agents, not only endued with Reason, whereby we are enabled to perceive the Nature and Tendency of our Actions, and to guide them by a Rule; but also furnish'd with several Passions and Affections, as Springs that excite us to Action, and whereby we are wrought upon in the Representation of Good and Evil, or Rewards and Punishments: And since civil Society (however absurdly Mr. Hobbes may represent it) is a *Constitution of Things, or a System of Laws, that are adapted to the common Principles, and Happiness of Mankind, and being enforced by proper Sanctions, are under the Administration of publick Characters*; I cannot possibly conceive what it is we want in the Frame of our Nature, that renders a Man unfit, or disproportioned to such a Situation. I confess indeed, there seems Occasion, as Things go now, for a good Deal of Discipline and Instruction, in relation to those Persons that are concern'd in the publick Management. But I would fain know, what great Need is there of any Thing of this

Nature,

Human Nature, when it comes to Maturity, is well adapted to it.

Nature, in order to enable the *Subject* to understand his Duty, and to dispose us to Obedience? One should think, that common Sense and Reason, and other common Principles of human Nature, which no Man is without, are fully sufficient to these Purposes. Most certain it is, that the Force or Obligation of Compacts (whereof Mr. *Hobbes* makes Mankind naturally ignorant; and therefore unfit to enter in to civil Society, till they be taught and instructed) is universally obvious to the common Understanding of all the Individuals of the human Species, that are not Infants, Idiots, or Madmen; from whom 'tis ridiculous to form our Notions of human Nature; for among the most ignorant, unpolished, and undisciplin'd, who is not sensible, that *Faith is to be kept, and Compacts performed?*

And tho' Instruction should be necessary to form us; this does not hinder, but we are naturally qualified.

AFTER all, tho' it should be granted, that no Man, without Discipline or Instruction, is fitted to civil Society; yet this can never infer any natural Unfitness. For every Body allows we have a natural Capacity of receiving Ideas, of comparing them together, and perceiving their Relations: And what is Instruction, but the opening of our Minds, or the enlarging of our Stock of Ideas, and laying them before us in their just Relations and Proportions: So that when a Man is fitted up to any State of Things, or is put in a Condition to pursue any Series of Actions, by having his Mind thus opened; *this* can never, with any Shew of Reason, be counted

counted unnatural. On the contrary, we judge of a Man's natural Powers, by the Success of Instruction upon him. And when Discipline is not able to form an Individual to the particular Business of Life we incline he should follow, we then say, *He is not naturally* capable of that Business, or his natural Powers are not equal to it. In a Word, Knowledge, which is the Effect of Instruction, is so very natural, and lies so obvious to human Minds, that the divine *Socrates* was of Opinion, 'tis nothing but *Reminiscency*, or a Calling to Mind those Things which once we understood. So that, I say, even tho' Mankind should want to be instructed, before they can be form'd to civil Society, this is far from implying, that we are naturally unfit for it.

*Doctrina sed vim promovet insitam,
Relique cultus pectora roborant.*

Hor. Od. 4. Lib. 4.

And therefore I should think it manifest,
that *Man in all Respects is a social Creature.*

TREAT.

counted unnatural. On the contrary, we judge of a Man's natural Powers, by the Success of Instruction upon him. And when Discipline is not able to form an Individual to the particular Business of Life we incline he should follow we then say, He is not naturally capable of that Business; or his natural Powers are not equal to it. In a Word, Knowledge, which is the Effect of Instruction, is so very natural, and lies so obvious to human Minds, that the divine Doctor was of Opinion, 'tis nothing but Remissness or a Calling to Mind those Things which once we understood. So that, I say, even the Mankind should want to be instructed, before they can be formed to civil Society, this is far from implying, that we are naturally un-
instructed.

Doctrines sed vim promoveat instans,
Religione cultus personae rebus.
Hor. Od. 4. Lib. 4.

And therefore I should think it manifest,
that Man in all Respects is a social Creature.

TREAT.

TREATISE II.

VIZ.

A further Explication of the Principles in the foregoing Enquiry, with some Reflections upon a late Book, intituled, *An Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.*

Sed ut perspiciatis unde omnis iste natus sit error voluptatem accusantium, doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam. Nemo ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas est, aspernatur, aut odit, aut fugit: sed quia consequuntur magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, &c. Cic. de Finib. Lib. i.

INTRODUCTION.



SINCE my Writing of the foregoing *Enquiry*, wherein I make Virtue, or moral Goodness, to consist in the Proportion and Agreement, which any Action of a rational Mind bears to the Self-love of all those other

'Tis propos'd to give a further Explication of the foregoing Principles; and to consider what Mr. H—s seems to advance against them.

intelligent Beings, to whom she is naturally associated; and wherein I likewise hold, that Self-love, as it exerts it self in the Desire of

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
Sect. I. universal unlimited Esteem, is the great commanding Motive that determines us to the Pursuit of such Actions. A late Book, intituled, *An Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, has fallen into my Hands, wherein, it may be thought, these Things are set in a quite contrary Light: I shall therefore here endeavour, for the Satisfaction of the Reader, to give a further Explanation of my Principles; and consider what may be said upon those Particulars, in which this ingenious Author and I do not seem so well to accord.

SECTION I.

Self-love is
undeniably
essential to
all animate
Beings.

THE fundamental Principle upon which I build, or from which I deduce all that I maintain in the foregoing Enquiry, is *Self-love*, or *Self-preservation*, which I all along conceive, as an essential Ingredient in the inmost Nature of all Beings whatsoever. And I can never think, there is any Man who will dispute the Truth of this Principle, or deny that it is necessarily inherent in all the several Minds that are in the Universe. In particular, one cannot but observe, that Self-love or Interest is so deeply laid in human Nature, and is so inseparable from our Constitution, that it even then exerts it self very powerfully, when, one should think, People are directly contradicting it; for most certainly

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 259

certainly (1) such unhappy Creatures, as with *Sect. I.*
 their own Hands make away with themselves, 
 and go about utterly to extinguish their Existence, do thereby intend to relieve themselves from some dark gloomy Thoughts, that are too tormenting to be endured, which is nothing but a violent *Effort* of Self-love, in one's Pursuit after Ease and Happiness.

BUT how much soever all Men may be agreed upon this Point in General, there is a great deal of Difference in Peoples Sentiments, with respect to the Application of this Principle, which, I am apt to believe, proceeds only from the different Notions we form to our selves of it. How it has come to pass, I know not, but a good many in the World have, in my Opinion, contrary to the Nature of Things, taken up with such narrow and contracted Notions of Self-love or Interest, that, according to what they understand by it, it is indeed the most odious and pernicious Principle that can

It is strangely misunderstood, and must therefore be explained.

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(1) Neque enim si nonnulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos, aut alla exitia querunt, aut ut ille apud Terentium, qui decrevit tandem se minus injuria suo gnato facere (ut ait ipse) dum fiat miser, inimicus ipse sibi judicandus est. Sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi effervescunt: et cum in mala scientes ruunt, tamen se optime considerare arbitrantur. — Quare quodvisque dicitur male de se quis melli, sibi que esse inimicus atque hostis, vitam denique fugere: intelligatur aliquam subesse ejusmodi causam, ut ex eo ipso possit intelligi, sibi quemque esse carum. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 3.

Se^{ct.} I. well be imagined. And I cannot but much wonder that our Author has given us a so very lame and imperfect Account of this Principle, when he designedly goes about to determine its Meaning *. I shall here lay it before the Reader in that View, wherein, I think, we ought in Reason to conceive it, and upon which I lay the whole Stress of my Argument.

Human Nature is originally form'd to Pleasure and Pain.

If we reflect upon our Constitution, we shall find, that human Nature is so turned, or is cast in such a Mould, that it is necessarily susceptible of *Pleasure* and *Pain*. I need not offer to explain what I understand by these Words: Every Body feels distinctly by his own particular Experience, what must be mean'd by them. And I am very much of the Opinion, that either the one, or the other of these Perceptions, is that which first gives a human Soul the Consciousness of her own Existence, or that the very first Ideas that are present to our Minds, are either some pleasing, or some painful Sensations. Nor do I think, that this Capacity of perceiving Pleasure and Pain, is a Thing peculiar to human Nature; I make not the least Doubt, but that all finite animate Beings whatsoever, are formed after the same Manner, and that it essentially belongs even to the meanest Insect: For I can by no Means induce my self to imagine, that brute Creatures are all meer *Automata*.

So that we necessarily like and pursue Pleasure; but hate and avoid Pain.

Now, from this original Cast of human Nature, that exerts it self, I do believe, from the first

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 261

first Moment of our Existence, there immedi- Sect. I.
ately ariseth a very active and commanding Principle, I mean, *Self-love*, or Self-preservation, according to the Influence of which, we necessarily delight in *Pleasure*, and seek and pursue after it; but hate *Pain*, and avoid and flee from it. But of this I shall take Notice more fully afterwards.

I suppose I need not here remark, that the Mind only is that Part of the human Constitution, which is the proper or the only Seat of Pleasure and Pain; no Sort of Matter, however modified, being at all capable of any Sort of Perceptions. 'Tis however to be observed, that whatever Pleasures or Pains we may happen to be sensible of, these do not spring up in the Mind of their own Accord, but are deriv'd to us, either from the Impressions of some Objects that are *external* to the human Soul, or from some Thoughts and Reflections, about which the Mind is *immediately* imploy'd. These are the two great, and the only *Sources* of agreeable, or uneasie Perceptions, that I know, or can form any Notion of.

In the *first Place*, I say, our Pleasures or Pains are derived to us, from the Impressions of some Objects that are *external* to the Mind. And the first of this Sort that occurs to our Observation, is the human *Body* it self, in which, for a Reason I shall give by and by, we all reckon our selves very deeply concern'd.

And both our Pleasures and Pains arise either from some Objects external to the Mind; or from some Thoughts wherein the Mind is immediately imploy'd.

The Pleasures or Pains of the Mind arise from the Constitution of the human Body it self.

Sect. I. **W**HERE is, I know not how, in the present State of our Existence, so close and intimate a Connection of Soul and Body together, that according as *this* happens to be affected, so does *that* receive either pleasing or painful Sensations. If the several Members, and the constituent Parts of this curious Machine, which the Mind always carries about her, have a brisk uniform Motion, and be so ballanc'd and adjusted, as easily to perform all the animal Functions, this gives a Briskness and Vivacity to the Mind, and entertains her with many agreeable Perceptions, which make her approve her present Situation, while she feels every Thing about her healthful and vigorous: But when the Blood and Spirits flag, or when the inward Motions of this human Machine happen to be disturbed, this affects the Mind with Pain, and gives her the uneasie Sensations of Trouble, Sicknes, or Anguish, so that she is now discontented with her present Condition. And thus far does the Mind depend immediately upon her Body for her Pleasures or Pains, without having Regard to other external Objects.

And from all those Objects that affect the bodily Senses.

BUT when we consider, how the human Body stands connected with the rest of the visible Creation, and depends, as to its Motions that immediately affect the Mind, upon the Impressions which from thence it receiveth; 'tis very obvious, that the Mind derives her Pleasures or Pains, by Means of her Body, from numberless other Objects. Those common Powers of every

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 263

every human Body (or rather of the Mind Sect. I.

(1) awaken'd by some particular Motions in the Body, after a Manner we do not now understand) that go by the general Name of the Senses, are the great Instruments, which convey to the Mind either Pleasure or Pain, from every Object we here converse with. And tho' these Senses be counted only five in Number, yet with what an infinite Variety of pleasing Ideas, and painful Sensations, is every one of 'em capable to entertain us? There is no Man, I am sure, who has reflected on his own Experience of Things, or who has attended to what passes into his Mind by his Senses, but must be sensible of thus much, and stand amazed at the wonderful Frame of human Nature, and the surprizing Effects, which the whole, and the several Parts of this visible World, as they fall under our Cognizance, have upon us.

How various are the great and solemn, and the beautiful Ideas we have by our Eyes? How

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many

(1) Neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed vim quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a sede animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris & oculis, & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus. Ut facile intelligi possit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi, quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat & adsit. Quid, quod eadem mente res dissimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum? quæ nunquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur, ut idem omnium judex solus esset. Cic. Tuscul. Q. Lib. 1.

Sect. I. many are the awful and grave, and the charming harmonious Perceptions we have by our *Ears*? And how numberless are the sweet and delightful Sensations we have by our *Taste*, our *Smell*, and our *Feeling*? 'Tis impossible to recount the great Diversity of those most agreeable Pleasures, which the Mind is capable of receiving by these Organs of her Body, from such Objects as are about us.


Mean
While the
Pleasures
that come
by our
Senses, are
more nume-
rous than the
Pains.

AND one cannot but here observe (which is plain from Experience) that the pleasing Perceptions we have by the Senses, are vastly more numerous than the painful ones. Besides that, in great Variety they lie, Plenty of them, obvious to every Body. The Heavens with the useful and glorious Furniture they have, and the Earth with her various Animals, her Mountains, Vallies, Woods, Fields, Rivers, &c. being all capable to entertain the meanest Mortal with the highest Gratifications one can enjoy by his Eyes, Ears, &c. And I say, there is no Man who can confine these most delightful Enjoyments to himself. Nay, the stately Buildings, the fine Gardens, the beautiful Inclosures, the glaring Furniture and Equipage, and other Appurtenances of great Life, that stand the Proprietor in so much Labour and Cost, lie in common, and can convey the finest Perceptions to every Beholder.

Which is
a strong E-
vidence of
the Goodness
of God to-
ward us.

AND as this wonderful Constitution of Things (were there nothing else to determine us) carries too strong Evidence along with it, of

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 265

of a powerful and wise Contrivance, to suffer **SECT. I.**
any considerate Man to imagine, that this 
World was formed by Chance; so it loudly
proclaims the unbounded Goodness of the great
Author of Nature, who hath thus provided us
so great a Variety of pleasing Perceptions, with-
out any Expence to our selves, which (not to
speak of those many agreeable Sensations we
perceive in Eating and Drinking) are sufficient
to over-balance all the Labour we are at, in
getting Subsistence for our Bodies. And thus
has the Mind, by Means of her Body, num-
berless delightful Ideas.

AND, as we plainly see, what are the parti-
cular Objects, that affect our animal Machine,
so as to excite those agreeable Sensations, 'tis
impossible but those Objects must be exceeding
grateful to the Mind; nor can we fail in being
sensible of a good Deal of Concern for them,
while we are conscious how much we depend
on them for our Satisfaction.

It is however to be remarked, that the
Mind cannot be *equally* concern'd, for every
particular Kind of *external Objects*, without any
Distinction. The present Frame of our Na-
ture necessarily determines us to be solicitous
about some particular Objects, that belong to
some particular Organs of our Body, much more
than about others: For there are some exter-
nal Objects, which, by the Impressions they
make upon the Body, entertain our Minds,
according to their several Qualities, with the
pleasing

Nor can
the Mind
fail to have
a tender
Concern for
such Objects.

However,
it is not e-
qually con-
cerned for
all.

Sect. 1. pleasing Ideas of *Beauty, Harmony, and fine Odours*; but then the Absence of these Objects does not occasion any Alteration in the animal Oeconomy, that gives Uneasiness to the Mind, so as to affect her with any Anxiety about them. Which, by the Way, lets us plainly enough see, that *Pleasure is Something else than the removing of Pain* (1).

It is mostly
solicitous for
those that
affect our
Taste and
Feeling.

BUT there are other Objects, namely, such as belong to our *Taste and Feeling*, which propagate such Motions to the Body, as give the Mind very agreeable Sensations, and that are of such Consequence to our Ease and Well-being, that when their Influence happens to fail, this occasions such a Change in the Motions of this Engine we have about us, that the Mind becomes uneasie, and cannot escape a quick Sense of *Hunger, Thirst, or Cold*. So that the Mind thus feeling sensibly, that by the Absence of such external Objects, she is inevitably expos'd to painful Sensations; this lets her know, how necessarily she depends on them, and makes her mighty solicitous to have them always at Hand, that, upon the first Approaches of these uneasie Perceptions, she may have it in her Power to make Use of them, and thereby maintain her own pleasing Situation.

AND

(1) Τοῖς γὰρ οἰσμοῖσι λυπῶν εἶναι πάντας πένους τὰς ἡδονάς,
καὶ πᾶν πῶς κλίσθαι. Plat. in Phileb.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 267

AND, as I have just now hinted, the present Frame of our Nature makes this our Solicitude, particularly about *Meats* and *Drink*, about *Clothes*, *Houses*, and other Things that defend us against Cold, and the Injuries of the Weather, very necessary; for this most wonderful Machine of the human Body necessarily requires, for its Support, a continued Accession of some Parts of external Matter, to promote its Growth, till it comes to a certain Bulk, Firmness, and Proportion; and to supply the constant Waste of its Parts, that are continually flying off, by reason of those internal Motions that are carried on within it; and wants likewise the Influence of some subtil Parts of external Matter, to agitate its Parts, and prevent its Fluids from stagnating. Upon which we may observe, that the great *Author* of Nature has plac'd some very quick Sensations of the Mind, *Hunger*, *Thirst*, and *Cold*, as a strong Guard over the Constitution of the Body, to hinder, for a While, the Dissolution of this curious Machine, and to protect, or keep up the Individual.

Which is necessary to the Preservation of the Individual.

THERE are *Sensations* of another Sort, which are likewise excited by some particular Motions in the Body, that direct every Individual to the Propagation of his Species. And these Motions, generally speaking, so strongly affect the Mind, and raise such violent Appetites towards the other Sex, that she can not find herself easie, till once these prevailing Desires be gratified, or the Motions in the Body that occasion

Besides those Pleasures and Pains, there are others that direct to the Propagation of the Species.

Sect. I.



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individual

So that the
human Body
being the
Instrument
of so many
Pleasures,
the Mind
cannot but
mightily
affect it.

casion them lose their Force, or be extinguish'd. And this again shews us, that the great *Parent* of Mankind has taken Care, in the forming of human Nature, to secure our exerting our selves in continuing our own Species, which he intended should be, as it were, renewed from one Generation to another (1).

THUS we see how the Mind necessarily depends immediately upon her own Body, and, by Means thereof, upon other external Objects, for her Pleasures or Pains. Now, 'tis this Dependence, which the Mind is always conscious she has upon the Body, that engageth her in so very deep a Concern for it. For if the Mind suffer'd no Alteration in her State, from whatever Impressions might be made on it by *external Objects*, we have no Reason to believe, but she would as easily part with a Limb, or any other Member whatsoever, as we now do with our Hair, and other Excrecences. But when the Mind sensibly feels, that the Body is the great Organ, whereby she receives so many of her agreeable and painful Sensations, and that these Things always happen to her, according to the Condition the Body is in, and the Impressions it derives from external Objects; this makes

(1) Τὸ δὲ, ἐμψύχει καὶ ἔρωτα τῆς τεχνοπείας, ἐμψύχει δὲ τῆς χειραγώγας ἔρωτα τῶν ἐκτελεσθῆναι, τῆς δὲ τραχείας μέγιστον μὲν πόνον τῷ ζῷον, μέγιστον δὲ οὖρον τῷ θανάτῳ ἀμύλα καὶ τὰυτα δοικα ἀρχαῖα πρὸς ζῶα ἢ βυλάσμενα. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. i.

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makes her to interest her self in the State of the **Sect. I.**
Body, as much as she does in her own Percep-
tions, and to imploy as tender a Concernment
about its Situation, as about the Manner of her
own Existence. By which Means she always
bears a mighty Liking and Good-will to the Bo-
dy; which is very much increased from con-
sidering its Usefulness, and that it serves as a
commodious Engine, to carry her about in
her Diversions and Amusements, and to pro-
cure other Objects, which she feels as necessary
to her Happiness.

AND, as I have already hinted, whatever
Good-liking the Mind bears to the Body, she
must necessarily have the same for those out-
ward Objects, which communicate to the Body
those particular Motions, that give her *pleasing*
Perceptions; since that without the Influence
of those Objects, she could not enjoy any de-
lightful Ideas, or prevent her having painful
Sensations.

Together
with all those
external Ob-
jects, that, by
Means of the
Body, are so
agreeable.

THUS far have I considered those Pleasures,
that arise from the Impressions of some Objects,
that are external to the Mind. And the Rea-
der will be pleas'd to observe, That whatever
agreeable Perceptions we have from thence,
they must all necessarily *expire with the Body*,
unless the *Author* of Nature immediately inter-
pose, and appoint new *Regulations*; for, in the
present Constitution of Things, the human Bo-
dy is the only Engine, whereby those pleasing
Ideas are convey'd to us.

'Tis how-
ever to be
observ'd, that
all these
Pleasures die
with the
Body.

I shall

Sect. I.

Secondly, The Pleasures of the Mind arise from some Thoughts wherein it is immediately imployed.

I shall now consider, in the next Place, those other delightful Perceptions that arise from some Thoughts and Reflections about which we may be immediately imploy'd. And here the Mind raises herself to the Enjoyment of those Pleasures that are above the Reach and Capacity of the Brute-creation, and wherein she can agreeably entertain herself independently of those Motions that are excited in her Body by external Objects. For the Mind, however in some Instances she may be entirely passive, and receive her Sensations without exerting herself in any Course of Action to procure them; yet she is not condemn'd to lie thus inactive, under the Power of every Impression external Objects may happen to make on her.

Such as contemplating the Nature of Things.

We are all conscious the Mind has a Power to turn her Thoughts from one Object to another, to examine into the Nature of Things and compare them together, to consider their Relations and Proportions, and the Dependence they have upon one another, and to enquire and form a Judgment of what Effects they may produce, whether with Respect to other Beings, or with Reference to herself. And while the Mind is thus searching into the Nature of Things, comparing and balancing them together, and settling their just Relations and Proportions, her Understanding is at every Step opened to new Discoveries, which cannot but make her sensible of the highest Satisfaction.

H. I.

FOR

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FOR the human Soul having a natural De-
sire after Knowledge; and finding herself al-
ways perplex'd and uneasy, when she cannot
have a full View of those Things she wants to
comprehend; whenever this Desire is gratify'd,
and Things yield to her Search after them, so
that she takes them up under clear and distinct
Apprehensions, this entertains her with the
most pleasing Emotions. One cannot but ob-
serve with what Pleasure Children will listen to
Stories, however fabulous, and how very cu-
riously they will seek to be let into the whole
Train of a Narration. There is hardly any one
but has a strong Itch after News, and is glad
to hear of the several Transactions, Events,
and Revolutions that have happen'd, and are
yet going on in the different States and King-
doms of the World; though these Things have
no Influence on his secular Concerns. In Mat-
ters of Speculation, the contriving a well adjust-
ed Hypothesis, that answers all the *Phænomena*
in any *System* of Things, that want to be ac-
counted for, affects the Mind in the most trans-
porting Manner. And if the Solution of a single
Problem, or the Demonstration of a single *Theo-*
rem is capable to give the Soul so much Joy, as
we find it does by Experience; what Raptures
must arise from viewing the Connection of in-
finite Numbers of mathematical Truths all na-
turally flowing from one another, and hanging
together in the most beautiful and surprizing
Manner? It must infallibly be a most amaz-
ing

Sect. I.



not find
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to be the
ground is
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it would be
the same
to be the
same

OR

Seet. I. ing Field of Pleasure, to see a whole Universe of Things form'd and adjusted by the exactest Rules of *Geometry*, in *Number*, *Weight*, and *Measure*! But not to observe how the Mind is affected in the Contemplation of this little Globe, and the heavenly Bodies, all, as it were, hung up in this wide *Expanse* we see about us, in their several Orders and Arrangements, their particular Motions, and Revolutions, and the Influence and Dependence they have upon one another; the Structure and Oeconomy which we see in the Formation of the meanest Plant, or the most despicable Insect, can ravish a Man, and make him sensible of the finest Delights. All these Things are inexhaustible Sources of pleasing Perceptions.

And considering the true Happiness of social Beings, the Means to obtain it, and one's Advances towards it.

AND as we can turn our Thoughts every where, 'tis with a very sensible Delight that we examine into the Nature and Principles of rational Agents; that we see the Relations we all bear to one another; what is the whole Compass of our Being; in what our several Interests consist; what can contribute to give us Pleasure; and by what Measures we ought in Reason to pursue our Happiness. And, in Speculations of this Nature, we can consider the Value of any particular Series of Actions, or the true Weight and Moment of any particular Set of Pleasures or Pains, in themselves and Consequents, and determine, which of them is most eligible. And when from our taking such Views of Things, we fix upon any particular Set

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 273

Set of delightful Perceptions, as our *main End*, Sect. I. or as lasting Enjoyments of the highest Moment, that will never fail us; and in the same Manner pitch upon the most proper Means, which we steadily pursue in order to attain our sovereign Design, that takes in the whole Compass of our Duration: The Consciousness of this, and every successful Step we make towards our supreme Felicity, must necessarily affect us in the most agreeable Manner. I have already taken Notice, that Man has a natural Propension to associate with other rational Agents; and, as I shall explain by and by, we cannot but necessarily desire the Good-liking and Esteem of those Beings among whom we are mixed: So that, for Instance, if we settle it as our main Purpose, to recommend ourselves to the Love, and Esteem, and Commendation of God, and of all Mankind, through every Stage of our eternal Existence (which, if we follow Nature, we cannot but do, as I have already explain'd in my Enquiry) every Degree of Esteem we acquire here, cannot but be exceeding grateful; the Prospect of being universally applauded for ever hereafter, must necessarily be very transporting; and the Means, that lift us up to this Commendation (which I have likewise shewn in the foregoing Enquiry, to be the Moral Virtues) cannot but prove extremely agreeable. All these Things let in upon the Soul numberless Perceptions, that are attended with the highest Gratifications.

S

AND

Sect. I.

The Pleasures that arise from such Thoughts, are eternal.

AND thus the Mind, without being under the Influence of her bodily Senses, can entertain herself with the most pleasing Ideas. And such agreeable Perceptions, not depending on any Impressions deriv'd to her Body from external Objects, but on her own Thoughts and Reflections that are always in her own Power, they go along with her into another World, after she has dropt this her earthly Engine, and she can enjoy and improve them during the whole Course of her Existence. So that this Sort of Satisfaction is *eternal*.

Now Self-love, in its general Notion, signifies our liking and pursuing Pleasure, our hating and avoiding Pain.

I have hinted above, that, from this original Turn of the Mind, whereby we are made *susceptible of Pleasure and Pain*, it naturally follows that we must necessarily *delight in*, and approve of our having *pleasing Perceptions*, and seek and *pursue* after them; but on the other Hand, *hate Pain* and *avoid* it: Which is what I understand, in general, by *Self-love*, *Self-preservation*, or *Self-interest*. And from what I have hitherto said, it appears, what those agreeable or pleasing Ideas must be, with respect to their Sources, in which we cannot but delight, or which we cannot but approve of and pursue.

But the Mind is not condemned to embrace every Pleasure whatsoever: It can balance them together, and thereby make a rational Choice.

HOWEVER, the human Mind not being condemned to admit of all Pleasures whatsoever, as they may happen to present themselves to us; but having a Power to look into the Nature and Consequents of Things, to balance them together, and to settle their *true Value*, so as to adjust and regulate her Approbation and Pur-

suings

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 275

suits in every Instance; we must here consider how this Principle of *Self-love* exerts itself, as it belongs to a *rational Agent*. And, to make this as plain as I can; I shall make the following Observations.

1. IN all our pleasing or painful Perceptions, there are three Things which every reasonable Man ought carefully to attend to, *viz.* the *Degrees* of Pleasure or Pain, the *Duration*, and the *Consequents* of these Perceptions.

Some Observations to settle the true Value of our Pleasures in order to determine the true Meaning of Self-love.

2. THE *Value* of any Perception (without having Regard to what flows from it) is determin'd by multiplying the *Degrees* of Pleasure or Pain, into the *Duration*. Thus, if an agreeable Perception has 6 *Degrees* of Pleasure, and 20 *Hours* of *Duration*, the full *Value* thereof, amounts to 120. After the same Manner the *Moment* of any painful Sensation is to be settled.

3. As pleasing and painful Sensations are attended, each with other Perceptions of the same Kind; so may pleasing Perceptions be attended with painful, and painful with pleasing, as their *Consequents*. This (without shewing from the Structure of the human Body, and the Nature of Things, how it cannot but happen so) is evident from daily Experience. All the World know, that the Pleasures of a Debauch, do commonly produce very uneasy Sensations; and that bitter Potions, or very disagreeable and nauseous Medicines, do frequently recover us to all the agreeable Perceptions we have in Health. And I need not observe, that, while the Pleasures a

Sect. I. Man has in Fair-dealing and Honesty, or the Pains and Trouble he undergoes in doing kind Offices to others, procure him all the delightful Perceptions one can have from the Esteem and Commendation of others; the Pleasures that prompt a Man to Villany and Injustice, have, for their natural Consequents, all the painful Sensations, with which Contempt and Infamy can oppress him. But whether these Consequents consist of pleasing or painful Ideas, their *Value* is to be fixed in the same Manner we do that of other Perceptions, viz. by multiplying the Degrees into the Duration.

4. PLEASURE and Pain being contradictory the one to the other, Pleasure may be consider'd as a *positive Quantity*, and Pain as a *negative* one. So that when they are added together, or when they meet together in one's Mind, they destroy each other, according to their several *Powers*. And therefore to determine the true *Value* of any mixed Perception, or of the State of one's Mind, where there is both Pleasure and Pain, the one must be subtracted from the other. Thus, in a mixed Perception, if there be four *Degrees* of Pain, and six *Degrees* of Pleasure, the true *Value* of this State of Mind is equal to two *Degrees* of Pleasure.

5. WHEN our indulging of any particular Set of Perceptions is attended with *Consequents*, whether pleasing or painful, to determine the full *Value* of those Perceptions, we must take their

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their *Consequents* into the Account, and add Sect. I. them according to their several *Powers*. Thus, if we indulge any Perception that has 5 Degrees of Pleasure, and 10 Hours of Duration, the *Value* is equal to 50. and if this Perception be attended with *Consequents*, *i. e.* other Perceptions that contain 8 Degrees of Pleasure, and 20 Hours of Duration, this is in *Value* 160. which, added to the former, make up in all 210 Degrees of Pleasure, the full *Value* of that Perception, consider'd in itself, and in its *Consequents*. But if this Perception, in *Value* equal to 50 Degrees of Pleasure, be attended with *Consequents*, *i. e.* other Perceptions, that contain 8 Degrees of Pain, and 20 Hours of Duration, the *Value* or Moment of the *Consequents* (—160.) being added to the *Value* (50.) of the Perception, which we suppose is the Cause of them, they destroy each other according to their several *Powers*, and there remain by Subtraction — 110 Degrees, a *negative Quantity*. So that the agreeable Perception is by so much worse than nothing, or is so much worse than no Pleasure at all, *i. e.* it is quite extinguished, and the Mind is involved in 110 Degrees of Pain, without any Sort of Balance or Recompence.


IN like Manner, we may fix the *Value* or Moment of any painful Sensations. For if an uneasy Perception that has 6 Degrees of Pain, and 10 Hours of Duration, and therefore in *Value* equal to —60. be attended with other

Se&t. I. Perceptions, that contain 4 Degrees of Pleasure, and 40 Hours of Duration, which is in Value 160. the true Value of that uneasie Perception is equal to 100 Degrees of Pleasure.

So that the Way to settle the full Value of any Set of Perceptions, is to multiply their Degrees of Pleasure or Pain, into their Duration, adding their *Consequents*, i. e. the Degrees of Pleasure or Pain in the consequent Perceptions, multiply'd into their Duration. And when the Sum or Balance is positive, or consists of Pleasure, I call it then *Interest, Gain, Advantage*; but when it is negative, or consists of Pain, it is then *Loss, Hurt, Damage*. And I hope the Reader will carry this along with him, and be so kind as to affix only this Meaning to these Words, or the like, when I happen to apply them to Matters of Virtue, in the Course of this Argument.

6. WHEN the Duration of our Perceptions, considered in themselves or in their Consequents is extended, this proportionally increaseth their Value, and augments our Gain or our Loss, according to their several Natures. Thus, if any Perception, that has 4 Degrees of Pleasure, and 20 Hours of Duration, which is in Value equal to 80. be lengthned out to 30 Hours, the Value is then increased to 120. and if the Duration be continued to Eternity, the Value must then be infinite. So that if the Duration of any Set of Perceptions be limited, but that of their *Consequents*, not; how numerous soever

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soever the Degrees of Pleasure or Pain in these Sect. I.
Perceptions may happen to be above those of  their *Consequents*, yet they must be counted either hurtful or advantagious, according to the Nature of their *Consequents*. Thus, the highest Gratifications the Mind can have by Means of her Body, may be infinitely pernicious, and the most insufferable Pains she can have that Way may be infinitely profitable,

7. As we may thus determine the true *Moment* or *Value* of any of our Perceptions, so can we compare our Perceptions, of whatever Sort, with one another, pleasing with pleasing, painful with painful, and painful with pleasing: And from what I have said, 'tis obvious, that in balancing Things of this Nature, we shall always find, that the *Value* of one Perception to another, is as the Degrees of Pleasure or Pain multiply'd into the Duration, adding the *Consequents*.

To illustrate this, I shall put the Case as favourably on the Side of Vice as possible. There are two Sets of Perceptions, the one contains 15 Degrees of Pleasure, that are let in upon the Mind through the Eyes, Ears, &c. by all the Instruments of *Luxury*; and it has 20 Hours of Duration; and there are no bad *Consequents* that follow from it: For we shall suppose that the Mind expires or ceases to be whenever it is over. This Perception, for Distinction's sake, I shall call *A*. The other Perception contains 6 Degrees of Pain, felt while the Mind is im-

Sect. I. ployed in her Search after Truth, or in pursuing those Measures that will recommend her to the Esteem and Commendation of a whole System of rational Beings. This second *Perception* has 20 Hours of Duration, but then it produceth consequent Perceptions, that contain 12 Degrees of Pleasure, and 60 Hours of Duration: This I shall call *B*. Now, I say that $A : B :: 15 \times 20 ; - 6 \times 20 + 12 \times 60$. that is, $A : B :: 300 : 600$. From which it appears that the Value of *B*. is double the Value of *A*. So that a Mind which, in her Pursuits after *Truth* and *Virtue*, submits to 6 Degrees of Pain for the Space of 20 Hours, which leads her to the Enjoyment of 12 Degrees of Pleasure for the Space of 60 Hours, has double the Pleasure she would have had, had she liv'd in *Luxury*, void of all Pain, with 15 Degrees of Pleasure for the Space of 20 Hours, and then expir'd, or been annihilated, to prevent her being involv'd in any bad Consequents. But if the Duration of the consequent Perceptions in *B*. be increas'd to Thousands of Years, or to everlasting Ages, this augments the *Value* of *B*. and renders it infinite above that of *A*. And if the Perception *A*. be attended with uneasy Consequents, or painful Sensations, that continue to Eternity, this sinks the *Value* of *A*. into an *infinite Negative*, or so as to make it infinitely worse than Nothing, or than no Pleasure at all; and consequently heightens the *Value* of *B*. to be,

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be, in Comparison to that of *A*. as it were, Sect. I.
more than infinite.

Now, from these Observations, one may easily conceive what we ought to understand by *Self-love* or *Self-preservation*. And, according to the Nature of Things, it must certainly signify our delighting in, and pursuing after, that Set of Perceptions, or, which is the same Thing, those Objects that entertain us with such Sensations, (whether pleasing or painful at present) as, in the Manner I have just now explain'd, our Reason dictates to us, to be most valuable. If indeed the human Mind had no greater Range or Compass of Thought than brute Creatures, our *Self-interest* would determine us to entertain or indulge any present Sensations, without looking any farther than what immediately affected us: But every Man is conscious, he can take a View of the whole *Compass* of his Being, can look into the Consequents of Things, and judge what Effects any Set of Perceptions he entertains *to Day*, may have upon him *to Morrow*, or the *next Day* after, and so on through the whole Course of his *Duration*. And as every Man can thus determine the *full Value* of any particular Set of Perceptions, so can he compare one Set with another, and judge which is most valuable, *that is*, which is capable to entertain him with the highest and most lasting Felicities. This is a Power that every Man is endued with,
and

These Observations shew that Self-love properly signifies our liking and pursuing those Pleasures that in themselves and Consequents, are most valuable.

Sect. I. and it is that particularly which makes the Difference betwixt us and the brute Creation.

The Pursuit of other Pleasures can't be call'd Self-love; nor does it belong to rational Agents.


AND as all Men have it thus in their Power to look into Futurity, to consider the Nature of Things, balance them together, and judge which is most *eligible*; if we chuse to indulge to our selves any particular Set of Perceptions, that have no real Value, but are hurtful and pernicious: This, (1) how well soever it may agree to the *Self-love* of short-sighted *Brutes*, can never be reconcil'd to that *Self-love* which properly belongs to a *provident* Creature, or a *rational Agent*, who is capable of understanding what Influence the gratifying of any present Sensations may have upon his Futurity.

But to understand fully the Meaning of Self-love, 'tis to be observed, that the *Mind* is a Man's Self.

I beg Leave here to admire the just Reasoning, and the noble Zeal, which some *beaten Philosophers* have imploy'd to perswade the World, that the *Mind* is a Man's Self, while the Body is only, as it were, a Prison, to which we are here for a While confin'd. And I hope, the Reader will indulge me the Pleasure

(1) Δοκῶς μοι, ὃ Σόκρατες, λέγειν, ὡς ἀνδρὶ ἡπῶνι ᾧ δια τῶ σώματος ἡδονῶν πάμπαν ἡδονῆς ἀρετῆς ἐρεσθήκει. πρὸ διαφέρειν, ἔφη, ὃ Ἐυδύδηναι, ἀνδρωποῖ ἀκρατὴς θνήσκει, τὸ ἀμαρτάνει; ὅστις γὰρ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν σκοπεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἡδίστα δ' ὅν παντὸς τρέψει ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τὴν δὲ διαφύγει τῶν ἀφρονεσάτων βουλημάτων; ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγεσθαι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἀποαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δὲ κακῶν ἀπιχεῖσθαι. καὶ ὕστερ, ἔφη, ἀρίστες τε καὶ εὐδαίμονες εἰσὶν γίνεσθαι, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατώτατες. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 4.

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sure of taking Notice, particularly of what Sect. I. *Socrates* observed upon this Point, some few  Hours before his Death: Which I shall give you with little or no Variation from the *English* Translation of *M. Dacier's French*.

Crito (one of *Socrates's* Friends that were attending him in Prison) having asked him (1), *How he would incline to be buried?* Just as you please, says *Socrates*, if you can but catch me, and if I do not give you the Slip. And then looking about on the rest of his Friends with a gentle Smile; I cannot, says he, get *Crito* perswaded, that this is *Socrates*, who discourses with you, and metho-
dizes all the Parts of his Discourse: But he still fancies, that I am the Thing, which he shall see,
by

(1) Θάπτομαι ἢ πῶς σε τρέπον; ὅπως εἰν ἔρη βέλαιδα.
εἰν πῆρ γε λαβῆται με, καὶ μὴ ἐκρύψω ὑμᾶς. γελῶντας ἢ αἰμα
ἡσυχῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας, εἶπεν, ἢ ποῦ δὴ ἔρη ὃ εἰν
δρῶς Κρίτων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμι εἶτα ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος,
καὶ διαταπῶν ἕκαστα καὶ ἀντιμεμνησμένων, ἀπὸ οἷσται με ἐκείνον ἢ ὅ
ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγον ὑπερὸν νεκρὸν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάψῃ. ὅτι
ἢ ἐγὼ πάσαι πολὺν λόγον ποιήσας, ὡς ἐπειδὴν πῶς τὸ φάρμα-
κον, ἐκείν ὑμῖν ὄφελος; ἀπὸ οἷσται ἀπὸν οἷς μαχά-
ρων δὴ πῶς ἐνδοξαίμωνίαι ταῦτα μοι δοκῶ ἀντὶ ἀλλὰς λέγειν
ὄφελος ὑμῖν. αἶμα δὲ ὑμᾶς, αἶμα δὲ ἐμαυτὸν. ἐγὼ οἶμι
εἰν με πρὸς Κρίτων ἔρη ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἐγὼ οἶμι, ἢ ἢ εἶτα πρὸς
τὸν Δικαστὴν ἐγγύατο. εἶτα ὡς γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὄφελος, ὑμᾶς ἢ
ἢ μὲν μὴ ὄφελος ἐγγύατο, ἐπειδὴν ἀποδάνω, ἀπὸ οἷσται
ἐγὼ οἶμι ἀπὸν ἢ ἢ Κρίτων ὅσον φέρω, καὶ μὴ ὄφελος μὴ τὸ σῶ-
μα, ἢ καὶ ὄφελος, ἢ καὶ ὄφελος, ἀνακαλῶ ὑπὲρ ἐμὴ ὡς δι-
να' ἀπὸ πᾶσι πᾶσι. καὶ λέγειν ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἢ ἐρωτᾷ
Σωκράτης, ἢ ἐκέρει, ἢ κατὰ ἡμῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἴδω ἢ δὴ ὅς εἰ
Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν, ἢ μόνον οἷς αὐτὸ τῶτο πλημμε-
λές, ἀπὸ οἷσται καὶ κακὸν πᾶσι καὶ ψυχῇ. ἀπὸ οἷσται θάρρειν τι γὰρ
καὶ φέρειν τὸ σῶμα θάψῃ, καὶ θάψῃ ὑμῶς, ὅπως ὅν σοι ὅ-
σον ἢ, καὶ μάλιστα ἢ γὰρ νόμιμον εἶναι. Plat. in Phædr.

Sect. I.

by and by, a Corps; and therefore he asks, *How I must be buried.* As to this long Discourse I made to you but now, in order to make it out, that as soon as I shall have taken down the Poison, I shall stay no longer with you, but shall part from hence, and go to enjoy the Felicities of the Bless'd: All this, it would seem, that I have said for your Consolation and mine, is quite lost with Reference to him. I beg of you, that you would be Bail for me to Crito, but after a contrary Manner to that in which he offer'd to bail me to my Judges: For he engaged, that I would not be gone. Pray engage for me, that I shall no sooner breathe my last, but I shall be gone. To the end that poor Crito may bear this Event more steadily, and when he sees my Body burnt or interred, may not despair, as if I suffer'd great Misery; and say at the Funerals, that Socrates is laid out, Socrates is carried out, Socrates is interred. For you cannot but know, my dear Crito, that speaking amiss of such Things, is not only an Impropriety of Speech, but it does a good Deal of Mischief to Peoples Souls. You should have more Courage and Hope, and say, that my Body is to be interred, and that I give you Leave to do in what Manner you please, so far as you judge it consistent with our Laws and Customs.

Thus does that great Man, with a noble Elevation of Soul, teach his Disciples what he properly was, not the Body, which they were soon to see a lifeless Carcase, but the Mind, which, after the Payson should stop the Mo-

tions

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tions of his earthly Machine, would straight Sect. I.
go off to inhabit the Mansions of the Blef-
sed. And with these sublime Notions he com-
forts his sorrowful Friends, looks into ano-
ther State of Existence, is undisturb'd, steady,
constant, and cheerful amidst the Approaches
of Death, and, in his last Moments, acts a
Part that shews a great Soul, untouch'd with
Things here below, raising her self up to take
her Place among glorious immortal Spirits
above,

Impavidum feriant ruina.

I really blush to reflect, how, notwithstand-
ing the Advantages of supernatural Revelation,
I might behave in such Circumstances.

HOWEVER, this, I think, is very certain, as
I have just now observed from *Plato, the Mind*
is properly one's Self, as being the only Seat of
all our Perceptions. So that to say, *One's Self*
Interest, or Self-preservation, is the same, as to
say, the *Interest*, and Preservation, or Well-
being of the *Mind* (1). And having already
explain'd, that the Mind derives all her Plea-
sures, either from some Motions that happen
in her Body, or from some Thoughts and Re-
flections, about which she is immediately im-
ploy'd;

So that
Self love
particularly
respects the
Pleasures of
the Mind;

(1) Nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens
cujusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quæ digito demon-
strari & oculis cerni potest. Cic. in Som. Scip.

Sect. I. ploy'd; her Well-being or *Interest* must necessarily be made up of some agreeable Perceptions, that flow to her, from one or other, or both of these Sources. So that the great Matter here, is, for the Mind to determine, how she ought to regulate her Conduct with Respect to these different Perceptions.

Not those
it has by its
bodily
Senses.

Now we know from Experience, that the Pleasures which spring from these two Sources, are not always consistent with one another. For there is nothing more obvious, than that whatever particular Mind is so powerfully devoted to some agreeable Sensations, that come from her Body, that she must needs have them at any Rate; she can never attain those delightful Perceptions, that arise from the Esteem and Commendation of a whole System of rational Agents. And, it during all the While I stay in this World, I can relish nothing but those Gratifications I receive by my *Eyes, Ears, Taste, Smell, or Feeling*; or if I am sensible of no Pleasures, but what proceed from those Motions in my Body, that are occasioned by external Objects; I suppose, no one will imagine, that when this Machine, the great Organ by which I have them, is taken down, and I go off into another World, where I shall have no Access to any such Gratifications, I can then find my self *easy* and *happy*. On the contrary, how can I avoid being extremely miserable? For since we carry nothing a-
long

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long with us into another World, but our vir-
 tuous or vicious Dispositions (1), my Passion
 to bodily Pleasures (tho' no other Mischief
 should befall me) must still remain, without
 any Possibility of ever having it gratified. And
 since that every Man, if he uses his Reflection,
 cannot but see, that such Effects must certain-
 ly flow from sensual Enjoyments, when they
 are the prevailing Pleasures of the Mind, *Self-*
love can never suffer us to approve our being
 under the Power of such Sensations, nor en-
 gage us to make it our main Business to pur-
 sue them (2).

I do not mean, that *Self-love* obligeth us to
 renounce those pleasing Perceptions we have
 by Means of our Body. This curious Engine
 we always carry about us, is so fram'd by the
 great *Author* of Nature, that it is capable of en-
 tertaining us with a great many most agreeable
 Ideas. And what can hinder us from grate-
 fully receiving those delightful Perceptions,
 which seem to be, more particularly than any
 other, the immediate Ordinance of the first
 Cause of all Things? I cannot help thinking,
 it

For howl
 ever such
 Pleasures
 may in
 some De-
 gree be inno-
 cently in-
 dulged,

(1) Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀνδρες ἢ ψυχὴν ἑρπετῶν, καὶ οὐδὲν
 παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν. Plat. in Phædr.

(2) Ἐοικα γὰρ καὶ τῷ ἑρπετῷ, μὴ τὸν ἐκείνου ἢ ἀρετὴν, καὶ ὁ
 σωφρονιστὴς εἶναι. ὅπως γὰρ ὁμογενεῖν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὗτος αὐτῷ ὁρ-
 γηται καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν. καὶ βέλτεται αὐτῷ αὐτῷ τ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
 φαυλότερον, καὶ ἀρετῆς. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν διακρίνει καὶ
 αὐτὸ ἑρπετῶν. τὸ γὰρ διακρίνει καὶ αὐτῷ, ὅπως ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ.
 καὶ ζῆν δὲ βέλτε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐδὲν, καὶ καλὸν τὸν ὁρπετῶν.
 Arist. Eth. Lib. 9. Cap. 4.

Sect. I. it certainly proceeds from some peevish narrow Humour that conceives very absurdly both of God and Man, to imagine we must not suffer our selves in the Injoyment of such Sort of Satisfactions. And I cannot but here take Notice, that the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* talks very whimsically on this Subject, while he will needs reduce all liberal Gratifications of this Nature, to *Vice* and *Luxury*. But I am well perswaded, there is no Man, that attends to the Nature of Things, but must be satisfied, that there is no more *Vice* or *Luxury*, in indulging one's Self in the pleasing Perceptions we have from a stately well-proportion'd Edifice, from fine Gardens, rich Clothes, and Furniture, harmonious Sounds, agreeable Tastes, and such like Sensations (provided the Mind does not delight in these Things, in Comparison to others, very trifling, as her principal Entertainments) than there is in pursuing the Pleasures, which one cannot but feel in a Course of *mathematical Demonstrations*.

Yet when they are the commanding Pleasures of the Mind, they prove most pernicious,

But how innocently soever one may allow one's self to enjoy bodily Pleasures; yet if the Mind be so intirely affixed to them, that she can relish nothing, but such Sort of Gratifications; or if she prefer them to the agreeable Perceptions, that spring from her own Thoughts and Reflections, suppose from the Consciousness, or the Prospect, of her being possess'd of the Applauses of God, and of all Mankind,

she

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the must act wrong ; since these sensual Plea- Sect. I.
sures are all mortal, must necessarily expire
with the Body, and cannot but be accounted
infinitely hurtful (1). For, according to the
Observations which I have above laid down,
to determine the full Value of any Set of Per-
ceptions, 'tis very manifest, that such Sen-
sations, when indulged so far as to keep out, or
prevent the prevailing Influence of those plea-
sing Ideas, that flow from another Source (how-
ever grateful they may be above all other Per-
ceptions for a While, yet in regard they leave
the Mind quite destitute, and under the Power
of eternal Despair and Perplexity) are infi-
nitely worse than Nothing, or than no Pleasure
at all.

So that a prudent and wise Being (such as
every Man is, when he acts according to hu-
man Nature) can never approve his indulging
such Gratifications in such a Manner, or suffer
himself to pursue them as his principal Design.

They are
those that
peculiarly
belong to
the Mind,
that are du-
rable as its
own Exi-
stence, and
of infinite
Value.

T

Such

(1) Τὸ δὲ σκεδὸν τῆς αἰρέσεως τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐνέχον,
οὐκ εἶδεν τὴν βλάβην· ὥστερ' εὖ τὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας γενναῖον
οὗτος τὸ μόνιμον ἀγὼς τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἐπ' αὐτῶν οὗ ἐργῶν τὴν
ὀφείσαν ἐπιδεικνύμενον, ὀφείσαν δὲ ἢ τὴν τῷ σώματι, ἢ δὲ
τὴν οὗ ἐκπῆς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, οἷς καὶ τὸ βλάδ' αὐτῶν
ἐργῶν ἐπαγγέλλεται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκτελεῖν ἢ μὴ ἀνιάσει ἑμῶς.
ἡμῶς δὲ δὴλον ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ, πρὸ οὐραίου ἀπορρίπτει, ἢ οὐ-
ραίου, ἢ ἀλλοῦ πῃ κακοπραγίας ἀνίσταται χρέματα, καὶ πλουτεῖν
πρὸ ἐξουσίας, πρὸ οὐραίου πρὸ ψυχῇ τῶν ἐπὶ ἀλλότῳ αὐτῇ καλῶν;
καὶ οὗτος οὗτος ἢ ἀναιδέως ἔχον, καὶ διὰ τὴν μάλλον ἐπιτελεῖται
πρὸ καλῶν ἢ οἷς ἀίδεον τῶν οἰρησμένων ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως
ἐλαττωμένοι ἐρεβλῶν τὴν ψυχῇ, καὶ διμαίνοντες πρὸ ἐν φῶτι πό-
λεσθαι. Hieron. in Carm. Pythag.

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Sect. I. Such a Pursuit, far from being *Self-love*, or *Self-preservation*, would, on the contrary, be *Self-hatred* or *Self-destruction* (1). And, as a Man's *Self-love* cannot but hinder him from yielding up his Mind to such Sensations, as, in their true *Value*, are pernicious and ruining; so must it powerfully engage him to approve and pursue those Perceptions, which, from balancing Things together, he perceives to be infinitely valuable, as being capable of entertaining him with *Satisfactions* that are as durable as his own *Existence*.

And 'tis
one's liking
and pursuing
such Plea-
sures, that we
call Self-
love.

AND therefore I conclude (and, I hope, my Reader, through the whole of this Argument, will understand me no otherwise) that *Self-love*, *Self-interest*, or whatever other Phrase can express this Principle in a rational Agent, signifies our embracing and pursuing those Perceptions, whether pleasing or painful at present, which, after we have look'd into the Nature and Consequences of Things, and fairly balanc'd them together, we judge to be most valuable, with relation to the Mind the only Seat of all our Pleasures, and properly one's Self (2).
And

(1) Οὐ γὰρ φιλεῖς σεαυτόν· ἐπὶ τοῦ καὶ τὸ φύσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν βέλτεια ταύτης ἐφίλει. M. Anton. Lib. 5. §. 1.

(2) Πᾶν δὲ τὸ τῆς (θείας) ὁμοιωσέως ὡς ἔχον μέγιστον ἡγεῖο-ζυμῶν τῆς φύσεως ἡν. ὁ, π τὸ μὴ βλάττειν ἐστὶ, τὸ τῆς θείας ὁμοιωσέως ἀπὸ τῆς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ βέλτερον ἡμῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμοίωσιν, τί ἐν ἀποστάσει τις ἰκανὸν ἀποστήσας ἑαυτοῦ τῆς πρὸς θεὸν ὁμοιωσέως φιλοσοφίας; χρημάτων δόσις; ἢ ἀφ' αἰσθησέως; ἀλλὰ μακροθυμῶμεν ἐφ' τὸ ὁρθεῖ λόγον καὶ ἀποστήσας αὐτοῦ.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 291

And give me Leave here to observe with *Soc. Sect. I.*
erates, that all the Safety and Happiness of Life,
 or all our *Salvation*, depends on the Choice we
 make of our Pleasures and Pains (1), or, on the
 Direction and Determination we give to *Self-*
love, while it prompts us to the Pursuit of de-
 lightful Perceptions,

I do not indeed think, that any Man who
 pretends to *Philosophy*, is to found his Principles
 upon the Authority of other People, tho' ever
 so famous; great Names do not convince a
 Man's Judgment, nor let him see *naked Truths*
 which one can only discern from considering
 the Nature of Things. However, when a Man
 foresees he shall be obnoxious to Censure, the
 putting himself under the Protection of some
 renowned Character, may at least engage People
 not to be over-hasty in condemning him. And
 therefore, I hope, the Reader will here permit
 me to give an Account of what were the Sen-
 timents of *Socrates* upon those Points, which I
 have been just now insisting on, with a parti-
 cular Regard to *Moral Virtue*; especially since
 our Author tells us, that in his Book *, the I-
 deas of moral Good and Evil are establish'd ac-
 cording to the Sentiments of the antient Mora-
 lists.

Socrates
 and *Plato*
 protect the
 Author in
 these Prin-
 ciples, which,
 'tis hoped,
 will prevent
 others from
 being over-
 hasty in con-
 demning
 him.

* Title Page
 Edit. 1.

T 2

THIS

το, ὡς ἀντιδιδόναι τῷ δακτύλῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ τῆς ἐμῆς
 ἀποδοῦναι. Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag.

(1) Ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν τῷ αἰσθητῶν ἰσχυρῶν
 ἡμῶν ἢ αὐτοῖς τῷ βίῳ ἔκον, &c. Plat. in Protag.

292 A further Explication of the

Sect. I. THIS wonderful Man maintains (1), that Knowledge or Wisdom is a fine beautiful Thing, able to govern a Man so steadily, that when he has his Mind open to discern what is Good and Evil, or what is Virtuous and Vicious, 'tis impossible that any Thing can over-power him, so as to determine him to act otherwise than this Knowledge or Philosophy shall command him; for it is sufficient to protect him against the Force of any Temptation. But, says he to Protagoras, " you know very well that the Vulgar don't believe us upon this Subject, and that they alledge, that most Men do, to little Purpose, know what is most just, and what is best, for they do nothing of it, though it be in their Power, and that frequently they act quite contrary. Those, of whom I have asked the Cause of so strange a Conduct, have all told me that those People are overcome by Pleasure, or by Pain, or are vanquished and carried away by some other Passion: But I am apt to believe, they are mistaken in this, as in many other Things."

AND, in order to make this appear, this great Philosopher explains and settles the true No.


(1) Δοκῶ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ δεινότητος τοιούτων τι εἶναι ἰσχυρὸν, ἢ δ' ἡρμυνικόν, ἢ δ' ἀρχικόν εἶναι. — ἂν ὅν καὶ περὶ τοιούτων τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, ἢ καλὸν τι εἶναι ἢ δεινότητος, καὶ διὸν ἀρχαίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ εἰάν τις γινώσκῃ τίς τ' ἀρχαία καὶ τι καλόν, μὴ εἴη κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός· ὅτι εἰ καὶ πρῶτον, ἢ εἴη δεινότητος καλῶσι· ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὴν οὐρανίαν βουλήν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; — εἶδον ὅν, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ, &c. Plat in Protag.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 293

Notions of Pleasure and Pain, as we ought to Sect. I.
take them from the Nature of Things: To ~~~~~
which Purpose he asks.

“ Do you, *says he*, who maintain you are
“ determin’d to commit vicious Actions, or to
“ pursue Evil from Pleasure, do you think that
“ any other Thing happens to you on such Oc-
“ casions, than what really happens at all Times
“ when you are enticed by the Pleasure of
“ *Feasting*, and by that of *Love*, to yield to the
“ Temptation, though you know very well,
“ that those Pleasures are very bad and very
“ dangerous? They would certainly answer,
“ ’Tis Nothing else. Should we afterwards ask
“ them, Why say you that those Pleasures are
“ evil? is it because they give you a Sort of
“ Pleasure in the very Minute that you enjoy
“ them, and that they are *both* agreeable? or
“ is it because in the Sequel they ingender Dis-
“ eases, that they throw you head-long into Po-
“ verty, and that they draw after them a Thou-
“ sand Misfortunes that are as fatal? Or, sup-
“ pose they should not be followed by any of
“ those Mischiefs, would you however call them
“ bad, because they cause Man to rejoyce? and
“ to rejoyce in Vice is the most deplorable of all
“ Vices, and the Punishment of Sin. Let us
“ consider, *Protagoras*, What other Thing could
“ they answer to us, than that they are not
“ evil by reason of the Pleasure they occasion,
“ at the Time of Enjoyment, but because of
“ the Diseases and other Accidents which they

Sect. I.



“ draw after them? And whatever destroys our
 “ Health, and causeth our Ruin, is it not very
 “ vexatious? I fancy they would agree to it,
 “ It should seem then, that those Pleasures are
 “ not evil, but because they terminate in Sor-
 “ row, and deprive Men of other Pleasures
 “ which they desire to enjoy. They would not
 “ fail to own it.”

“ But if we should take the contrary Side,
 “ and should ask them, My Friends, you say
 “ that disagreeable Things are good. How do
 “ you understand it? will you speak by Ex-
 “ ample of bodily Exercises, of Wars, of Cures
 “ that the Physicians perform by Incision, by Pur-
 “ gations, or by the strictest Diet? Do you say,
 “ that those Things are good, but that they are
 “ disagreeable? They would be of that Opinion.
 “ But why do you call them good? Is it because
 “ at the very Minute they cause the greatest of
 “ Aches and infinite Pain? or, because by their
 “ Operation they occasion Health and a good
 “ Habit of Body, that they are the Preservation
 “ of Cities, that they raise to Empire, and that
 “ they heap Glory and Riches upon certain States?
 “ Without Doubt they would make no Scruple
 “ to take the last Part. But do you call these
 “ Things good for any other Reason, than be-
 “ cause they end in Pleasure, and that they re-
 “ move and chase away Vexation and Sorrow?
 “ Or, can you tell me of any other Motive that
 “ obliges you to call these Things good, than
 “ the

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 295

“ the removing of Pain, and the Expectation Sect. I.

“ of Pleasures? No, you cannot.”

“ WELL then, do you not seek after Pleasure,
“ as a good Thing, and do you not avoid Pain,
“ as an evil? You certainly do so. 'Tis plain
“ therefore, that you take Pain for an *Evil*, and
“ Pleasure for a *Good*, since that you call Plea-
“ sure itself an Evil, when it deprives you of
“ certain Pleasures that are greater than those
“ which it procures you, and when it is the
“ Occasion of Troubles more sensible than all its
“ Pleasures: For, had you any other Reason to
“ call Pleasure an Evil, and did you judge of it
“ by any other Standard, you would make no
“ Difficulty to tell it us. But I am sure you
“ can't find it.”


“ AGAIN, after the same Manner with respect
“ to Pain, it is then you call it a *Good*, when
“ it delivers you from certain Anguishes that are
“ greater than those which it creates in you.
“ Or, when the Pleasures it procures you are
“ greater than its Vexations. And were you de-
“ termin'd from any Thing else than what I here
“ tell you, to call Pain a Good, you would cer-
“ tainly let us know of it; but 'tis not in your
“ Power. — But I yet give you Leave to
“ declare whether you find Good to be any other
“ Thing than Pleasure, or Evil to be any other
“ Thing than Pain.”

THUS that great Man having settled the No-
tions of *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and made it appear
that *this* is no other Thing than *Evil*, and *that*

Sect. I. no other Thing than *Good*. From this he lets
 us see what a gross Mistake, and how ridiculous it is to alledge, "That a Man knowing
 " Evil to be Evil, and being able to prevent
 " his abandoning himself thereunto, ceaseth not
 " to commit it, because he is hurried along by
 " Pleasure; and that it is no less absurd to advance on the other Side, that a Man knowing
 " Good, yet refuseth to do it, because of some
 " present Pleasure that diverts him from it: For
 " Pleasure and Good being of the same Import, to say a Man commits Evil because he is overcome and hurried away by Pleasure, is the same
 " as to say, a Man commits Evil, because he is overcome and carried away by Good! A pleasant enough Absurdity. Besides that, 'tis here
 " suppos'd, that the Good whereby a Man is overcome, is not capable to prevent his committing an Action, which he knows to be evil, and is able to forbear; for otherwise he would not have sinned. But for what Reason is Good
 " incapable of surmounting Evil? or, why has Evil the Strength to surmount Good? It can
 " be for no other Reason, but that the Evil is greater than the Good. And from hence it
 " must follow, that when a Man is overcome by Good, he chuses the greatest Evils in room
 " of the least Good, or that he prefers Pain to Pleasure; which indeed is very ridiculous."
 " NOR will it lessen the Absurdity, to say, there is a great Difference between a present
 " Pleasure, and a Pleasure or Pain that is to come
 " and

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 297

“ and expected ; for do they differ by any other *Sec. I.*

“ Thing, than by Pleasure and Pain? No, says 

“ *Socrates*, they can differ in nothing else.”

So that this extraordinary Man, who, as *Cicero* says, (1) first introduced moral Philosophy into the World, and settled it among Men, *than which*, as the same *Cicero* observes (2) from *Plato*, a greater or a better Blessing Heaven cannot bestow on us : I say, the divine *Socrates* is clearly of Opinion, That there is no Man that commits Evil, or pursues a vicious Course of Life, because he is overcome by Pleasure, but because he wants Knowledge, or mistakes the Nature of Things, and is ignorant and stupid. And therefore he firmly maintains, that all our Safety and Happiness depends upon the good Choice we make of Pleasure and Pain, which cannot be done unless we have some particular Science whereby to govern our Judgment in those Points. And to illustrate this, he makes the following Observations.

“ A Man, says he, who knows how to balance Things well, and who puts agreeable Things on one Side, and disagreeable Things on another, as well those that are present, “ as

(1) *Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e coelo, & in urbibus collocavit, & in domos etiam introduxit, & coegit de vita, & moribus, rebusque bonis & malis querere. Tusc. Q. Lib. 5.*

(2) *Nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, majus aut melius a Diis datum munus homini. Acad. Quæst. Lib. 1.*

Sect. I. “ as those that he may foresee are to come,
 “ knows very well, which are the most nume-
 “ rous. For if you weigh the Agreeable with
 “ the Agreeable, you must always chuse the
 “ most numerous and the greatest; if you
 “ weigh the Disagreeable with the Disagreeable,
 “ you must chuse the least in Number and the
 “ smallest; and if you weigh the Agreeable
 “ with the Disagreeable, and that the last are
 “ surmounted by the first, whether it be that
 “ the Present are surmounted by the Absent, or
 “ the Absent by the Present, we must always
 “ chuse the greatest Number, *that is*, the first,
 “ the Agreeable; and if the latter, I mean the
 “ Disagreeable, weigh down the Scales, we
 “ must beware of making so bad a Choice. Is
 “ not that all the Art to be used? ”

“ If therefore our Happiness consisted always
 “ in chusing and doing that which is greatest,
 “ and in rejecting that which is least, what
 “ should we do, and what should we have Re-
 “ course to, to assure us of Happiness all our
 “ Life-time? Should we have Recourse to the
 “ Art of Measuring, or should we content our
 “ selves with Appearances, and with a simple
 “ Glance of the Eye? But we know, that the
 “ Sight has often deceived us, and that when
 “ we have judged by the Eye, we have been o-
 “ bliged to change our Opinion, when the Que-
 “ stion to be decided has been, Which is the
 “ Greatest? Whereas the Art of Measuring has
 “ always remov'd those false Appearances, and,
 “ by

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 299

“ by making the Truth appear, has set the Mind Sect. I.
“ at Ease, which rely'd upon this Truth, and
“ has ascertain'd the Happiness of our Life.
“ What would our Disputants say to that? would
“ they say, that our Safety depends upon the
“ Art of Measuring, or upon any other Art?
“ And if our Safety should depend upon the
“ Choice of Even and Odd, every Time that
“ one must chuse the least, and compare the
“ Most with the Most, the Most or the Least
“ with the Least, and the One with the Other,
“ whether they be near, or at a Distance, upon
“ what Art would our Safety depend? Is it
“ not upon the Art of Arithmetick? For the
“ Art of Measuring, which teacheth us nothing
“ but the Greatness of Things, is no longer the
“ Business in question; it would be requisite
“ to know the Even and the Odd, and nothing
“ but the Knowledge of Arithmetick can teach
“ us that. ”

“ WELL then, since it has appear'd to us, that
“ all the Safety and Happiness of Life depends
“ upon the good Choice which we should make
“ between Pleasure and Pain, that is to say,
“ between that which in these two Kinds is the
“ greatest or the least, the most numerous or
“ the least, the nearest or the farthest off; is
“ it not true that the Art of Measuring is the
“ Art of examining the Largeness of Things,
“ and of comparing their different Resem-
“ blances? ” And if so, *then we want such an*
Art or Science to guide us in our Choice of Plea-
sure,

Sec. I. sure, and thereby to ascertain the Happiness of Life.

THIS Science Socrates represents to be *Virtue* or *Moral Philosophy*, which gives the Mind a true Knowledge of Things, which shews her where Pleasure lies, and removes and keeps off that Darkness and Ignorance whereby we are betray'd into vicious Actions.

To the same Purpose Plato observes, at the Beginning of his second Book of *Laws*, "That the first Sensations which Children have, being Pleasure or Pain, it is by these that *Virtue* or *Vice* is derived to the Mind. And if these Passions in Children, before they come to the Use of their Reason, be well manag'd, so as severally to be directed to those Things that are their proper Objects: This, says he, I call good Discipline. But when they are the same Way determin'd by one's own Judgment and Reason, it is then *Moral Virtue* (1)." And a

(1) Αναμνησθῆναι τοῖνυν ἔγωγε πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ, τί ποτε λέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ ὁρῇ παιδείᾳ· τίτω γὰρ, ὡς γ' ἐγὼ τοῦ ζῶντος, ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδευματι τίτω καλῶς καταρτιζόμενα σωτηρία. λέγω τοῖνυν τῶν παιδῶν παιδείᾳ ἐν πρώτῃ αἰδέσθαι, εὐδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία φθαίνειται, ὡς πᾶσι πάντ' εἶναι. οὐδένησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι βεβαιῶν, ἐντυχῆς ὅτῳ καὶ ὅδῳ τὸ γυῖον περιγένητο. τίλειθ' δ' ὅτι ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος ταῦτα. καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς πάντα κακῆμεν ἀγαθὰ. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν φθαγνομένην ὡς πᾶσι παισὶν ἀρετὴν, εὐδονῇ δὲ καὶ οἰλίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ καὶ μίσῳς αὖ ὁρῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνων, μετὰ τὴν ἀναμνησκόμενον λόγῳ λαμβάνειν. λαβόντων δὲ τὸ λόγον, συμπρωήσονται τῷ λόγῳ, ὁρῶς ἐκείνῳ καὶ προσκόντων ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτις δ' ἢ συμφωνία, ἐξυμπόσα μὲν ἀρετὴν. τὸ δὲ οὐαὶ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 301

little from the Beginning of his Fifth Book of Sect. 12
Laws, he tells us, " That all Men hanging, as
 " it were, on *Pleasure* and *Pain*, as the two
 " great Springs whereby we are all along mov'd
 " and determin'd through the whole Course of
 " our *Lives*, wherever *Pleasure* prevails, there
 " we must necessarily yield. And so far is
 " *Virtue* from condemning any Thing of this
 " Nature, that, on the contrary, it derives all
 " its *Praise* from its leading us to the greatest
 " *Pleasures* (1)."

WHEN

οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου μαλιστα, ἡδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι καὶ
 ἡδοναίαι. ὅς ἐστιν ἀνάγκη τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῶον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰον
 ὅσων τῶν καὶ ἐκπεριμένον εἶναι σπουδαίαις ταῖς μεγίσταις. δὴ
 δὴ δὴ καλλίστην βίον ἐπαινεῖν, μὴ μόνον ὅτι τῆς χρηματικῆς κρατεῖ
 οὐκ ἐυδελείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι, ἐν πᾶσι ἐδέλῳ γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ νέεσθαι
 οὐ φρονεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς γένεσθαι, κρατεῖ καὶ τὴν ὅτι πάντες ζητῶμεν,
 τὴν χαίρειν πλεον, ἐλαττω δὲ λυπηδὲς ὅσα δὴ βίον ἀπαντα.
 οὐ δὴ ἴσται τὸτο σφῆς, ὅτι γίνεσθαι πᾶσι ὅσα δὴ, ἐπὶ μῶς καὶ σφῆδρα
 φανῆσθαι. ἢ δὴ ὅσα δὴ πᾶσι, τὸτο ἡδὴ ὅσα τὸ λόγος καὶ λαμβάνει
 τὸτο σκοπεῖν. ἡδονὴν βυλόμεθα εἶναι ἡμῖν, λύπην δὲ ἡδὴ αἰρέ-
 μεθα, ἢ τὴν βυλόμεθα. τὸ δὴ μὴ δέτερον, ἀντὶ ἡδονῆς ἢ βυ-
 λόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλὰ πλεον βυλόμεθα. λύπην δὲ ἐλαττω καὶ
 μῶς οὐκ ἐστὶν βυλόμεθα. ἴσα δὴ ἀντὶ ἴσων ἐκάτερα τέτων,
 ἢ καὶ βυλόμεθα ἢ χρῶμεν ἀνὲρ διασφῆν, ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὅσα
 πλεον, καὶ μῶς δὴ, καὶ σφῆδρα πλεον, ἴσται πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐκαστία
 ὅσα πᾶσι πᾶσι ταῖς, ὅσα βυλὸν διαφῆροντα πᾶσι καὶ μὴ δὴ δια-
 φῆροντα ὅσα αἰρεσὶν ἐκάτων. ἢ τὸ δὴ τέτων ὅσα ἀνάγκης δια-
 φῆροντα, ὅσα ἢ βίῳ ἢ πλεον πολλὰ ἐκάτερα καὶ μῶς καὶ
 σφῆδρα, καὶ σφῆδρα δὴ τὰ πᾶσι ἡδονῶν, βυλόμεθα. ὅσα δὴ τὰ
 ὅσα πλεον,

ἀντὶ τῆς,

When the Reader finds that these Sentiments of these two great Philosophers, *Socrates* and *Plato*, do exactly agree, or are the very same

ἐναντία, ὃ βυλόμεθα. καὶ αὖ ἐν τῷ ὁλίγῳ ἐκείνῳ καὶ σμικρῷ καὶ
 ἡραμίῳ, ὑπερβαίνει δὲ τὸ λυπηρὲς, ὃ βυλόμεθα. ἐν τῷ δὲ ἐ-
 ναντία, βυλόμεθα. ἐν τῷ δὲ αὖ βίῳ ἰσχυροτέρῳ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἀντιθέτων, δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἰσχυρότερον βίον. ὡς τῶν μὲν ὑπερβαλλόν-
 των τὸ φέρον ἡμῶν, βυλόμεθα, τῶν δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐκχυρῶν ὃ βυ-
 λόμεθα. πάντα δὲ δὲ διαπορεύονται τὰς βίους ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐν τούτοις
 ἐνδιεμένοι παρούμεθα, καὶ διὰ διαπορεύονται ποῖντες οὐσίαι βυλόμεθα.
 καὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις τούτων ἔχει φαιδρὸν βύλας, διὰ πᾶσα ἄγνοια καὶ
 ἀπυρία τῶν ὄντων βίῳ αὐτὰ λέγουμεν. πάντες δὲ καὶ πᾶσι ἐν
 βίῳ, ὡς καὶ διὰ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ βυλῶν τὸ καὶ ἐκείνους, ἀν-
 λητὸν τε καὶ ἀκύντον ἰδόντες, ὡς νόμον ἑαυτῶν ταξάμενοι, τὸ φέ-
 ρον ἅμα καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἄλγος τε καὶ ἡλιείας ἐλόμενοι. ζῶντες ὡς
 οἶόν τ' ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων μακάριον παρὰ; λέγουμεν δὲ πᾶσι βίῳ
 εἶνα εἶναι, καὶ φρόνιμον εἶνα, καὶ εἶνα τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, καὶ τὸ ὑγιανόν βίον
 εἶνα ταξάμεθα. καὶ τούτοις ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκείνων τῶν τιτλι-
 αίων, ἀφ' ὧν δὲ αὐτῶν, ἀκόλως, οὐκ ἔστι. πᾶσι βίῳ ὃ πᾶσι
 σκῶν τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπὸ πάντων, καὶ ἡραμίῳ μὲν λυπηρῶς, ἡραμίῳ
 δὲ ἡδονῶν, μακάριος δὲ ὁπθιμῶν, καὶ ἔρωτες ἐκείνων, ἡραμίῳ
 παρεχόμενοι. ἀκόλως δὲ ὁδὸν ἐκείνων, καὶ σφαιρῶν μὲν λυ-
 πῶν, σφαιρῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν, συντόνους δὲ καὶ ἐκείνων ἐκείνων
 καὶ καὶ ἔρωτες ὡς οἶόν τ' ἡραμίῳ πᾶσι παρεχόμενοι. ὑπερβα-
 λόμεθα δὲ ἐν τῷ τῷ σφαιρῶν βίῳ τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἐκείνων
 ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκόλως, τῶν λυπηρῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν
 καὶ πικρῶν. ὅταν ὃ μὲν, ἡδονῶν ἡμῶν τῶν βίῳ, ὃ δὲ, λυπηρῶν
 τῶν ἐκείνων ἀνθρώπων σφαιρῶν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡραμίῳ. καὶ τὸ καὶ βυλῶν
 μὲν ἡδονῶν ζῶν, ἐκείνῳ παρεχόμενοι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἀκόλως ζῶν. ἀπὸ
 ἡδονῶν ἡδονῶν ὡς, καὶ τὸ λυπηρῶν ὁδὸν, καὶ ἐκείνων ἀνθρώπων ἀκόλως
 ἐκείνων ἀκόλως. ἢ καὶ δὲ εἰμαρμένη, ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν, ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ
 τῶν καὶ σφαιρῶν ἐκείνων ὡς ζῶν ὃ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐκείνων
 πᾶσι δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ καὶ ὁδὸν βίῳ διαπορεύονται, ὡς ἔχουσιν
 μὲν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν, ὑπερβαλλόμενοι δὲ ἡδονῶν μὲν λυπηρῶν ἐν ὁδῷ
 λυπηρῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν ἐν νόμῳ. ἡμῶν δὲ ἡ βυλῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 τῶν βίῳ, ἐκείνων καὶ λυπηρῶν ὑπερβαλλόμενοι ὡς δὲ ὑπερβαλλόμενοι, τῶν
 τῶν βίῳ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν. ὃ δὲ πᾶσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀκόλως, καὶ ὁδὸν
 τῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων φαιδρῶν ὡς, καὶ ὃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν
 ἐκείνων καὶ σμικρῶν καὶ μακρῶν ἐκείνων ἀπὸ τῶν, τῶν καὶ
 ἡδονῶν ἐκείνων ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόμενοι, τῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν ἐκείνων
 πᾶσι.

same with my Principles, I hope I shall be for- Sect. II.
given for troubling him with so long a Quotati-
on. But I shall now proceed.

SECTION II.

WHAT I have hitherto observed relates to *Self-love*, as it belongs to *human Nature*. I shall now explain what I understand by this Principle when applied to the *Deity*. And, in order to this, it must be remarked;

*Tis proposed to explain Self-love when applied to the Deity.

THAT rational Agents associated to one another bear different Characters and Relations with respect to each other ; according to which they naturally desire to be entertained with different Sets of pleasing Perceptions. Thus, among Mankind particularly, we have *Governor, Proprietor, Benefactor, Parent, &c.* and consequently, *Subject, Property, Beneficiary, Child, &c.* All which are different Characters in which Men stand related to one another ; and when the Mind attends in which of these she is vested, she finds herself inspir'd with such particular *Desires or Appetites*, that want to be gratify'd

'Tis pro-
posed to ex-
plain Self-
love when
applied to
the Deity.

Rational Beings have different Appetites, according to their different Characters.

[illegible]

Sect. II. by such a particular Conduct, or Series of Actions in other Minds or rational Agents, to which she stands so and so related. This, I suppose, is what all the World have pretty good Conviction of from Experience, or from their inward Sense of Things. And I need not here take Notice what particular Appetites belong to these particular Characters, or what particular Set of agreeable *Ideas* the Mind naturally requires, according as she is conscious with which of these she is invested: Every one that knows, the Meaning of the Words, must understand thus much.

Thus a Prince or Governor has some Appetites peculiar to his State.

I shall only observe, if a Man, for Instance, be a Governor, the Thoughts of his bearing this Character necessarily inspire him with a Desire to have the Reverence, the Submission, and Loyalty of all those rational Agents, whom he knows and owns to be his Subjects. And when People do, in all Instances, express their Esteem and Duty to their Prince, this gratifies those Appetites he has from his Character, and thereby entertains him with agreeable Perceptions, which he cannot but delight in and approve of. Whereas, when they express no Regard to his Character, but testify, in some Series of Actions, Contempt, Disobedience, and Rebellion against him, this is treating him as quite another Person than what he is conscious he is, 'tis directly contradictory to his Appetites as a Prince, and cannot therefore but affect him with uneasy Sensations, which one must necessarily hate, condemn

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 305

demn and avoid. All this is very obvious, and Sect. II. it plainly lets us see, that *Self-love* operates on every rational Agent, according to the Character which he is sensible belongs to him.

Now, from this, one may easily understand how *Self-love* comes to be attributed to the Deity. For, in this Question, we are not to consider the supreme Being, as he is precisely in his own Nature, but as he bears such a Character, or stands so and so related to Mankind, or other rational Agents. And in this View we must regard him as the *Creator and Preserver*, the *Governor, Proprietor, Benefactor*, and the great *Parent of Mankind*, &c. These are the Relations which the first Cause of all Things bears to us his rational Creatures; and the Character he assumes, and wherein he acts, is made up of these Particulars.

And God being our Creator, Governor, &c.

So that, with the Cautions I have mention'd in my *Enquiry*, we must suppose, I say only suppose, that the supreme Former of the Universe, is inspir'd with all those Appetites, which, as we conceive, naturally belong to a Being acting in such a Character. Upon which Supposition, we must again imagine, that as on the one Hand, the great Father of Spirits cannot but necessarily delight in, approve of, and pursue the *Worship, Homage, Submission, Love, Gratitude*, &c. of his Creatures and Subjects: So on the other Hand, he cannot but hate, condemn and reject their *Neglect, Contempt*, and in a Word, every Action whatsoever, that can be injurious

We must suppose him inspir'd with corresponding Appetites: And his delighting and seeking to have these Appetites gratify'd in the Conduct of his Creatures, is *Self-love*.

Se^ct. III. to him, as invested with such a Character. And
 this is what I understand by *Self-love, Interest*
 or *Preservation*, when 'tis ascrib'd to the *Divine*
Nature.

S E C T. III.

'Tis pro-
 pos'd to ex-
 plain the
 Rise of our
 affecting So-
 ciety.

I HAVE hinted in my *Enquiry*, that from ob-
 serving other Creatures of the same outward
Structure of Body with our selves, we are im-
 mediately conciliated, and strongly incline to as-
 sociate together. I shall here explain this Ar-
 ticle a little further, in taking Notice of some
 Things, which, in my Apprehension, do cer-
 tainly excite and strengthen our affecting hu-
 man Society, wherein we find our selves highly
 gratified.

We are
 highly
 pleas'd with
 our own
 Make, and
 prefer it be-
 fore that of
 all other
 Animals.

IN this visible World, every Man sees num-
 berless Sorts of Creatures, all differing from one
 another, and very unlike himself; and tho' we
 may observe some particular Animals to excel us
 in Strength, Swiftmess, or the Beauty of their Co-
 lours, yet there is no Man that would incline to
 have himself transform'd into the *Shape* of any
 one of them (1). The Structure of our own
 Bo-

(1) Tu hoc physice non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix, &
 quasi sui sit lena natura. An putas ullam esse terra marique
 belluam, quæ non sui generis bellua delectetur? Quod ni ita
 esset, cur non gestiræt taurus equæ contrectatione, equus vaccæ?
 An tu aquilam, aut leonem, aut delphinum ullam anteferre censēs
 figuram suæ? Quid igitur mirum, si hoc eodem modo homini
 na-

Sec& III. Besides that, we are conscious of some inward Powers and Faculties, which we do not apprehend any other Animals, that are not of our Shape, to be endued with, and which we judge so considerable, that we thereupon value our selves infinitely above all other Parts of the visible Creation.

When we see it in others, it immediately conciliates us, and inclines us to associate together.

Now setting this Value on the external Frame of our Nature, and the inward Abilities of the Mind, as we happen to see other Creatures of the same Frame, Shape, and Proportions, differing, as we always presume, in every respect, from every other Kind of Animals, as much as we do our selves; and so nearly approaching to our Make, that they are exactly our own Image and Impression, we cannot but highly esteem them above all other Creatures we see, and conceive very friendly Affections towards them, as being our *Equals* and of our *Nature*; and very strongly affect to associate our selves with them, as having a particular Interest in them, such as we are not sensible of in any other *Species* of Creatures (1). And as we thus find our selves influenc'd with kind Dispositions towards our Fellow-men, so do we secretly apprehend, that they are affected after the same friendly Manner towards us: For what else can we possibly suppose, when we conceive they are like our selves,

(1) Δι' ὁμοιότητος γὰρ πάντα οἰλεῖ ὅτις ἄλληλα συνάπτει·
τῇ δ' ἀνομοιότητι καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς ὄντα τοῖς τέποις χωρίζει.
Hierocl. in Carmin. Pythag.

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selves, or partake of our Nature? And this, in *Sec. III.* particular, cannot but mightily contribute to bring us, with open Arms as it were, into Society with one another.

ALL this, methinks, naturally flows from that Value and Good-liking we have for our selves. And I cannot but here observe, we have a plain Confirmation of it from daily Experience. We commonly see *Parents* peculiarly fond of those Children, who, more than the rest, resemble them. And do we not feel some kind Motions in our Breasts to an indifferent Person, of whom we know nothing else, but that we see he resembles our Friend in the Features of his Face, or in the particular Make and Air of his Body? And I suppose every Body knows, how very naturally People of the same Age or Profession, or of the same Principles and Disposition, do assemble together, and contract Friendship with one another (1). And, as I shall have occasion to observe afterwards, what is this but one's loving himself in another? So that, in my Opinion, there is a Desire, or a Propension to Society, natural to every Man, that takes its Rise from *Self-love*.

AND indeed the great *Author* of Nature has subjected us to such Appetites, as make our living together in Society very necessary to our Well-

So that one's Propension to Society takes its Rise from *Self-love*, from seeing our Image, or our selves, in others.

This Propension is particularly strong in the Sexes toward each other.

U 3

Well-

(1) Μέγα δὲ οὖτος φιλίαν καὶ τὸ ἀνταρῆσαι, καὶ ἡλικίας εἶναι. ἡλικίας γὰρ ἡλικία φιλοῦ καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἐταῖροι. Andron. Paraph. Lib. 8. Cap. 16.

Sect. III. Well-being. I have already hinted, that, from
 some particular Motions in the Body, there arise
 certain Desires in the Mind, which cannot be
 gratify'd, except the one Sex have Correspondence
 with the other. And both Sexes feeling
 such natural Propensions towards each other,
 they cannot but incline to approach one another
 in a friendly Manner; and their mutual
 Embraces proving so agreeable, they cannot but
 necessarily chuse to live together. I see nothing
 can hinder us to imagine, that *this*, and
 the other Principle (I mean *that* just now mentioned,
 whereby we strongly affect our own
Species) did both powerfully concur to conciliate
Adam and *Eve* together, who, we have good
 Reason to believe, were the two First of our
 Species.

— — — — — On she came
 Led by her Heavenly Maker, though unseen,
 And guided by his Voice, nor uninform'd
 Of nuptial Sanctity, and Marriage Rites :
 Grace was in all her Steps, Heaven in her Eye,
 In every Gesture Dignity and Love,
 I overjoy'd could not forbear aloud

— — — — — I now see
 Bone of my Bone, Flesh of my Flesh, my Self
 Before me — — — — —

I follow'd her, she what was Honour knew,
 And with obsequious Majesty approv'd

My

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My pleaded Reason. To the nuptial Bower Sect. III.
I led her blushing like the Morn —

MILT. *Parad. lost.* Book 8.

AND those amorous Entertainments that pass between the Sexes, producing other Individuals that bear their Likeness, which they cannot but look upon as *Parts* of themselves (for which I shall account afterwards) they have a strong Propension to keep with their Children, and to make one Society with them. All this, as it is exactly agreeable to the Nature of Things, so 'tis absolutely necessary to the Propagation of Mankind, and to prevent our Species from being extinguished, which the first Cause of all Things design'd to have continued.

AND as we all grow up under the Care and fond Affections of our Parents, who help us in our Sorrows, and minister to our Pleasures, this gives us an exquisite Relish of the great Advantage of Society, and makes us regard our Fellow-men as the great Promoters of our Happiness: So that from our earliest Days we cannot but all along preserve a strong Inclination to associate our selves to one another. And certain it is, that the Gratification of this social Appetite makes one of our greatest Pleasures.

It comprehends our Children.

It grows up with us; and its Gratification is one of our most pleasing Enjoyments.

S E C T. IV.

From
Self-love we
desire the
Love and E-
steem of
other intel-
ligent Be-
ings.

BUT, as I have observ'd above in the *En-quiry*, our Propension to Society does not wholly *terminate* in the Presence of other intelligent Beings; we likewise passionately desire the *Love* and *Esteem* of those Beings with whom we are assembled. And that this Desire after the Love and Esteem of others, comes immediately from Self-love, is to me very manifest.

For, as we
are consci-
ous, that o-
ther Beings
are safe or in
Danger, ac-
cording as
they
are the Ob-
jects of our
Love or
Hatred;

WE are sensible, from what passes in our own Breasts, that whatever rational Agents we *love* and *esteem*, we always like and approve their being in agreeable Circumstances; we judge them worthy of those delightful Perceptions they enjoy, and find ourselves dispos'd to co-operate with them to maintain and promote their Happiness: So that such Beings as we affect and value, are not only secure, with respect to us, of what Pleasures they are at present possessed of, but they can promise themselves our Assistance to defend them against the injurious Attacks of others, and to help them in their Pursuits after higher Satisfaction. Whereas, when we entertain *Hatred* and *Contempt* against other rational Agents, we dislike and condemn their being in any pleasing Situation, we judge them unworthy of any Degree of Happiness, and we would concur to dispossess them, and

to

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to reduce them to Misery : So that such Beings Sect. IV.
are, so far as our Power can reach, in no State
of Safety, and can look for nothing but Mis-
chief at our Hands. And thus do we find our
selves very differently affected towards other
Beings, according as we love and esteem, or
hate and contemn them. And those other ra-
tional Agents, are, severally, either in safe or
in dangerous Circumstances, according as they
are the Objects of these different Passions.

BUT now, there is no Man who imagines
that he is the only Being that is liable to the
Influence of this Sort of Love and Hatred. We
always regard other intelligent Beings as in-
spir'd with the same Passions, and govern'd by
them in the same Manner we are ourselves.
And therefore, as we are all conscious that such
Beings whom we love and esteem, are secure
of their Happiness, and may depend upon our
Assistance, to support, and advance it ; while
those whom we hate and contemn, have no
Security this Way, but may promise themselves,
if it lies in our Power, to be rendred mise-
rable : So, in like Manner, we naturally conceive
ourselves either safe, or in Danger, with respect
to our delightful Enjoyments (so far as we de-
pend upon others) according as we have, ei-
ther their *Love* and *Esteem*, or their *Hatred* and
Contempt. Upon which Views of Things, 'tis
impossible but we must desire the *Love* and *E-*
steem of other rational Agents, *that is*, that they
like and approve our being in Happiness ; that
they

So we
plainly ap-
prehend that
we likewise
are safe or in
Danger, ac-
cording as
we are the
Objects of
their Love
or Hatred.


Sect. IV. they count us worthy of it; and that they stand always dispos'd to assist us in our Pursuits after it. For as this immediately corresponds, or is the very same with that *Love and Esteem* we bear ourselves; so when we reflect, how we depend (in whatever Respect) upon the Goodwill of other rational Agents, for our delightful Perceptions, it makes us easy and secure, it prevents all Apprehensions of ever being disturb'd by them, and it gives us the pleasing Prospects of their going along, or co-operating with us to establish our present, and procure any future Felicity. And, as *Tully* observes, *we cannot possibly have a stronger Guard for the Safety of our Lives and Fortunes; nor can any Thing more effectually help us forward in the Improvement of all the several Branches of our Happiness, than the Love and kind Affections of our Fellows* (1).

And therefore Self-preservation cannot but prompt us to desire their Good liking and Esteem.

So that from our being conscious, that other intelligent Beings can form a Judgment of our Case,

(1) *Rerum autem omnium nec aptius est quidquam ad opes tuendas, quam diligere; nec alienius, quam timeri. Præclare Ennius, quem metuunt oderunt. Quem quisque odit, perisse expetit. Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obistere, si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. — Malus enim custos diurnitatis metus; contraque benevolentia, fidelis est, vel ad perpetuitatem. — Quod igitur latissime patet, neque ad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam ad opes & potentiam valet plurimum, id amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur; ita facillime quæ volumus, & privatis in rebus, & in Rep. consequemur. Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuuntur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2.*

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CASE, approve our being happy, and heartily SECT. IV.
concur with us in our Endeavours to be so; 
and knowing that they are all animated and
govern'd by the same Passions we are ourselves,
which operate upon them in the same Manner
they do upon us: I say, 'tis from the secret
Sense we have of these Things, that our *Self*
love necessarily prompts us to desire their *Love*
and *Esteem*.

AND this gives us a very good Reason,
“ why we cannot possibly receive with equal
“ Serenity and Composure, an *Affault*, a *Buffet*,
“ an *Affront* from a Neighbour, a *Cheat* from
“ a Partner or Trustee, as we would an equal
“ Damage from the Fall of a Beam, or Tile,
“ or a Tempest; or have the same Thoughts
“ and Sentiments of *both*. ” 'Tis likewise from
hence evident, “ how *Villany*, *Treachery*, *Cru-*
“ *elty*, cannot be as meekly resented as a Blast,
“ or Mildew, or an overflowing Stream *.”

From which it appears, that in our Misfortunes by inanimate Things, we must be differently affected from what we are when receiving Injuries from intelligent Beings.

For those Passions we are sensible of, when we receive any Affront or Injury from intelligent Beings, do not spring immediately from the outward Damage they do us, but from a secret Apprehension of their being actuated with *Contempt* and *Hatred* against us, whereby we have a quick Sense, they contradict our natural Desire after the *Love* and *Esteem* of others, and to have all Men to co-operate with us in our Endeavours to be happy. But as we look upon inanimate Beings as quite unactive, without being in any Degree capable of imploying any
Sort

* See our Author, P. 119.

Sect. IV. Sort of Affections about us ; so we have no
 ~~~~~ Notion of their either gratifying or crossing our  
 Desire of Esteem, or that they should, from any  
 Choice of their own, either consult or oppose  
 our Interest. And therefore, when we happen  
 to suffer by them, we may well regret our  
 Misfortune, and feel ourselves concern'd for  
 our having lost some of our pleasing Enjoy-  
 ments: But, unless a Man be extremely foolish  
 and whimsical, he can never be sensible of  
 any Passion against those inanimate Creatures,  
 which have occasion'd his Loss, without being  
 capable of any Design to disturb him.

Unless we  
 conceive  
 that those  
 inanimate  
 Things are  
 employ'd to  
 our Hurt by  
 intelligent  
 Beings, who  
 pursue us  
 with Hatred.

INDEED, if we conceive that those Things  
 are under the Power and Direction of an intelli-  
 gent Being, who makes Use of them to our  
 Prejudice ; this gives us the View of a rational  
 Agent pursuing us with Contempt and Hatred,  
 and exerting these Passions (we know not how  
 far) to ruine our Interest: Which is so very  
 contradictory to *Self-love*, whereby we desire the  
 Esteem of others, and to have them to assist us  
 in promoting our Happiness, that (if some o-  
 ther Consideration does not prevent it) we  
 cannot but be affected with the keenest Resent-  
 ments (1). But, I say, as to the Things them-  
 selves

(1) Πίσυκα γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπολόγων ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰ  
 ἀγαθὰ, μὴ ὑπομένειν φεικίπτεν τῷ κακῷ. ἄτα τὸ πλεονέκτητον,  
 ὅταν μὴτε φερόμενα μεταδοῖναι δυνάσθῃ, μὴτε τὰ ἐμπο-  
 δίζοντα ἀνίσχυρῶσαι, καὶ δυναί μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅν δύνανται λυσιδ-  
 ρῶ, καὶ Δία, καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ἄλλους. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὁμιλοῦντες με-  
 τὰ ἑμὲ καὶ αὐτοῖς. Arian. Lib. 1. Cap. 27.

*Principles in the foregoing Enquiry.* 317

selves by which we immediately suffer, since Sect. V. they are purely insensible and inactive, and cannot contradict our natural Desire after the *Love* and *Esteem* of others, they are not the Objects of our Resentment. After the same Manner, I might account for our being affected, when we receive Good from intelligent Beings, in a quite different Manner, than what we are when we receive equal or greater Good (with respect to external Enjoyments) from inanimate Ones. But this I shall have Occasion to take Notice of afterwards.

S E C T. V.

**H**ERE it is to be remarked, that *Moral* Now Moral Virtue lies in this Love we desire of others : *Virtue* directly consists in this *Love* and *Esteem* which one rational Agent bears to another.

I suppose every Body will own, there is nothing that can be call'd *Virtue*, but that which passeth betwixt two intelligent Minds, or that which lies immediately in the Conduct of one Mind towards another. We never imagine there is any *Virtue* in the mutual Services, which a Man and a brute Creature do to one another : Nor do we count it *Virtue* in inanimate Beings to gratify any of our natural Appetites. Those Things indeed may be extremely acceptable and beneficial to us, as they entertain the Mind with those Pleasures that arise from

For Virtue is only to be found among intelligent Minds conversant together.



Sect. V. from some Motions in her Body ; but we do not here conceive, there is any Sort of Inter-  
course betwixt one Mind and another, without which there can be no *Virtue* (1). Nay, if we regard only the external Actions of our Fellow-men, without taking Notice how they stand affected to us in their Minds, there is no more *Virtue* here, than there is in the Actions of brute Creatures, that act always without any rational Choice and Reflection (2). But when we consider what passeth in any rational Mind with relation to us, or what Thoughts and Affections she employs about us, we then observe one Mind corresponding with another, and acting in what we call either *Virtue* or *Vice* (3).

So

(1) Οὐδὲ θνητὸν δεῖ χάρις, ἐδὲ ἀρετῇ. Arist. Eth. Lib. 7. Cap. 1. Ἐν μὲ τῇ τῶν ἀψυχῶν φιλήσει, ἢ λέγει φιλία, ἢ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιοίησις, ἐδὲ βύλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθῶ. μελλόντων γὰρ ἔσθαι τῷ ὄντι βύλησιν τ' ἀγαθῶ, ἀλλ' οἷον σὺζις βύλησιν αὐτὴν ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ. Id. ib. Lib. 8. Cap. 2.

(2) Ἐν οἷς γὰρ κοινὸν καὶ ἐστὶ τῷ ἀρχοῦ καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἐδὲ φιλία, ἐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τεχνίτην πρὸς ὄργανον, καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ διαπότῃ πρὸς δούλον. ἀλλ' οἷον γὰρ ταῦτα ὑποφύει χρωμένων. φιλία δ' ἐκ δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἀψυχα, ἐδὲ δίκαιον ἀλλ' ἐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βῆν' ἐδὲ πρὸς δούλον, ἢ δούλου ἐδὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ δούλος, ἐμψυχον ὄργανον τὸ δ' ὄργανον, ἀψυχος δούλος. ἢ μὲ ἐν δούλῳ, ἐκ δεῖ φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἀνδρωπῶ. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πὶ δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνδρωπῶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωῦσθαι νόμῳ καὶ συνθήκῃ, καὶ φιλίας δὴ καὶ ὅσον ἀνδρωπῶ. Id. ib. Lib. 8. Cap. 11.

(3) Καὶ τί οἶσι τὸς μὴ λέγοντας χάρις ἐμφαίνουσιν, ὅταν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτῶς ὅτι οἱ σωτῆρες εἴσι πάντες καὶ νοῦσι, ἢ τὸς ἐκπαινόντας τί δοκεῖς ἐμφαίνουσιν ὅταν ὑποφύει ὅσον ἐνὶ τῷ κοινῷ τὸς ἐκείνους ποιεῖν. Xenoph. de Regn.

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So that *Virtue*, as *Socrates* (1) observes, ly. Sect. V. ing in the internal Actions of the Mind (since those Actions, as they concern other rational Agents, are either *Love* and *Esteem*, or *Hatred* and *Contempt*, or such Affections and Actions as naturally flow from these leading Passions) *Virtue* being a good and friendly Thing, must necessarily consist in *Love* and *Esteem*. And, as I have just now hinted, the *Love* and *Esteem* which other rational Agents bear to us, exactly corresponding with our own *Self-love* or Interest, and being that which, according to the Influence of this Principle, 'tis impossible for us not to desire; it naturally follows, that

THE *Goodness* of any Action, done by one intelligent Mind to another, from which it is denominated *Moral Virtue*, immediately lies "in the Suitableness and *Congruity*, which that Action bears to this *natural Turn* of Mind, essential to every rational Agent, whereby we receive and pursue *pleasing Perceptions* (2)." So that the *Virtue* or *Goodness* of any moral Action toward us lies precisely in its Suitableness to gratify one's *Self-love*.

Or,

(1) Τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἀληθές, τοῦτον μὲν πῶς ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη· ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἔξω περὶ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. οἱ ἀληθεῖς καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ βασιλεῖα καὶ ἀνδρεία περὶ αὐτῷ ἔχουσιν ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖν περὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γίνῃ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι καὶ οἰκία ἐνδύμενον, καὶ ἀρετή αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ κοσμιότητα, καὶ φίλον γινώσκοντα αὐτῷ, &c. Plat. de Rep. Lib. 4. Μίττω δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τῷ δρᾶσθαι τὸ θεαίρεται· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τῷ ἥδυν ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ τὸ κέλευν. Arist. Eth. Lib. 8. Cap. 13.

(2) Ἐν πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς τῆς τοῦ πάθος συνίστα καὶ συντίθεται, καὶ ἀπὸ ἐγκρασιᾶς τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ποιεῖν, τῷ κρῖναι τῷ καίρι, τῷ καὶ μὴ λυπῶν

**Se&t. V.** Or, in the Conformity it has to our *Self-love*, while it concurs and co-operates with this Principle in approving our being happy, and to secure and promote our *Well-being*.  
(1).

This is  
the Doctrine  
of the fore-  
going *En-  
quiry.*

THIS is that which I have endeavoured to establish in the foregoing *Enquiry*. And however our Author (whose *Book* I am to examine, so far as it affects my Principles) may seem in several Places to contradict this Notion of *Moral Virtue*; yet one should think, that in other Places he expressly maintains it.

It is main-  
tain'd by  
Mr. H. A.

IF we examine (says he, in that *Section* where he proposes to shew, That *the Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, are reducible to one general Foundation*) “ If we examine, says he, \* all the Actions which are counted amiable any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approved, we shall find, that in the Opinion of “ the

παν φέρειν, τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς, καὶ πάντες ὡς κακὸν ἵκοντο τὰς ἐπι-  
 ραίας, οἱ καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ καὶ ἥττοσι. ὥστε ἀνεγκυκλῆ  
 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπης εἶναι τὴν πᾶσαν ταυτὴν ἀναγκασθεῖσαν. ἐν δὲ  
 μικρὸν βροθῇ τῷ ζῆτῳ πᾶς ἀναγκάσει, τὸ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ὅτι τὸ  
 καλὸν χαίρειν, ἢ λύπῃσι, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἐπὶ πολλῇ μικρὸν μέ-  
 λους τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ ἡδονῇ καλὸν ἢ λύπῃσι, ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ὅτι  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πᾶς ἡδονῇ καλὸν ἢ λύπῃσι, ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
 — — ὁ μὲν δὲ καλὸν χρῶμεν ὅτι ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ, ἀνθρώπων, ὁ δὲ  
 κακὸν, κακὸν. Andron. Erh. Arist. Paraph. Lib. 2. Cap. 3.

(1) Τάτων 'αὐτῶν δὲ μεμνηθεὶς τις ἢ ὅτι ὅλων φύσις, καὶ τίς  
 ἢ ἐμὴ, καὶ πῶς αὖτις πρὸς ἐκείνῳ ἔχουσιν, καὶ ὁποῖον τι μέρος  
 ὁποῖον τῷ ὅλῳ ἔσται, καὶ ὅτι ἐλπίς ἐκκαλύπτει τὰ ἀκάλυπτα τῇ φύ-  
 σει, ἥς μέρος αἶ, πρόσθεν τι ἀπὸ καὶ λήγειν. M. Anton.  
 Lib. 2. § 9. Vid. Lib. 3. § 9.



## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 321

“ the Person who approves them; they always Sect. V.  
 “ appear as benevolent, or flowing from the *Love* ~~~~~  
 “ of others, and Study of their Happiness, whe-  
 “ ther the Approver be one of the Persons be-  
 “ loved, or profited, or not; so that all those  
 “ kind Affections, which incline us to make  
 “ others happy, and all Actions supposed to  
 “ flow from such Affections, appear morally  
 “ good, if, while they are benevolent towards  
 “ some Persons, they be not pernicious to o-  
 “ thers: Nor shall we find any Thing amiable  
 “ in any Action whatsoever, where there is  
 “ no Benevolence imagin’d; or in any Dispo-  
 “ sition, or Capacity which is not suppos’d ap-  
 “ plicable to, and design’d for benevolent Pur-  
 “ poses.” The Reader cannot but observe,  
 that this Gentleman here delivers the same  
 Sentiments upon this Point that I have done:  
 For, when he says, we approve an Action  
 as morally good, because it flows from the  
 Love of others, and Study of their Happi-  
 ness, ’tis the same as to say, because it bears  
 a Conformity to our *Self-love*, or *Interest*, as  
 I have just now explain’d.

AND indeed, the Definition which he gives  
 us of his moral Sense, that he talks so much a-  
 bout, comes to the same very Purpose; for he  
 calls it, “ a Determination of our Minds to  
 “ receive amiable or disagreeable *Ideas* of Acti-  
 “ ons, when they occur to our Observation,  
 “ antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or  
 “ Loss to redound to our selves from them \*.”

And ex-  
 actly answer  
 his Explica-  
 tion of a  
 moral Sense.

X

By

**SECT. VI.** By which one can only understand, that every Man has a natural Turn of Mind to receive pleasing or painful Perceptions from the Actions of intelligent Beings; which is indeed *antecedent* to any Opinion of Advantage or Loss, which can redound to us from any Object whatsoever. But in the mean Time, those amiable or pleasing *Ideas*, which we have a Determination or Turn of Mind to receive from some Actions of rational Agents, may be call'd *Advantage*, as the disagreeable or painful ones may be call'd *Loss* or *Damage*. All this is no other Thing than that which I have been above representing: So that, even according to this Author, the Ground upon which we approve any Action as morally good, is the Suitableness or *Congruity* it bears to our *Self-love* or *Interest*.

## S E C T. VI.

'Tis propos'd to explain what is the great Motive to virtuous Actions.

And if it be not Self-love in the Desire of the Love and Esteem of other social Beings, what is it?

**H**ITHERTO I have endeavour'd to explain what I understand by *Self-love* and *Moral Virtue*; I shall now consider, what is the immediate and *principal Motive* that determines us to the Pursuit of virtuous Actions.

**A**ND, for ought I have yet seen to the contrary, I must still own my self of the same Opinion I have laid down in my *Enquiry*, where I maintain, that *Self-love*, as it exerts it self in the *Desire* of the *Love* and *Esteem* of other intelligent Beings, is this *great* and *commanding Motive*.

It

*Principles in the foregoing Enquiry.* 323

Sect. VI.

IT is true, as all the Passions that enter into the Constitution of intelligent Beings, are certain *Springs* in our Nature, whereby we are dispos'd or excited to Action; so *Love*, and all the various Affections wherein it is diversify'd, or with which it is complicated, and in the Exercise and Direction whereof Moral *Virtue* is included, are so many inward *Springs*, which, as they happen to be moved by their several Objects, do each of them *bend* the Mind towards Action, and may prevail in *some* Instances to cause it exert its Powers, without being stimulated by the Desire of *Esteem*, in behalf of other Beings. But withal it seems manifest, that those Affections are not able, by their own Power, to determine the Mind in all Instances, and to bear it up in a steady Pursuit of *Virtue*, or of Beneficence toward others. The calm sedate Passion of *universal Love* and Benevolence is certainly unequal to this Purpose: It does indeed, as I have just now said, *bend* the Mind, in some Degree, towards Action; but I dare say, every Man proves it true by Experience, that this *Bent* is so weak, or the Passion moves the Mind so gently, that under its *Influence* it can withstand no great Opposition, nor undergo any great Labour or Application. So that, in order to rouse the Mind's Activity, and to make it steady and *vigorous* in the Pursuit of *Virtue*, or in imparting Happiness to all other Beings around it, there is Need of some other Passion, that has sufficient Power to *animate* and *support*



# 324 A further Explication of the

Sect. VI. it: And the Passion that is fully able thus to incite and bear up the Mind, is, in my Apprehension, the Desire of *Esteem*; which I therefore take, tho' not, perhaps, in every Instance, yet in the general and main Conduct of Life, to be the great Motive to *Virtue*.

SOME indeed raise a horrid Clamour against this Principle; and the Man who goes about to contend for it, must expect to meet with the kind Imputation of *vain, selfish, mercenary, a Disciple of Epicurus*, and I know not what, perhaps a *Destroyer of all Religion and Virtue*. But as all the World are agreed, there must be some Motive or other that excites rational Agents to the Pursuit of *Moral Virtue*, I would fain know what this Motive is, if it be not *Self-love, or Self-interest* (1).

As for the Beauty and Amiableness of Virtue, these Words plainly express some elegant Pleasures where by Virtue affects the Mind.

I am not ignorant, what great Noise there is made about the *native Beauty* and *Amiableness*, the fine Harmony and Proportion of *Moral Virtue*, and with what a genteel Air these Things are recommended to us, as the great Motives by which only we ought to be govern'd. And indeed, these are all very polite Words, and being taken from the Entertainments of the *beau Monde*, or the fashionable Part

(1) Ημῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐρημένων, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν πμίων καὶ πλείων. οἷοι δ' ἔπος ἔχουσιν, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ταύτης οὐ χρεὶν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα ἀπαγγέλλειν. τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἶπον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, πμίων π καὶ θεῶν τίθεται. Arist. Eth. Lib. 8. Cap. 11.

## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 325

Part of the World, they seem to have some-  
 thing of Greatness and Generosity affix'd to  
 them. But for my Part, I have been in use to  
 form such selfish Notions of every Thing that  
 relates to *Moral Virtue*, that I know not what  
 these genteel Phrases can signify, if it be not  
*Pleasure*, or some pleasing Perceptions, that is,  
*Interest* or *Advantage*. And I violently suspect,  
 if those Philosophers, who, in Matters of Vir-  
 tue, talk so much of their τὸ καλόν, Beauty,  
 Symmetry, and Harmony, and such like, will  
 explain what they understand by these Ways  
 of Speaking, we shall find they mean nothing,  
 but that *Virtue* derives to the Mind very de-  
 lightful Ideas, and is every Way fit for promo-  
 ting our Happiness (1).

X 3

I

(1) Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη [Σωκράτης], ἔτι γ' ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ π' ἀ-  
 γαθὸν οἶδα, ὃ μὴ δυνάμενος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἢ τ' οἶδα, ἔφη, ἢ τε δυνάμε-  
 νός τε. τὸ δὲ Αἰσχύνη ἐρωτῶντι αὐτὸν, εἴ π' οἶδ' ἢ καλόν;  
 καὶ πολλὰ, ἔφη. ἀρ' ἔτι, ἔφη, πάντα οὕτως ἀλλήλοισι; ὡς οἶον  
 τε μὲν ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. πῶς ἔν, ἔφη, τὸ τὸ καλὸν  
 ἀνομοιον καλὸν εἶναι; ὅπν' ἢ Δί', ἔφη, εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὸν πρὸς  
 δρόμον ἀνδρῶν ἀλλ' ἀνόμοιον, καὶ ἀλλ' πρὸς πόλιν. εἰ  
 δὲ αἰσίοις, καλὸν πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ταχὺ εἶρεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφε-  
 ρέντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνη μὲν, ἢ ὅτε σὺ ἠρώτησα, εἴ π' ἀγαθὸν οἶ-  
 δέης. σὺ δ' οἶσιν, ἔφη. ἄλλο μὲν ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ δὲ καλὸν ἔστι;  
 καὶ οἶδ' ὅπ' πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰσι; αὐτῶν  
 μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἀγαθὸν. πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλὸν  
 εἰσιν. ἔπειτα οἱ ἀνδρώποιοι τὸ αὐτὸ τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καλοὶ  
 καὶ ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται. πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνδρώ-  
 πων καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται. πρὸς ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάν-  
 τα οἷς ἀνθρώποι χροῶνται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ νομίζουσι, πρὸς  
 ἀπὸρ ἀν' ἑυχρίστου ἢ. ἀρ' ἔν, ἔφη, κόσμῳ κοσμοκόμοι καλὸν  
 εἶναι; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, καὶ χρυσῇ γε αἰσίοις, σίχαρον, εἰς πρὸς τὰ  
 αὐτῶν





## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 327

give us, or of their Usefulness, that is, their being *Se& VI.*  
capable of procuring us agreeable Perceptions, or  
because they are both thus pleasing and useful (1).

And that, on the other Hand, whatever Things  
are ugly and deformed, they are called so, from their  
being immediately painful, or attended with bad  
Consequents, or both (2). In particular he takes  
notice, that every Action is fine or beautiful that  
tends to make us live agreeably, and without Pain.  
So that every Action that is lovely or amiable, is  
at the same Time good and profitable (3).

NAY, our Author himself, who spends a con-  
siderable Part of his Book in accounting for the

And is  
confess'd by  
Mr. H— a.

X 4

Original

(1) Τα καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα, καὶ χρώματα, καὶ ὀσ-  
μήματα, καὶ φωναί, καὶ ὁππιδεύματα, εἰς ἑδὼν ἀποβλέπων καλῶς  
ἐκαστὸς καλῶς; οἷον φωνῶν τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ, ἔχει ἢ πε-  
ρὶ τὸ ζῆλον λέγει καλῶς εἶ, φωνὴ δ' αὖ ἐκαστον χρησιμὸν, ἢ  
φωνὴ τῆτο, ἢ περὶ ἡδονῆν πνα, εἰς ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποῦ  
τὸς θεωρεῖντας; ἔχεις τὴ ἐκτὸς τέτων λέγειν περὶ σώματ' ἡλ-  
λως; Οὐκ ἔν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἔτω καὶ ὀσμήματα, καὶ χρώματα,  
ἢ διὰ ἡδονῆν πνα, ἢ διὰ ὠφέλιαν, ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρω, καλῶς φε-  
ραζόμενος; ἢ καὶ τὰς φωνάς, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μυσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύ-  
τως; καὶ μὴν τὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς νόμους, καὶ τὰ ὁππιδεύματα, ἢ δι-  
να ἐκτὸς τέτων ὅτι τὰ καλὰ, τὴ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶ, ἢ ἡδύα, ἢ  
ἀμφοτέρω; ἔκιν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἡλλ' ὡσαύτως, Plat.  
in Gorg.

(2) Οὐκ ἔν χρημάτων, καὶ σώματ', καὶ ψυχῆς, πρὶν ὄντων,  
στρεψαίς εἴρηκας πορνείας, πινίας, νόστον, ἀδικίας; τίς ἐν τῶ-  
των πορνείων αἰσχρῇ; ἔχ ἢ ἀδικία; καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τὸ ψυ-  
χῆς πορνεία; εἰ τὴ αἰσχρῇ. καὶ κακίῃ; Πῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες,  
λέγεις; ὦ δι. αὖ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, ἢ τὴ λυπῶν μυσίῳ παρέχον,  
ἢ βλαβῶν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω, αἰσχρὸν ὅτι ἐν τῇ ὁμολογημῶν  
ἐν τῷ ἐμπερθεῖν; &c. Plat. in Gorg.

(3) Αἰ ὅτι τότε πράξις ἀταστος, ὅτι οὐκ ἡλύτως ζῆν καὶ  
ἡδύως, ἀρ' ἔ καλῶς καὶ ὠφέλιμος; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν  
τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον; Id. in Protag.

# 328 A further Explication of the

Sect. VI. *Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Order*, (with a Design, I suppose, to lay down a Foundation upon which he may demonstrate, that we neither approve nor pursue *Virtue* from *Self-interest*) gives us no other Notions of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, but that they are some pleasing Perceptions of the Mind, to which there is no Resemblance in the Objects that excite them \*, and which he expressly calls *Advantage*, and the Objects from which we derive them *advantagious* †.

So that if its Beauty moves us to the Practice of Virtue, we are mov'd by Pleasure, or from Self-love.

FROM which, methinks, it appears we are agreed, that the *Beauty*, *Amiableness*, *Harmony*, and such like Epithets of *Moral Virtue*, are no other than some delightful Ideas of the Mind, which we likewise call *Advantage* or *Interest*. So that if a Man be determin'd to pursue *Virtue* only from its native *Beauty* and *Amiableness*, he is determin'd to pursue it only from *Pleasure* or *Interest*, that is to say, he pursues it (as our Author \* likewise explains the Matter) from *Self-love*.

All other Pretensions are idle and vain.

AND this certainly is the Case with those refin'd Spirits, who maintain, that *Virtue* is its own Reward, and give out, they have no Regard, in the Practice thereof, to their own Pleasure or Interest. For I can by no Means induce my self to believe, that those elevated Gentlemen look upon *Moral Virtue* as a formless Thing: No, they are questionless very much of *Socrates's* Opinion, who represents *Virtue* to be, as it were, a divine Personage attended with

\* B. 41. S. 17. † P. 12. S. 15. \* R. 113.

## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 329

So many *Graces and Beauties*, i. e. pure and un-  
mixed *Delights*, which render her exceeding il-  
lustrious (1). And when they behold *Moral*  
*Virtue* thus recommended under so many fine  
and agreeable *Ideas*, this awakens their natural  
Sense, or Desire of Pleasure, and thereby excites  
them to pursue after it. So that *Self-love* prevails  
in *Matters of Virtue*, even over those generous  
Souls (whether they own it, or no) who judge  
themselves the most disinterested.

NOR will it ever mend the Matter, to alledge,  
that this Beauty and Harmony, *that is*, these  
pleasing *Perceptions* are founded upon, and arise  
from the *Order, Uniformity, Symmetry* and *Pro-*  
*portion* we see in *Moral Virtue*. On the con-  
trary, from this *Order, Symmetry* and *Proporti-*  
*on* which we see, or rather feel in *Moral Virtue*,  
'tis very manifest, that the Principle of *Self-love*  
obtains in all Instances whatsoever.

As I have already hinted, if we attend to the  
Nature of Things, one cannot but confess, that  
there is no *Virtue* but what passes between two in-  
telligent *Minds*; and that virtuous Actions are done  
by one Mind to another. So that, in *Moral Vir-*  
*tue*, we have one Mind producing such and such  
Actions

And as for  
the Founda-  
tion of Beau-  
ty, viz. Pro-  
portion,  
Uniformity,  
&c. this  
proves the  
same Point.

For since  
Moral Vir-  
tue is always  
among  
Minds,

(1) Ἀλλὰς ὅτι ἡ δὴν αἰσθητικὴ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν οἰκίαν ἡμῶν νόμιμος, καὶ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς μετὰ ὑγιᾶς καὶ τῇ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ διὰ καὶ συμπαθείας ἀρετῆς ὁπότε καὶ πάντες οἱ ὁπαδοὶ γυμνάσιοι αὐτῇ ξυμπαροῦσι. Plat. in Phileb. Ἐλπίζω (says *Virtue* to *Hercules*) εἰ γὰρ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁ δὸν πρᾶξις, σοφὸν ἂν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σπουδῶν ἐργάτην ἀγαθὸν μένεις καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐπιμαρτυρεῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπέσθαι φαίνεται. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 2.



Sect. VI. Actions, and another Mind receiving them. As for Instance, we have one Mind producing *Love*, *Reverence*, *Submission*, &c. and another Mind receiving these moral Actions. Now the Question is, wherein do we here see *Uniformity* and *Proportion*, or, in what here do they immediately consist? In my Opinion, to determine this, we must consider what those two Minds are in themselves, or, as they stand related to one another. And according to the Nature of Things (the one being *Subject*, and the other *Governor*) as the *subject Mind* owns and approves her self as such, desires the Favour and Protection of the other, and to partake of all the Felicities of her Government: So the *governing Mind* owns and approves her self as such, desires the Duty and Loyalty of her *Subjects*, and to maintain them in Peace, Order, and Happiness. Which, the Reader will reflect, is, in both Instances, nothing but *Self-love*, exerting it self in a Suitableness to the different Characters with which those two rational Agents are invested. So that we have here to compare together two *intelligent Minds*, each of them actuated with different Appetites, according to their different Circumstances; and the one producing such particular Actions, which the other receives and entertains (1).

AND

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(1) Γελῶν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων δίκαια ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν σομάτων μόνον φέροιντο. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 5.

## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 331

AND when we compare these Things together, we plainly see, *on the one Hand*, that the Love, Reverence and Submission of the *subject Mind*, exactly correspond to the Character of the governing *Mind*, and gratify all her Desires and Appetites; and, *on the other Hand*, 'tis evident, that the same Love, Reverence, and Submission exactly suit with the Character of the *subject Mind*, and are naturally powerful and successful Instruments to gratify her Appetites, in procuring her the Love and Protection of the governing-Mind, and a Share in all the Advantages of her Government. So that we have here Uniformity amidst Variety; and the Proportion plainly lies in the Fitness or Conformity, which Love, Reverence, and Submission bear to the Character, the Desires and Appetites, *that is*, the Self-love of the governing Mind, as also, to the Character, the Desires and Appetites, *that is*, the Self-love of the *subject Mind*. After the same Manner, one might shew the Proportion and Uniformity in every other Case of Morality. Nor can rational Beings live together, without their Affections and Actions be thus mutually proportion'd and adjusted (1).

FROM which it appears, that not only the Beauty and Harmony of Moral Virtue, but the very Foundation of this Beauty and Harmony, viz. Order,

SECT VI.

We can only find Proportion in the Correspondency of the Actions of those Minds to each others Appetites or Self-love, according to their several Characters.

Which plainly shews that the Foundation of the Beauty of Virtue has a manifest Reference to Self-love.

(1) Συντάξαι δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἕκαστον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ὅντας, καὶ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅαρ ἡ ἰσότης δοκεῖ εἶχειν. Arist. Eth. Lib. 8. Cap. 5.

**Sect. VI.** *Order, Symmetry and Proportion*, must all be reduced to *Self-love*, and cannot possibly be accounted for, without a very particular Regard to this Principle. And therefore, upon the whole, I still say, if a Man be determined to pursue *Virtue* from its *Beauty, Harmony, Symmetry, and Proportion*, he is determin'd to pursue it from no other Motive, but that of *Self-love or Interest*, i. e. from the *Pleasures* with which *Virtue* entertains him.

But Mr. H— neither gives out Beauty nor Pleasure as the Motive to virtuous Actions.

OUR Author indeed does not contend for *Beauty, Order, or any Thing* of that Nature, to be the Motive to virtuous Actions: So that what I have hitherto said, does not immediately concern his Principle. However, we may here observe that he plainly asserts, that the *Author of Nature* has determined us to receive from uniform Objects the *Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony*, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it \*. In which he holds, that *Pleasure* is, according to the Appointment of the *supreme Cause* of all Things, both the *Motive* and the *Reward*. I confess he limits this to Matters of Knowledge, and will not admit of it in the Study and Practice of *Virtue*. But I could wish to be inform'd, why the *Pleasures*, which we are determin'd to receive by a *moral Sense* (as our Author expresses it) or from uniform Objects in *Morality*, must not answer the same Purposes, and operate upon us in the same Manner, or serve as *Motive* and *Reward*, as those *Pleasures* do, which arise from the like Cause, i. e. uniform



## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 333

form Objects in Geometry? If this be not allow. Sect. VI.  
ed (which, in my Opinion, the Nature of Things makes absolutely necessary) I am at a Loss to conceive what the first Part of our Author's Enquiry signifies, and what shall become of the Doctrine of Uniformity amidst Variety. But be that as it will, our Author, I say, (in the Opinion of Aristotle (1), to the great Prejudice of Moral Virtue) rejects all Pleasure whatsoever, and will not admit even of Beauty it self, to be the Motive to virtuous Actions. So far is he from allowing any Thing of this Nature, that he seems plainly to maintain, *If Pleasure or Interest determines us to the Practice of any moral Actions, this diminishes the Virtue of those Actions, in Proportion*

(1). Δοκῶ [ἡδονή] συμφικαῖωδ' τῷ γίνεσθαι ἡμῶν. Διὸ παιδεύουσιν τὰς νέας, διακίζοντες ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην. Δοκῶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄνδρσι ἡδονὴν ἀρετὴν μέγιστον ἔχειν τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ, καὶ μισῶν αὖθις. Διατίθειν γὰρ πάντα διὰ παντὶς τῷ βίῳ, βροτῶν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν τοῖς ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ ἐυδαιμονίᾳ βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα θεωρεῖν, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγειν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων, ἡμῶν αὖθις δεῖ παρὰ τὸν βίον. ἄλλως τι καὶ πολλὴν ἔχοντων ὁμοφροσύνῃσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τ' ἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λαμβάνουσιν οἱ δ' ὄψιν καὶ κομῶν φαῦλον. οἱ μὲν ἴσως πατισμένοι ἔσονται καὶ ἔχουσιν οἱ δὲ οἰομένοι βέλπον εἶναι τοῖς ἡμῶν, ἀποφάνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι. ῥέπουσιν γὰρ τὰς πολλὰς τοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ δαλύνουσιν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. διὸ δεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἄγειν, ἐλθόντων γὰρ αὖθις ὅτι τὸ μέγιστον. μήποτε δὲ καὶ καλῶς γέτε λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς προσέξεσι λόγοι. ἡδονὴν εἰσι πρὸς τῶν ἔργων. ὅταν ἔν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς ἔργοις τὴν αἰσθησιν, καταφρονέμενοι καὶ τ' ἀληθεῖς θεωροῦμεν αὐτοὺς. ὁ γὰρ ἄλλος τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὁρθεῖς ποτε ἐφίεμεν, ἀποκλίνειν δοκῶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔσονται ἅπαντα. τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν. εἰδείσθαι ἔστι οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων, καὶ μόνον τοῖς εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς βίον. συνωδὸν γὰρ ὅν τις τοῖς ἔργοις πείσεται. διὸ θεωρεῖται τὸς ἐυκλείτους ζῆν κατ' αὐτοὺς. Aristot. Eth. Lib. 10.

Sect. VI. *portion to the Influence which this Pleasure bath over us \**: So that if *Self-interest* be the *sole Motive* of all our Actions, we can at this Rate pretend to no *Virtue* at all. In short, having, in his Way, remov'd the falsly suppos'd Springs of those Actions that are counted virtuous, he next establisheth the true one, which he calls,

He makes  
it pure  
Instinct.

*Some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others ; or some Instinct antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others\*.*

THIS is the sole Motive, and the only valuable Spring of virtuous Actions that our Author will allow of. And when we reflect, that the Love of others, or the Study of their Good, to which, this Gentleman says, we are thus determin'd, is it self *Virtue*; it appears, that the precise Motive to virtuous Actions, is, according to him, *mere Instinct*. And this indeed he represents as so very necessary to the constituting of *Moral Virtue*, that where this *generous Instinct*, as he calls it, does not prevail, so as to prevent our having any View or Regard to our own Good or Pleasure, there can be there no *Virtue*; at least, our *Virtue* is diminish'd in Proportion to the Power that *Self-love* has over us, as I have just now hinted.

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I will not pretend to give the Reader any **Sect. VI.**  
 Idea of this *Instinct* (1). Our Author \* expressly  
 calls it an *occult Quality*, which is a Part of Phi-  
 losophy far beyond my Comprehension. How-  
 ever, one may consider what he lays down, in  
 order to establish this his only true Motive to  
 virtuous Actions. And to make good his Opin-  
 ion

And tho  
 one does not  
 understand  
 occult Qua-  
 lities, yet one  
 may exa-  
 mine what is  
 laid down to  
 establish this  
 pretended  
 only true  
 Motive.

(1) If one understands by *Instinct* a certain *Propension*,  
*Inclination*, or *Appetite* inherent to our Nature, it may be  
 thought not so consistent with the Character of a Philosopher, or  
 an Enquirer after Truth, to make use of Words or Names,  
 that intimate something unintelligible, in expressing Things  
 which we cannot but fully understand from inward Conscious-  
 ness. However, if *Instinct* is taken in this Meaning, 'tis  
 plain we must consider it the same Way we do our other Pro-  
 pensions or Appetites; and cannot therefore, from any Regard  
 to it, be obliged to alter our Notion of Moral Virtue, and to  
 confess it is not founded in *Self-interest*. For in the View  
 we have of a rational Agent, we do not conceive a Being of  
 such a particular *Substance*, but a Being, whatever the *Sub-  
 stance* is, that is made up, or is a *Composition* of such parti-  
 cular *Powers* and *Propensions*, or *Appetites*. And *Self-  
 love* consisting in one's gratifying those Appetites whereof one  
 is compounded; since *Instinct* is no more than a certain Pro-  
 pension or *Appetite*, that contributes to the making up of  
 our *Composition*, we must conceive, when a Man in any Par-  
 ticular is led by *Instinct*, that he therein only follows the  
*Propension* of his Nature, or only pursues the *Gratification*  
 of a certain *Appetite*, that is to say, that he is only govern'd  
 by *Self-interest*. And therefore, however it may be alledged  
 that *Parents love their Children from Instinct*, and that  
*Man affects his Species from no other Principle*, this does  
 not say, but, in both Instances, we are influenced by *Self-love*;  
 since we therein only gratify some Propensions or Appetites  
 inherent to our Nature. And that kind social Propensions are  
 deeply laid in human Nature, is so far from being deny'd in  
 this Treatise, that it is every where strongly maintain'd.



Sect. VI. nion upon this Point, he gives us some Instances, wherein he conceives, that Men act from disinterested Love, *i. e.* a Love of others that does not spring from *Self-love*, or that has no Relation to ourselves, or our own Good and Interest.

*An honest Farmer, says he, will tell you, that he studies the Preservation and Happiness of his Children, and loves them without any Design of Good to himself.\** By which our Author understands, that Parents love their Children, without being influenc'd to it by *Self-love*.

I see the Character I must bear for my contradicting this Principle: However I cannot but own my self among those *Sophists*, as our Author is pleas'd to call them, who maintain, that Parents look upon their Children as *Parts of themselves*, and that 'tis from this View they have of them, that they love them so tenderly as they do. This indeed our Author very much ridicules. *How, says he, are they Parts of our selves? Not as a Leg or an Arm: We are not conscious of their Sensations. But their Bodies were form'd from Parts of ours. So is a Fly or a Maggot, which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! Such Reflections are below the Character of this ingenious Author. The plain Matter is this.*

Man naturally likes his Kind, as they bear his Likeness and Image.

EVERY Man, as I observ'd before, is mightily pleas'd with the Structure of his own Body, and with the Powers and Faculties of his Mind: On account of these Things he values himself extremely,

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extremely, and judges he has the Preference by Sect. VI. infinite Odds, above all other Kinds of Animals. Besides that, as he thus highly affects and esteems his own Make and Constitution, so when he sees other Creatures of the same Frame, and endued with the same Faculties, he cannot but reverence his *own Nature*, and accompany these his Fellow-men, with all the friendly Emotions of Love and Respect.

Now, every Man being thus determin'd from the Love he has for himself, to bear a Good-liking and Esteem to human Nature wherever he meets with it; when he finds he has produced one or more Individuals that partake of this Nature, to which he pays so great a Regard, (besides the general Benevolence which he naturally bears to all Mankind) he is very sensible of some peculiarly warm and tender Affections towards those Individuals in particular, from the Consciousness of their being his own proper Productions. For this I might appeal, not only to every *honest Farmer*, but to the inward Sense of all Parents whatsoever.

And he particularly affects his Children as they are his proper Productions, or Parts of himself.

AND does not this very Principle continually prevail in the Case of every other laudable *Production*, whereof a Man knows himself to be the Author? I do believe, when our Author reflects on it, he follows his Book through the World (as his Friend *Horace* did his before him) sympathizing with the dear Piece in all its Fortunes of whatever Sort, and still wishing and promising it kind Entertainment, with a

As an Author likes the Books he has compos'd and publish'd, not from Instinct, but from his being conscious they are his own Productions

Y

good

Sect. VI. good Deal of more Concern and Tenderneſs, than he ſhould have done, had it been produc'd by me or any other Perſon.

— — — Fuge quo diſcedere geſtis.

*Non erit emiſſo reditus tibi. Quid miſer egi?  
Quid volui? dices, ubi quis te læſerit. Et ſcis  
In breve te cogi, cum plenus languet amator.*

*Quod ſi non odio peccantis decipit augur;  
Carus eris Romæ, donec te deferat ætas.*

HOR. Lib. 1. Epift. 20.

THIS, I confeſs, is my Caſe with reſpect to this little Eſſay. For I find I cannot but heartily wiſh, that it may be ſo fortunate as to pleaſe thoſe who peruſe it, and have the Honour of their Approbation.

AND pray, what is the Reaſon why People are thus tenderly concern'd for what they publiſh, and accompany their Performances with their particular good Wiſhes? I can hardly think our Author will account for it by mere *Instinct*. I perſwade my ſelf, every Body will allow it proceeds from a ſecret Senſe of a particular Inter-eſt which we are conſcious we have in them, as being our own proper *Productions*.

Nor by maintaining thus much can one deſerve the Imputation of Sophiſtry; AND I would fain hope, the Reader will acquit me from the Imputation of *Sophiſtry*, when I here contend, that, from the like Conſideration, *Parents* are inſpir'd with that tender Love they bear to their *Children*. It is manifeſt they are our *Productions*. And when we look upon them in this Light (as every Parent naturally does)



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does) we regard ourselves, according to the Sect. VI.  
 Laws of Propagation, as the immediate Au-  
 thors of their Nature and Being, and we look  
 upon them as parted from us, or as *Parts* of  
 ourselves, which we have produc'd into the  
 World; not indeed as a *Leg* or an *Arm*, a  
*Fly* or a *Maggot*! but as intire human Creatures,  
 that have sprung from us with our Nature and  
 Image.

AND how very justly one's *Children* are cal-  
 led *Parts* of himself, I might here take Occa-  
 sion to shew from that common Maxim, *Omne*  
*animal fit ex animalculo*, which is now receiv'd  
 by every one who has the least Skill in Philo-  
 sophy. But I shall only observe, there are some  
 common Phrases in every Body's Mouth, as,  
*Such an one's Blood runs in such an one's Veins* (1),  
 and the like, that express the common Sense  
 of Mankind upon this Article. Nor are these  
 Ways of Speaking of a late Original, they have  
 obtain'd from the Beginning of the World.  
 And, in the *Books* of the *Old Testament*, we fre-  
 quently find *Children* of the same *Parents*, saying  
 each to other, *Thou art Flesh of my Flesh*, and  
*Bone of my Bone*: So that, in my Opinion, *Pa-*  
*rents* always regarding their *Children* as their  
 own Productions, or as *Parts* of themselves, 'tis  
 under this View they so tenderly affect them (2).

Y 2

And

(1) ——— ἡμὲς ἐστὶ καὶ αἷματι ἡμετέρῳ. Hom.  
 Odvff. π.

(2) Οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ εἰργασίαν καὶ τέχνην ὡς ἐαυτῶν τὴν ὄντα·  
 καὶ δὲ τέχνην τοὺς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τὴν ὄντα. μάλλον δ'  
 ἰσχυρῶς

For as there  
 is good Rea-  
 son to call  
 one's Chil-  
 dren *Parts* of  
 one's self;  
 so it has  
 been the  
 common  
 Opinion of  
 all Ages.

Sec. VI. And therefore, the Love with which even an *honest Farmer* embraceth his *Children*, and from which he studies their Preservation and Happiness, is not *disinterested*, but is founded upon, and ariseth from that *Love* he bears to *himself*.

But there are other Things that augment this Love of Parents toward their Children, that are likewise founded in Selflove :

Such as Compassion and Sympathy.

THIS might suffice to shew the Falseness of our *Author's* Reasoning : But because the *Love* of *Parents* to their *Children*, is so particularly tender and strong, I beg leave to take Notice of some other Considerations (that likewise belong to *Self-love*) from which it is very much augmented.

ACCORDING to what I have already hinted, all Men being of a *similar Nature*, as they cannot but mutually love one another, so we necessarily find ourselves differently affected, according to the different Circumstances in which we see others are placed. This appears from every Man's Experience ; 'tis that which renders *Rhetorick* of such Consequence, and so very powerful. And, for a Proof of it, one might instance in

ἴσουσιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἢ τὰ γινναιόμενα ἐπὶ ἐκ τούτων·  
 καὶ μᾶλλον συνήκει τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῶν γινναιόμενων, ἢ τὸ γινναιόμενον  
 τῶν ποιήσαντων. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἰκείον τῶν ἀφ' οὗ οἶον ὁδὸς ἢ  
 θρῖξ οἰκείον τῶν ἐχόντων ἐκείνων δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἢ ἡθὺς.  
 καὶ τῶν πλήθει δὲ τῶν ἔχοντων οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐυδαίμονες γινναιόμενα σίγγασιν· τὰ  
 δὲ σφραλδίζοντα τοῖς ἔχουσιν τὰς γονεῖς, συνεπὶ ἢ αἰδέσθων λα-  
 ζόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ δὲ ἀφιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες.  
 γονεῖς μὲν ἔν τε τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτοὺς· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν, οἶον  
 ἐπεὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν καχευμένων τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων  
 προύκοιτα. αἰδέσθων δὲ ἀλλήλους τῶν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν προυκέναι.  
 ἢ γὰρ ὅπως ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης, ἀλλήλοις ταυτὸ ποιεῖ· οἷον ὅτι  
 ταυτὸν αἶμα, καὶ ῥίζαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. *Arist. Eth. Lib. 8.*  
*Cap. 12.*

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in a great many Particulars, fetcht from the *Seft. VI.*  
*Stage*, and from common Life; in which, if  
one could do it decently, human Creatures  
might be compar'd to musical Instruments that  
have *similar Chords*, wherein it happens, that  
when one of these *Chords* is *struck upon*, all the  
rest that are *Unisons*, receive the same *tremu-*  
*lous Motion*, which occasions the same *Sound*, or  
are affected in the same Manner. And it ap-  
pears, that the great *Author* of Nature has de-  
sign'd we should thus sympathize, or be thus  
affected with one another's Circumstances; for  
I see no other Reason that can be given, why  
the inward Passions of the Mind express them-  
selves so very distinctly in human Countenan-  
ces. *We may observe*, says our Author, *how*  
*wonderfully the Constitution of human Nature is a-*  
*dapted to move Compassion*. Our Misery and Distress  
immediately appears in our Countenance, if we do  
not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain  
to all Spectators, who, from Observation, understand  
the Meaning of those dismal Airs. *We mechanically*  
*send forth Shrieks and Groans upon any surprising*  
*Apprehension of Evil*; so that no Regard to Decency  
can sometimes restrain them. Thus all who are pre-  
sent are rous'd to our Assistance, and sometimes our  
injurious Enemy is made to relent.

So that from this peculiar Frame of human  
Nature, when we see our Fellow-creatures ex-  
pos'd to Misery, without being capable of any  
Thing, but to express to us their helpless Con-  
dition, by their Looks, their Fears, Sighs, and  
Cries,



Señt. VI. Cries, our Hearts are touch'd very sensibly,  
 our Bowels of Pity are strongly mov'd, and  
 we feel a powerful Propension to help and re-  
 lieve them.

— — — *Si vis me flere, dolendum est*  
*Primum ipsi tibi : tunc tua me infortunia ledent,*  
*Telephe vel Peteu. — — —*

*Format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem*  
*Fortunarum habitum — — —*

HOR. de Arte Poet,

AND therefore Children appearing to their  
 Parents, for so many Years, poor helpless Babes,  
 still craving Pity by their innocent Tears, this  
 sensibly moves all the soft Passions of human  
 Nature, and fills our Breasts with a melting  
 Tenderness, which naturally engageth us to  
 succour and cherish our dear *Infant-productions*,  
 that are intirely cast upon our Compassion and  
 Care. And when, for some Years, we are thus  
 accusom'd to embrace our Offspring with all  
 the soft and delicate Passions, this Tenderness  
 grows up into a Habit, and has so bended our  
 Minds, that we naturally follow them through  
 all the Occurrences of their Lives, with a very  
 quick and tender Concern.

The  
 Friendship  
 between  
 Husband and  
 Wife :

IN the next Place 'tis to be remarked, that  
 from the sincere Good-liking and Friendship  
 which *Parents*, I mean, Husband and Wife, do  
 mutually bear to one another, they cannot but  
 very affectionately regard their joynt Offspring.  
 Every

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Every Body knows, that such People as are Sect. VI.  
capable of being touch'd with the generous  
Emotions of Friendship, do not respect only  
the Person of their Friend, but every Thing  
else that belongs to him, or whatever he is sup-  
posed to have an Interest in. It has been long  
ago observ'd, *That we are secretly mov'd with a  
certain Sort of Good-will and Respect towards the  
very Places where our Friends had their Birth,  
where they have resided, or that bear any Sort of  
Relation to those Persons whom we love and e-  
steem* (1). And much more must we be sen-  
sible of a particular kind Regard for the *Children*  
of our Friend, by whom, in a peculiar Manner,  
he keeps up his Memory, and transmits himself  
to future Ages; or whom he is to leave be-  
hind him as his *living Remains*. This the Na-  
ture of Things renders very necessary: For,  
whatever is connected to the *Idea* of our Friend,  
*that* recommends itself along with the principal  
Character, and cannot therefore but find a Share  
in the same friendly Affections (2). So that  
when a *Father* reflects, that his *Children* are the  
Productions of the Woman he tenderly loves,  
Y 4 this

(1) Quin ipse, vere dicam, sum ipsi villæ amicior factus,  
atque huic omni solo in quo tu ortus & procreatus es.  
Movemur enim, nescio quo pacto, locis ipsis, in quibus  
eorum, quos diligimus, aut admiramur, adsunt vestigia.  
Cic. de Legib. Lib. 2.

(1) Οὐ μόνον γὰρ ὃ φίλες, εἰκός. ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι ἀνάγκη τὸ  
ἐρωπεῖν τε αὐτοὺς ἔχοντα, πᾶν τὸ συγγενὲς τε καὶ οἰκίαν τῶν  
παίδων ἄρα πάντων. Plat. de Rep. Lib. 6.

Sect. VI. this gives them the Advantage of an additional Light, wherein they appear under many agreeable *Ideas* (besides what they have from the Relation they bear immediately to himself) which naturally increase his Tenderneſs, and make him feel a more affectionate Concern for them. After the ſame Manner are the Affections of *Mothers* likewise augmented.


And the  
Hopes we  
have that  
our Children  
will act an  
honourable  
Part in Life.

BESIDES that, *Parents* do always promise themselves, their *Children* will probably, ſome Way or other, make a Figure in the World, I do believe, there is no Body who allows himſelf to imagine, that his *Child* ſhall grow up, and live under Scorn and Deriſion, or Contempt and Infamy, for we are all apt to forebode very favourable Things with reſpect to our Offspring; and even thoſe imaginary Titles that are every where beſtow'd on *Children*, ſerve to ſhew us, how very naturally People are diſpoſed that Way: Nay, is there any Thing more common than for *Parents* to declare, that before their *Children* ſhould live a Diſgrace to themſelves and Family, they would a thouſand Times rather lay them in their Grave? Indeed every *Parent* is not ſo extravagant as to flatter himſelf, that his *Children* ſhall raiſe themſelves to ſome elevated Station among Mankind (tho one does not know, how far their good Fortune may contribute to lift them up to an exalted Character, ſuch Events having been frequent



quent enough in the World.) However, we always flatter ourselves, that they shall act with Success and Honour, at least, in that Station of Life for which we design them, and distinguish themselves by some good Quality, or some Superiority or other, so as to be taken Notice of in the *Circle* of their Acquaintances, however mean those may be in Comparison to others.

AND thus *Parents* forecasting in their Minds the laudable Figure which they hope their *Children* will make in the World, they naturally conceive, because of the particular Interest which they are conscious they have in them as their *own Productions*, and the Care they have had in their Education, whereby they are qualify'd to act their Part so commendably; I say, from these Things *Parents* naturally conceive they have a Share in all the Honour and Reputation their *Children* shall attain to. So that we look upon our *Children* as the worthy Instruments, by whom we shall one Day acquire Credit and Esteem; which cannot but in the mean While mightily recommend them to our affectionate Concern and Good liking. And when we find our *Children* begin to give Evidences of Knowledge and Affections, as this plainly lets us see, they are of our Nature, not Fools or Idiots, (tho' these affect us with all the soft Touches of Pity and Compassion) but *moral* or *rational Agents*; so is it the Dawning of our Hopes, that promiseth the full accomplishing of all those fond Expectations we indulge

Sect. VI.  indulge to ourselves of having Honour and Esteem by them; and cannot therefore but immediately warm our *Breasts*, and make us sensible of very tender and lively Affections towards them.

So that the Love of Parents toward their Children is not disinterested, but comes from Self love.

THESE are the Considerations (all manifestly founded in *Selflove*) which, concurring with the Consciousness of our *Children* being our Productions, make paternal Affection exceedingly tender and strong. And it evidently appears, that we all along conceive we have a very particular Interest in our *Children*, especially as they are *Parts* of ourselves; and that it is under the Sense, and in the View of this very near and intimate Relation, that we so tenderly embrace them.

So that the Love of *Parents* to their *Children* is not antecedent to, and the Cause of the Conjunction of *Interest* between *Parent* and *Child*, so as to make them *Parts* of ourselves, when they were not so before (as our *Author* will needs have it) but is plainly consequent upon, and the Effect of an inward Sense of the peculiar *Interest* we have in them, as our own Productions. And hence it is obvious, that this *Love* is by no Means *disinterested*.

'Tis further alleged in favour of Instinct, as the only Motive to Virtue.

THE other Instance which our *Author* makes use of in order to establish *disinterested Love* as the only true Principle or Motive to virtuous Actions, comes plainly to this, namely:

That we bear Good-will toward those Persons with whom

\* 'Tis approved to be true by Experience, that we bear a Benevolence even to any Society of Men, or rational Agents, with whom we have no Sort of

\* See our Author p. 158. § 10.

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of Interchange, or from whom we have received neither good nor bad Offices. And since our good Wishes attend even those Persons with whom we have no Sort of Communication, that can make us delight in their Happiness; this (according to our Author) is a manifest Proof, that our Love of them is quite disinterested, or that it springs from Instinct, and does not arise from Self-love or Interest.

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we have no social Inter-  
course, and  
are tenderly  
concerned  
for their  
Interests.

BUT, in my Opinion, when we are thus sensible of such friendly Affections towards other People, we always consider them as our *Fellow-men*, or as *intelligent Beings*, like ourselves, susceptible of the same Joys and Sorrows. And when they appear to us in this Light, we see, as it were, our own Nature diffused among them, so that thro' Consciousness of our own State, or from what we often feel in our own *Breasts*, as we happen to be engag'd in such and such Circumstances, we are very nearly touch'd and affected (as our *Author* himself insinuates) by whatever Situation we observe them to be plac'd in; like the friendly old Gentleman in *Terence*, who generously declares,

But this  
proceeds  
from our  
viewing  
them as our  
*Fellow-men*,  
or partaking  
of our  
Nature.

*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*

So that from the Consciousness of a Conjunction of Nature between us and our *Fellow-men*, we, in a Manner, put ourselves in their Circumstances, and thereby expose our Minds either to Pleasure or Pain, according as we see them diffe-



**SECT. VI.** differently affected. And our *Author* has provided us a very good Instance, whereby this may be illustrated.

And what  
ever Ten-  
derness we  
conceive in  
their Favour,  
it comes  
from put-  
ting our  
selves in  
their Cir-  
cumstances,  
and must  
therefore be  
resolved into  
Self-love.

*Let a Man, says he, of a compos'd Temper, out of the Hurry of his private Affairs, read of the Constitution of a foreign Country, even in the most distant Parts of the Earth, and observe Art and Design, and Study of publick Good in the Laws of this Association, and he shall find his Mind mov'd in their Favour; he shall be contriving Rectifications and Amendments in their Constitution, and regret any unlucky Part of it which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall bewail any Disaster which befalls them, and accompany all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now there is Nothing plainer to me than that this Man, who in so friendly a Manner is attach'd to this foreign Community, secretly mixes himself among them, and, in his own Thoughts, becomes one of that Society. For when he observes Art, and Design, and Study of publick Good to prevail in the Laws of this Association, has he any Notion of what is good, but from considering the Relation which Things bear to his own Nature? Or, can he in Reason approve any Thing as such, that does not serve to gratify those Appetites which he has in common with the rest of Mankind? For my Part, I do not see what other Standard one can have, whereby to judge what is good or evil, but the common Nature of rational Agents consider'd in its whole Compass, whereof one can*

## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 349

can have no Notion but by narrowly examining Set. VI.  
*into himself*: Which, I think, is fairly intimat-  
 ed to us, in that famous Saying *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*,  
*Know thy self*, which being counted too confi-  
 derable to come from a *Mortal*, is attributed to  
 God himself (1); and in these excellent Rules  
 that comprehend all the Moral Virtues, *Love*  
*your Neighbour as you do your self; do as you*  
*would be done by* (2).

So that when this Man goes about to deter-  
 mine what is good to any Body of Men, he  
 cannot but necessarily associate himself with  
 them; for the *Enquiry* plainly turns upon what  
 is good to *his Nature*. And as he must thus  
 settle what is good, from the Congruity which  
 Things bear to his Taste and Appetites; so  
 when he sees his own Good, or, which is the  
 same Thing, the Happiness of his Nature de-  
 sign'd and pursued in all the Laws, and in the  
 whole Frame of a Civil Government, his Mind  
 cannot but be mov'd in Favour of that parti-  
 cular Association; and hence being, in a Sort,  
 embarked with them, he cannot but bewail  
 any Disaster which befalls them, and accompany  
 all their Fortunes with the Affections of a  
 Friend.

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(1) *Intrandum est igitur in rerum naturam, & penitus, quid ea postulet, pervidendum: aliter enim nosmetipsos nosse non possumus. Quod præceptum, quia majus erat, quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatum est Deo. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 5.*

(2) *Ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀφείδει, τὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρετῆς μὴ ποιεῖν. Isocrat. in Nicocl.*

Sect. VI. Friend. And does not all this manifestly proceed from *Self-love*?

BUT it is particularly evident from what is further said in this Instance we have just now before us, that as this Man *unites* himself in his own Mind to this foreign Society, so is he wholly governed by *Self interest* in all the Concern he has for them. For I would fain know, when he contrives *Rectifications* and *Amendments* in their Constitution, and regrets any unlucky Part of it, which may be pernicious to their *Interest*, how comes he by the Knowledge of such Blemishes in their Form of Government? Or, how does he understand, that such Things may prove pernicious to their *Interest*? It would seem, that those Foreigners are not sensible of thus much themselves, and that they are well pleased with their present Establishment, since, it is supposed, they are making no Alterations. I violently suspect, that this disinterested Man of our *Author*, secretly conveys himself into this foreign Country, though in the most distant Parts of the *Earth*, where, mixing himself among the other Members of that Community, he considers what Things in their Constitution do not suit with his *Genius* or Appetites, but seem to have a Tendency to ruine his Interest and Happiness; which therefore, from the Principle of *Self-preservation*, he cannot but incline to have rectify'd. This, I confess, would be the Case with me, a Subject of *Great Britain*, were I contriving Rectifications and Amendments



## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 351

mendments in the Constitution of *France*. For Sect. VI. setting a mighty Value on *Liberty* and *Property*, I would certainly declare against arbitrary Government, and balance the Power of *Prince* and *People* in such a Manner, as that the one should not usurp upon the other: And yet those People who live under an *absolute Monarch*, may, perhaps, be as well pleased with their Constitution, as I can be with ours, which I reckon the best in the World.

So that, in my Opinion, this Benevolence, which our Author's Man bears to his Society of Foreigners, is not *disinterested*, but manifestly springs from *Self-interest*. And, no doubt, had we any Notions of *rational Agents* capable of moral Affections, in the most distant Planets, our good Wishes would still attend them, and we should delight in their Happiness, from the same very Principle. For 'tis still our own Nature, as we are *intelligent Beings*, or *rational Agents*, which we pursue and embrace, in those *Inhabitants* of the Planets, with our friendly Affections.

THESE are the two Instances wherein our Author proposes to let us see *disinterested* Affection in its strongest and simplest Kind, and whereby he imagines we may easily discover its universal Extent, so as to allow it the sole Motive to *Virtue*. But I would fain think, I have made it appear, that the Benevolence he mentions in both Instances, is so far from being *disinterested*, that it directly springs from *Self-love*.

So that  
pure Instinct  
can be no  
Motive to  
virtuous  
Actions

Se& VII *love*. And therefore I will beg Leave to conclude, that, for ought our *Author* has yet said, his *generous Instinct*, or *disinterested Love*, can so little pretend to be the only true Motive to virtuous Actions, that it is really no Motive at all.

## S E C T. VII.

'Tis proposed to consider whether virtuous Affections take their Rise from Self-love.

FOR a further Explication of my *Principles*; and to shew how very natural they are, I shall now consider how our *Author* makes it appear, that none of those Affections which we call *virtuous*, do spring from *Self-love* or *Interest*.

To which Purpose this Gentleman having very justly observ'd \*, That all *Virtue*, or *Vice*, is either some *Affection* towards rational Agents, or some *Action* consequent upon it, he lays down Love and Hatred as the two original Affections of human Nature, that are of most Importance in *Morals*, and whereof all the rest of the Passions are but different Modifications. Upon which, he divides our Love into *Love of Complacence* or *Esteem*, and *Love of Benevolence*; and our *Hatred*, into *Hatred of Displacence* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred of Malice*: And then goes on to consider, whether these Affections can be influenc'd by Motives of *Self-interest*.

As

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\* P. 138.

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As to the Love of Complacence, Esteem, or Sect. VII. Good-liking, this, he says \*, at first View appears to be *disinterested*, i. e. not to spring from Self-love or Interest, but from, what he calls, generous Instinct. But this, in my Opinion, is so openly disagreeable to the Nature of Things, even as our Author himself accounts for it, that I am really tempted to suspect, I do not well comprehend what particular Ideas he affixes to this Word *Disinterested*. And yet I cannot think I am mistaken; for 'tis certainly all along his main Design to make out, that we are determin'd to pursue *Virtue*, or to love other rational Agents, and promote their Happiness, not from Self-love, but from Instinct: So that I cannot but still think, that his *disinterested Love* is that which he supposes to spring only from Instinct, and that it is because of its being deriv'd from such an Original, that he gives it this Epithet.

Mr. H—n  
alleges that  
the Love of  
Esteem or  
Good-liking  
comes from  
Instinct.

BUT, that our Love to other rational Agents flows from quite another Source, is exceedingly manifest from the Way in which our Author himself does here account for it: For he expressly declares, and indeed very suitably to the Nature of Things, that our Love and Hatred are entirely excited by some moral Qualities, Good or Evil, apprehended to be in the Objects about which those Affections are employ'd. And this, I am well perswaded, is a very rational Account in general, how it comes about, that those Af-

But at the  
same Time  
he confesses  
that this  
Love is ex-  
cited by the  
Apprehen-  
sion of mo-  
rally good  
Qualities in  
those Per-  
sons that are  
the Objects  
of it.

Z

fections



*Sen. VII.* *W*ections exert themselves, or by what different Springs they are severally excited. Tho, in the mean Time, I cannot but observe, did our Love and Hatred, with respect to any particular Objects, take their Rise from mere *Instinct*, I do not well conceive it possible to assign any particular Reason, as that which brings them into Action.

And I would fain know, wherein consists the Goodness of those moral Qualities.

*2.* *HOWEVER*, I cannot but take Notice, that our *Author* here wholly lays aside all his own Principles, and says enough to convince any Man, that this *Love of Esteem* is mov'd or excited by *Self-interest*. For pray, what are those *moral Qualities*, which, from their being good, engage our Love, and determine us to esteem those rational Agents in whom we discover them? I suppose, 'tis no other Thing than the *Goodness* of those Qualities, that is the Foundation of this Love and Esteem. I shall be glad then to understand wherein this Goodness consists.

There is indeed a Distinction of Goodness into Natural and Moral.

I know, there is a Distinction of Goodness, into *Natural* and *Moral*; and that all the World are agreed with our *Author*, that *natural Good* signifies nothing but the *Pleasure* which we receive either mediately or immediately from natural (by which is here meant inanimate or *brute*) *Objects*, such as Houses, Lands, Riches, Meats, Drink, Pictures, fine Gardens, Horses, and the like. But what *Ideas* must we have of *moral Goodness*? Does this likewise ly, as well as the other, in Pleasure? Or, does it signify

## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 355

signify any Thing else? I confess ingenuously, SECT. VII.  
that I neither have, nor can form any other  
Notion of it. And I conceive, that this Sort  
of Pleasure, or Good, is call'd *moral*, because  
it springs from the *Mores*, the *Manners*, or the  
Affections and Actions of *intelligent Beings*, or  
rational Agents, and to distinguish it from that  
Kind of Pleasure, or Good, which we have  
from inanimate or irrational Creatures; though  
it might be call'd *natural*, with as good Reason  
as any other Sort of *Pleasure*, or *Good* what-  
soever.

THIS is true, as I have just now said, there is  
a Difference betwixt *moral Goodness*, and that  
which is call'd *natural*. But then this Diffe-  
rence does not ly in that the one is *Pleasure*,  
and the other *Something else*; it consists only in  
the Kind, Degree, or Consequents of the plea-  
sing Perceptions, which those different Objects,  
that are call'd *morally* and *naturally good*, derive  
to us. One might subdivide *natural Goodness*  
into a great many particular Sorts, which differ  
fully as much from one another, as *moral Good-  
ness* can do from every one of 'em. If Custom  
would allow of it, might not a Body talk of  
*musical Goodness*, *picture Goodness*, *landskip Good-  
ness*, &c. thereby understanding the Pleasures  
which we have from *Musick*, *Pictures*, *Land-  
skips*, and the like? And do not all these Sorts  
of *natural Goodness* differ from one another, as  
much as *moral Goodness* possibly can do? And  
yet the wide Difference that is among them

But the  
later as well  
as the  
former lies  
wholly in  
Pleasure.

Sect. VII. never hinders us from owning, that we understand nothing by these different Sorts of *Goodness*, but *Pleasure*, or different Perceptions, all attended with *Pleasure*, in which their *Goodness* only consists. So that, in my Opinion, how much soever *moral Goodness* may differ from that which we commonly call *natural*, it by no Means follows from hence, that it lies in Something else than *Pleasure*, as our *Author* seems to insinuate.

This is maintain'd by all Philosophers that write intelligibly.

IN short, I cannot but observe, that I never had Occasion to see any *Philosopher*, whether ancient or modern, that speaks intelligibly upon this Point, who represents *moral Goodness* to ly in any Thing else than *Pleasure*. I have already hinted, that our *Author* himself, so far as I can understand him, has no other Notion of it. And I am sure, it evidently appears from what I have in several Places quoted from *Plato*, that this was the avowed Opinion of that great *Philosopher*, as every one must own who is acquainted with his Writings. Nor do I think it possible for any Mortal to apprehend *moral Goodness* to be any Thing else, than the *Pleasure* (*natural Good*) which we perceive from the Actions of other intelligent Beings. But, as *Socrates* says above, you have still Leave to declare, if you find *Good* (whether *natural* or *moral*) to be any other Thing than *Pleasure*; or *Evil*, to be any other Thing than *Pain* (1).

For

(1) 'Αλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὗτος ἀναδιδόντες ἕξασιν, εἰ πᾶσι ἔχοντες ἄλλο πρᾶγμα ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τὸ κακόν. ἢ τὸ κακόν ἄλλο πρᾶγμα ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Plat. in Protag.



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For my own Part, I am fully satisfied, that the *Goodness* of those moral Qualities, which is the Motive, or Spring, whereby we are excited to love and esteem such *rational Agents* as are possess'd of them, lies precisely in those *Pleasures* which we perceive from those Qualities.

AND therefore, when it is said we are determin'd to the Love of Esteem towards rational Agents, from the *Goodness* of those moral Qualities which we apprehend to be in them, it is the same as to say, we are determin'd thus to love them from the *Pleasure* which they minister to us by their moral Qualities or Actions. Which, I humbly conceive, is as strong an Evidence of *Self-love* or *Interest*, as is our Liking of Musick, Landskips, and the like, from the Pleasures which these Things afford to us. It is true, our *Author* observes, that *the very Frame of our Nature determines us to love those moral Qualities in rational Agents*. But after the same Manner are we likewise determin'd to love good Meats, and Drink, agreeable Sounds, fine Pictures; which, notwithstanding this natural Determination, our *Author* allows we pursue from *Self-love*. So that this cannot, in any Degree, alter the Case.

AND indeed, if we will consider, one by one, all the several moral Qualities, that can be call'd *virtuous*, in any rational Agent whatsoever, we shall find, that we like and approve those Qualities for no other Reason, but for their being good to us, i. e. for the *Pleasure* they give

And therefore, when Love of Esteem arises from the Goodness of, i. e. the Pleasure we have in the moral Qualities of others, it comes from Self-love.

So that we value moral Qualities only for their gratifying Self-love.

Sect. VII.

us, or for their gratifying our *Self-love* (1). This, I flatter my self, I have made out sufficiently in the foregoing *Enquiry*, and from what I have said in this further Explication.

This Mr. H—  
seems to  
confess with  
respect to  
the cardinal  
Virtues.

AND besides what I have already observ'd from our *Author* with relation to this Point, he delivers his Opinion very plainly \*, and affirms, "That all those Dispositions that enter into the Nature of what we call the *cardinal Virtues*, serve only to expose a Man to Neglect and Contempt, unless they have such a Turn as to engage him in promoting the Interests of other People. For, says he, these four Qualities, *Temperance, Courage, Prudence and Justice*, commonly call'd *cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, and entitle their Possessors to our Good-liking and Esteem, because they are Dispositions universally necessary to promote publick Good, and denote Affections toward rational Agents, which when they exert themselves into Action, make us feel a very sensible *Pleasure*; otherwise there would appear no *Virtue* in them." This, as I take it, is our *Author's* Opinion.

And in  
Truth, all  
Moral  
Virtues and  
Characters  
gain our  
Love and  
Esteem, in  
Proportion  
to the  
Degrees of  
Pleasure  
they afford  
us.

UPON which I shall here remark, that the *Moral Virtues* excite our Love and Esteem, in Proportion

(1) Δοκεῖ γὰρ ὅτι πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ πᾶν δ' ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἢ ἡδὺ, ἢ χρησίμου. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀν' ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺν ἢ ἡδονὴν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀν' ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδονὴν, ὡς τίλη. *Arist. Eth. Lib. 8.*

\* P. 137,

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Proportion to the Influence they have on our *Happiness*, or according as they contribute, less or more, to indulge our *Self-love*, and promote our Interest. Thus, if a Man religiously observes all the Rules of *Temperance*, and in his private Conduct never be found guilty of any Excess; we but very coolly regard him, when he can pretend to nothing else: But if he stirs about in an active Part of Life, proves true to his Words and Promises, and, in all his Dealings with other People, shews nothing but *Candor* and *Honesty*, these are Qualities that recommend him to our Good liking. And if he be likewise *courteous* and *affable*, and expresses, in all his Deportment, a civil obliging Disposition, this raises him higher in our Esteem, and gives him a greater Share in our Affections: But if this sober, faithful, honest, ingenuous, affable Man, further appears to us with an *open generous Heart*, that employs a bountiful Hand in doing kind Offices to others, or with a *brave masculine Spirit*, sure and steady, that exerts itself in the Defence or Relief of the Injur'd and Oppress'd; this sets him off in the fairest and most amiable Light, and approves him to the highest Degrees of our Love and Esteem. For while we sincerely commend a *sober, upright, honest Character*, we warmly applaud and celebrate that one, which, besides these good Qualities, is likewise made up of *Urbanity, true Fortitude* that can

be



Seft. VII. be relied on, *Bounty*, and *Liberality* (1). All this is plain from Experience. The Nature of Things makes it necessary: And the true Reason why our Love and Esteem are thus increas'd and augmented, is because our *Self-love* or *Interest* happens to be more indulg'd and gratify'd. *Of all Men valuable for Virtue, the generous and liberal, says Aristotle (2), are the most acceptable, because they are the most useful in imparting Good, and doing kind Offices.*

Which makes it plain, that we value and esteem moral Agents from Self-interest.

AND therefore it appears to me, that we affect and value other intelligent Beings in Proportion to their Benevolence towards us, or according as they contribute to give us *Pleasure*, or to advance our Happiness (3). And so very selfish is *Tully*, that he expressly directs us to express our Love, and regulate our Beneficence towards

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(1) Quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit, facitque ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur: tamen justitia & liberalitas id maxime efficit, Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1. Vehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama & opinione liberalitatis, beneficentiae, justitiae, fidei, omniumque earum virtutum, quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem — Atque haec quidem sunt causae diligendi gravissimae, Id. de Offic. Lib. 2.

(2) Φιλῶν δὲ ἄλλων μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέροι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ὠφελίμοι γὰρ ὅσοι δὲ ἐκ τῆς δόξης. Eth. Lib. 4. Cap. 1.

(3) Τὸν μὲν καταδιδόντα, ὅς ἀχρεῖται γὰρ πλεονέκτην δὲ αὐτὴν δύναμενον, ἐδέχοντα δ' ἔαν δέουσαν. ἢ δὲ ὁδονῶντα, ἢ ἐκόντα μηδενὶ κοινωνῶν δὲ φιλίας γινώμενον ἀγαθῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν μὲν ψεῖν. Plat. de Legib. Lib. 5.

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towards others by this very Standard (1). So Sect. VII. that, in my Opinion, we love and esteem the Temperate, the Brave and Generous, the Prudent, the Just, the Bountiful and Beneficent, only from *Self-interest*, or because they minister to our *Pleasures*.

NAY, so uncontrollable a Power has *Self-love* over us in Matters of Virtue, that, as our *Author* very well remarks, "Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to love, with Esteem and Complacence, a third Person entirely unknown, or if known, apprehended to be cruel, treacherous, ungrateful; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Diffimulation of Love, but real Love of Esteem no Price can purchase." For if this third Person be entirely unknown, we do not then apprehend him under any of those good Qualities, that strike in with our *Self-love*, and flatter our natural Desire

And as Self-love can at no Rate suffer us to esteem, but irresistibly determines us to hate a vicious Character :

after

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(1) Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia delectus esset dignitatis : in quo & mores ejus erunt spectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur, & animus erga nos, & communitas ac societas vitæ, & ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata : quæ ut concurrant omnia optabile est : sin minus, plures causæ, majoresque, ponderis plus habebunt. — De benevolentia autem quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud est in officio, ut ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligimur. Sed benevolentiam, non adolescentulorum more, ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius & constantia judicemus. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1.

**SECT. VII.** after Happiness. Nor yet do we conceive him under any of those evil ones that are contrary to *Self-interest*: So that, according to the Nature of Things, we can neither contemn, nor esteem him; if it be not in so far as we know he partakes of our Nature, we must necessarily have a secret Regard for him: But if he be known, and offers himself to us as *cruel, treacherous, ungrateful*, these are Qualities under which we apprehend him, so utterly contradictory, and so very shocking to *Self-love*, while they present us with nothing but Pain and Misery, that, instead of being capable of exciting our Love and Esteem, they necessarily provoke our Contempt and Hatred, and all those other Passions that are complicated with a Desire of our own Preservation.

So at no Rate can it suffer us to hate, since in all Events it irresistibly sways us to esteem one that is virtuous.

“ WHEREAS, on the contrary, represent a Character as generous, kind, faithful, humane, and we cannot avoid loving it with Esteem and Complacence.” For manifestly, these are Qualities exactly adapted to *Self-love*, and serve mightily to promote our Interest, and cannot therefore but necessarily engage our Esteem and Good-liking. “ Indeed a Bribe may possibly make us attempt to ruine such a Man, or some strong Motive of (*false*) Advantage may excite us to oppose his Interest, but it can never make us hate him, while we apprehend him as morally excellent, ” or while he appears to us with all these excellent Qualities, *Humanity, Kindness, Justice,*



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*Justice, Generosity, and the like, which immedi-* Sect. VII.  
ately favour *our Interest*, and promise us all the  
Satisfactions our Nature can desire. " Nay,  
" when we consult our own Hearts, we shall  
" find, that we can scarce ever persuade our-  
" selves to attempt any Mischief against such  
" Persons, from any Motive of (*false*) Ad-  
" vantage, nor execute it without the strongest  
" Reluctance and Remorse, until we have  
" blinded ourselves into a bad Opinion of the  
" Person in a moral Sense, " *that is*, until we  
have once stript him of all his good Qualities,  
*Honesty, Love, Beneficence*, and the like, which  
*co-operate with Self-love*, and imag'd him to our-  
selves under all these evil ones, *Deceit, Inju-*  
*stice, Cruelty, Perfidy*, and whatever is *contrary*  
*to Self-interest*, which necessarily awaken our Ha-  
tred and Revenge. For while we see him  
with nothing about him but those Qualities that  
suit with *Self-love*, or serve our Interest, we  
can no more hate him than we can taste Sweet  
to be Bitter, or conceive Light to be Darkness,  
or rather, than we can hate ourselves ; and must  
as necessarily love and esteem him as we are  
pleas'd and delighted with beautiful or harmo-  
nious Objects, or rather, as we love and esteem  
ourselves.

NOR will it in the least alter the Case, as  
our Author likewise observes very justly, though  
this Man should live in the most distant Parts  
of the World ; (to which I shall add) nay,  
though

And it  
matters not  
whether the  
Man is act-  
ing in the  
most distant  
Parts of the  
Earth, nor  
whether he  
has been  
dead—  
whatever  
Number of  
Years ago.

Sect. VII. though he has been dead many thousand Years ago. For it is confessedly impossible, that one's Views and Apprehensions, that are founded on the Nature of Things, which is always steady and uniform, can suffer any Change by whatever Distance of Place or Time. So that a rational Agent, who, in the most distant Nation upon Earth, some thousand Years ago, acted a brave generous Part of Life, is as well the Object of our Love and Esteem, as that Man is, who is just now among ourselves acting in the same Character. And the Reason is very plain; for both Characters are made up of the same Ingredients, and the Ideas we form of both the one and the other, bear the same Relation to *Self-love*. I confess, our brave generous Neighbour, and Contemporary, may touch us far more quickly, and gain upon our Love and Esteem far more sensibly, because of the *Effects he makes us feel* of his good *Qualities*: But this can never hinder us from inwardly regarding that Man, whom we call up, as it were, from the Dead, or whom we fetch from the utmost Parts of the Earth, and represent to ourselves with those *Qualities*, or under those *Ideas*, to which our *Self-love* cannot but mightily conciliate us (1).

Only we  
may ob-  
serve, that  
we come to  
be affected  
by distant

UPON which I desire Leave to take Notice,  
that when we are thus viewing such a one's  
Character,

(1) Πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι οἷς ἔχ' ἐπαίνοισιν, ὑπελαμβάνοντες  
δὲ ὁπτηκότες εἶναι ἢ χησόμενοι. Arist. Eth. Lib. 8. Cap. 2.

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Character, we either secretly convey ourselves Sect. VII. to that Part of the World, where he immediately acted, or we change the Scene of his Actions to those Places where we are; and, in both Cases, we either really feel, or only imagine ourselves in such Circumstances as make us the fit Objects of his *moral Abilities*: For *Self-love*, as I have already hinted, is the only *Test* we can apply, whereby to judge of their *Goodness* ||. And this, I cannot but think, was the Way how those useful Refugees, our *Author* speaks \* of, came to leave their own Country, and flee to ours for Protection. They found themselves at home, under all the Oppressions of Tyranny, which were quite contradictory to their *Self-love*; and forming to themselves the just Character of a *British Monarch*, brave and generous to maintain the Liberties of the Subject, this, tho' the real Object was at some Distance, was so very suitable to their *Self-interest*, that, to have a Share in the Effects of those *royal Qualities*, they abandon'd their natural Prince, and came gladly over to a foreign one, under whom, they had conceiv'd, they should enjoy all the Advantages of human Society. So that I do here profess my self to be so far of the same Opinion with those refin'd Explainers of *Self-love*, whom our *Author* condemns for maintaining, "That we hate or love

" Charac-

Characters, by putting ourselves in the Circumstances of the Agent: For that Self-love is the only Standard whereby we can judge of the Value of their moral Qualities.

|| See above, P. 348, 349.

\* P. 123.



Sect. VII. " Characters, according as we apprehend we  
 " should have been supported or injur'd by them,  
 " had we liv'd in their Days." Nor has he  
 said any Thing that, in the least, invades the  
 Truth of this Principle.

'Tis pro-  
 posed to  
 consider,  
 whether  
 Benevo-  
 lence to-  
 ward others  
 is disinter-  
 ested, and arises  
 from In-  
 stinct, as  
 Mr. H—  
 alleges.

I shall consider, in the next Place, what our  
 Author proposes in order to shew, that the Love  
 of Benevolence is likewise *disinterested*. And as  
 to this he tells us \*, that the very Name excludes  
 Self-interest: For, says he, we never call that  
 Man benevolent, who is in Fact useful to others,  
 but at the same Time only intends his own Interest,  
 without any Desire of, or Delight in the Good of  
 others. If there be any Benevolence at all, it  
 must be *disinterested*; for the most useful Action  
 imaginable, loses all Appearance of Benevolence, as  
 soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-  
 love, or Interest. What our Author here ob-  
 serves, with respect to the very Name of Bene-  
 volence, I own I do not well understand.

All Objects  
 of our Af-  
 fections ap-  
 pear to us  
 under Ideas  
 that relate to  
 ourselves, or  
 to Selflove;  
 particularly  
 the Objects  
 of our Be-  
 nevolence.

ACCORDING to the Views which I have of  
 Things, I always conceive, that whatever Ob-  
 jects any of our Affections are employ'd about,  
 we never but apprehend them under some Ideas  
 or other, that have a plain Relation to ourselves,  
 and are the Spring of those particular Affections  
 which happen to be exerted. And I do own,  
 that if those rational Agents to whom we bear  
 Good-will, do not appear to us under any such  
 Ideas, our Benevolence towards them is quite  
 dif-

## Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 367

disinterested. But, as it is impossible for us not Sect. VII.  
to apprehend the Objects of our Benevolence  
under some particular *Ideas* or other; so I am  
well perswaded, that every Man, who attends  
to what passes in his own Breast, will easily  
discern, that those *Ideas* in which they appear  
to us, and whereby our Benevolence towards  
them is excited, refer directly to *Self-interest* (1).  
'Tis very certain, that when we look upon *ra-*  
*tional Agents*, as *kind, just, generous, grateful*  
(all which have a manifest Relation to *Self-love*)  
we cannot but under these Views necessarily  
bear them Good-will, and heartily wish them  
all Sort of Happiness. And 'tis full as evident,  
that we never regard the Objects of our Bene-  
volence, as *cruel, unjust, ungrateful*, so as to  
wish them well under these Apprehensions, or  
because they are possessed of such particular  
Qualities. On the contrary, when *rational A-*  
*gents* offer themselves to us in any such Light,  
which appears clean contrary to *Self-interest*,  
we find ourselves necessarily inspir'd with Ill-  
will and Hatred against them.

I confess, that intelligent Beings, who carry  
about them such odious Qualities, may, not-  
withstanding this, be the Objects of our Bene-  
volence: But then it is obvious, that they  
must appear to us, not under these, but quite  
other

And in  
mixed Cha-  
racters, 'tis  
only such  
Ideas that  
excite our  
Benevolence  
toward  
them, which  
cannot  
therefore  
come from  
*Instinct*.

(1) Ὅλως δ' ἡ βουλοία δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐποικιλίαν πρὸς τὴν  
ἐπὶ τῷ φανῶ καλὸς πρὸς, ἢ ἀνιδρωτὸς, ἢ πὶ τῶντων. *Arist.*  
*Eth. Lib. 9. Cap. 7.*

Sect. VII. other *Ideas*, such as have a Congruity with  
 ~~~~~ *Self-love*. And this our *Author* maintains very  
 expressly. "For, says he; as *Love* of *Esteem*
 " and *Complacence* is always joyn'd with Bene-
 " volence, where there is no strong Opposition
 " of (*false*) *Interest*: So Benevolence seems to
 " presuppose some small Degree of *Esteem*, not
 " indeed of actual good Qualities; for there
 " may be strong Benevolence, where there is
 " the Harred of Contempt for actual Vices. As
 " a *Parent* may have great Benevolence for a
 " most abandoned *Child*, whose Manners he
 " hates with the greatest Displacence; but Be-
 " nevolence supposes a Being capable of *Virtue*.
 " We judge of other *rational Agents* by our-
 " selves. The *human Nature* is a lovely Form,
 " we are all conscious of some morally good
 " Qualities and Inclinations in ourselves, how
 " partial and imperfect soever they may be;
 " we presume the same of every Thing in hu-
 " man Form, nay, almost of every living Crea-
 " ture: So that by this remote Capacity of
 " *Virtue*, there may be some small Degree of
 " *Esteem* along with our Benevolence, even
 " when they incur our greatest Displeasure by
 " their Conduct*." So that, when we bear
 Good-will, and wish well to *rational Agents*,
 that act a bad Character, our Benevolence does
 not arise from our seeing them with their evil
Qualities about them, but from our viewing
 them

* P. 142. § 4.

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them under those *Ideas* that recommend them Sect. VII.
to our Love, or that are connected, as I have 
hinted before, with *Self-interest*, such as their
being our *Children*, or at least of our *Species*,
partaking of our Nature, which we always re-
ckon a *lovely Form*, and which we never but
suppose capable of *Justice*, *Kindness*, *Gratitude*,
Generosity, and other morally good Qualities,
that suit with, and flatter our *Self-love*. And
our Benevolence to *rational Agents*, thus taking
its Rise from our having such *Ideas* of them,
as bear so direct a Relation to *ourselves*, we can-
not but allow, that it is not *disinterested*, but is
manifestly founded on *Self-interest*.

NOR can I think with our *Author*, "That
" the most useful Action imaginable loses all
" Appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we
" discern that it only flowed from *Self-love*, or
" *Interest*." For tho' a Man should relieve the
Poor, redeem Captives, assert the Liberties of
the oppressed, or do any such useful Action to
his Fellow-men, only from the *Pleasure* he has
in their Happiness, *that is*, as our *Author* like-
wise understands it, from *Self-love* or *Interest*;
I suppose no Body will imagine, that such kind
Actions are done without any Degree of Bene-
volence. 'Tis true our *Author* does not seem,
in this Particular, to understand *Self-interest* in
that Sense wherein I here take it, and as he
makes Use of it himself in other Instances:

Nor is it
true, there
can be no
Benevolence
in the most
useful Acti-
ons, because
it flows
from such
Ideas.

A 2

But

Sect. VII. But one must argue according to the Nature of Things. And, I hope, this Gentleman will give me leave to observe, he does not always affix the same *Ideas* to *Self-love*, *Interest*, and the like, which cannot but prove the Cause of a good deal of Mistake and false Reasoning; whereof we have an Instance in the Point just now before us. For here he remarks, that *we never call that Man benevolent, who is in Fact useful to others, but at the same Time only intends his own* (I would call it *false* or *mistaken*) *Interest, without any Desire of, or Delight in the Good of others*: (Which I always apprehend as an essential Ingredient in one's *true Interest*.) And indeed every Mortal must say so; for there can be no other Thing meant by *Benevolence*, than a *Desire of, or a Delight in the Good of others*. So that when a Man is without any such Good-will towards others, he can never be call'd *benevolent*; because he has really *no Sort* of Benevolence at all, whether disinterested, or otherwise, how useful soever his external Actions may be to us. But this can make Nothing to the present Purpose; for the Question is here, when a Man has Benevolence towards others, *that is*, when he bears us Good-will, and heartily wishes our Happiness, or sincerely desires and delights in our Good, I say, the Question is here, from whence springs *this Benevolence*? And from what I have hitherto said, I hope, it appears, that it plainly arises from *Self-interest*.

So

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 371

So that I will beg Leave to conclude, in **Sect. VII.** Opposition to our Author *, that *since all our Love to rational Agents, proceeds only from Self-interest, there is no Action that can be disinterested as far as it flows from Love to rational Agents.* And therefore the Love of Benevolence, as well as the Love of Esteem, arises from Self-interest, or is excited by Ideas that correspond to Self-love.

OUR Author having next proposed to find, if some other Affections in which Virtue may be placed, do arise from Self-love, he instances in *Fear, or Reverence, arising from an Apprehension of Goodness, Honour, and Justice.* Upon which he observes, that *the same Arguments which prove Love of Esteem to be disinterested, will prove this honourable Reverence to be so too.* After the same Manner it may be shewn, that Fear or Reverence do likewise arise from Self-interest.

And, in like Manner, I do assure him that the same Reasoning I have used to shew, that the Love of Esteem is founded on *Self-interest*, will serve likewise to make it appear, that this reverential Fear springs from the same Principle: So that I need not insist upon this Point. Only I shall remark from our Author, that this honourable Reverence plainly arises from an Apprehension of amiable Qualities, *i. e.* Qualities which give us Pleasure, or that flatter our *Self-love* (for I can understand nothing else by their being amiable) in the Person who is the Object of it. And since it is the *Amiableness* of, or the *Pleasure* we perceive from, some particular Qualities, such as Goodness, Power, Justice, apprehended to be employed in our Fa-

A a 2

your,

* P. 142. * P. 145. § 5.

Self-interest. *our*, which inspires us with this Affection towards those rational Agents, who exert these Qualities for our Advantage, 'tis very manifest, that this honourable Reverence arises from *Self-interest*.

S E C T. VIII.

'Tis proposed to vindicate some Objections made to Mr. H-'s Principles.

THAT which falls next in my Way, is to consider how our Author removes those Objections which he starts himself against his own Principles. And, I hope, what I shall have Occasion here to observe, will cast a further Light on this Argument.

1. We love the Beneficent from Self-interest.

THE first, he says, occurs from considering, "That nothing so effectually excites our Love toward rational Agents, as their Beneficence to us *," *to which he afterwards adds*, that "Bounty toward ourselves is a stronger Incitement to Love, than equal Bounty toward others; whence, *says he*, we are led to imagine that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from *Self-interest*."

For our Love is consequent to the Bounty

IN answering of this Objection, our Author, I beg leave to say, goes intirely off the Question, and argues against a mistaken Notion of his own, which by no Means relates to the Purpose. For he all along supposes, that this *Self-interest*, which is here represented as the Spring of

* P. 146, &c.

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See, VIII



of that Love which we bear to beneficent Persons, consists in some Advantage or other, that is *subsequent* to it, and in procuring of which our Love serves only as a Means. Whereas this Love, as our Author is at great Pains to shew, is certainly the *Effect* or Consequent of that Bounty or Beneficence which rational Agents bestow on us; as the Objection, as it is here stated, plainly intimates. And I am clearly of this Gentleman's Opinion, that was our Love of another Person antecedent *in every Respect* to his Bounty toward us, we might be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain as heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices; which, as I have before remarked, is, without doubt, impossible. Besides that, according to this Supposition, as our Author likewise observes, our Love must cease towards one, who has ruined himself in kind Offices to us, when he can advance our Fortunes no farther. But though our Love of the Beneficent is, beyond Dispute, consequent to their Bounty, I do not see how it follows from hence, that it does not spring from *Self-interest*; when, in my Opinion, we cannot have a stronger Proof of the contrary.

I suppose our Author will allow, that every Object of Bounty feels himself inspired with some particular Desires or Appetites, which he wants to have gratified, and in the Gratification whereof he has *Pleasure*, or finds his Interest: So that when a rational Agent adapts himself

Which re-
lieves some
Desires or
Appetites in
our Nature:

SECT. VIII. to an Object of Bounty, and entertains him with such Things as are suitable to his Appetites, this Benevolence cannot but prove exceeding grateful, and the Pleasure which one perceives from such Bounty, cannot but make one sensible of the most friendly Affections towards the liberal Donor. From which it appears, that as we love the Beneficent, in consequence of their Bounty, so the Love we bear them manifestly flows from *Self-interest*, or from the Pleasure with which their Liberality entertains us.

And these being more sensibly felt in our own Case than in that of others; we cannot but particularly affect those that are beneficent to us.

AND 'tis very evident, " how that Bounty
 " towards ourselves, must be much more power-
 " ful to excite Love, than equal Bounty towards
 " others: " For every Man is much more feel-
 ingly touched with his own Wants, or with his
 own Desires and Appetites, than he can be with
 those of other People; and cannot therefore but
 have a quicker Sense of Pleasure from what an-
 swers his own Case, and consequently a higher
 Degree of Love towards those Persons, who
 thus gratify him, or favour his Interest, than
 he can possibly be sensible of from equal or
 greater Bounty conferred on others. And our
 Author's Reasoning, upon this Point, comes
 much to the same Purpose: For he observes
 very justly, " That in the Benefits which we
 " receive ourselves, we are more fully sensible
 " of their Value, and of the Circumstances of
 " the Action, which are Evidences of a gene-
 rous Temper in the Donor; and from the good
 " Opinion

" Opinion we have of ourselves, we are apt to
 " look upon the Kindness as better imploy'd,
 " than when it is bestowed on others, of whom
 " perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments."
 Which, if I can understand the Meaning of
 Words, is plainly to say, " That *Self-interest*
 " determines us to higher Degrees of Love to-
 " wards the Beneficent, when they are bountiful
 " to ourselves, than when they are so to other
 " People."

NOR is it at all sufficient to disprove this,
 (as our Author would have it) to alledge,
 That *Bounty from a Donor apprehended as moral-
 ly evil, or extorted by Force, or conferred with some
 View of Self-interest, will not procure real Love.*
 For when we consider, that Beneficence does
 not so much ly in external Offices, as in the
 inward Affections of the Mind, and is a friend-
 ly Action, which one intelligent Mind, or ra-
 tional Agent, voluntarily does to another, for
 the Good or Interest of the *Beneficiary* (1); it

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There is however no loving of those Persons whose Minds are not engag'd in our Favour, while they pretend to do us external Services.

(1) Non potest beneficium manu tangi, sed animo geritur. Multum interest inter materiam beneficii, & beneficium. Itaque nec aurum, nec argentum, nec quicquam eorum quæ a proximis accipiuntur, beneficium est, sed ipsa tribuentis voluntas. Imperiti autem, id quod oculis incurrit, & quod traditur, possidenturque, solum notant: contra, illud quod in re charum atque pretiosum est, parvipendunt. — Quid est ergo beneficium? benevola actio tribuens gaudium, capiensque tribuendo, in id quod facit prona, & sponte sua parata. Itaque non quid fiat, aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente. Quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo. Senec. de Benef. Lib. 1. Cap. 5, 6.

Seft. VIII. does not appear, that, in these Instances juſt now mentioned, particularly the two laſt, there is any Beneficence at all, without which our Love can never be excited.

We may indeed affect a Donor of the worſt Character, tho not near ſo much as one of the beſt equally kind to us.

I will not here debate, whether a Man morally evil, is capable of beneficent Actions. I ſhall only obſerve, that when we view him in this Light, or behold him as *beneficent*, 'tis impoſſible but we muſt give him our real Love; though at the ſame Time, when we take in his whole Character, and attend to his morally evil Qualities (which are all contrary to *Self-love*) this again raiſes our Aversion: So that here is real Love, and real Hatred, ariſing from the different Lights in which the ſame Perſon may appear to us; which is ſufficient Evidence, that our Author's Obſervation, in general, is not very juſt; and gives us a good Reason, why our Love would not be the ſame towards the worſt Characters, as it is towards the beſt, if they were equally bountiful to us.

But we can never affect that Man who is forc'd to do us Service.

BUT when a Man's Services are extorted from him, we do not conceive, there is in this Caſe *any Sort of Beneficence*, becauſe we plainly ſee, that his *Mind* is utterly *averse to us*, or that his inward Affections, as a rational Agent, are quite contradictory to our *Interest*; on which Account we cannot but be affected with Contempt and Hatred againſt him, how much ſoever

ver

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 377

ver we may happen to like any external Offices Sect. VIII.
he is forced to do us (1). ~

AND as to that Man, who is liberal to us with some View of mistaken *Self-interest*, (I call it *mistaken* or *false*, here and elsewhere, because, according to the Nature of Things, the *Interest* of one rational Agent, can never be inconsistent with that of another, as is plain from my *Enquiry*) I say, as to that Man, who is liberal to us with some View of mistaken *Self-interest*, that is, with a *Design*, as our Author explains it, to *allure us into something dishonourable*, which is the same as to say, into something contrary to *Self-interest*, he can never be counted beneficent, so as to offer himself to us as an Object of Love; since we clearly see, that in all his Bounty towards us, he intends nothing with respect to us (so far as we apprehend it) but to involve us in such Circumstances, as should expose us to Disgrace and Misery (2).
Which

Nor can we value him who, by his Services, means to involve us in something cross to our Interest.

(1) Οὐτε γὰρ αἱ μὴ ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπερβίαι χάριτες ἡμῶν ἐδίδκην ἔτι, ἔτι τὰ ἀφροδίσια τὰ βίαια, ἡδὲ αἱ ἐφάμετο. ὡσαύτως ποῖον ἔστι αἱ ὑπερβίαι ἐπὶ τῶν φοβημένων πικρὴ ἐστίν. Xenoph. de Regn. Ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ τὰς διὰς, τοῖσι μὲν ἔχοντι ὑπερβίαις, εἰ ἐπιδίην ἀνάγκη ὑπερεῖναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν μὲν δοκῇ ἡδὲ. διὰ δὲ γινώσκον δοκῶντι ὅτι ἐννοίᾳ καὶ φιλῶν τῇ ἡμῶν τὸ δῖον συλλαμβάνουσιν, τῶν αὖ μὴ δοκῶν καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ῥᾶν φέρον ἢ τὰς μισούντας μὲν, ἔκπλεον δὲ πάντα ἀνάγκη διαπορευόμενοι. Id. de Instit. Cyr. Lib. 3.

(1) Videndum est primum ne oblit benignitas & iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, & cæteris. — Nam & qui gratificantur cuiquam, quod oblit illi cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici, neque liberales, sed perniciosi

SECT. VIII. Which, in my Opinion, is so glaring a Proof, that we love our Benefactors from *Self-interest*, or because they give us *Pleasure*, and promote our Happiness by their kind Offices, that I am surprized how our Author has fallen upon this Instance, which makes so directly against his Principles.

So that one may say, We love the Beneficent as we do a Field or Garden, viz. from Pleasure or Interest.

BUT he asks, " Can any Man say, that he only loves the Beneficent, as he does a Field or Garden, because of its Advantage? His Love then must cease towards one who has ruined himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object, which ceases to be useful, unless a poetical *Prosopopœia* animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. " Yes, I do own, that our Love to the Beneficent flows from the same Principle, which that proceeds from (if it can be called Love) which we bear to inanimate, or irrational Beings that are useful to us, viz. *Self-interest*, or Pleasure (1).

BUT

ciosi assentatores judicandi sunt. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 1. "Ον γὰρ ὃν ἡγήσωνται πρὸς τὸ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς φρονιμώτερον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι, τότε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπερβολῶς πείθονται. — ποτε δὲ οἷον) παιδόμενοι κακὸν πλὴν ἡμῶν, ἔτι ζημίαις πάντοτε θέλουν ἔκλειν, ἔτι δόξαι ἐπαίρειν. ἔτι γὰρ τὰ δῶρα ὅτι τῷ ἑαυτῷ κακῷ ἔχον ἔστι λαμβάνει. Xenoph. de Instit. Cyr. Lib. 1.

(1) Οἱ δὲ φίλοι, ἢν τις ἐπίσταιται αὐτοῖς χρηστὸν ὥστε ἀφελῆσαι αὐτῶν. τί φήσομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι; χρήματα, ἢ Διῶ, ἢ Κερτόβουλα; καὶ πάλυ γε μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς βύς. ἢ ἀφελιμώτεροι

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BUT then I say, that our Love to rational Agents, under the Notion of Beneficent, is of a more *elegant* Nature, and cannot but, on many Accounts, be vastly stronger and higher. For, besides that they entertain us with those Pleasures which a Field or Garden afford to us, that can only gratify our Minds by means of our Body, as we are Animals; they derive to us numberless other Satisfactions as we are *rational Agents*; they bear our *Image*, or they partake of our Nature; and from their own Choice, with Good-will and *Esteem* towards us, they cheerfully direct and accompany us in all our Fortunes, still lessening our Griefs, and heightning our Joys, and always supporting us

But then our Love toward our Benefactors, is of a more elegant Nature, much stronger and higher.

ἡ δὲ τῶν βοῶν. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 5. Κάτιτοι περὶ τοῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων ἐξασφαλόμεθα φίλοι ἀγαθοί, ἐκ δὲ πολλῶν κρείττων φαίνεται; ποῖον δὲ ἴσμεν, ἢ ποῖον ζεύγος ἔστω χρησίμων, ὥστε ὁ χρηστὸς φίλος; ποῖον δὲ ἀνδράποδον ἔστω εὐνὴ καὶ ἐξασφάμενον; ἢ ποῖον ἄλλο κτῆμα ἔστω πᾶν χρηστόν; ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάπητι περὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐλλείπον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων κατασκευῆς, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν προεξίει. καὶ ἂν τί πῃ εὖ ποιῆσαι δεῖ, συνεπαύμα ἂν τί περὶ τοῦ ταρβήν, συμφορῆς, τὰ μὲν συναλίσκων, τὰ δὲ συμπερίων, καὶ τὰ μὲν συμπίδων, τὰ δὲ βιάζομαι καὶ εὖ μὲν προεπίονταί, πλεῖστα εὐφραίνων, σφαλλόμενος δὲ πλεῖστα ἐπανορθῶν. αἱ δὲ αἶτι χεῖρες ἐκείνῳ ὑπηρετοῦν, καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ προφύσσει, καὶ τὰ ὅσα προακύνει, καὶ οἱ πόδες διανύουσιν, τέτων φίλος ἐνερgeticὸν ἐλπίδος λέγει. πολλάκις αὖ περὶ αὐτῶν περὶ ἢ ἐκ ἐξήγησας, ἢ ἐκ ἐλπίδος, ἢ ἐκ ἡμετέρας, ἢ ἐκ διηγήσεως, ταῦτα ὁ φίλος περὶ τὸν φίλον ἐξήγησας ἄλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐνιοὶ μὲν διήγησας πηρὶν διηγάμεν, τὸ χαρπύ ἐνεκάν τὸ δὲ παρορῶντα κτήματι, ὁ καλῶς φίλος, ἀργῶς καὶ ἀναιμῶς οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπιμέλονται. Id. ibid. Lib. 2.

Seet. VIII. in our Pursuits after Happiness (1). And when rational Agents appear to us in this Light, they recommend themselves to that Love and Esteem,

(1) Est autem amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia & caritate summa consensio ; qua quidem haud scio an, excepta sapientia, quicquam melius homini sit a Diis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii præponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Belluarum hoc quidem extremum est : illa autem superiora, caduca, & incerta, posita non tam in nostris consiliis, quam in fortunæ temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, præclare illi quidem : sed hæc ipsa virtus amicitiam & gignit & continet ; nec sine virtute esse ullo pacto potest. — Tales igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio, cui potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, qui non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescat ? Quid dulcius quam habere, qui cum omnia audeas sic loqui, ut tecum ? Quis esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis æque, ac tu ipse, gauderet ? Adversas vero ferre difficilius esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam, quam tu, ferret. Denique cæteræ res, quæ expetuntur, opportune sunt singulæ rebus fere singulis : divitiæ, ut utare ; opes, ut colare ; honores, ut laudare ; voluptates, ut gaudeas ; valetudo, ut dolore careas, & muneribus fungare corporis. Amicitia res plurimas continet : quoquo te verteris, præsto est ; nullo loco excluditur ; nunquam intempestiva ; nunquam molesta est. Itaque, non aqua, non igni, non aere, ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur, quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de vulgari, aut de mediocri (quæ tamen ipsa & delectat, & prodest) sed de vera & perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam & secundas res splendidiore facit amicitia, & adversas patiens communicansque, leviores. Cumque plurimas & maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum præstat omnibus, quod bona spe præluceat in posterum ; nec debilitari animos, aut cadere patitur : verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tanquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Cic. de Amicit,

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esteem, which 'tis impossible that inanimate or Sect. VIII.
irrational Beings can at any Rate be the Ob-
jects of.

NOR can it ever follow from this Principle, that our *Love* or *Gratitude* must cease towards our *Benefactor*, when we understand he can do us no more Service, or minister no more Pleasure to us: For as this can never happen (it being in the Power of the meanest Mortal to entertain us with his good Opinion and Love, in which, as our Author observes, *we necessarily delight*, even when we expect no other Advantage) so when we reflect on the kind Offices that have been done us, we at the same Time recollect what were our Circumstances when we received them. By which Means we put ourselves back to that Part of our Life, where we were under such Wants, or under the Cravings of such Appetites, and conceiving, that such a Man generously relieved us, and thereby gave us Pleasure, and perhaps brought us to this easy Condition, in which we now are, we cannot but be sensible (without the Assistance of a poetical *Prosopopæia* to raise an imaginary Gratitude) of the most friendly Affections towards him, and gratefully acknowledge his Beneficence, though now we know he can profit us no more, if it be not still to retain his Good-will to us, and to follow us with his hearty Good-wishes, which we cannot but find

Nor will Self-love suffer us to quit our kind Affections and Gratitude toward our Benefactors, tho now they can only oblige us with their kind Wishes.

SECT. VIII. find very acceptable, or, as our Author speaks *,
 wonderfully delightful (1).

And as
 Self-love
 thus deter-
 mines us to
 affect our
 own Bene-
 factors, so it
 likewise
 sways us to
 value those
 that are be-
 neficent to
 others.

THUS, I think, it manifestly appears, that we love the Beneficent from *Self-interest*. And it is very certain, that the same Principle determines us to love not only those Persons that are beneficent to ourselves, but such likewise as are beneficent to others. For, according to what I have before observed, we can have no *Sense* or Perception of the *Goodness* of those Qualities which are exerted by rational Agents, but by considering ourselves *fit Objects* to whom they may be apply'd, or, *which is the same Thing*, by imagining ourselves in the Circumstances of those Persons towards whom they are exerted; that by thus putting ourselves under the *Influence* of these Qualities, we may judge whether they give us *Pleasure*, and tend to promote our Happiness (2). 'Tis impossible, in my Opinion, for a Man to have any Notion of Beneficence, in any particular Instance, as a good Thing, unless he knows there

* P. 164.

(1) Benefica voluntate benevolentia movetur, etiam si res forte non suppetit. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2.

(1) Καὶ χαλῶς γὰρ νῦν δείξῃ, ὃ Σωκράτης, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ δειζόμενον τὸ χαλόν. Σω. ἔκυν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ; ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν χαλοῖν διαίτηρον κάλλιον ἢ, ἢ τῷ ὑπέρω τέτοιον, ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον, κάλλιον ἔσται ἢ τοῖς ἡδονῇ, ἢ ωφελείᾳ, ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; καὶ ὅταν δὲ διὰ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἔτερον ἢ ἢ τοῖς λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον, αἰσχρὸν ἔσται, ἢ ἐκ ἀνάγκης; Plat. in Gorg. See above the Quot. from Andron. P. 319.

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there are some particular Appetites in the *Beneficiary*, or in human Nature, so and so circumstantiated, to which it corresponds, or which it serves to gratify. But how shall one know this, without attending to the *various Touches* of his own Bosom, as he should be affected in such particular Circumstances? This, I would fain think, is indisputable, and cannot but be reckoned an undeniable Proof, that as we perceive the Goodness of beneficent Actions from their Correspondency to *Self-love*; so we affect and value the Authors of these Actions, from a certain Apprehension of the *Pleasure* we should enjoy in the Circumstances of those Persons to whom they are apply'd.


It is true, we conceive *Good-liking* and *Esteem* toward such as are *beneficent to others*, from the Satisfaction we have in those others being happy by their Means. But this Regard for the Happiness of others, from which we value their Benefactors, is likewise founded in *Self-interest*. I suppose all the World will confess, that our Benevolence can never be excited without the *Intervention* of some Ideas: And I have before observed *, that those Ideas wherein we apprehend the Objects of our Benevolence, have a manifest Relation to *one's Self*. Thus, when we see a Being that is like ourselves, sharing in our Nature, or bearing our Image; in these Ideas we conceive Good-liking towards

* P. 366.

Sec. VIII. towards him: And if this Being, who thus resembles us, likewise appears to us bearing virtuous Affections, which, in every Instance wherein we can be supposed to have Intercourse together, expressly *promise* us Safety and Happiness; our Benevolence in these additional Ideas must necessarily prove strong and hearty. So that the Ideas that recommend other Beings to our Benevolence, thus plainly involving *ourselves* or *our Interest*, 'tis pretty manifest, that we affect the Objects of our *Benevolence* from *Self-love*.

Now we are all conscious, when once we come to conceive benevolent Dispositions toward other Beings, that *this State of Mind* naturally gives us Joy in their Happiness, and makes us *uneasy* at their Misery. And as, in this Manner, we depend in our Pleasures and Pains upon the Circumstances of other People; so from hence it necessarily follows, that those who are beneficent to others, *that is*, those who *relieve* the Objects of our Benevolence from Pain and Trouble, and, by imparting Good to them, make them *cheerful* and *happy*, do thereby, at the same Time, likewise *relieve* our Minds from Uneasiness, and entertain us with *agreeable Perceptions*, whilst they gratify our benevolent Dispositions, that give us a Concern for the Comfort and Wellbeing of those Persons on whom they have bestow'd their Bounty. Upon which, when we sensibly feel that the Beneficent are thus *conspiring* with our Dispositions,

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sitions, and do therein contribute to our *Pleasure*, Sect. VIII.
'tis unavoidable but we must affect them from 
Self-interest. Nor can it well be doubted that
we affect the Beneficent from this Principle, if
we further consider, that our Love towards
them bears always a *Proportion* to the Good-
liking or Concern we have for the *Beneficiary*.
'Tis natural, and universally felt in Experience,
when any Being employs his Beneficence in
behalf of our near *Relations* or particular *Friends*,
that, in this Case, our Love toward that Being
rises much higher, than when he employs his
Beneficence in behalf of other People, in whom
we are not so nearly interested: And as for
such as are beneficent to those to whom we are
bound by no particular Ties of Kindred or
Friendship, 'tis plain that we affect and value
them, according as, in the Conduct of their kind
Affections, or in the Application of their Boun-
ty, they observe *Cicero's* (1) Rule, which di-
rects

B b

rects

(1) *Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia delectus esset dignitatis; in quo & mores ejus erunt spectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur. — Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus, pleneque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus præclare agitur, si sint simulacra virtutis: etiam hoc intelligendum puto, neminem omnino esse negligendum, in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat; colendum autem esse ita quemque maxime, ut quisque maxime his virtutibus lenioribus erit ornatus modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa, de qua jam multa dicta sunt, justitia. Nam fortis animus & magnus in homine non perfecto, nec sapiente, ferventior plerumque est; illæ vero virtutes virum bonum videntur potius attingere.*
De Offic. Lib. 1.

Sec. VIII rectis us to proportion our Benevolence to Peoples Virtues, or their moral Dispositions; which are Ideas, wherein they appear to us, that relate to ourselves, and, as they prevail in any Object, make us less or more sensible of an Interest in their Happiness. And this, I say, makes it further manifest, that we love those who are beneficent to others, from Self-interest.

Mean
while, the
Benefactor
affects the
Beneficiary,
more than
the Benefi-
ciary does the
Benefactor,
because the
former con-
ceives him-
self existing
in the latter;
whereas the
latter does
not thus ap-
prehend him-
self in the
former.

BUT there is a Question that seems here to deserve our Notice: *Whence is it, that the Benefactor has a greater and more tender Liking for the Beneficiary, than the Beneficiary for the Benefactor?* How our Author will be pleased with Aristotle's Explication of this Phenomenon in the Affections of intelligent Beings, I know not; but to me it appears very ingenious. In short, this Philosopher observes (1), "That
" every

(1) Οἱ δ' ἐνεργῶς τὰς ἐνεργηθέντας ἀκῶς μᾶλλον φιλοῦσι, ἢ οἱ ἐκ παθόντες τὰς δράσαντας. καὶ ὡς ὅτι λόγον ἔχοντες, ἐπὶ τούτοις. τοῖς μὲν ἔν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ἐπὶ οἷς μὲν ὁφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὁφείλει. καθάπερ ἐν ὅτῳ τῶν δυνάμεων, οἱ μὲν ὁφείλονται βύλῳ, μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὁφείλουσι, οἱ δὲ δυνάμενοι καὶ ὁφείλονται τῆς τῶν ὁφειλόντων σωτηρίας. ὅτω καὶ τὰς ἐνεργηθέντας βύλας, ὅτῳ τὰς παθόντας, ὡς κομισμένους τὰς χάριτας τοῖς δ' ἔκ εἶναι ὁφειλόμεναι τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Εἰς τὰς δ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτὰς, ἐκ πολλῶν διακρίσεων. ὅτι δ' ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἀμύμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκ πάσης, ἢ ποιῶν ἔστιν. ὁ δὲ δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἰτιον, καὶ ὅτι ὁμοίον τῷ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεων. ὅτι γὰρ οἱ φιλοῦσι πρὸς ὁμοίον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὰς βύλας τῆς κομιδῆς ἔνεκα, οἱ δ' ἐκ πολλοῦ φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τὰς ἐκ παθόντας, καὶ μὴ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι σίμιοι, καὶ οἱ οἷς ὕστερον γίνονται. ὅτι καὶ ὅτῳ τῶν τοιοῦτων συμβέβηκε πᾶς γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίον ἔργον ἀγαπᾶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπᾶται ἂν ὅτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ἐμψύχῳ γινώσκοντι. μάλιστα δ' ὅτῳ τῷ πρὸς

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“ every Man conceives his natural Powers, in Sect. VIII.

“ their Exercise and Effects, to be himself. So

“ that when a Benefactor exerts his Powers,

B b 2

“ and

ὅτι τὰς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει ὑποαγαπῶσι ὅς ἔστι τὰ οἰκία
ποιήματα, ὅτι γὰρ οἱ ὡς περὶ τέχνη. τοῦτο δὲ ἵσους ἐκ τῶν
ἐνεργημάτων, τὸ ὅς ἐν παροῦσιν ἔργον ὅτι αὐτῶν. τὸ δὲ ἀγα-
πῶσι μᾶλλον, ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα.

* Τὸ δὲ αἶτιον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον πᾶσι αἰρε-
τον ἐκείνῳ· ἐμὲν δὲ κυρίως ὅτι ἐν-
έργειαν ὡς ἐμὲν δὲ ἐνεργείαν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ
πράττειν· ὁ δὲ πρᾶττειν ἐνεργείαν, ὅτι ἐν
τῷ ἔργῳ. ἢ ὅς οἰκοδομικὸν, ὅς ἄλλος ἐκ τῆς
οἰκοδομίας, ἐνεργείαν ὅτι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. καὶ
ἔστι αὐτὸ ἢ οἰκία, καὶ ὁ οἰκία, ὁ τεχνίτης.

ὁμοίως καὶ πᾶς ἐνεργῶν ἐνεργείαν ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἢ τοῦτον οὐ-
σὶν μὲν ἐφίεσθαι τῷ ἴδιῳ, τὸ ἴδιον δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρᾶττειν, τὸ ἔρ-
γον δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ πρᾶττειν ἐνεργείαν, φάνερόν ἐστι καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ
τῷ περὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ ποῦτον ζητεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον εἶναι. οὐ-
σὶν δὲ περὶ φιλοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ βύλεται εἶναι· οὐσὶν δὲ φιλοῦ περὶ τὸ
ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον. ἔστι δὲ μάλιστα περὶ φιλοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα φι-
λοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, καὶ τὸ ἐνεργητέμενον, καὶ ὅτι ἔργον
ὅτι αὐτοῦ, μάλιστα φιλοῦ καὶ διὰ τὸ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἐνεργῆσαι.
ἢ ὅς μάλιστα φιλοῦ ὅτι περὶ φιλοῦ ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ
μὲν ἐνεργῆσαι ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ βέλπειν ἐνεργῆσαι, καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῦ
ὅτι τὸ ἐνεργῆσαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ καὶ χεῖρ τῷ ἐν πάσῃ, ὅτι ἐν
αὐτῷ θεωρεῖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθόν. — — — ἐπὶ τὰ πᾶσι κτηνῶν

τα σφόδρα μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοῦται τῶν ἐξ ὧν κατεργάζονται· ὅ-
τι καὶ τὰ χημέατα οἱ κτηνῶν, τῶν διατεταμένων μᾶλλον
φιλοῦται. ἔστι δὲ ἄπορον μὲν τὸ ἐν πάσῃ, ἐργῶδες δὲ τὸ ἐν
ποιεῖν· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πάσῃ ἐν τῷ ἐνεργητέμενον, τὸ δὲ ἐν
ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἐνεργῆσαι καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ ἐνεργητέμενον μᾶλλον ἢ
τὸ ἐνεργῆσαι φιλοῦται. καὶ διὰ τὸ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοῦται ὅτι
μᾶλλον, ὅτι πᾶσι γινώσκει, ἢ οἱ παῖδες φιλοῦται, τὸ καὶ ὅτι
ὑπὸ τῷ τεχνῆσαι ποιεῖται. καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσους αἱ μητέρες, ὅτι ὅτι
οἱ παῖδες, ἢ οἱ παῖδες ὅτι αὐτοῖς περιήραρον ἐς τὸ βίον.
πᾶσι δὲ ὁδοῦται εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἐνεργῆσαι οἰκία. Arist. Eth.
Lib. 9. Cap. 7. And says Seneca, Non mentiar, si dixe-
ro neminem non amare beneficia sua, neminem non ita com-
positum animo, ut non libentius eum videat in quem multa
concessit; cui non causa sit iterum dandi beneficii, semel do-
diffe. De Benefic. Lib. 4.

Sect. VIII. "and thereby imparts Good or Happiness to
 "another Person; he looks upon this other,
 "the Beneficiary, as he has receiv'd the Ef-
 "fects of his Powers, or is possess'd of the
 "Good he has imparted, to be his *Workman-*
 "*ship*, wherein he has an *Existence*, and which
 "therefore he cannot but embrace with the
 "same Tenderness he does himself: Whereas
 "the Beneficiary, being only passive, does not
 "apprehend himself thus existing in the Bene-
 "factor, and cannot therefore be sensible of
 "such tender Affections towards him." This
 is *Aristotle's* Account of the Matter; from which
 one may easily understand, that, in the Opinion
 of this Philosopher, *Self-love* universally pre-
 vails, and gives Life to our kindest and most
 social Dispositions.

Another
 Objection
 vindicated,
 viz.

BECAUSE the *third* and last Objection which
 our Author proposes against his own Principles,
 is pretty nearly related to what I have been just
 now observing, I shall here consider it.

* Virtue is
 pursued
 from the
 concomitant
 Pleasure.

Perhaps, says he, *Virtue* is pursued because of
 the concomitant Pleasure. To which he answers,
First, by observing, That this plainly supposes a
 Sense of *Virtue* antecedent to Ideas of Advantage,
 upon which this Advantage is founded; and that,
 from the very Frame of our Nature, we are de-
 termined to perceive Pleasure in the Practice of
Virtue, and to approve it, when practised by our-
 selves or others *.

HERE

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HERE again I am at a Loss to conceive what sec. VIII.
our Author understands by a *Sense of Virtue* 
antecedent to Ideas of Advantage, upon which this And Pleasure or Advantage being the only Standard whereby we can judge of the Virtue or Goodness of moral Actions,
Advantage is founded. For my Part, I know
no one Action of an intelligent Being, that can
be called virtuous on any other Account, than
from its Correspondency to *Self-interest*, or its
Fitness to promote the Happiness of one's Na-
ture. Thus, our Actions towards the *Deity*
are called virtuous, because they are suitable
to his *Self-love*; as, on the other Hand, the Ac-
tions of the *Deity* towards us, are called virtu-
ous, because they are adapted to the *Interest* of
human Nature: And a whole System of ratio-
nal Agents that have Intercourse with one ano-
ther, their Actions are called virtuous, when
they mutually contribute to promote each other's
Happiness. And I hope no Body will condemn
this Principle, till he has once impartially ex-
amined what I have said to support it in the
foregoing Enquiry.

SO that since *Self-interest*, or *Pleasure*, is the
only Standard by which we can judge of the
Virtue, i. e. the *Value* or *Goodness* of any Ac-
tion whatsoever, I do not see how a *Sense of*
Virtue can be antecedent to *Ideas* of Advan-
tage. But how comes it to pass, that *Virtue's*
being pursu'd because of the concomitant Plea-
sure, plainly supposes a *Sense of Virtue* antece-
dent to *Ideas* of Advantage? I hope our Au-
thor has not forgot, that he allows, we pursue
or purchase Pictures, Statues, Landskips, from

There can be no Sense or Perception of Virtue antecedent to Ideas of Advantage.

Sect. VIII. *Self-interest*, or because of the concomitant Pleasure; and yet, I fancy, he will never say, that this plainly supposes a Sense of Pictures, &c. antecedent to *Ideas* of Advantage. Nor can I conceive why the Pleasure, which is always a Concomitant of *virtuous Actions*, is not as much a Motive of *Self-interest* in Matters of *Virtue*, as it is in the Case of Statues and Landskips. I own indeed, that, from the Frame of our Nature, we are determin'd to perceive Pleasure in the Practice of *Virtue*, and to approve it, when practis'd by ourselves, or others: But then I still contend, that it is *this Pleasure* we perceive in *Virtue*, that has this Influence upon us; or, that the sole Ingredient in the Frame of our Nature, that determines us to approve and pursue *Virtue*, is *Self-love* or *Interest*.

'Tis indeed
alleg'd, that
all *Virtue* is
not pleasant,
particularly
Sorrow
Pity, &c.
virtuous
Passions
whereby we
relieve the
Oppress'd.

BUT that which strikes directly against this Objection, is what our *Author* observes further. "May we not, *says he*, justly question whether all *Virtue* is pleasant? Or, whether we are not determin'd to some amiable Actions in which we find no Pleasure?" This, I say, lies directly against the Objection. And to make it out, he represents "Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy, and Pity, which are *virtuous Passions* of the Mind, as all over Pain and Uneasiness, without any concomitant Pleasure: So that when, from the Influence of these Passions, we exert ourselves into Action, 'tis not any Pleasure that determines us, but merely the Uneasiness we find ourselves under. From whence

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" whence it follows, that in all our Attempts Seet. VIII.

" to relieve the Miserable, or to do any such

" friendly Offices, to which these Affections

" excite us, we do not act from *Self-interest*;

" or with a View to remove our Uneasiness :

" For if our sole Intention in Compassion or

" Pity, were the Removal of our Pain, we

" should run away, shut our Eyes, divert our

" Thoughts from the miserable Object, which

" we seldom do: Nay, we crowd about such

" Objects, and voluntarily run into Pain, unless

" Reason, and Reflection upon our Inability to

" relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination,

" or some selfish Affection, as Fear of

" Danger, overbalances it. And tho the Uneasiness

" of these Passions determines us to endeavour

" an Alteration in the State of the Object,

" but not otherwise to remove the painful

" Affection, while the Occasion is unalter'd ;

" yet the Alteration intended in the State of

" the Object by such Passions, is never imagin'd

" to be a private Good to the Agent, as it always

" is in the selfish Passions. Which further

" shews, that these Affections are neither

" chosen for their concomitant Pleasure, nor

" voluntarily brought on with a View to private

" Good. So that there must of Necessity be

" some other Motive, that determines us to

" assist the Oppress'd, defend the Injur'd, and

" the like, than any Thing that can affect us

" from these Passions; which can be no other

B b 4


" Thing,

Sect. VIII. " Thing, than a natural kind Instinct, " as our
 And 'tis Author elsewhere observes.

confess'd
 that if these
 Passions
 were made
 up only of
 Pain, we
 cou'd not
 exert them
 from Self
 love.

THIS, I suppose, is the Strength of our *Author's* Reasoning upon this Point. And I do own, that if these Affections determine us, as they certainly do, to help or succour the Oppressed, we are not influenc'd by *Self-love* in such generous Actions, upon Supposition, that these Passions are only painful, or that the Objects which excite them, affect us only with Uneasiness. But, at the same Time, I must say, that if the Objects of those Passions deriv'd to us no other Sensations but such as are painful, we should be so far from assisting them, or running to their Relief, that, on the contrary, we should necessarily flee from them, and consult our own Ease, by getting out of the Reach of such Objects as entertain'd us with nothing but Misery, and so leave them to struggle alone under all their Misfortunes. This infallibly would be the Case; and it never fails to happen so, when miserable Objects assault our Minds (which require to be touch'd gently, in order to feel the Movements of these delicate Passions) in too rough and insolent a Manner, and impress us with such Violence, that we are sensible of nothing but Pain and Uneasiness. For on all such Occasions we can be affected no otherwise, than we naturally find ourselves, when a Man is pursuing us with Instruments of Misery, that present us with nothing but Anguish and Affliction. So that when these Passions determine us

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us to appear in Defence of the Miserable, they must certainly be made up of something else than Uneasiness. 

AND is it not very manifest, that they carry a good deal of Love and Benevolence towards those Persons, who are the Objects of them? Or, do they not plainly imply a very sensible *Pleasure* in the Safety and Happiness of those Persons, for whose Sake or Interest they are exerted? This I might shew with respect to every one of those particular Passions here mention'd. But our *Author*, himself seems to give up the Question, when he allows, that *all the Passions and Affections justify themselves*, or that we approve our being in such a Manner affected on such an Occasion, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected: For how is it possible, that this Approbation can be without some concomitant Pleasure? Besides that, he calls those *Passions* or *Dispositions*, lovely and good, by which one can only understand pleasant and delightful. And indeed, 'tis utterly impossible there can be any one Affection of the Mind, that contains nothing but pure Pain and Uneasiness. For when a Man, under the Influence of any Passion, finds himself uneasy from what immediately affects himself; this manifestly flows from the Love he bears himself, or the Delight he has in his own Happiness; and when he happens to be disturb'd from what afflicts, or is grievous to other People, this certainly springs from the Love he bears them, or the Delight

he

But they are mixed Passions, containing both Pleasure and Pain:

Sec. VIII. he has in their Happiness. For, had we no Pleasure in our own, or other Peoples Well-being, we should questionless be indifferent, whatever Events happen'd either to them, or ourselves. So that since every Passion, where there is any Uneasiness, does certainly take its Rise, and all along exerts itself, from Love, Pleasure, or Interest; it must necessarily be of a compounded Nature, and, while it lasts, consist of both Pleasure and Pain. And this all the World are sensible of, since that every such Affection is universally call'd a *pleasing Anguish*, a *generous Sympathy*, and the like, or, as our *Author* terms it, an *uneasy benevolent Passion*, which always denotes a mixed Affection.

That are
two Powers
conspiring
together for
the Relief of
the Miser-
able.

FROM which I shall observe, that when a Man is under the Influence of any such Passions, he is animated in his Pursuits both from *Pleasure* and *Pain*; which, in such Instances, do always mutually assist one another, and are like two Forces impelling the same Body with the same Direction. And this cannot but oblige one to admire the great Goodness of the *Author of Nature*, and his fatherly Concern for the Happiness of Mankind, who has thus secur'd our mutually assisting one another in all our Afflictions, not only from a reciprocal Love, but from a tender Fellow-feeling, or a generous *Sympathy*, whereby we are blended or knit together in the same common Lot, so as to take Part in each other's Distresses.

IN

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IN the mean while 'tis here to be remarked, that in all those Passions, whereby we are excited to relieve the Miserable, the main Thing that determines us, or that which is directly intended, is the *Pleasure* we have in the Safety and Happiness of those Persons, about whom these Affections are imploy'd; to which the *Pain*, wherewith they are mixed, serves only as a powerful Auxiliary, that eggs us on in our Endeavours to become Masters of that Satisfaction. Thus, when I find my self exposed to Misery from any dangerous Objects, I become immediately sensible of Fear, Anger, Sorrow, and the like; and from the Pain I therein feel, complicated with a strong Delight in my own Preservation, I necessarily flee from those Objects, directly towards that *Pleasure* I have in my own Safety. And, in like Manner, when we see others exposed or involved, we fly to their Assistance with a direct secret Intention to have the *Pleasure* we always perceive in their being easy and happy; or, as our *Author* expresses it, *we are excited directly to desire the Relief of the Miserable*; to which we are powerfully prompted from the *Pain* we are under to apprehend them oppressed or afflicted. So that I perfectly agree with our *Author* when he observes, "That the Removal of our Pain is seldom directly intended in the uneasy benevolent Passions, but that we directly pursue an Alteration in the State of the miserable Objects", that is, (as I understand it; and I do

SECT. VIII.

And 'tis the Pleasure we have in the Deliberance and Safety of such Objects, that is directly intended:

SECT. VIII. do believe no Body else can form any other Notion of it) *the Pleasure of seeing them safe and easy.*

Nor is it any Way absurd to call this Pleasure a private Good most agreeable to Self-love.

BUT I must beg Leave to differ from this Gentleman in the Conclusion. For as I cannot but think, that the Alteration intended in the State of the Objects, is secretly imagined to be a *private Good*; so it manifestly appears, that these Passions, whereby we are excited to pursue this Alteration, are founded upon, and exert themselves from *Self-love*, or *Interest*, I mean *private Pleasure*, whether it arises from our own, or other Peoples Happiness: And therefore “these Affections are both chosen, or at first yielded to, for their *concomitant Pleasure*;” “and are voluntarily brought on, or indulg’d” “and pursued, with a View to *private Good*.”

So that all Actions that come from these Passions are attended with Pleasure.

THUS, methinks, it appears, that *Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy* and *Pity*, are of a mixed Nature, uneasy benevolent Passions, consisting of Pleasure and Pain, and do always proceed upon *Self-love*. Now, from this it necessarily follows, that all the virtuous Actions into which these Passions exert themselves, such as relieving the Distressed, defending the Injur’d, and repairing of Wrongs done by ourselves, are always attended with Pleasure, and do naturally spring from *Self-interest* (1).

AND

(1) Αὐτίον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπου λόγον, δι’ ὃν ἐδίδκατο τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ εἶναι φίλῳ, ὅτι τῶν μὲν αὐτοῦ ἀμαλῶν, ζητοῦν

SeA. VIII.

This u-
niversal Ex-
perience
loudly de-
clares.

Dulce & decorum est pro patria mori.

I own indeed, that these Actions, in some Instances, may involve a Man in a good deal of

τὸ φῖλῶν καὶ τὸ πατρὶς ἀγαθὸν ἔχον ὢν καὶ ἀποδυνήσκει δι-
 ᾧ, ὅτι μὴ ἔν τούτοις ὄντιν ὁ ἀνδρὶς ἀληθὺς εἶναι. ὁ μὲν
 διὰ τὸτο ῥητέον αὐτὸν μὴ μάστιγα οἰσάμενον εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ
 μὲν ἐν φάσει οἰσάμενος εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μαγάλων μακρὰ σφύσει.
 καὶ τὰ μακρὰ ῥήτων τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶν ἐκτεταμένα.
 οἷς μὲν γὰρ φίλοις, καὶ τῇ πατρὶς γνημματα, καὶ πῦμας, καὶ τοιαῦ-
 τα περίχου, εἰσὶν αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ γνησόν, καὶ φι-
 λώμενον εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅν ἐκείνη πάντα ἐλπίσιν. καὶ ὅ-
 πως διὰ τούτου οἷον φίλων, καὶ τῆς πλάκας ἀποδύνει, καὶ τὴν αὐτῆ
 σφύσιν ζῶν, μίξιν ἐκέρδιανεν ἢ σφύσιν. αἰρεῖται γὰρ ὁλίγον
 χροὸν ἡδύναι σφόδρα τὴν ἀγαθὴν καὶ ἐκτετατὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ πολλ-
 ῶν ἡρέμας καὶ βέλτερον αὐτῷ εἶναι ἡγεῖται τὸ εἶναι μακρὸν ὄντα
 μαγάλων γάμον κατὰ θυμάτων, ἢ μακρὸν βιώσαντα μὴ ἔπως
 ἐκτετατὸν εἶναι, καὶ μίαν προῆξιν ποιήσας καλλὴν καὶ μαγάλην, ἢ
 πολλὰς καὶ μακράς. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνων καλλίω. καὶ προῆξιν διὰ ἀν-
 δρίας ὅσοις σφύσεται τῷ φίλῳ, καὶ ἔχον οὕτως προῆξιν, ἐκεί-
 νῳ τῆς φιλοπῆμης ὄψιν χωρεῖ, καὶ πινέμενα διὰ τὸ μίξιν ἀγαθόν
 αὐτῷ ἀποδύει. καλλίον γὰρ τῷ αὐτὸν προῆξιν, τὸ αἰπὸν τῷ
 καλῷ τῷ φίλῳ γινέσθαι. διὰ ταῦτα διὰ ἐκείνων δοκῶ ἀνδρὶς
 εἶναι, ἀπὸ πάντων αἰρέμενον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ πλέον ζητῶν ἐν
 οἷς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδρίας. φαίνεται τοῖνυν μάστιγα αὐτὸν φίλῳ
 ὁ ἀνδρὶς, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ καλῷ τὸ πλέον ἐκείνῳ γινέμενον. Οὕτω
 μὲν ἐν δὴ φίλῳ εἶναι, κατὰ πῦμας εἶρηται. ὅς διὰ οἱ πολλοὶ
 ἔχον. Andron. Eth. Arist. Paraphr. Lib. 9. Cap. 9.

(1) Ο' μ' ἐκυστος ταλασιπορών, ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι φερώνων ἐυ-
φροσύνη, διον οἱ τὰ θεῖα θερῶντες, ἐλπίδι τῷ λήϊματι ἡδώς
μυχθῶσι. καὶ τὰ μ' τοιαῦτα ἀέθλα τῷ ποιῶν μυχρῷ πρὸς εὖ εἶα

Sept. VIII. of Trouble and Uneasiness, which may frighten some narrow Souls, that are not large enough for such heavenly Delights, from ever attempting them. But when an open beneficent Mind once undertakes them, all the Fatigue and Hardships she meets withal in such noble Pursuits, are mightily sweeten'd, and become exceeding agreeable from the Consciousness of her being engag'd in delivering her own Species, from those

δοι. τὰς δὲ πονούντας ἵνα φίλως ἀγαθὸς κήσων, ἢ ὅπως ἐχ-
θρὸς χειρώσων, ἢ ἵνα δυνατὸι γινόμενοι, καὶ τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ
ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ τῇ αὐτῶν οἰκῇ καλῶς οἰκῶσι, καὶ τὰς φίλως ἐν
ποιῶσι, καὶ τὴν πατρίδα εὐεργετήσιν, πῶς ἐκ διδῶν ὡς καὶ τότε
καὶ ποιεῖν ἡδίστως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ζῆν εὐφραίνονται, ἀγαπῶν
καὶ αὐτὸς, ἐπαινῶμενος δὲ καὶ ζηλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπὶ δὲ
αἱ μὲν ῥαδιουργίαι, καὶ ὅσα τῶν ἐπὶ ἐπιχειρήματι ἡδοναί, ἔτι σώματι
ἐνέξιας ἱκαναί εἰσιν ἐργάζεσθαι, ὡς φασὶν οἱ γυμνασταί, ἐπὶ
ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον ἐδιδάσκειν ἐμποιοῦσιν. αἱ δὲ διὰ καρπ-
είας ἐπιμέλειαι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἐξικινῶνται πρὸς
αὐτὸν, ὡς φασὶν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. λέγει δὲ καὶ Ἡρόδοτος

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλασθὲν ἔστιν ἐλάττω
Ρηϊδίως· λίγη μὲν ὁδὸς, μέλας δ' ἐγγύθι νῆαι.
Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰσθῶτα θεοὶ περιπέριον ἔδωκεν
Αδύναται, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρδιος ὁμιος ἐπ' αὐτῇ.
Καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν ἑπὶ δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
Ρηϊδία δ' ἥπιτα πῖλος, χαλεπὴ γὰρ ἔνθα.

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐχάρμης ἐν τῇ δὲ

— — — — — τῶν πόνων

Πολῦται ἡμῖν πάντα τ' ἀγαθὰ διδοί.

Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 2.

Ἐκείνη δὲ καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλεονεχὲς τ' ἀγαθὰ μάλλον εὐφραίν-
ουσι, ἢ ὅσα αὐτῶν περιουσία πρὸς ἐπ' αὐτὰ ἀπίσται. οἱ γὰρ
πόνοι ὄντες τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. αὐτοὶ δὲ τῷ δόμῳ πνεύματι πρὸς
ἐξέλιξιν ἔτι πολυπλοῦς ἐργασματοδότης αὐτῶν, ὡς δ' ἡδὲ εἶναι. καὶ
δὲ ὅταν μὲν μάλας ἀνδρῶν ἐπιθυμῶσι, ὁ δὲ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ταῦτα
φαίνεται, αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐργασματοδότης. Id. de Inst.
Cyr. Lib. 7.

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those Calamities under which they are oppressed. Sec. VIII.
 sed, and in restoring her own Nature, that lovely Form, as our Author calls it, to Ease and Happiness. Sure I am, the Injured and Oppressed find these Actions wonderfully delightful: And I am pretty confident, that the kind Benefactor has a quick Sense, or largely participates, of every Degree of Pleasure he has the good Fortune to administer to them. *It is, says Cicero (1), more consonant to Nature, to undergo the greatest Labours and Toils in maintaining the Safety, and promoting the Happiness, if it were possible, of all Mankind, than to live in Solitude, not only free from Cares, but amidst the*

(1) Magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis, aut juvandis, maximos labores, molestiasque suscipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio cœlestium collocavit; quam vivere in solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine & viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque, splendidissimoque ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponebat: ex quo efficitur hominem naturæ obedientem, homini nocere non posse. Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil se existimat contra naturam facere, aut magis fugiendam censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum, quam facere cuiuspiam injuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri in hominibus violandis; quid cum eo differas, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? Sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed & multo illa pejora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem; errat in eo, quod ullum aut corporis, aut fortunæ vitium, animi vitiis gravius existimat. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unicujusque, & universorum. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3.

Sect. VIII. *the highest Gratifications. And indeed every Man of a noble and exalted Turn of Mind, prefers the former Sort of Life, far before the later.*

And Mr.
H— himself
seems to
confess it.

BUT our Author himself does not seem to be so very consistent upon this Point; for those very Actions, in which he says a Man has no Pleasure, he calls, at the same Time, *amiable*. And, I suppose, one can understand nothing by an Action's being *amiable*, but its being *pleasant* or *delightful*; at least, I turn my Thoughts every Way, but cannot, for my Life, form any other Notion of it. And how any Man can apprehend an Action as *amiable*, or *pleasing*, and yet feel no *Pleasure* in it, is, I confess, beyond my Comprehension. So that, from the whole, I conclude, that all *Virtue* is *pleasant* (1); and there is no *amiable* Action in which we find no *Pleasure*, or *Self-interest*, the great Principle whereby, in every Instance, we are actuated.

THIS

(1) Τοῖς μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδύα μάλιστα, διὰ τὸ μὴ οὖσι τοιαῦτα εἶναι τοῖς δὲ φιλοφρόνοις ἔστιν ἡδύα καὶ οὖσι ἡδύα τοιαῦτα δὲ αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις. ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδύα, καὶ κατ' αὐτάς. ἔστι δὲ προσδοκᾶται ὅτι ἡδονὴς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, ὥστε φησὶν ἡδύα, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν αὐτῇ. ὥστε τοῖς ἐρημένοις γὰρ, ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν. ἔτι γὰρ δίκαιον ἐστὶν εἶναι τὴν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἔτι ἐλευθερίῳ τὴν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίαις πράξεσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ δ' ἔγωγε, κατ' αὐτάς εἰναι αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδύα, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἰ καὶ καλῶς κρίνει σὺ αὐτῶν ὁ ἀποδιδῶν. Arist. Eth. Lib. I. Cap. 8.

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THIS is so strongly expressed by Maximus Sect. VIII. Tyrius, that I must here beg Leave to transcribe his Sentiments. " Since we are considering " Virtue and Pleasure in relation to one another, I will by no Means, says that Philosopher (1), say any Thing to the Disadvantage

C c

" tage

(1) Επί δε ἀρετῆς οὗτος ἡδονὴν ἢ ὀφείτως χρεῖν, ἢ λαμβάνεται μὲν τῇ ἀρετῇ (ἢ γὰρ παρὰ, ἢ δὲ βλάπτουσι ὁ κατὰ ἡδονὴν λόγος) προεῖται δὲ λέγειν, ὡς εἰ πῶς ἀρετῆς ἀφαιρήσει πῶς ἢ ἡδονῇ, καὶ τὸ δυνατόν αὐτῆς περιουσιάζειν ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐλαττωδῶν ἀρετῶν. ἀποφανεμένης ἡδονῆς καὶ γὰρ ὁ κατὰ ἀρετὴν ποιεῖν ἔκοντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονῆς παρὰ τὴν ῥῆσιν ἢ περιουσιάζειν. ὡς παρὰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρηματισμοῖς ἔστιν ἔκοντος ἀνταταλάσσειν δραχμὴν τελευτῇ, ἢ δὲ χρυσὸν χαλκόν.

ἢ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι ἔκοντος ζῆντος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς ἀμοιβὰς, καὶ ἰσοστασίαι ὅσοι. χρυσὸν τε καὶ χαλκόν, καὶ τὴν χρυσὴν τὴν χαλκὴν. ὅπως ἀμύχῃ καὶ τὰς τῶν πόρων οὐμολίας ὅσοις ποιεῖ πῶς ἔκοντος. (ἢ γὰρ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς) ἀλλὰ πῶς δὲ τὰς περιουσίας πόνους, ὡς μὲν ἔστιν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀραιοκοτίων, τὴν χαλκὴν ὡς δὲ πῶς τῶν ἀλαιοκοτίων, ἡδονῆς καὶ γὰρ τὸ χαλκὸν ἔκοντος, ἡδονὴν λέγειν. χαλκὸν γὰρ ἀντὶ τῆς χαλκῆς, ἢ μὴ ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν. ἔστιν δὲ οἷμαι καὶ αὐτὴν τινασθῆναι, διὰ τῆς ἀποφανεμένης πάντων χρημάτων ἀρετωτέρων, ὡς ἔστιν ἀντὶ πῶς καὶ δυνατόν ἀλλάξαι καὶ τελευτάτα, καὶ πόνους, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία δυσχερῆ. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄλλου ὅππῃς ὄνομα τῆς ἐκτὸς ἀπῆς, Ἀχίλλης μὲν ἀποδιδόσκειν ἔκοντος, καὶ πικρὸν ἀποδιδόσκειν τὸ Πατρόκλῳ, οἷμαι. Ἀγαμέμνων δὲ ἀχρηστῶν καὶ περιουσιάζειν καὶ περιουσιάζειν, βασιλείας τῶν δὲ ἔκοντος ἔκοντος καὶ περιουσιάζειν καὶ ἀρετῶν, οὐμολίας παρὰ τῶν πῶς ἔκοντος ἡδονῶν ὀφείματα. ὡς παρὰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῶν οὐμολίας ὀφείματα ἀρετῶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν τινασθῆναι καὶ ἀποφανεμένη καὶ δὲ καὶ ἀρετῶν, καὶ τὸ δυσχερῆ ὅσον περιουσιάζειν ἔκοντος, ἀντὶ ἀνταταλάσσειν τῶν τῆς περιουσιάζειν τῶν ὀφείματα. ἐστὶν δὲ ἀρετῶν καὶ ἐκτὸς τῶν ὀφείματα ἀρετῶν, ἀφαιρήσει καὶ ἀρετῶν τῶν ποδόντων κακῶν. ὅπως καὶ τὰς περιουσιάζειν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡδονῆς πῶς, ἢ οὐ μὲν ἀρετῶν καλῶς, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἀρετῶν ἡδονῶν, ἔκοντος. ἔστιν, εἰ ἀντὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἷμαι, καὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔκοντος καὶ γὰρ ἀρετῶν ὀφείματα ἡδονῶν ὀφείματα. καὶ

Sect. VIII.

“rage of Virtue: Nor can a Discourse concern-
 “ing Pleasure, admit of any Thing that is ill-
 “natur’d or reproachful. I only observe thus
 “much, If you take away Pleasure from Vir-
 “tue, you quite destroy all its Force and Efficacy;
 “for nothing virtuous that is void of Plea-
 “sure, can be the Object of one’s Choice or Pursuit.
 “Certain it is, that the Man who undergoes
 “Fatigue and Toil in the Pursuit of Virtue, is
 “thereto animated by the Love of Pleasure,
 “either present or expected: For, as in the
 “Matter of Exchange, no Man wittingly, if
 “he is not an arrant Fool, will give away a
 “Talent for a Drachm, or Gold for Brass; but
 “the Barter, however it may be equal, must
 “tend to the Dealer’s Profit, in whatever his
 “Customer has Occasion for. Just so in the
 “Case of Toil and Labour, no Man involves
 “himself from a pure Love towards Labour,
 “(which would prove a most unhappy Sort
 “of Love) but he exchanges his present Toils
 “for

Καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν νομῶν, καὶ χαρῶν ἢ ἡδονῶν καλῶς, ἢ οὐ καλῶς
 τῆς ἀφροσύνης τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἴσον, καὶ ἢ ἡδονῶν
 γινώσκω, ἢ ποῖα ἢ Ἡρακλῆα ἔκρινον, ἢ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δυν-
 ματῶν πόνοι ὁμιλητῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστῶν καὶ ἐδάδα, ἢ σὺν τῇ δι-
 εῖα φρασσαλλόμενοι, ἢ τοῖς ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμεις ἀσφαρόμενοι,
 ἢ σὺν τῇ ἀρετῇ οὐλομένηντα, ἢ ἡμερωπῶν ἢ γῆς, ἢ καδάρ-
 τῃν, ἢ ἐπὶ ἢ Οἴπῳ ἰόντα, ἢ ἐπὶ πῶς φραγγόμενοι, ἐκ ἀλλο-
 τῆς ἢ μεγάλαις καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ ἀρεταῖς ἡδοναῖς χερσαί-
 γόμενοι, ταῖς μὲν πύρροις ὅμοιαι τοῖς πύρροις, ταῖς δὲ, με-
 λῶσις ὡς τῇ πύρρῳ, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰναίοντα. Ἀλλὰ οὐ μὲν
 τῇς τότε πύρρῳ ἴσας, πᾶσι δὲ Ἡρακλῆος ἡδονῶν ἢ ἴσας αἰς
 ἔχαιρον. Ἐχαιρε καὶ ἢ Ἡρακλῆος ταῦτα δρῶν, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἴσων
 καὶ ἐκ αὐτῶν, οἱ μὴ δρῶν ἔχαιρον. Max. Tyr. Dissert. 33.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 403

“ for that which those who know no better, Sect. VIII.
“ would call *worthy* and *laudable*, but which,
“ with those who understand the Nature of
“ Things, is called *Pleasure*. And talk as you
“ will of Beauty and Excellence, you certainly
“ mean *Pleasure*. Perhaps indeed a Thing
“ may be thought excellent, though it should
“ afford no *Pleasure*: But, for my Part, I am
“ of a quite contrary Opinion; nor can I but
“ think that *Pleasure* is preferable before every
“ Thing else, since, upon its Account, People
“ will suffer Death, Wounds, Labour, and a
“ Thousand other Hardships. And assign what
“ different Names you please to the Cause of
“ such Actions; let it be call'd *Friendship* in
“ *Achilles*, when he died cheerfully to revenge
“ the Death of *Patroclus*; let it be the Thoughts
“ of a *Kingdom* that made *Agamemnon* so vigi-
“ lant, and to distinguish himself in the Council
“ and in the Field; and you may call it the
“ Safety of his *Country* that animated *Hector* to
“ lead out his Troops, and upon their Head to
“ fight with so much Bravery; these are all
“ Words that express particular Sorts of *Plea-*
“ *sure*.”

“ IN bodily Distempers the Patient is glad
“ to endure Incisions, Burnings, Thirst, Hun-
“ ger, and such other painful Prescriptions,
“ upon the Prospect of thereby recovering his
“ Sleep; but if you take away all Hopes of the
“ future Good, you shall immediately prevent
“ his submitting to these Evils: Now just so

Sect. VIII. "in the Conduct of Life, People exchange Labour for Pleasure."

"I confess indeed, that *that* which you call
 "Virtue is so: But I would ask, Does
 "the Mind chuse *Virtue* without any *Love* to-
 "wards it? Now, if you grant there is *Love*,
 "you, at the same Time, grant there is *Plea-*
 "sure. And however you may change the
 "Name, and call Pleasure *Joy*, I object nothing
 "to the Variety of Names, I apprehend the
 "Thing, and perceive it is Pleasure. Nor was
 "Hercules induc'd to undergo such extraordi-
 "nary Toils and Labours for the Benefit of
 "Mankind, by any other Motive, than some
 "mighty Pleasures, Part whereof accompany'd
 "his Labours, and Part followed after them.
 "Indeed, while you see the Toils which *Her-*
 "cules underwent, you do not see the Plea-
 "sures he conceiv'd: But Pleasure he had in
 "them, and for that Reason he endur'd them.
 "Nor would he ever have undergone them, if
 "he had not had Pleasure in pursuing them."

Object. 3.
 Mankind
 seem per-
 swaded of
 the Existence
 of a Deity,
 and may
 pursue Vir-
 tue from
 the View of
 future Re-
 wards.

THE only remaining Objection which our
 Author mentions against what he maintains, is
 taken from this, "That the whole Race of
 "Mankind seems perswaded of the Existence
 "of an Almighty Being, who will certainly
 "secure Happiness, either now or hereafter, to
 "those who are virtuous, according to their
 "several Notions of *Virtue* in various Places:
 "And upon this Perswasion, *Virtue* may, in

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 409

"all Cases, be pursu'd from Views of Inte. *Self VIII.*
"rest *."

IN Answer to which, he, in the first Place, *Mr. H. —* appeals to all Mankind, whether there be no Benevolence but what flows from a View of Reward from the Deity. Nay, says he, do we not see a great Deal of it among those who entertain few, if any Thoughts of Devotion at all? For * many have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, who have scarce any Opinions about the Deity, or any Thoughts of future Rewards; and abhor any Thing which is treacherous, cruel, or unjust, without any Regard to future Punishments.

UPON this I shall observe, that whether every Man is under the Influence or not, of the Belief of a Deity, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments, as the great Motives that excite him to virtuous Actions; this by no Means alters the Case: For, from what I have said above, it appears, there are other Views upon which every Man acts, which plainly shews, that we are determin'd in our Pursuits after Virtue, from Self-love, Pleasure, or Interest. So that I might here own, without any Prejudice to my Principles, there is a great deal of Benevolence among those who entertain few Thoughts of Devotion at all, or, who have no Regard to Rewards or Punishments in another World.

Mr. H. — alleges, that many are inspir'd with a great deal of Benevolence, and have high Notions of Honour, Faith, &c. without any Opinions about God or another World.

But whether People in their Actions have a Regard to God and another World, or no; there are other Views upon which they act, wherein they are govern'd by Self-love.

C c 3

How-

Sect. VIII.

Only 'tis
pretty odd
how those
who have
scarce any
Opinions
about God,
or any
Thoughts
of Futurity,
can be in-
spir'd with
Benevo-
lence, and
have high
Notions of
Honour,
Faith, &c.

HOWEVER, I cannot but say, it puts me to a Stand to conceive how those Persons who have scarce any Opinions about the *Deity*, or any Thoughts of *Futurity*, can be capable of Benevolence, or have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, and universally pursue these Virtues: For, if a Man be inspired with true Benevolence towards his Fellow-men, it is, in my Opinion, impossible he can be so unsufferably stupid as not to understand, that there is an almighty kind Benefactor, showing down numberless Blessings on those Objects he so tenderly affects, and who co-operates with him, if I may speak so, to render them happy, infinitely more happy than he can ever have it in his Power to make them. And if he has but any the least Suspicion (which our Author must suppose he has; for he does not represent those benevolent Persons as downright Atheists) I say, if he has but any the least Suspicion of his having an almighty Assistant, who powerfully seconds his poor Endeavours, and can gratify even his highest Wishes, which are too great for him to accomplish himself; must he not be exceedingly fond of the Notion? Can he neglect to indulge it? How can he escape being fired with the warmest Love and Devotion towards this most beneficent Being? And when his Thoughts are turned this Way, can he confine the Goodness of this Almighty Benefactor to the narrow Span of a few Years? Or,

does

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 407

does he wish the Objects of his Benevolence see. viii. no other Happiness, than what they may have in this present State of Humanity? I cannot give myself Leave to think, but that, from the Notions he must have of a good Deity, and the friendly Wishes he bears his Fellow-men, he will please himself with the cheerful Prospect of seeing them all happy beyond the Grave, under the Influence of divine Bounty and Munificence. And if he apprehends there is even but a Possibility of this (though every considerate Man has infinitely more) how can he but like to entertain such pleasing Perceptions? So that I cannot but say, it puts me to a Stand to conceive how those Persons that are animated with true Benevolence towards their Fellow-men, can scarce have any Opinions about the Deity, or any Thoughts of a future State.

I incline to think, they are of no narrower Principles than *Socrates*, who having laid down as undoubted Truths, "That there is a future
" State of Rewards and Punishments, and that
" all Men, without respect of Persons, shall
" receive, every Man according to the moral
" Qualities of his Mind, or the Deeds done
" in the Body," he observes in relation to himself, "That being under the Aw and In-
" fluence of these Principles, he made little
" Account of this World, but laid out all his
" Endeavours, not only to purify his own
" Mind, that he might appear universally pure

'Tis true, we see a great many in the World who are so far from having any Devotion, or any Thoughts of Futurity, that they will openly insult that God who made them, of whom they hold their Lives, in whose Air they breathe, whose Bread they eat, and with whose Raiment they are clothed; and yet, I own, those very Persons will talk high of *Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice*, and how they abhor, as what is infinitely beneath them, to do a dirty ungenerous Thing.

BUT (not to urge those Gentlemen to declare from what honourable Principles they express so much Contempt of the *Deity*) I would beg to know, if those Men of Honour, (whom *Socrates* (1) calls *Slaves*, as having a

Set VIII

Some indeed openly affront God, and seem to despise future Rewards, and yet will talk high of Honour, &c.

But are those Men of Honour animated with universal Benevolence?

διδοι δυνάμει, καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀποφασίαν, ὅτι τῶν τῶν βίον, καὶ
 τῶν ἀγῶν τῶν, ὅν ἐγὼ φημι, ἀντί πάντων τῶν ἐσθλῶν ἀγῶ-
 νων ἐστίν. καὶ ὁμοιωθῶ σοι ὅτι ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐσθλὴν βοήθειάν σου
 ἵσταί ἡ δίκη σου ἡ, καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἡν τῶν δι' ἐγὼ ἔλαβον, — — —
 πᾶσα δ' ἡν ταῦτα μῦθος σοι δοκεῖ λήϊα δ' ὡς ἰσχυρὰ καὶ
 ἀποφασίαι αὐτῶν. καὶ ἐδὼν γ' ἡν δυναμῶσιν ἡν καταφρονῶν
 τῶν, ἡν πρὸς ζήτωντες ἔλαβον αὐτῶν βαλτίαν καὶ ἀληθείαν ἐν-
 ἡν. ἡν δι' ὅσας ὅτι πρὸς ὅσας ὅσας, ὅσας σφάταιται ἐν
 τῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐ τὸ καὶ Πῶλα καὶ Γοργίας, ἐκ ἔχοντες ἀπο-
 δίδεσθαι, ὡς δὲ ἄλλον πρὸς βίον ζῆν, ἡ τῶν, ὡς καὶ ἐκείνη
 φησὶν συμφορῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι πρὸς τοῖς λόγοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἐλαγχό-
 μων, μόνον ἐστὶν ὁμοιωθῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
 μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μαλετηρίᾳ
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἰδία καὶ δυνα-
 μίαν, &c. Plat. in Gorg.

(1) Ἀντὶς δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ θελήματα, σκοπιὰ
 ἢ ἐυσέβει, τί εὐσεβεῖ· τί καλόν, τί διακρὸν· τί δικαίον, τί
 ἀδίκον· τί συμφέρουσιν, τί μανία· τί αἰσθήσια, τί δουλεία· τί πα-
 λαιά.

Q10 *My further Explication of the*

Juster Title to this base Character) have an
 universal Benevolence to all Mankind, and do
 they express this friendly Affection of their
 Minds in all the Instances of Honour, Faith,
 Generosity and Justice, towards every Indivi-
 dual of their own Species, with whom they
 have any Sort of Intercourse. Or, do they con-
 fine their Benevolence, and those Virtues that
 flow from it to a few, and discharge them
 only in some particular Instances; so as that,
 for Example, while they think it below them
 to triek their Neighbour of his Money, they
 will not perhaps be scrupulous to ravish his
 Daughter, or to debauch his Wife (1).
 As to those People who are animated with
 an universal Benevolence towards their Fellow-
 men, I have given my Opinion already, That
 they cannot, in Reason, be supposed to be the
 Persons, who affront, or have no Thoughts of
 the Deity, and are void of Devotion.

They are
 certainly
 mere Pre-
 tenders to
 Honour, and
 are meanly
 govern'd by
 Preak and
 Humour.

But as to this last Sort of Gentlemen, who
 have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Gene-
 rosity, Justice, 'tis plain indeed, that they have
 scarce any Opinions about the Deity, or any
 Thoughts

Λε, τί πολιτικὸς τί ἀρχὴ ἀνδράπων, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνδράπων
 καὶ οὐ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτὸς δὲ εἰδότες ἡγήτο καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς
 ὅ, τὸ δ' ἀγνοῦντας ἀνδραποδῶντες αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν καλῶς.
 Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 1.

(1) Καὶ παλιχάτων μὲ ὀπλισμένων τῶ μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τῶ
 καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυόντων τῆς τῶν ἀσχυ-
 ρίαν ὀπθυμίας, ἔλθοντες ὅμως εἰς τὰ ὀπλινδύνα φέροντες ὅ,
 ἐκ ἧδὲ οὗτο πάντεσσιν ἐκκαθαίρονται. Xenoph. Me-
 morab. Lib. 2.

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Thoughts of a future State. But where is ^{sec. viii.} their Benevolence, and the honourable Train of Virtues that constantly attend it? I see a whimsical ridiculous Character, without Beauty or Order, which can never be inspired with that manly Virtue, which is universally, in all Instances, equal and uniform. Give me Leave to say, I violently suspect, that those fine Gentlemen, with which the World now a Days so much abounds, are not actuated by (what a Philosopher would call) a benevolent Principle towards their Fellow-men, when they exert themselves in what they call their Honour, &c. but from some silly, or freakish Humour of their own, or some narrow pitiful Views that are unworthy a Man of Honour (1), and quite inconsistent with Self-interest. If the Reader will look into that Remark which the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* has upon this Point of Honour, he will see the Gentlemen I am here speaking of, presented to him in a very just Light. How silly is the Creature, says *Socrates* (2), who does not understand, that he who performs

And in Truth, the Conduct of such Persons, is highly to be commended, and follows the Example of Reason, Liberty, and Justice, and is the most virtuous and noble View to God and another World.

(1) Καὶ ἔχει δὲ ἄποκοπήν τιμῶν κληρονομία τ' αὖ ἐν μεγάλῃ ψυχῇ, μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. ἐκ τῆς δὲ αὖ ἐν πτωχείᾳ αὖ τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ εὖ δόλον, ἢ πτωχὴ, καὶ ἀπονομίαν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. τοῖς δὲ ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ ψυχῇ διὸν κόσμον τὶς εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν μάλιστα γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ ἡ γὰρ αὖ ἐν πτωχείᾳ ἐκείνων. διὰ τὸ χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγάλῃ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἐν γὰρ διὸν τὶς ἀνὴρ ἀποκαταστάσει. *Arist. Eth. Lib. 4. Cap. 3.*

(2) Ὡς μοχθηρὸς ὅστις δὲ ἐκ τοῖς ἐκείνων εἰδέναι, ὅτι ὁπότ' ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ συμφορὰς τε καὶ καλλίαν εἰς τὸ οὐ γόνον διαπύρεται, ὅτι οὐ καὶ ὁ νικῶν; *Xenoph. Apol.*

Seft. VIII. performs those Things which will prove most beautiful and advantageous to Eternity, has gain'd the Victory, and is the most worthy and honourable?

And in Truth, the Conduct of such Pretenders, makes it highly necessary to follow the Example of heathen Philosophers, and explain moral Virtue with a View to God and another World.

AND as I cannot but here observe, that the Conduct of those Pretenders to Honour makes it too apparent, how necessary it is, for the Support of *Virtue*, always to consider and explain it with a particular Regard to the *Deity*, and another World, (which, as the *Nature* of Things manifestly requires, I have endeavour'd to do, after the Example of all the *antient Philosophers*, in the foregoing *Enquiry*.) So I can never think that any Man is doing good Service to *Virtue* or *Religion*, who contributes, in any Sort, to withdraw Peoples Minds from the Influence of these Principles. 'Tis observed by *Tully*, *When the Minds of Men are possess'd with the Belief of God's governing the World; that he takes Care of the human Race; that he sees all Things, even our most secret Thoughts; and that he makes a Distinction between Good and Evil, and will punish the Wicked, and reward the Righteous. These*, says he, *are not only certain Truths, but highly useful to Mankind: For, in what Piety towards God, in what Love and Beneficence towards one another, must those Persons live, who are perswaded, that God is in all Things their Witness and their Judge (1)?*

How

(1) Sit igitur hoc jam a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur,

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How it has come to pass I will not say, but Sect. VIII.
a particular Set of Men among us, that usurp
the Name of the *polite World*, and pretending
to be free from all Biass, set up for great Vir-
tuosi,

gerantur, eorum geri judicio ac numine; eisdemque optime
de genere hominum mereri; & qualis quisque sit, quid agat,
quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat,
intueri; piorumque & impiorum habere rationem. His enim
rebus imbutæ mentes, haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili, & a ve-
ra sententia. Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse o-
portere tam sulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem
putet inesse, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ea quæ vix
summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri po-
tet?—Utiles esse autem opiniones has quis neget, cum in-
telligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando, quantæ salutis sint
fœdera religionis? quam multos divini supplicii metus a scelere
revocarit? quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos, Diis
immortalibus interpositis, tum iudicibus, tum testibus? Cic.
de Legib. Lib. 2. I must here likewise transcribe some noble
Sentiments of Socrates concerning God and his Providence,
together with Xenophon's Reflections upon them: Ω' γα-
ρ, ὅσον, κατὰ μὲν δὴ ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ὅσον αὐτῷ ἴσους
ἀλλὰ ὡς κατὰ φύσιν, ὅσον δὲ καὶ ἐν παντὶ φερόμενον τὸ
πάντα, ὅπως αὖν αὐτῷ ἴσους ἢ, ὅπως τῷ θεῷ, καὶ μὴ τὸ ὅσον μὲν ἴσους
ἀλλὰ ὅσον πολλὰ καὶ ὅσον ὅσον, καὶ δὲ τὸν θεὸν ὁρῶμεν
ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὅσον, καὶ δὲ τὸν θεὸν μὲν ἴσους καὶ ὅσον
τὸν θεὸν, καὶ ὅσον τὸν θεὸν ὅσον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ὅσον
φερόμενον, καὶ δὲ τὸν θεὸν φερόμενον καὶ ἴσους εἶναι ἅμα πάντα
ὅσον, καὶ ὅσον ὅσον ἀνθρώπων διακρίνων καὶ ὅσον
τὸν ἀνθρώπων ὅσον, καὶ καὶ ὅσον τὸν ἀνθρώπων
μὲν, καὶ συμβουλευόμενον κατὰ μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ὅσον
καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ ὅσον ἀνθρώπων διακρίνων, καὶ πᾶσι διακρίνων
καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων συμβουλευόμενον, γινώσκον τὸ ὅσον, ἐπὶ
ποῦτόν ὅσον, ὅσον ἅμα πάντα ὅσον, καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλων, καὶ παρ-
ταχὺ παρταχὺ, καὶ ἅμα πάντα ὅσον ἀλλήλων αὐτοῖς. Εἰς δὲ
πάντα λέγων, ὅσον τὸν θεὸν ὅσον, ὅσον τὸν θεὸν ὅσον, ὅσον τὸν θεὸν
τὸν ἀνθρώπων ὅσον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσον, καὶ ἀ-
λλήλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσον ἐν ὅσον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσον
ἐν πᾶσι. ὅσον φερόμενον, ὅσον ὅσον. Xenoph. Memorab.
Lib. 1.

Soft, VIII. *tuosi*, and to see Things in a wonderfully clear and just Light, have got an odd Taste in relation to Matters of *Virtue*, to which *Xenophon*, (who, as the *Earl of Shaftsbury* observes in his Advice to an Author, joyn'd what was deepest and most solid in Philosophy, with what was easiest and most refin'd in Breeding, and in the Character and Manner of a Gentleman) and to which *Plato*, *Cicero*, and all the finest Wits among the Antients, were utter Strangers: These genteel Moderns are so squeamish and delicate, that they cannot hear of the Deity and another World, bearing any Weight in a Treatise concerning moral *Virtue*, but they are immediately out of Conceit with it. This is the polite Taste of our fine Gentlemen! and I confess, that such tender Consciences are much to be pity'd, and ought, perhaps, to have a Share in our Indulgence. But since I appear in this Argument, not as a *Christian Priest*, but as an *heathen Philosopher*, I hope they will not take Offence at what I am going to propose to them on those Articles from my Fellow-heathens.

"We do great Mischief to ourselves, says *Hierocles* (1), if we imagine there is no Providence

(1) Τὴν μέγιστον καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον κακίαν, ἐὰν ἀσχετόντων ἢ οὐκ ὄντων, ἢ κακῶς φροντισμένων οἰκισθῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ταυτὸν ἐκείνῳ μὴ διδόναι εἴναι διόν ἢ ὄντα μὴ φροντίζον ἢ φροντίζοντα μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἢ δίκαιον. αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς παρτοδοκίης ἀδικίας ἐστὶν ἀνεκπαινετάτα, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κακίου συνωδύνει τὰ τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς ἐλαχίστα δόξασμασιν. ὡς γὰρ ἡ εὐσεβεία κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀρετὴν, ὅταν ἡ πάσης κακίας ἡγεμὼν ἢ τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀπὸ πᾶσης. In Carm. Pythag.

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
“vidence in the Universe; or if there be, that see. viii.
“Things are very ill lookt after. For this is
“as much as to alledge, there is no *God*; or,
“if we confess his Existence, that he takes no
“Care of the World; or, if he concerns him-
“self with human Affairs, that he is neither
“good nor just in his *Administration*. But
“these are Thoughts that seem with Iniquity,
“and the Man who is thus infected, is thereby
“carry’d away to all Sorts of Wickedness.
“For, as *Piety* towards *God* brings forth and
“nourishes the moral *Virtues*, so the abandoning
“one’s *Devotion* towards the *Deity*, is the
“*Ring-leader* of all *Vice* whatsoever.” Nor
do we suffer less, in this heathen Gentleman’s
Apprehension, when we have no Regard to the
Immortality of the *Soul*, or another *World*.
“Those, says he, who have a Notion that the
“*Soul* is mortal, do rather shew themselves
“vain conceited *Virtuosi*, than true solid *Philo-*
“*sophers*, when they go about to explain that
“we must not neglect the Pursuit of *Virtue*.
“For if no Part of us remains after Death,
“whose Nature is capable of being adorn’d
“with *Truth* and *Virtue*, (such as we conceive
“the rational *Soul*) we could have no pure
“or sincere Desire after the real Ornaments of
“Life: For the *Suspicion* of one’s being totally
“extinguish’d at Death, prevents our applying
“ourselves to the Study of *Virtue*, and leads
“us to the Pursuit of sensual Pleasures, wherein
“we make no Matter what they are, or how
“we

SECT. VIII. "we come by them. And indeed, since the
 "Soul, in this Supposition, has no Existence
 "by itself, and is only the *Result* of a certain
 "Temperament of Body, upon which it wholly
 "depends for its Being and Preservation; how
 "can a Man, upon such Principles, be counted
 "prudent or considerate, that does not gratify
 "his Body in all Instances? Or what could
 "induce us to part with our Body for the
 "sake of *Virtue*, since, in the Event of the Soul's
 "perishing with the Body, the *Prize* we die
 "for has no where an Existence? But heaven-
 "ly Men, continues the same Philosopher, have
 "sufficiently demonstrated that the Soul is im-
 "mortal, and that *Virtue* alone is its proper
 "Beauty and natural Ornament. (1). "

IN short, I might here appeal to all Man-
 kind, whether there ever was, in any Age of
 the World, one single Instance of a virtuous
 Man,

(1) Οἱ θνητὸν ὁμοῦναι τὸ ψυχρὸν, οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι τὸ ἀ-
 ρετὸν κοινόν· μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλθύνουσιν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἰσ-
 μίαν ἡμῶν καὶ θάνατον, καὶ οὕτω οὖσαν ἔχον ἀλθῆσαι καὶ ἀρετὴν
 ποιεῖσθαι, οἷον δὲ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ λογικὸν ψυχρὸν, ἐκ αὐτοῦ
 ἡμῶν καὶ ἀρετὴν γίνετο τῶν καλῶν. ἀποφαντικὸν δὲ ἡ ἰσχυρία τῆς
 φθαρτικῆς τὸ οὐδὲ τὰντα ἀναδῆναι, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀπολεῖσθαι ἀρετὴν σωματι-
 κήν, ὅπως οὐκ εἶναι ὅσον αὐτῇ, καὶ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖσθαι ἰσχυρίαν.
 πῶς δὲ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι κατ' αὐτὴν, ἢ μὴ οὕτως καὶ
 εὐκλείδῃ; καὶ πάντα χαρίζεσθαι τῷ σώματι. δι' ὃ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
 ἰσχυρίας οὐκ εἶναι, ἐκ ἧς καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν, ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ δὲ τῇ
 ποιεῖ διατλάσθαι τὸ σῶμα; πῶς δὲ ἀπονομιεῖται δι' ἀρετὴν
 τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλοτρίῃ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν αὐτὴν ἀμα τῷ σώματι διαφθί-
 ρειν; ὅσα μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἐκείνη τὸ θάνατον ὁμοῦναι
 φαμεν; ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ μὴ τῶν ἰσχυρίων τῆς οὐσίας ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ
 δεικνῆναι, ὅτι τὸ ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχρὸν, καὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ μὴ οὐσίας ἀρετῆς κα-
 ταλεῖσθαι. Id. ibid.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 417

Man, animated with a steady *Benevolence*, "not *sec. VIII.*
 " only to *this* or *that* particular Person, in *this* 
 " or *that* particular Instance; but to his own
 " Nature, as it is in itself universally diffus'd
 " among all *Mankind*," without any *Devo-*
tion towards God, or any Respect to *Futu-*
rity. That excellent Philosopher *Arrian* tells us
 expressly (1), That we can no otherwise have our
 Souls purged from lewd and vicious Passions, but by
 fixing our Eyes upon God, cleaving to him alone,
 and purifying ourselves by the prevailing Influence
 of his Laws. And in another Place (2), Con-
 sider, says he, and suffer not yourselves to be bur-
 ry'd away by every extravagant Fancy, every im-
 petuous Passion. The Contest is great, divine and
 illustrious; the Prize is a Kingdom, Liberty,
 Happiness. Look up to God, and call upon him
 to second and assist you. For you must know, says
 Socrates (3), that in this present State of Huma-
 nity, if you escape Corruption and Vice, and be-

D d

come

(1) Τα αὐτὴ χάρις, ἐν τῷ δυν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐκκαλε-
 ῖται Περιούσιον καὶ Σκίρων, λύπην, φόβον, ἀνθυμίας, φόβον,
 ἀπαισιολογίας, φιλοφροσύνας, μαλακίας, ἀφροσύνας πάντα
 δ' ἐν ἑσθ' ἄλλως ἐκκαλεῖται, ἐν μὲν αὖτε μόνον δ' ἐν δὲ ἀπεκρί-
 νεται, ἐκείνη μὲν ἀποπροσηγορεύεται, τοῖς ἐκείνη ἀποπροσηγορεύεται
 καθυπομένον. Lib. 2. Cap. 16.

(2) Μόνον τέλος μὴ συνταραχθῆς μίχας δ' ἀγῶν ἐστίν,
 δόξα τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὸ βασιλείας, ὑπὸ ἐλευθερίας, ὑπὸ εὐεργείας,
 ὑπὸ ἀταξίας, τῷ δυν μόνον, ἐκείνη δὲ ἀπικαλῶ βοηθῶν καὶ
 ἐξουσίαν. Ibid. Cap. 18.

(3) Εὖ γὰρ γινώσκω, ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτὸν οὐδὲν καὶ γίγνεται διον
 ἀλλ' ἐν ταύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτῶν, διὸ μοιγεῖται αὐτὸν οὐδὲν
 ἀγῶν, ἢ ἑκάς ἐροῖς. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 5.

2nd VHL come what you ought to be, pure and virtuous, it must be attributed to the Blessing of God.

BUT I must here again beg of our *squeamish* Gentlemen, to permit me, without offending their tender Consciences, to transcribe some Reflections from one that was no *Christian*, concerning the Necessity of our praying to God for his *Blessing* and *Assistance*, in order to our becoming truly virtuous. Pythagoras, or whoever was the Author of those golden Verses, lays down the Rule, Undertake nothing, says he, without first praying to God to prosper you; and Hierocles explains it in this Manner (1).

“ THERE

(1) — — — ΑΛ' ἔρχου ἐπ' ἔργον

Θεοῖσιν ἐπυξάμεν^Θ τιλοῖται — —

Πάντα τὰ ποιεῖς ἢ κτήσῃς ἢ ἀγαθὸν συντελεῖν τε διὰ βρο-
χίων ὁπλίσαντες ὁ λόγος, τὸ δ' ἡλῆες αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς
συνέργειαν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αἰρίσιν πῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ
τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν διόδῳ ἔχοντες, τὸ παρ' ἐκείνου συνεργῆσαι, καὶ τιλο-
ῦσθαι τῶν αἰδνητῶν πάντως περὶ χρῆζομεν. τοῖσι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παρ'
ἡμῶν συνευχόμενον ἐκτετινομένην χερσὶ ποδὶ λαβὴν τῶν καλῶν
τὸ δὲ ποδὶ διὰ συντελεσμένου χρηστὰ ἐν καὶ πρὸς τὸ δόσθαι τῷ
ἀγαθῶν. καὶ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐκτετινομένην περὶ καλὰ τὸ δὲ ἐκτετινομένην
τῷ ζῆτῳ ὁρῶν. ἡ δὲ εὐχὴ μεθέξει^Θ τὸ πρὸς ἡμῶν ζῆτῳ
σιν, καὶ τὸ ποδὶ διὰ δόσθαι, ἐκτετινομένη τὸ αἰτίας ἡμῶν, τὸ ἐν
τῷ τὸ μὲν συνεργῆσαι ἡμῶν, καὶ ποδὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τιλοῖται. πῶς
δ' ἂν λάβοι τις τὸ ἐν, μὴ διδόντ^Θ διὰ; πῶς δ' ἂν δόσθαι
τῷ ποδὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς αὐτεξέστω μὴ αἰτνῇ, ὁ διδόναι περὶ καλὰ
δίδος; ἢ ἂν μὴτε λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ εὐχῇ ποιῶμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔρ-
γῳ ταύτην κρατύνωμεν. μὴτε τῇ ἑαυτῶν συνεργῆσαι μόνῳ διαρρῶ-
μεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ διόδῳ συνεργῆσαι εὐχόμεθα, καὶ οὕτως ἔσθαι
ὅτι ὕλη, καὶ εὐχῇ πρὸς ἔργῳ συνάπλωμεν. καὶ τὸ δὲ ποδὶ τῷ, ἐπὶ
ἀεργαζόμεθα καὶ εὐχόμεθα, καὶ ἀεργαζόμεθα συνεργῆσαι, συνά-
ψας εἰπὼν, ΑΛΛ' ἔρχεται ἐπ' ἔργον θεοῖ-
σιν ἐπετρεχάμενος τῷ τῷ. ὅτι γὰρ μὴ
γονοῦσθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ ὡς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὄντα καταρτίζονται.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 419

“ THERE is here briefly prescrib'd to us, all sect. VIII.
 “ that is needful for the Acquisition of Happi-
 “ nels, namely, *our own Endeavours*, and *the*
 “ *Assistance of the Deity*. 'Tis indeed in our
 “ own Power to chuse that which is good ;
 “ but as this Power is given us of God, so
 “ 'tis not to be doubted but we need his Con-
 “ currence or Assistance, and to have those
 “ sensible Objects that are about us rightly di-
 “ sposed to our Interest. For, as to our own
 “ *Endeavours*, they seem to be only like the
 “ *Hand stretch'd out to receive good Things* ;
 “ whereas that which *God contributes*, is like
 “ the

ἡ χρεὶς τῷ θεῷ συνεργίαι· ὅτε ψυχῆς τῆς εὐχῆς τῆς λογισμαίως
 ἀρετῆς, μὴδὲν ὁρῶν τὴν κτήσιν τῶν αἰτηθέντων περισφόντας,
 ἴπν γὰρ ἢ ἀδίων ἀρετῆν, εἰ δίδόντε τὴν τοῦ εἰπεῖν, ὁπτηδύσμενον
 ἢ ἀντιέχοντον εὐχῆν. ὅν τὸ μὲν ἀδίων ὅν προαυαρεῖ τ' ἀρετῆς
 τ' ὕψος· τὸ δὲ ἀργὸν ἐκλύσει τ' εὐχῆς τὸ δραστήριον. πῶς γὰρ
 ἴσται τί χαλὸν ὃ μὴ ὁρῶν κανόνα τ' θεῖον ἀρετῆς ; πῶς δὲ τὸ
 ὁρῶν τὴν τοῦ ἀρετῆς μὲν ὃ τ' ἐκείνῃ συνεργίαι πάντως δεῖ
 ὁρῶν ὑπόστασιν ; ἴσται γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἐκείνῃ, θεῷ ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ, ἐκείνῃ
 δὲ πᾶσα τῷ ὁρῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς δίδεται ὁρῶν ὑπόστασιν. ἡ εἰκὴ τὸ
 κτώμενον, ἴσται μὴ ἐκείνῃ βλέπειν, ὃ ὁρῶν ὁμῶς τὸ χαλὸν
 κτήσιν. ἀπευδόντας ὅν ὁρῶν τ' ἀρετῆς ἀρετῆν, εὐχῆς ἀρετῆς
 καὶ, ἡ εὐχῆς μὲν τ' κτήσιν πάντως ἐργάζεσθαι. τὴν τοῦ δὲ ὁρῶν
 τὸ θεῖον ἡ λογισμαίως βλέποντας ἀρετῆς, ἡ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἴσται
 τὴς συντήσιν, μὴ τ' ἀρετῆς αἰτίας ὅν ἀρετῆς. ἡ γὰρ πᾶσι τ'
 αἰνῶνι εὐστως ἡ τρεῖς ἀρετῆς ἐκείνῃ, ὃ μόνον τῷ ἴδ' τοῖς πᾶσι,
 ἀλλὰ ἡ τῷ εὐ ἴδ' αἰνῶνι αἰτία κατὰ τὴν, τὸ οὐκ εἶναι ἀρετῆς
 δὲ πάντως ἐφαπλάσσει τῷ κοσμῷ, ὅσον ὅς ἀκέραιον ἡ νοε-
 ρόν. ἡ δὲ τῷ πάντως ἐκείνῃ ψυχῇ, ἡ αἰς ὅμμα ὁρῶν ὁρῶν πᾶσι
 ἴσται διασπῆσαι, ἡ τῷ τ' ὁπτηδύσμενον ὅν χαλὸν ὁρῶν τ'
 εὐχῆς ἐκείνῃ, ἡ πάλιν ἀπὸ τ' εὐχῆς πᾶσι πᾶσι τ' ἀρετῆς
 ὅν ἐκείνῃ λόγους ἐργα συνάπτειν, ἡ ἐργα ἀρετῆς θεῖας
 διαλέξειν βεβαιώμενη, ἡ τῷ μὲν εὐερίκῃ, τῷ δὲ ἐλλειπτομένη,
 ἀρετῆς αἰς εὐχῆς, ἡ εὐχῆς αἰς ἀρετῆς. τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ τ'
 ἀρετῆς ἡ τ' εὐχῆς ἐκείνῃ. In Carm. Pythag.

Sect. VIII. " the *Source* and *Spring* from whence those
 " good Things are deriv'd to us. So that, in
 " the Nature of Things, one's *Endeavours*
 " to obtain Good, can be counted no more
 " than a *Searching* after it; but the *Concurrence*
 " we have from God, is a *pointing* that Good
 " out to us, in our regular Attempts to ac-
 " quire it. Now *Prayer*, steadily address'd to
 " him who is the first Cause of our Being, and
 " who carries on and completes our Well-
 " being, is *Something intermediate*, that comes
 " between our *Searches* and the Good that God be-
 " stows on us. And let us here consider, How
 " can a Man come by any Thing that is good,
 " if God does not bestow it on him? And how
 " will God, whose Nature it is to impart *Happi-*
 " *ness* to other Beings, bestow any Thing good
 " upon that Man, who has it in his Power to
 " ask it, but seeks it not? One should think,
 " that, as we hope for *Success* in our Efforts
 " after Good, we must pray to God to *conspire*
 " and assist us. And on one Hand, that we
 " may not make *Prayer* to ly wholly in *Words*,
 " without supporting it by *Endeavours* to render
 " what we pray for effectual; and on the other
 " Hand, that we may not rest wholly upon
 " *Endeavours*, without praying to God for his
 " Assistance, and thereby animating our En-
 " deavours, and giving them Life and Vigour:
 " In a Word, that we may pray for *Success* in
 " our Endeavours, and may endeavour to com-
 " pass what we pray to succeed in, *Pythago-*

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 421

“ras joyns these Things together, and says, *sect. VIII.*
“*Betake yourself to Business, having first pray'd* ~~~~~
“*to God to prosper you.* And in Truth, we
“ought never to enter upon the Pursuit of *Vir-*
“*tue*, with a Conceit we may acquire it by
“ourselves, without the *Assistance of God*; nor
“ought we, at any Time, to content ourselves
“with *praying only*, using no Endeavours to at-
“tain to what we pray for. At this Rate we
“should be employ'd, either in seeking after
“a *Virtue* that is *void of God*, if I may speak
“so, or in putting up *Prayers* that have nothing
“to support them. And as that which is
“void of *God*, has nothing of the Nature of
“*Virtue*; so *Prayers*, seconded by no Endea-
“vours, have no *Efficacy*. I say, that which
“is void of *God*, has nothing of the Nature of
“*Virtue*: For, how can any Thing be *virtuous*,
“that is not done after the *divine Rule*? And
“that which is done after this Rule, how
“could it have subsisted without the *Influences*
“of the *Deity*? For *Virtue* being the *Image* of
“*God* in a rational Soul, as every Image must
“have a *Pattern* for its Subsistence, so whate-
“ver is acquir'd as *virtuous*, must refer to *God*,
“as our great *Pattern* in the Acquisition of
“*Virtue*; otherwise it is only an *Imposture*, and
“can have no Value. From which we may
“plainly see, that whoever are ambitious to
“acquire *real Virtue*, which will prove of Con-
“sequence, they must *pray to God for his As-*
“*sistance*; and such as pray for this Purpose,
“they

D d 3

SECT. VIII. “ they must likewise labour to compass what they
 “ pray for. And thus it is that we come to
 “ fix our Eyes upon God, the glorious Pattern
 “ of *Virtue*; and to exert ourselves in the Pur-
 “ suit thereof, under the *Influences* of the first
 “ Cause of all Good. For God, who is the Foun-
 “ tain of eternal Nature, is the eternal Cause
 “ not only of *Being*, but of *Well-being*, to all
 “ other *Existences*: And having diffus’d his
 “ divine Goodness, his own proper Bounty,
 “ through the World, an incorruptible and in-
 “ tellectual Light, the Soul that attends to this
 “ Light, and is at Pains to clear up its Mind di-
 “ stinctly to perceive it, is, from its *Efforts* in
 “ the Pursuit of *Virtue*, excited to Prayer, and
 “ from having its Prayers answered, makes its
 “ *Efforts* more vigorous: So that it joyns *Work-*
 “ *ing* with *Praying*, and strengthens its virtuous
 “ *Endeavours*, by its heavenly *Intercourses*; and
 “ by this Means comes to discover Good, and
 “ to improve in *Virtue*. ”

THESE are Reflections, which, in my Ap-
 prehension, let us see the sure Way to acquire
 real *Virtue*; so that putting up our Prayers to
 God, and relying on his Influences, we should,
 as Aristotle directs us (1), devote ourselves to Im-
 mortality,

(1) Εἰ δὲ θεῶν ὁ νῦν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ὁ καὶ τῶν βίον,
 θεῶν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπου βίον. καὶ δὲ ὁ καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπων,
 ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖ, ἀνθρώπων ὄντα, ἐν δὲ θνητὰ καὶ θνητὴ
 ὅλα ἐπὶ θεῶν ἐστέον ἀναδρατίζον καὶ ἀπαντα ποιεῖν ποιεῖ τὸ
 καὶ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐν δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ μέρος ἐστὶ
 ὁμοειδές.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 423

mortality, and do all we can to live suitably to *Seft. VIII.*
that Part of our Nature (the Soul) which is
most excellent. For, as we are taught by Plato
(I), whatever Blessings a righteous Man has in
this Life at the Hands of God, and whatever Ex-
pressions of Love and Esteem he meets with among
Men; these are all nothing, in respect of Greatness
and Number, to those Rewards that are waiting
him in another World: Nor are the Punishments
which the Wicked have here inflicted on them, either
by God or Man, any Thing at all, as to their
Weight and Number, in comparison to those Mis-
eries they shall suffer hereafter.

IN this Manner it was, that in former Ages,
Men of the finest Learning and Politeness, ex-
plain'd and recommended moral Virtue: And,
upon the Principles they advance, I am tempted
to suspect, that no Man can be animated in re-
lation to his Fellow-men, with high Notions
of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, whilst he
is void of Devotion towards God, and has no
Regard to Futurity. "Take away Piety, and

Nor can
a Man have
any good
Reason or
Cause of Be-
nevolence
toward his
Fellows, that
does not
likewise
move him
with Bene-
volence to-
ward the
Deity.

D d 4

" I

ἀνδρῶν καὶ πρῶτον πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡδέχεται πάντων. δέξαι δ'
ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείσσον καὶ αἰμιον. καὶ ἀποποιεῖται
τῶν ἐν, ἐν μὲν δ' αὐτῷ βίον αἰετοῖτο ἀλλὰ πνέει ἄλλοι. Arist.
Eth. Lib. 10. Cap. 7.

(1) Ἀ' μ' ποῖον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ ὅπως δια-
τι καὶ ἀνδραίων, ἀθάλα τε καὶ μωδὸν καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται, ὅπως
ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δις αὐτῇ περιέχεται ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαύτη
ἐν οἷς. Καὶ μάλ' ἔστιν, χαλὰ τε καὶ βέλαια. Τούτοις πείνουν, ἢν
δ' ἐγώ, ἢ δ' ἐν ὅτ' πλήθει, ἢ δ' μετρίῳ, ὅπως ἐατὴν, α' τε-
λευτούμενα ἐκτίσεν ὁτιμώτα. Plat. de Repub. Lib. 10.
See above, P. 77.

Sect. VIII. " I know not, says Cicero (1), but Faith, hu-
 man Society, and that most excellent Virtue,
 Justice, or Righteousness, are no more. " And
 'tis really not to be imagin'd what good Rea-
 son or Principle there is, which determines a
 rational Agent to Benevolence towards his own
 Species, that does not naturally operate much
 more powerfully, in exciting to Benevolence to-
 wards the Deity.

— Can we want Obedience then
 To him, or possibly his Love desert,
 Who form'd us from the Dust, and plac'd us here,
 Full to the utmost Measure of what Bliss
 Human Desires can seek or apprehend?

MILT. Parad. lost.

Cicero puts the Question, *The Man*, says he
 (2), whom the Stars in their different Orders,
 whom the Vicissitudes of Day and Night, the various
 Seasons of the Year, and the Things that are pro-
 duc'd for our Comfort and Enjoyment; I say, the
 Creature in human Shape, whom these Things do

not

(1) Atque haud scio, an, pietate adversus Deos sublata, fides
 etiam, & societas humani generis, & una excellentissima virtus,
 justitia, tollatur. De Nat. Deor. Lib. 1.

(2) Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum, noctium-
 que vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea,
 quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogant,
 hunc hominem omnino numerare qui decet? De Legib.
 Lib. 2,

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 425

not inspire with Gratitude towards God, how can we with any Decency count him a Man? *Seft. VIII.*

To conclude, if *Instinct* shall be supposed to be the *Spring* of *Benevolence*, one must necessarily conceive, that the *Author* of *Nature* would have certainly laid it in the human Mind with so commanding a *Turn* towards himself, that if it exerted itself in any Instance, it should infallibly be in this. But the *Heavens*, as *Tully* observes (1), are laid open to human Eyes, and they lead every considerate and thinking Man to the Knowledge of God; and from this Knowledge springs Piety, with which is connected Justice, and all the other Virtues, that are the Foundation of that Happiness wherein we resemble the Deity.

So that I must declare, if a Man be govern'd by the Nature of Things, or if he has any fix'd Principle of worthy Actions, so as to be capable of giving a rational Account of his Conduct (without which he can never, in Justice, be reckoned virtuous) 'tis impossible but he must love God, as well as his Neighbour, and find himself inspired with an universal Benevolence,

So that if a Man has any fix'd Principle of worthy Actions, he cannot but love God as well as his Neighbour,

(1) Quid vero? hominum ratio non in cælum usque penetravit? soli enim ex animantibus nos astrorum ortus, obitus, cursusque cognovimus: ab hominum genere finitus est dies, mensis, annus: defectiones solis & lunæ cognitæ, prædictæque in omne posterum tempus, quæ, quantæ, quando futura sint. Quæ contuens animus, accipit ab his cognitionem Deorum: ex qua oritur pietas; cui conjuncta justitia est, reliquæque virtutes: ex quibus vita beata existit par & similis Deorum. De Nat. Deor. Lib. 2.

Sect. VIII. *lence*, which always proceeds uniformly: Other-
 wise, I say, he can pretend to nothing but
 mere Freak and Caprice; for the same Reason or Cause does every where necessarily produce the same Effects. On which Account, the *moral Virtues* are all naturally linked one with another, and cannot be found separated in the same rational Mind (1).

But 'tis argued, If the Deity is govern'd by Self-love, then 'tis absurd to expect that so independent a Being will delight in the Virtuous, and reward them.

BUT our Author reasons further against the Objection, in this Manner. *As this Benevolence*, says he, *does scarce deserve the Name; when we desire not, nor delight in the Good of others, any farther than it serves our own Ends; so if we have no other Idea of Good, but Advantage to ourselves, every rational Being must act for its own Advantage.* And when Things every where go on at this Rate, what Reason or Foundation can we have to expect *Benevolence* or Rewards from God or Man, further than it is the Interest of the Benefactor? " And with respect to God particularly, must not all Expectation of Benefits from a Being whose Interests are independent on us, be perfectly ridiculous? For, what should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? Can we prove that it is for his Advantage

" tage

(1) Πάντα γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ καὶ τὰ ἀρετῆς μέρος λέγεται καὶ φιλία. Plar. de Rep. Atque hæc conjunctio, confusioque virtutum, tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. Nam cum ita copulatæ connexæque sint, ut omnes omnium participes sint, nec alia ab alia possit separari: tamen proprium suum cujusque munus est. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 5.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 427

“ tage to do so? Perhaps the Misery of Crea- Sect. VIII.
“ tures may be as capable of giving him Plea-
“ sure as their Happiness: And who can find
“ Fault, or blame such a Being to study their
“ Misery; for what else should we expect, since
“ he acts only for his own Advantage? Unless
“ we prov’d, that the Happiness of Creatures
“ was advantagious to him: Which will
“ certainly be lookt upon as very absurd, if
“ we do not suppose some beneficent Disposi-
“ tions essential to his Nature, which determine
“ him to consult the publick Good of his Crea-
“ tures, and reward such as co-operate with
“ this kind Intention. And if there be such
“ Dispositions in the Deity, where is the Im-
“ possibility of some small Degree of this pub-
“ lick Love in Creatures? And why must they
“ be supposed incapable of acting but from
“ Self-love?”

THIS, in our *Author's own Words*, is, as I take it, the full Strength of his Reasoning. And, I would fain think, 'tis already answered in my *Enquiry*: So that I shall here only again profess; I so far own, that every rational Being acts for his own *Advantage*, or with a View to his own Good, Pleasure or Interest, that I still judge it utterly impossible that it can be otherwise. And though one can by no Means desire, or delight in the Good of others, any farther than it serves his *own Ends*, that is, than it serves to give him *Pleasure* (which, as I have frequently insinuated, is what must be under-
stood

Certain it is that no Being can delight in the Good of others, but so far as it serves to give him Pleasure, or to gratify his Self-love.

Sect. VIII.

stood by one's own Ends, Advantage, and the like. And this our *Author* seems to allow of, as in many Places, so particularly in this; for after he has argu'd against its being for the *Advantage* or *Interest* of the *Deity*, to reward *Virtue*, unless we suppose some beneficent Dispositions essential to his Nature: *Perhaps*, says he, *the Misery of his Creatures may be as capable of giving him Pleasure*, that is, as his whole Reasoning plainly imports, *of promoting his Advantage, or serving his own Ends*) I say, though one can by no Means desire, or delight in the Good of others, any farther than it serves to give him *Pleasure*, yet this cannot possibly hinder this Benevolence from deserving the Name: For what other, or stronger *Benevolence* am I capable of towards any Being whatsoever, than to *delight* in his Happiness? But I ought perhaps to *delight* in his Good, farther than it serves my own Ends, *i. e. farther than it serves to give me Delight!*

I suppose, our *Author* will allow, that *Horace* was animated with a very sincere Benevolence toward *Mecenas*, his great Patron and Benefactor; and yet, in the Height of this friendly Affection express'd to *Mecenas* himself, how openly does he appear serving his own Ends, and consulting his own Ease and Pleasure? I cannot desire a better Instance to illustrate, or to shew the Nature and Power of my Principles.

Quid

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Quid nos, quibus te vita sit superflite

Jucunda; si contra, gravis?

Utrumne jussi persequemur otium

Non dulce, ni tecum simul?

An hunc laborem mente laturi, decet

Qua ferre non molles viros?

Feremus: — — —

Roges, tuum labore quid juvem meo

Imbellis, ac firmus parum?

Comes minore sum futurus in metu,

Qui major absentes habet:

Libenter hoc & omne militabitur

Bellum, in tua spem gratie:

Non ut juvencis illigata pluribus

Aratra nitantur mea:

Satis superque me benignitas tua

Ditavit, &c.

HOR. Epod. 1.

NOR can our being thus influenced by *Self-interest*, ever prevent our having a Reward from the *Deity* for our *Virtue*. For as *Self-love* determines us to love, worship and adore the great Author of our Being, and the supreme Disposer of our Futurity; and to love our Fellow-men, and promote their Happiness: So does *Self-love* likewise determine the *Deity* to be studious of the Good of his Creatures, and particularly

And since the Moral Virtues are highly grateful and pleasing to the Deity, he cannot but reward those that pursue them.

sec. VIII. cularly to reward the Virtuous. Indeed if his
 Interests were, in all Respects, entirely independent on us; or, if he were quite indifferent what Way soever we acted; in particular, if *Virtue* were not *advantagious*, or agreeable to his Nature, or, if it did not serve the Happiness of his Creatures for whom he bears so fatherly a Concern; I confess, the Virtuous could have no Foundation to expect *Benevolence* or *Rewards* from him. But since we know, that as he interests himself in our Conduct, so is *Virtue* exactly consonant to his Nature; must he not from this Congruity necessarily approve of virtuous Actions, and find it his *Interest*, or *have Pleasure* (according to our Way of Speaking) to reward, or to testify his Approbation of those Actions, in some Instances of *Benevolence* towards those *rational Agents* who pursue them*? 'Tis true, the *Deity* approves of *Virtue*, because it suits and co-operates with some beneficent Dispositions, essential to his Nature, which determine him to consult the *publick Good*, or the Good of all his Creatures. But then, 'tis very obvious, that those beneficent Dispositions, whereb he is thus determin'd, are not *disinterested*, as our *Author* would have them. For, besides that, the Pleasure which the gratifying of those Dispositions (we may suppose) derives to the divine Mind, is *Self-interest*. (For their being essential can ne

* See Arift. quoted above, P. 74.

ver alter the Case: Hunger and Thirst are De- Sect. VIII.
sires or Appetites inseparable from our present
Constitution; and yet, it is confessed, we pur-
sue the gratifying of those Appetites, or Dispo-
sitions, from *Self-interest*.) They are manifestly
founded upon, or arise from *Self-love*.

It cannot but be owned, that we are all the
Offspring or Productions of the *Deity* (1), on
whom he has display'd his infinite Power and
Wisdom, and whom he has form'd after his
own Image (2). And when he regards us in
this Light, how can he but tenderly affect his
own *Children*, wish well to his own Workman-
ship so curiously contriv'd, and embrace us with
the most beneficent Dispositions*? This, I
dare say, is plain to every Man's Experience,
when he looks upon any Object, under such
near Relations to himself. And since we can
judge of the *Deity* no otherwise than by our-
selves; and that there is no Imperfection in
one's being thus mov'd upon our having such
Ideas of Things, I cannot conceive, why we
must

And in-
deed, we ba-
ring his Chil-
dren and
Creatures,
Self-love
can't but
engage him
to affect us
under these
Relations,
and to de-
light in our
Happiness.

(1) Νῦν δὲ γινώσκεις τὴν ψάλλον αἰτίαν λέγειν θεῷ. Plat. in
Phileb. Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina,
cum alio nullo, nisi cum ipso Deo, si hoc fas est dictu, com-
parari potest. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. Lib. 5.

(2) Cogitavit enim nos ante natura, quam fecit. Nec tam
leve opus sumus, ut illi potuerimus excidere. — Scias
non esse hominem tumultuarium & incogitatum opus. Inter
maxima rerum suarum natura nihil habet, quo magis gloriatur,
aut certe cui gloriatur. Senec. de Benef. Lib. 6. Cap. 23.

* See Arist. quoted above, P. 282.

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must not suppose the *supreme Being* to be the same Way affected. And as this lets us see (perhaps as a demonstrative * Argument *a priori*) that the Misery of his Creatures can never be capable of giving him Pleasure; so it gives us plainly to understand, that their Happiness is *advantagious* to his Nature, as it serves to give him Pleasure from its Suitableness to his beneficent Dispositions, or his *Self-love*. So that when a Man co-operates with those kind Intentions of the *Deity*, to render his Creatures happy, he cannot but recommend himself to the divine Acceptance, as one who favours his *Interest*, and therefore as a fit Object of his Beneficence, whom he cannot but reward from *Self-love*.

And thus the *Deity* himself being govern'd by *Self-love*, we may well approve of such a Principle in human Nature.

AND when it thus appears, that even the *Deity* himself is studious of the Good of his Creatures from *Self-interest*, I suppose no Body will contend, that Man is determin'd to the same Pursuits, from a Principle which our *Author* reckons more perfect.

THE great *Cicero* explains the Matter quite otherwise: *Since*, says he (1), *it is beyond Doubt, that*

* See our Author, P. 303. § 13.

(1) Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus & prosint, & obfint; proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare sibi animos hominum, & ad usus suos adjungere. Itaque quæ in rebus inanimis, quæque in usu, & tractatione belluarum fiunt, utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis; hominum autem studia ad

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry: 433

that Men may be either most useful, or most mischievous to one another, I judge it to be the proper Business of Virtue, to gain Peoples Affections, and engage them in the Service of our Happiness. As for the Advantages of Life which we receive from inanimate Things, or from brute Creatures, they are owing to those Arts that require bodily Labour: But the hearty and ready Endeavours of our Fellows to promote our Interests, are excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Men. For almost the whole of Virtue moves upon these three Points; first, our discerning the naked Truth and Certainty of Things, their Agreement and Correspondency, their Consequences, what their Rise is, and from what Causes they proceed; then, our bridling our Appetites and Passions, and making them obedient to Reason; and, last of all, our treating those to whom we are associated, with Discretion and Prudence, that we may have them bear-

E e

tily

ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta & parata, viro-
rum præstantium sapientia & virtute excitantur. Etenim
virtus fere omnis in tribus rebus vertitur; quarum una est in
perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid
consentaneum cuique, quid consequens, ex quo quæque gi-
gnantur, quæ cujusque rei sit causa; alterum, cohibere motus
animi turbatos, quos Græci πάθος nominant, appetitionesque
quas illi ὀρμηδες, obedientes efficere rationi; tertium, iis qui-
buscum congregamur, uti moderate, & scienter, quorum stu-
diis, ea quæ natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus;
per eos denique, si quid importetur nobis incommodi, propul-
semus, ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sunt, tan-
taque pœna afficiamus, quantum æquitas, humanitasque pati-
tur. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2.

Sect. IX.

~ tily to conspire with us in our Pursuits after those Enjoyments that make up the full Happiness of our Nature; and that, by their Assistance, we may repel Injuries, and punish those who have done us Mischief, as far as Equity and Humanity will bear.

S E C T. IX.

'Tis proposed to vindicate Self-love in the Desire of Esteem, as the great Motive to virtuous Actions.

IT only remains that I take Notice, so far as it concerns my Principles, of what our Author says with respect to that particular Notion of Self-love, as it exerts itself in the Desire of Esteem, which I lay down as the great Spring that animates all Mankind to the Pursuit of Virtue. And as I have made it appear, so our Author here allows *, that *this Desire of, or Delight in the good Opinion and Love of others, is founded upon Self-love.* But then he observes, *That our Determination to love Honour, presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it.* For it is not, says he, Honour to be universally known, no Matter how; it is the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Qualities, or Abilities presumed to be applied that Way; for Abilities constantly applied to other Purposes procure the greatest Infamy."

Our moral Sense, or natural Power to perceive Pleasure

As to this moral Sense our Author speaks of, and which, he and I are agreed, can signify nothing

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nothing but “ a natural Power or Capacity to
 “ receive pleasing or painful, i. e. advantageous
 “ or hurtful Ideas, from the Actions of intelligent
 “ Beings, as they are applied to us, or occur
 “ to our Observation;” I say, as to this *mo-
 ral Sense*; I do own, it is antecedent in me
 (and without Dispute in every Body else) to
 my honouring any other Being whatsoever:
 Nay, I shall say further, this Sense is not only
 thus antecedent, but I must needs have it grati-
 fy’d before I set the least Value on any Man
 alive (1). And if the World will condemn
 and slander me as a *Disciple of Epicurus*, for be-
 ing so prodigiously selfish, or so absolutely de-
 voted to my own Pleasure and Happiness, I
 hope our *Author* has the disinterested *Benevo-
 lence* to defend and support me, for he really
 betrays one into this mercenary Principle, by
 telling us, that we honour or entertain a respect-
 ful Opinion of other rational Agents, for nothing
 in the World but their morally good Actions, or their
 Abilities presumed to be applied that Way. For,
 what can any Mortal understand by this, but
 that we love and esteem other People, only be-
 cause of the kind, friendly, beneficent Actions
 they do us, which all minister to our Pleasure;
 or their Abilities presumed to be applied to the
 serving of our Interest? And ’tis certainly, as

SECT. IX.

from the
 Actions of
 intelligent
 Beings, is
 antecedent
 to, and must
 be gratify’d
 before our
 honouring
 any Agent
 for his Vir-
 tues.

E e 2

our

(1) Τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ
 τὸ ἀρετὴν, ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς πράξεις. *Arist.*
Eth. Lib. 1. Cap. 12.

Sect. IX. our Author * elsewhere justly observes, this Perception of *Beauty* or *Excellence*, i. e. of *Pleasure*, *Delight*, *Joy*, derived to us from the kind Offices of rational Agents, that determines us to admire and love them. Nay, this, in our Author's Opinion, is so very necessary a Foundation of Esteem, " That if a Man apply his moral Abilities of any Kind, or his natural Advantages, to other Purposes, contrary to (what one must call) *Self-love*, or if he don't employ them in promoting our *Happiness*, but mind only his own mistaken private Advantage, without any Regard to our Welfare, he shall then find our Honour, or Esteem of him to cease, and himself exposed to Infamy : " As is a *rich Miser*, who hoards up his Wealth, without having the open kind Heart, and the beneficent Hand to supply our Wants, or relieve the Necessities of our Nature.

THESE, I should think, are our Author's Sentiments on this Point. But I shall not be very confident of this, for he says, That *Honour* presupposes a Sense of something amiable, besides Advantage, viz. a Sense of *Excellence* in a publick Spirit ; that is to say, according to the true Import of these Phrases, it presupposes a Sense of *Pleasure*, besides *Delight*, a Sense of the *finest Satisfaction*, that spring from beholding a publick Spirit, devoted to our *Interest*, or the Happiness of our Nature. However, I would fain think,

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think, I may well enough conclude, that our Sect. IX.
 Author has taught me to declare, that I will
 honour no Man, but on condition he gratifies
 my *moral Sense*, i. e. entertains me with *advan-*
tagious Ideas, or *pleasing Perceptions* from those
 Actions he applies to me, or to my *Nature*, as it
 is diffused through a whole *System of intelligent*
Beings. And I have good Reason to hope, if
 any Man will take the Trouble to look into his
 own Breast, he shall find himself every Whit
 as *selfish* in this Particular, as I do here openly
 profess myself to be.

So that I do own, a *Sense of moral Good*, i. e. This makes
 of *Pleasure from the Actions of rational Beings*, it plain, that,
 must be *antecedent* to Honour: For Honour is in our Sense
 founded upon it, or springs from its being or Taste of
 gratified: But how does this make it appear, Things, the
 as our *Author* alledges, that we have other *I-* Virtue or
deas of moral Actions, than as they are *advan-* Goodness of
tagious or hurtful? I hope the Reader by this moral Acti-
 Time is fully satisfied, that our *Author's moral* ons consists
Sense represents them just so, and no otherwise. in the Plea-
 And as a further Proof of it, we shall look sure they
 back to the Beginning of his first Section, derive to us,
 where he observes *, *That the Perceptions*, says which ex-
 he, of *moral Good and Evil*, are perfectly *disse-* cites our
rent from those of natural Good or Advantage, every Esteem or
one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the Honour.
different Manner in which he finds himself affect-
ed, when those Objects occur to him; in particu-

E e 3

lar,

Sec^t. IX. lar, with respect to inanimate Beings and rational Agents, upon Comparison, we say, *Why should we admire, or love with Esteem inanimate Beings? They have no Intention of Good to us; their Nature makes them fit for our Uses, which they neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational Agents; they study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are benevolent toward us.* By this our Author intends to give us a Notion of *moral Good*, as quite different from that of *natural Good or Advantage*. But what Idea can a Man have of this Study of our Interest, this Delight in our Happiness, and this Benevolence toward us? For my own Part, I will confess, that all these Actions of a rational Agent, raise no other Ideas in my Mind, but what are exceeding *advantagious*. Indeed they do affect me with a quick Sense of elegant Pleasures, such as one can never possibly have from *inanimate Beings*, that are only passive to our Uses. But I still say, 'tis only those pleasing delicate *Perceptions* that make up their Goodness, and recommend the Agents to our Love and Esteem.

Nor are we hereby hinder'd from honouring those Persons, the sensible Effects of whose virtuous Dispositions are not immediately communicated to us, but to other People.

BUT, says our Author, *had we no other Idea of Actions but as advantagious or hurtful, we never could have honoured or loved Agents for publick Love, or had any Regard to their Actions further than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of publick Good, but we had never desir'd it any further than it tended to our private Interest, without a Principle*

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principle of Benevolence ; nor admired and loved those who were studious of it without a moral Sense. Sect. IX.

Here I humbly conceive, that our Author quite mistakes the Point, while he imagines, that a Man cannot apprehend an Action as *pleasing* or *advantagious*, and for that Reason honour the Author of it, except he immediately reap the Fruits thereof, or unless it directly touch his Case in particular : As if a rich Man could perceive no Pleasure from the Bounty of another, and on that Account honour the Benefactor, unless the Beneficence were immediately done to himself ; when, in Truth, not only the Person more particularly obliged, but every Body else, both *Rich* and *Poor*, have a good deal of *Pleasure* (which I here call *Advantage*) from viewing a *beneficent* Character ; which they look upon as a *common Refuge*, while they condemn the Ingrateful, as *common Enemies*, that discourage *Liberality* (1). This, I say, is our Author's Mistake. And I hope I have given a rational Account, how the contrary must necessarily happen : To which I refer the Reader.

E e 4

Mean

(1) Benefacta male locata, malefacta arbitror. Quod autem tributum est bono viro, & grato, in eo cum ex ipso fructus est, tum etiam ex cæteris ; temeritate enim remota gratissima est liberalitas : eoque eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cujusque bonitas commune perfugium est omnium. — Omnes enim inamemores beneficii oderunt : eamque injuriam, in deterrenda liberalitate, sibi etiam fieri, eumque qui faciat communem hostem tenuiorum putant. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 2.

~ Sect. IX. Mean while, you will here remember, that I endeavoured to shew, that as *Selflove* is the Standard whereby we can only judge of the *Virtue* or *Value* of any Action whatsoever, so when we love and honour *A.* for his Benevolence towards *B.* we secretly put ourselves in *B's* Circumstances, and in our Minds conceive ourselves the Objects of *A's* Kindness or Bounty: And after this Manner do we take Part in all the Concerns of our Fellow-men. So that there can be no *beneficent Action* done in any Part of the World, which, when it occurs to our Observation, does not affect us, and tend to our *own private Interest*, or serve to give us *Pleasure*. From which one may form a Notion of the unbounded *Goodness* of the *Author* of Nature, who has so framed every Individual, that, besides what Good he has immediately in his own Lot, he naturally shares in all the Pleasures and Felicities of other intelligent Beings.

AND thus, methinks, it still appears, that the *Honour* we confer on other rational Agents, flows from the *Pleasure* we perceive from those Actions with which they entertain us: Which, I say, plainly shews, that our *moral Sense*, as 'tis here called, is *antecedent* to our honouring any Man.

But if moral Actions appear virtuous to us, only as they are advantageous, or afford us Pleasure;

BUT our Author likewise observes, that our *Determination* to love *Honour*, presupposes in him who pursues it, a Sense of *Moral Virtue*. This, I confess, I do not well understand, unless it be supposed that the Honour, or the

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Love and Esteem which we pursue and receive **Sect. IX.**

from other intelligent Beings, is *Moral Virtue*, or a necessary *Effect* of it: Both which it certainly is. And in either of these Senses, I own it presupposes in him who pursues it, a Sense of *Moral Virtue*; but otherwise, it may, in my Opinion, as well be said, that our Determination to love *Musick*, presupposes in him who pursues it, a Sense of *Moral Virtue*. How-
why do we pursue Honour? Or, when secure from Punishment, why are we uneasy at the unfavourable Opinion of the World?

ever our Author observes, "That were there
 "no moral Sense, or had we no Idea of Acti-
 "ons, but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*; I see no
 "Reason, *says he*, why we should be delight-
 "ed with Honour, or subjected to the Uneasi-
 "ness of Shame; or how it could ever hap-
 "pen, that a Man, who is secure from Pu-
 "nishment for any Action, should ever be un-
 "easy at its being known to all the World.
 "The World may have the worse Opinion of
 "him for it; but what subjects my Ease to
 "the Opinion of the World?"

THAT we have no other Idea of moral
 Actions, but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, has
 been, I hope, made already pretty manifest.
 And I have before given a sufficient Reason,
 why we must necessarily be delighted with
 Honour, and subjected to the Uneasiness of
 Shame, or to a grievous Sensation of Misery
 from Contempt, or the unfavourable Opinion
 of others concerning us. Nor is it possible
 (such is the wise Appointment of the first Cause of
 all Things, the supreme Governor of the Universe)
 that

Self-love
 necessarily
 prompts us
 to the Pur-
 suit of Ho-
 nour; and
 makes us
 uneasy at
 Contempt
 and Hatred.

SECT. IX. that any Man can be secure from Punishment, when he knows that the World have a bad Opinion of him, or entertain Contempt and Hatred against him for his Actions. For as one cannot but have *Pleasure*, and judge himself happy in the Love and Esteem of other intelligent Beings; because these Affections exactly correspond with one's *Self-love*, and promise us nothing but Safety and Happiness (1): So when we are conscious, that we are odious to the World, and have nothing from them but Aversion, Contempt and Hatred; these Affections, on the other Hand, are so contrary to *Self-love*, and represent to us such Miseries, that we cannot but be afflicted with very painful Sensations. 'Tis true, a Man may make Shift, perhaps, to secure himself from the external Effects of Contempt and Hatred (though this cannot be done effectually when one is odious to every Body) but notwithstanding this he cannot escape being his own Tormentor (2).
For

(1) Nam diligi & charum esse, jucundum est; propterea quia tutiorem vitam, & voluptatem efficit plenior. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 1.

(2) Quamquam hic quidem tyrannus (Dionysius) ipse indicavit, quam esset beatus. Nam cum quidam ex ejus assentatoribus, Damoclus, commemoraret in sermone copias ejus, opes, majestatem, dominatus, rerum abundantiam, magnificentiam ædium regiarum: negaretque unquam beatiorem quemquam fuisse. Visne igitur, inquit, Damocle, quoniam hæc te vita delectat, ipse eandem degustare, & fortunam experiri meam? Cum se illa cupere dixisset, collocari jussit hominem

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 443

For when he reflects how the Minds of the Se& IX.
 World are employed about him; this gives
 him so many Ideas so dreadfully shocking to
 Self-preservation, that he cannot but find him-
 self exceedingly uneasy. From which it ap-
 pears, that the Nature of Things, or one's
 Self-love, subjects his Ease to the Opinion of
 the World. And, as *Xenophon* remarks, to e-
 stablish Laws that carry in their Nature the Pu-
 nishment of Transgressors, seems to me to be the
 Work

hominem in aureo lecto, &c. Fortunatus sibi Damoclus vide-
 batur. In hoc medio apparatu fulgentem gladium e lacunari,
 seta equina appensum, demitti jussit, ut impenderet illius beati
 cervicibus. Itaque nec pulchros illos administratores adspicie-
 bat, nec plenum artis argentum, nec manum porrigebat in
 mensam: jam ipsæ defluebant coronæ: denique exoravit ty-
 rannum, ut abire liceret, quod jam beatus nollet esse. Cic.
 Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. 3. Aristotle has some very fine Re-
 flections concerning the inward Miseries of wicked Men.
 Οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πάσχει. καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισῶν,
 φύγουσι τὸ ζῆν, καὶ ἀναρῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς. Ζητοῦσι τι οἱ μοχθηροὶ μὴ
 ἀνὸς συνημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φύγουσιν ἀναμνηστικοί. ὃ πολλοὶ
 λῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοῖσδε ἐπεὶ ἐλπίσουσι, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες
 μὴ ἐτέρων δ' ὄντες, ἀπλοῦν δέον, ἔδωκεν τι φιλητὸν ἔχοντες,
 ἔδωκεν φιλικὸν πᾶντος πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς. ἔδωκεν δὲ συγχάριτον, ἔδωκεν
 συναλγῆσθαι οἱ τοῖσδε ἑαυτοῖς. γαστρίῳ δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ
 μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖν, ἀπὸ χρόνου πρῶτον τὸ δὲ, ἢ δὲ καὶ τὸ
 μὴ δὲ. τὸ δὲ ἐκείνῳ ἔλαττον ὥστε διασπῶνται. εἰ δὲ μὴ δὲ
 τὸ αἶμα λυπεῖται καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μὴ καὶ λυπεῖται ὅτι
 ἔδωκεν, καὶ ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐβύλατο ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν πᾶντα γινέσθαι αὐτῶν
 καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι γίνονται. ἔδωκεν δὲ φαῦλον ἔδωκεν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
 φιλικῶς διακρίνειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ δὲ ἔχειν φιλητὸν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ ὅτι
 ἔχειν, λίαν δὲ ἀδύνατον, οὐκ ἐστὶν τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατηρεῖν,
 καὶ πλεονέκτην ὀφειλὴν εἶναι. ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλικῶς ἀνέχειν,
 καὶ ἐτέρων φίλον γίνεσθαι. Arist. Eth. Lib. 9. Cap. 4.

Sect. IX. *Work of a Legislator highly eminent, and far above Man* (1).

And as we are thus necessarily engag'd in the Pursuit of Esteem or Honour; so Mr. H— makes the Desire of Honour an additional Motive to Virtue.]

Now, as every Man's *Self-love* does thus determine him to pursue *Honour*; or, as we are all necessarily delighted with the good Opinion and Love of others, and cannot possibly be easy, unless we have the *Esteem* of those intelligent Beings, with whom we have any Intercourse, or to whom we stand associated: So this is the Principle which I have laid down in my *Enquiry*, as the *great commanding Motive* to virtuous Actions (2). And our Author allows, that "Honour being constituted by Nature pleasant to us, it may be an additional Motive to Virtue: But the Person whom we imagine perfectly virtuous, acts immediately from the Love of others; however those refin'd Interests may be joynt Motives to him to set about such a Course of Actions." Here, I say, our Author allows, that the Desire of *Honour* may be an *additional Motive* to Virtue, while it joyns its Influence with the Love of others, which is the principal Motive, and from which a Man must immediately act, before we can imagine him perfectly virtuous. So that here, we have *two Motives* that determine us

to

(1) Τὸ δὲ τὰς νόμους αὐτὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνίστασθαι τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν, βέλτιον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων νομοθέτε δόξαν μοι ἔσται. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 4.

(2) Levis est animi, lucem splendoremque fugientis, veram gloriam, quæ est fructus veræ virtutis, repudiare. Cic. in Pison.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 445

to the Pursuit of Moral Virtue. First. The Sect. IX.

Love of others, which acts as the chief and principal One; and then, the *Desire of Esteem*, which serves only as an Assistant. But I would beg to know, if our *Love* of others, or our *Benevolence* towards them, is not *Virtue*, or a virtuous Action? This our Author all along declares. And is it not the present Question, what is the *Motive* that determines us, not only to this, or that particular Piece of Virtue; but to every virtuous Action whatsoever, and consequently to this *Love*, or *Benevolence* itself? And when I am ask'd, what moves a Man to the Love of others? I suppose, no Body will accept of this Answer, *His Love of others moves him to the Love of others*: Unless we thereby understand the *concomitant Pleasure*, with which Love is always attended; which our Author rejects as *too selfish* a Principle.

IN a Word, if we will take our *Ideas* from the Nature of Things, the *Love* of others is so far from being the chief, and an essential *Motive* to *Virtue*, that, in the present Argument, it is no Motive at all, since being itself *Virtue*, or a virtuous Action, one should think, there is Need of some *Cause* or *Motives* to excite it in the Mind, and to engage the Mind to pursue it. And this, it would seem, our Author was so very sensible of, that he makes the *immediate Motive* to *Love* or *Benevolence*, to be a kind generous *Instinct*: Which is a Principle I don't pretend to have any No-

But it is certainly the only true Motive, and fully able to support us.

tion

Se& IX. tion of. So that *the Desire of Honour*, is here left alone to act by itself, as *the only Motive* to virtuous Actions. And indeed, it is a manly, glorious, and divine Principle (1), and is fully sufficient to animate and support us in the most noble and dangerous Pursuits (2).

Nor can our knowing that an Agent has no other Motive of Action, but a Desire after our Esteem or Honour, ever prevent our apprehending Virtue in his Actions.

“BUT, says our Author, if we knew an Agent had no other Motive of Action but Ambition (that is, as he explains it himself, a Desire of, or a Delight in the good Opinion and Love of others) we should apprehend no Virtue, even in his most useful Actions, since they flow’d not from any Love to others, or Desire of their Happiness.” Indeed it is very certain, that how useful soever any Actions may be to us, which we receive from o.

ther

(1) Καὶ ὁ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ ἴβραν, τάτω διαφέρειν ἀνὴρ ἢ
ἄλλων ζώων, τῷ πλεονεξῶν ὁρῶντι ἐπὶ σπείροις τε καὶ ποταμοῖς, καὶ
ὕδασι, καὶ ἀφροδισίοις πάντα ὁμοίως ἡδιστὶ βόσκει τὰ ζῷα. καὶ
ὁ φιλοπαιδεία ἔτ' ἐν ταῖς ἀλόχοις ζώοις ἐμφύει, ἔτ' ἐν ἀν-
θρώποις. οἷς δ' ἂν ἐμφυῇ πλεονεξίαν τε καὶ ἐπίπλεον ἔρωτα, οὗτοι
εἰσὶν ἡδὴ οἱ πλεονεξοῦντες καὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων διαφέροντες, ἀνδρες
δὲ καὶ ἐκείναι ἀνθρώποις μόνον νομιζόμενοι. ὥστε ἐμοὶ μὲν εὐλόγως
δοκεῖτε πάντα πάντα ὑπομένειν, ἀ φέρετε ἐν τρυφῇ, ἐπι-
πλεονεξοῦντες καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς
ἀνθρωπίνην ἡδονὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγυτέρω εἶδους, ἢ ἢ σφίσι τὰς πλεονεξίας ἐν-
φύουσι. Xenoph. de Regn.

(2) Somus enim natura, ut ante dixi (dicendum est enim sæpius) studiofissimi, appetentissimique honestatis: cujus si quasi lumen aliquod adspexerimus, nihil est, quod, ut eo potiamur, non parati simus & ferre, & perpeti. Ex hoc cursu, atque impetu animorum ad veram laudem, atque honestatem, illa pericula adeuntur in præliis, non sentiunt viri fortes in acie vulnera, vel sentiunt, sed mori malunt, quam tantillum modo de dignitatis gradu dimoveri. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. Lib. 2.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 447

ther rational Beings, yet we can never apprehend any the least *Virtue* in them, if we conceive they are not *Love*, or do not flow from *Love* in the Minds that do them. For as *Moral Virtue* can pass only between rational Minds, so does it particularly consist in the *Love* of others, or a Desire of their Happiness; *this Benevolence* being the *only Bond* that knits us together in every Instance of our Commerce one with another. And as all the virtuous Actions of the Mind, *Justice, Faith, Pity, Gratitude, Generosity, &c.* are only *Love* to others, shewing itself in different Lights, or exerting itself in different Manners; so whatever Actions one Mind does to another, they can be counted no farther virtuous, than they partake of this *Love*, or of a Desire of the other's Happiness: So that whatever Action is void of *Love*, it must at the same Time be void of *Virtue*, however useful one may find it, and by whatever Motive it may happen to be influenc'd. All this is exceeding true.

BUT then the Question still remains, What is the *Motive* that determines us to exert and pursue this *Virtue*, or this *Love* towards others; which must necessarily be, as it were, interwoven in every other Action of the Mind, in order to render it virtuous? That this Motive cannot be the *Love* of others, is abundantly plain; that it is not *Instinct*, a *je ne sçai quoi* is not here alledg'd. 'Tis certainly no other, even from our *Author's* Sentiments in this Place, than the

Sect. IX. the *Desire of Esteem*, or a *Delight in the good Opinion and Love* of others.

In short, the Pursuit of Esteem and Honour not only renders ourselves virtuous, but it is the raising and improving of Virtue in others; and this brings about universal Concord and Happiness.

THIS is an unlimited universal Passion, whereby all Men are actuated, and without the gratifying of which no Man can ever find himself easy among those Beings to whom he is associated. And as the *Desire of Esteem* universally determines us to pursue *Love* towards others, or to exert ourselves into all virtuous Actions whatsoever (for these are the only Means, that can effectually recommend us to the good Opinion and Love of others) so from hence we cannot but have the most elevated Apprehensions of the wonderful Goodness and wise Contrivance of the great Parent of Mankind, who, in the Nature of Things, has determin'd us to pursue *Virtue*, with a View to raise such Affections (*Love and Esteem*) in other rational Agents, as render them likewise virtuous, or morally good towards us (1). By which Means, there is made the best and the amplest Provision possible, to secure every one's Ease and Comfort; we are all deeply engag'd in a generous Contention, a noble Plot, to promote each other's Felicity. And if we follow this divine Constitution

(1) Νομοδότης ἡ τέταρτος μέλει, ὅπως ἐν πλείονι ἐν πόλει διαφείνηται ὁ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὗτο μαχρὰ. ἐν γυνὶς ἐννομεῖται τὰς πολίτας, παιδοὶ τε καὶ ἀνάγκη πῶς μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις τὴν ἀρετήν, ἢν ἂν ἔχουσιν τὸ κοινὸν δυνάμει ὅσον ἀρετῆν. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμποῦν τοῦτοις ἀνδράσι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἢ καὶ ἄλλοις τῶν πόλεως βέλῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταρῃται αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εὖνδον μὲν τὴν πόλεως. Plat. de Rep. Lib. 7.

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of Things, we shall all endeavour, to the ut- Sect. XI
most of our Power, to be joyful and happy in
one another, through the whole Compass of
our Duration;

S E C T. X.

THUS far have I endeavoured to explain
my own Principles, and to shew the
Weakness of our *Author's* Reasoning against
them. And I shall be extremely well pleas'd,
if the Reader judge that I have made it appear
pretty evidently, that we pursue *Virtue*, or ex-
ert ourselves in all the Acts of Devotion to-
wards *God*, and of Benevolence towards our
Fellow-men, from *Self-interest*. For had we once
disengag'd ourselves from those gloomy Appre-
hensions, which some People are at Pains to in-
culcate upon us, when they strongly assert, and
will needs have us to believe, that, in Matters
of *Virtue* or Religion, we must not view our
own *Interest*, or yield to *Self-love*, as our prin-
cipal Motive: I say, did we once shake our-
selves loose from these dark unmanly Notions,
so as to submit to the unbounded Power of *Self-*
interest, which necessarily determines us to pur-
sue our own Fortunes in the Good and Prospe-
rity of others, as we are rational eternal Minds;
associated to *God*, and to one another; I
am well perswaded, that *Virtue* and Religi-
on would have a great many more Vota-

The Pursuit of Vir-
tue from
Self-interest
is of the
highest Con-
sequence to
Religion:

F f ries;

Sect. X. and therefore most necessarily mischievous to *ourselves*. So that I cannot but mightily applaud *Socrates* (1) for condemning that Man, who first separated *Virtue* and *Self-interest*, or *Utility*, these two most friendly Companions, from one another; and judge with him, that this unnatural unworthy Divorce, is the fatal Source of all the Irregularities and Mischiefs of Life: For as it is impossible (2), that *Self-interest* can ever be inconsistent with *Virtue*, but only the *deceitful Shadow* of it, which, I own, is grasped at by every deluded Imagination, to his own Ruin, and the great Disturbance of the World:

(1) Recteque Socrates execrari eum solebat, qui primus utilitatem a natura sejunxisset: id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium. Cic. de Leg. Lib. 1. Dubitandum non est, quin nunquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. Itaque accepimus Socratem solitum execrari eos, qui primum hæc natura coherens, opinione distraxissent. Id. de Offic. Lib. 3.

(2) Ac primum Panætius in hoc defendendus est, quod non utilia cum honestis pugnare dixerit aliquando posse (neque enim ei fas erat) sed ea quæ videntur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum: nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, sæpe testatur: negatque ullam pestem majorem vitam hominum invalisse, quam eorum opinionem, qui ista distraxerint. — Atqui in talibus rebus aliud utile interdum, aliud honestum videri solet. Falso, nam eadem utilitatis, quæ honestatis est regula: qui hoc non præviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus. Sic enim cogitans; est illud quidem honestum, verum hoc expedit: res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere; qui fons est fraudum, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium. — Honestate igitur dirigenda utilitas est, & quidem sic, ut hæc duo verba inter se discrepare, sed tamen unum sonare videantur. Id. ibid.

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World: So every wise Man who follows Na- Sect. X.
ture, takes up *Virtue* and *Utility* under the same
Ideas, determines them by the same Rule, and
he knows that these are only two Words that
signify the same Thing (as plainly appears
from what I have hitherto said) which he stea-
dily pursues to the unspeakable Pleasure and
Happiness of himself, and a whole System of
rational Agents. And here I would willingly
give a Translation of *Arian's* (1) Sentiments upon
this Point. But this learned *Philosopher* sets
this Matter in such a strong Light, that I am

F f 3

much

(1) Καθόλου γὰρ μὴ ἔξαπατᾷ. πᾶν ζῶον ἔστιν ὑποκείμενον
κρίνεται, ὡς καὶ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι. ὁ, πᾶν ἔν τῷ τοῦ φαινομένου
αὐτοῦ ἐμποδίζον, ἂν τ' ἀλλοῦς ἢ τούτου, ἂν τὴ πατὴρ, ἂν
τὴ τέκνον, ἂν τ' ἐρωτῶν, ἂν τ' ἐρευνῶν, μισῶν, συμπάσκει
καταφύγει. ἔστιν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον φιλεῖν οἰονοῦν, ὡς τὸ ὑπὸν συμφέρον
τούτου πατὴρ, καὶ ἀλλοῦς, καὶ συγγενὲς, καὶ πατρις, καὶ υἱός.
ἔστιν ἔν οἷς τούτου ἐμποδίζον ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ δοκῶσιν, καὶ οἱ
ἀνθρώποι, καὶ τὰ ἰδιώματα τὰ αὐτῶν καταφύγει, καὶ πᾶν
ταῦς ἐμπροσθεν. ὡς περὶ Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκείνου ἐμπροσθεν
τὰ Ἀσκληπείαν, ἀποθανόντα τῷ ἐρωτῶν. διὰ τούτου, ὅτι μὴ
ἐν ταῦτα πᾶσι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον. καὶ τὸ ὅσον, καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ
πατριδα, καὶ γυνεὺς, καὶ φίλους σφίσι τὰ πάντα. ἂν δ'
ἀγαθὸν μὴ τὸ συμφέρον, ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ φίλους, καὶ ἢ πατριδα, καὶ
καὶ συγγενεῖς, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον οἴεται τὰ πάντα πᾶσι, κα-
ταφύγει, ὡς τὸ συμφέρον. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐγὼ, καὶ τὸ
ἐμὸν, ἐκείνῳ ἀντίκειναι ῥέπειν τὸ ζῶον. οἱ ἐν σαρκί, ἐκείνῳ τὸ κω-
λύον (1). οἱ ἐν πρᾶξει, ἐκείνῳ (2). οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς, ἐκείνῳ.
οἱ τοίνυν ἐκείνῳ οἱ ἐγὼ, ὅπου ἢ πρᾶξις, ὑποκείμενον καὶ
φίλοις ἵσμεν οἱ δὲ δίκαι, καὶ ἡμῶν, καὶ πατὴρ. τούτου γὰρ μὴ συμ-
φορῶν, πρᾶξις ἢ πρᾶξις, ἢ αἰδήμονα, ἢ ἀνεκτικόν, ἢ ἀδελφικόν,
καὶ σωφροσύνην, φυλάσσειν πᾶσι χρεῖται. ἂν δ' ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἵκαν-
τὸν δὲ, ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ καλόν, ὡς ἰχυρὸς γίνεται ὁ Ἐπικύριος
λόγος, ἀποφάσκει ἢ μὴδὲν (3) τὸ καλόν, ἢ ἀπὸ τὸ ἐνδοξόν.
διὰ ταῦτα ἢ ἀγνοίας, καὶ Ἀθλῶαίς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δια-
φύγει, καὶ Θεβαῖοι καὶ ἀμφότεροι, &c. Lib. 2. Cap. 22.

Se^{ct.} X. much afraid the *English* Reader will not be well able to bear it. And therefore, tho I do own every Thing in the Place I refer to, as my Principles, I shall content myself with marking it down in the Margin.

"Tis plain that my Neighbour will loudly declare, there is no Virtue or Goodness in my Actions towards him, unless they serve his Interest, or gratify his Self-love.

BUT how can any Man preach up to me, that, in whatever kind Offices I do to himself or other People, I must not be governed by *Self-love*, or intend the promoting of my own *Pleasure*? I would beg to know, if he, or any Man alive, will commend one single Action of mine, or count it virtuous, if it has not the good Fortune to favour his *Self-love*, and promote his *Interest*? Our *Author* is certainly in the Right when he observes, "That however those Rewards, which accompany a Man's own Actions, may make him approve what he does himself from *Self-love*; yet this can never make him approve and love another Person for the like Actions, whose Merit is not imputed to him, or from whose Actions he receives no Benefit." No, such is the *natural selfish* Frame of all intelligent Beings, (and the Misfortune is, 'tis not in our Power to avoid it) that we must be pleas'd and gratify'd ourselves, by whatever Actions other People apply to us, before we can give them our Love, or our Approbation.

And is it not ungenerous and meanly selfish in any Man to pretend, that

AND pray, why must all the World I have any Commerce with, be thus absolutely govern'd by *Self-love*, and *virtuously* refuse to relish any Thing from me any farther than it serves their *Interest*,

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or ministers to their *Pleasure*; while I, poor Man, **Seft. X.** must stand condemn'd entirely to renounce the same *Principle*, and to have no *Regard* to my own *Ease* or *Advantage*, under the *Pain* of being counted highly criminal? This I don't think is fair *Dealing* (1). And I am apt to believe, there is no Man upon Earth, who has a *Right* from any Authority whatsoever, to command me to devote myself wholly to his *Service*, without ever minding my own *Good* or *Interest* (2). 'Tis the universal Language of Nature, *None dearer to us than ourselves* (3). And does not Charity begin at Home, and from thence flow out, and spread itself through a whole Community of intelligent Beings (4)? For my own Particular, I do not see what better Title any Man can possibly have to consult his *Happiness*, than I have to promote mine.

But, says our Author, we are universally ashamed to say, an *Action* is just, because it tends to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage* of the Actor: And we as seldom condemn a beneficent kind *Action*, because it is not *advantagious* to us, or to the Actor.

F f 4

Actor.

as I would be virtuous, I must study his Pleasure and Interest, without regarding mine own?

Indeed, if a Man allows others the same Privilege, he needs not be ashamed to confess, that in his Ap probation and Pursuit of moral Virtue he is governed by Self-interest.

(1) Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑπερῷον ἢ τὸ τοῦ ἄλλου. ὅρα δὲ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῖς; ἀπὸ πνέ; πατὴρ σου εἰμι. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλοτρίοις σου εἰμι. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαθὸν. Arim. Lib. 3. Cap. 3.

(2) Sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitæ pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est, non repugnante natura. Illud quidem natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3.

(3) Ἐμὸν παρ' ἐμὲ οἷόν τι καὶ ἄλλοις. Arim.

(4) Eadem ratio facit hominem hominum appetentem, ut profectus a charitate domesticorum, ac suorum, currat longius, & se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate. Cic. de Fin. Lib. 2.

Sect. X. *After* *. Indeed, if a Man absurdly imagines, that his Advantage lies in those Pleasures that cannot be gratify'd without being injurious to God, and his own Species, I confess he has good Reason to be asham'd of his Stupidity, in imagining or saying, an Action is just or good because it tends to his Advantage, when, in Truth, it serves only to expose him to Contempt and Infamy, and to render him utterly miserable. But when I say, "An Action is just, because it tends to my Advantage, or contributes to give me Pleasure, as I stand associated with God, and all my Fellow-men," I am no more asham'd of this than I am asham'd of the Perfections of the Deity, and of the essential Properties of human Nature, or of the Truth of any mathematical Theorem (1). Nor is it possible that any such Actions can ever be disadvantageous to me, or to any one else, or at all come under the Notion of Vice (2), unless the Nature of Things be alter'd. In short, how can I miss to be governed by Self-love, when I see all the World besides, only animated from this Principle (3)?

CAN

* See Page 167.

(1) Οὐ γὰρ τὰς ὁ δὲ ἡδονὴν π. σφάτῃσιν, ἔστιν ἀλόγως, ἔτι παύλα, ἔτι ἀκρατὴς ἀλλ' ὁ δὲ αἰχρῶν. Arist. Eth. Lib. 7. Cap. 9.

(2) Utilitas & turpitudine in eadem re inesse non possunt. Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3.

(3) Εἰσὶ πρὸς διδασκαλίας ἔχουσιν ὅτι τὰς λόγους, καὶ διαμύμονας τὰς φιλοσοφίας καὶ φασὶν αὐτὸς ἐκ ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ πλεονεξία ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ τὰς ταύτας διασφάττει, ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐν πρὸς δόμῳ ἢ ἐν διακομιδῇ, διὰ τὴν τὰς μὲν ἐν λόγῳ δὲ διαμύμονας φέρουσιν, τὰς δὲ ἐν ἑρῶς σφάτῃσιν βυλομένους ἐπιστῶν;

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 457

CAN that most disinterested Man, the most rigid Myſtick upon Earth, ſay, he ſerves God for nought? that he has no Pleaſure in it? or, that he expects nothing by it?— Let him ſpeak out, and he ſhall declare for my Principles.— Under what Ideas do you look upon the ſupreme Being, when you regard him as the Object of your Worſhip? Do you confine your Thoughts to his being eternal, immense, omniſcient, almighty? Or, do you open your Views wider, and take in his moral Perfections? I ſuppoſe, you likewise apprehend him as either evil or good. But under which of theſe Perceptions do you pay him your Adoration? I can hardly think you will contradict our Author, who very juſtly obſerves, *That no Body apprehends any Virtue in baſe Dread and Servitude towards a powerful evil Being; and to reverence a Being neither good nor powerful, is ſeen by every Body to be a Jeſt.* You muſt then certainly conceive the Object of your Worſhip, as an immense Being, of infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs. But how, do you think, are theſe Perfections employed? What are their Objects? Or, in *whoſe Favour* are they exerted? Do you imagine, that the God whom you worſhip, does, with

Sect. X.

It prevails
in all Acts of
Devotion, &

οἱ δὲ αἱ πλεονεξίαι λυπῶσιν αὐτοὺς, πλείους καὶ μείζους ἐν τῇ
ἔργων, ἢ τῇ λόγων ἐνρήσμεν γυνομένης. ἔπειτα καὶ κείνο ἀπο-
ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς, ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν θεῶν εὐσεβῶμεν, καὶ τὸ
δικαιοσύνην ἀσκήσωμεν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἐπιτηδεύωμεν, ἵνα
ἵνα τῇ ἄλλων ἑλαπίον ἔχωμεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐν αὐτῇ πλείων ἀγα-
θῶν τὸ εἶον διδύμεν. Isocrat. in Nicocl.

Sect. X. with all the Excellencies of his Nature, enjoy an undisturbed Rest, and indulge his own Ease, beyond the Skies, without any the least Concernment for other Beings in the Universe? Or, do you think, that this almighty wise Being, does indeed represent his Goodness to others, but that the only Scene of it is above the Heavens, while you ly here below utterly neglected? Or, are you well assured, that he interests himself in human Affairs, and takes Mankind into his kind Protection? That *you are* the Object of his Beneficence, and that he bids *you* rely on his Power, Wisdom, and Bounty, for your Safety and Happiness, through every Stage of your Existence (1)? Indeed the *Epicureans* had a stupid Notion, that the *Deity* was so intirely wrapt up in his own pleasing indolent Perceptions, that he never discompos'd his Rest,

(1) Περὶ θεῶν οἱ μὲν πᾶντες εἰσι λέγοντες, καὶ δ' ἔτι τὸ θεῶν οἱ δ', ἢ) μὲν, ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ ἀρχαίαι, καὶ μὴ ποιοῦν μὴδὲ πρὶν τοῖς θεοῖς, οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ κατὰ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, εἰς κοινὸν δὲ μέτρον, καὶ ἔτι κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκαστοῦ πάντες δ', ὧν ἦν καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ Ἰωχάρις, οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τῇ λήθῃ κινῶμεθα. πολὺ πρότερον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι καὶ ἐκαστὸν τύπων ἐπισκέρδαι, πότε καὶ ὕμῃς λεγόμενον ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ εἴδω, πῶς ὅτι τέλει ἐπισκέρδαι θεοῖς; εἰ δὲ εἰσι μὲν, μὴδὲν δ' ὀπμιέμενοι, καὶ ἔτι πῶς ὕμῃς εἶναι; ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄντων, καὶ ὄντων μελαινάων, εἰ μὴδὲν διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀνθρώπους ὅτιν' ἔχ' αὐτῶν, καὶ μὴ Δία καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς, πῶς ἔπ' καὶ ἔτι πῶς ὕμῃς ὅτι; πάντα τὰ ταῦτα ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐπισκευάζει, καὶ αὐτῷ γινώσκω ὅτι πάντα καὶ τὸ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα, καὶ ἀνὰ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πάντα τὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ πάσης. Arian. Lib. 1. Cap. 12. Οὐδεὶς ἐστὶ ἀνθρώπων ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ πάντων αἰεὶ καὶ διηνεκῶς ὁ πατὴρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀδμεν. Id. Lib. 3. Cap. 24.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 459

by intermeddling in the Affairs of Mankind, or Sect. A concerning himself, whether we were happy or miserable: And yet they maintained, that we ought to worship and adore him, because of the supereminent Excellencies of his Nature. But, I dare say, you very much approve of *Cotta* in *Tully* (1), for bringing these little Philosophers under the Lash for such Absurdities.

So that I strongly imagine, you apprehend the Object of your Worship as *beneficent* towards you, and imploying his infinite Power and Wisdom, according to the Influence of this kind amiable Disposition of his Nature. And, no Doubt,

(1) At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus Deos, libros scripsit Epicurus. At quomodo in his loquitur? ut *Coruncanum*, aut *Scævolam*, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas: non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem: nec manibus, ut *Xerxes*: sed rationibus Deorum immortalium templa & aras everterit. Quid est enim, cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum Dii non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? At est eorum eximia quædam præstantque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam elicere sapientem. An quidquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quæ sua voluptate lætans, nihil nec actura sit unquam, neque agat, neque egerit? Quæ porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? est enim pietas justitia adversus Deos: cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla cum Deo sit communitas? sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum Deorum: qui quamobrem colendi sunt non intelligo, nullo nec accepto ab iis, nec sperato bono. Quid est autem, quod eos veneremur propter admirationem ejus naturæ, in qua egregium nihil videmus? — Deinde, si maxime talis est Deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. 1.*

Sect. X. Doubt, as *Socrates* finely observes (1); *The more glorious the Being is, who condescends to take Care of us, the more he is to be honoured.* But when you apprehend the *Deity* under these *Ideas* that promise you so much *Advantage*, so as to refuse to worship him, unless he presents himself thus favourably inclin'd to your *Interest*, and studious of your *Happiness*; pray, what is the generous Principle that determines you? I see nothing here that has the least *Semblance* of your being *disinterested*. Give me Leave to say, this is a sufficient Demonstration to me, and, I suppose, to every Body else, that even in *Matters of Devotion*, you are absolutely governed by *Self-interest* (2).

And in the
most sincere
and virtuous
Friendships.

LET me again ask, From whence do those Friendships spring that are counted the most virtuous and disinterested? I hope I have made it before pretty manifest, that *Self-love*, necessarily determines us to associate with one another, But how comes it to pass, that we enter into a more close and intimate Correspondence with *this Man* rather than with *that*? A Gentleman of *Honour* and *Virtue*, who lives easy and contented, without any unlawful Ambition to better his Fortune in the World; I see, that in his

Choice

(1) Οὗτοι, ἔφη, ἐγὼ, ὃ Σόκράτης, ὑποφωτὸ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγούμεαι, ἢ ὡς τ' ἐμὴς διατριβῆς προδίδωμι· ὅκουν, ἔφη, ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξίως σι διατριβῆς, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον πικρὸν αὐτῷ. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 1.

(2) Τὸ δ' ἀληθές ἐν τοῖς φρεσὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ τῷ βίῳ κρίνεται· ἐν τέττοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Arist. Eth. Lib. 10.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 461

Choice of Friends, he overlooks the *Clown* of Sect. X. no Education; that he keeps within his own Rank, or perhaps goes beyond it: Nor does he indifferently give himself up to every one of that Station or Rank from which he takes his Friend; but from among the many Hundreds that are about him, upon the same Level, or of a higher Order, he pitches upon one or more as his Bosom-companions, and leaves all the rest excluded from this Intimacy. Besides that, none of those Persons, whom he chuses and embraces as his Friends, are obscene and vicious, actuated by Principles pernicious to Society (1): They are all Men of *Honour* and *Virtue*, of the same agreeable Complexion, the same lovely Dispositions with himself. But how comes he to affect these more than the others? Or, what is the Principle that determines him in his Election? 'Tis not from the Views of filling his Coffers, or of raising himself to Pomp and Pageantry. The Treacherous and Lewd do, in some Circumstances, serve one to promote such Purposes more effectually. And I heartily own, that when a Man looks upon others under no other Ideas, but such as shew them capable of assisting him in Pursuits of this Nature, he then rates them no otherwise than one would do his brute Animals; that

(1) Οὐ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις οἱ πονηροὶ ποτὶ συναισθημάτων ἀξιοῦνται. πῶς γὰρ οἱ τὰ πονηρὰ ποιῦντες τοῖς τὰ πονηρὰ μετὰ φίλοις γίνονται; Xenoph. Memorab. Lib.

Sect. X.

that in such Instances he is intirely void of all *Virtue*, in so far as he forms such Notions of his Fellow-men, and applies them to such Uses as they necessarily hate and disdain; and can never be thought to act from *Self-interest*, unless you imagine, it is one's Interest to expose himself to the Contempt of a whole *System* of rational Agents, whom he thus injuriously abuses. But, I say, there is no such Design in this friendly Association. Nor can I bring myself to believe, that he is influenced by mere *Instinct*. For, as I observe, that the Base and Dissolute do flee the Society of the Honourable and Virtuous, and enter into Cabals, or contract what they abusively call Friendships with one another (1); so I can never conceive, how *Instinct*, in the same Nature, can produce different Effects, quite contradictory the one to the other. In short, I can imagine nothing that determines him to this particular Choice, but his seeing those Qualities in his Friend which he loves and values in himself, or his beholding his own Image fairly stamped upon him; which, when he sees, he cannot but tenderly affect, and find himself irresistibly conciliated to that Person who bears it (1).

(1) Οὐτε γὰρ τὸς πονηρὸς ὁρῶ φίλος ἀλλήλοις διαμένους εἶναι πῶς γὰρ εἴη ἢ ἀχάριτοι, ἢ ἀμελεῖς, ἢ πλεονέκται, ἢ ἄπρηστοι, ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἄνθρωποι δύναντο φίλοι γινέσθαι; οἱ μὲν ἔν πονηρίᾳ πάντες ἑμοίγε δοκῶσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροὶ μάλλον, ἢ φίλοι πρὸς εἶναι. Id. ibid.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 463

it (1). And what is this, but one's loving him- self in another, or being moved and influenced by Self-interest (2)?

So that, upon the whole, I will conclude, that the sole and universal Motive to virtuous Actions, is Self-love, Interest, or Pleasure. Nor am I much afraid, that the impartial Reader will judge, that this wise Philosophy of the Moderns, as our Author * is pleased ironically to call it, is any just Ground for that kind Imputation, which this Gentleman has the Goodness shrewdly to insinuate against the Mainrainers of it, as if they deserved no better Character than the *Disciples of Epicurus*. As no Body, says *Maximus Tyrius*, offers to reproach Reason, as if it were not naturally valuable and excellent, though some People employ it to Purposes naturally base and unworthy; so no Body ought to impeach Pleasure, but blame those who do not rightly manage it (3). Nor do I think it in any Degree possible,

Nor can this Principle in its full Compass and Latitude, ever produce any bad Effects.

(1) Quod si etiam illud addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse, quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat, & tam attrahat, quam ad amicitiam similitudo: concedatur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant, adiscantque sibi quasi propinquitate conjunctos, atque natura. Cic. de Amic. Verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tanquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Id. ibid.

(2) Ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φιλοῦν ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸς. Arist. Eth. Lib. 9. Cap. 4. Καὶ ἀγαπᾷ τὸ φίλον, τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἀγαπᾷς φίλον καὶ ἑαυτὸν, ἀγαθὸν γινέσθαι, ὁ φιλοῦν ἀγαπᾷ τὸ φίλον καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαπᾷ. Id. ibid. Lib. 8. Cap. 5. P. 209.

(3) Εἰ παῦλον τι ῥηῖμα ἴδωμι, ἢ ἂν ἦν ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἡμᾶς τὸ ἀρετὴν τῶν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀρετῶν ἀρετῶν.

Se&t. X. possible, that *this Philosophy*, as I have here represented it, *must be fruitful of nothing but Discontent, Suspicion, and Jealousy*, so as to make it a Man's Duty to thank God, as our *Author* does, that, in spite of such Opinions, our *Nature itself* leads us into Friendships, Trust, and mutual Confidence: As if one was going about, from the Principles I am here contending for, impiously to rob Mankind of those Felicities, those most valuable Enjoyments of human Life, which, I confess with *Cicero* (1), would be doing a Thing as pernicious to the World, as the turning the Sun out of the Heavens.

No, in all Instances, it powerfully promotes universal Safety and Happiness.

INDEED, if a Man, through Inattention, Perverseness, or some Narrowness of Mind, mistake his own Interest, and place it in those Things where it does not, and cannot lie, this can hardly fail to engage him in those Pursuits which are disturbing to Society, which tend to ruine other People, and to bring Mischief on his own Head; though, in the mean Time, *this* can no more be Self-love, than that is Benevolence, which our *Author* shews, is at the Bottom of

λέμενα ἐς αὐτὴν, ἢ Σαρδαναπάδου προσὶ ταῦτα ἀ-
δρῶα, καὶ ὅσα τέτων πικραιότερα, ἢ καὶ ἡδονῆς ἔργα, ἀλλὰ τίχρη
καὶ λόγῳ, φθαρουσάντων οὗ ἀνδραγαθῶν οἰς ἡδονῆς δι' ἐντο-
λῶν οὗ τεχνῶν ὅτι τὴν χροῖον. Ὡς αὖτε ἐν ἡδονῇ λαοδότης τῆς ἀ-
γῆς ὡς ἡ καλὴν τῇ φύσει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς χροῖας
ὅτι τὸ μὴ φύσει καλὴν ἔτας ὅτι τῇ ἡδονῇ λαοδότης, ἀλλὰ
τοῖς χροῖοις ἡδονῇ κακῶς. Max. Tyr. Dissert. 33.

(1) Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt: qua a Diis immortalibus nihil melius habemus, nihil jucundius. Cic. de Amicit.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 465

of the most odious Enormities. But when a Sect. X.
Man opens his Mind, and follows *Self-interest*,
as the Nature of Things lays it out before him;
this is *Self-love*, and it effectually determines
him to such a Series of Affections and Actions,
as cannot but render himself, and whomsoever
he has any Communication with, in all
Respects, *easy, cheerful, and happy*. So that I
shall here again observe, "As all the mischie-
vous Passions that break out among intelligent
Creatures, and confound Heaven and Earth,
and all Things sacred and profane, do only arise
from *mistaken Self-interest*; 'tis very certain,
that *Piety and Virtue* are safe, and shall be
cheerfully exerted; that the *Peace, Order*
and *Prosperity* of the Universe are secure, and
shall be gloriously advanc'd and supported,
when rational Agents do steadily pursue that
which every wise Being can only judge to be
Self-interest." This is what *Arian* gives us
to understand, in very strong Terms, in the
Place which I have above referred to in the
Margin; and I cannot but own, I firmly be-
lieve (1), that all our Happiness intirely depends
upon our making a right Choice in Points of this
Nature.

G g

Nature.

(1) Οὐχὶ ἔστι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπων ἵεναι, ἔστι ἐκείνη πάντα
τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ ἀτοκμήματα ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ ἀγνοίας γί-
νηται; Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ Ἀχιλλεύς ἀπὸ ἀλλήλοισι διαφέροντο. ἔχον
δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι τίνα ἔστι συμφέροντα καὶ ἀσύμφορα; *Arian*,
Lib. 2. Cap. 24.

Sect. X. *Nature.* And indeed (1), the Man who chuses his Pleasures, as they are call'd, (for the Name is common) in the Society of Vice, however for a short Time he may gratify himself, he must fall, beyond Recovery, into bitter Repentance: For his Pleasures pass away, and his Turpitude remains; which cannot fail to fill his Soul with Sorrow and Anguish. Whereas, the Man who pursues the best, the highest, and the most lasting Pleasures,

(1) Ο γὰρ ἀρετῇ διατρέπων καὶ ἡδοναῖς ἀμεταμελήτους καὶ
 πᾶσι μιαιφάνων τὸ δ' ἀρετῆς μόνιμον. πῶς οὖν γὰρ πᾶσαι ἡδοναὶ
 ἐπιτελεῖται ἡσυχαστὴν εἶναι ἀποκλεισθῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὴν
 ἑαυτοῦ ἰσχυρίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπακολουθεῖ τὰς ποιεῖσιν ἡμῖν, ἢ τὰς
 ἴσως ταῖς φαντασίαις τῶν ἐπιτελεῖσιν αἱ χεῖρες τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπι-
 τελεῖται. τὰς δ' ἀμείνων ἡδοναῖς συνεστέρχον ἀποδίδωται. ὅτι μὴ
 μόνον τὸ καλὸν πεισθῆναι δ' ἀποδίδωται τῷ φαντασῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ
 τῇ ἡδονῇ νικᾷ, δι' ἣν μόνον δοκεῖ εἰς χαλκίαν ὁ φαντασῶν ὑπὸ
 γὰρ καὶ γὰρ ὅσον ἢ διδιδόται δ' ἀποδίδωται ἀμείνων ποσὶν καὶ ἡ
 ἡδονῇ δ' ἡδονῆς αἰσθητῆρος. ἐπὶ γὰρ ὅτι κατ' ἀρετὴν βίῃ δ' ἀπο-
 δομῶντος ἀνταχόμενον, τὸ ὅτι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅτι δ' ἐν χαλκίᾳ δ' ἀ-
 εἰώδης, καὶ ἀποδοῖ δ' ἡλόν ὡς ἢ μὴ τῷ ἀποδοῖ ἡδονῇ δ' ἀπο-
 δομῶντος μὴ μὴ γὰρ καὶ ἀποδοῖ συνεπομένῃ ἢ δ' τῷ φαντασῶν ἡδονῇ
 λαζομένη (διδοῖται γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ ὄνομα) πρὸς δ' ἀποδοῖ καὶ ἡ-
 πλοῖον ὁμοῖον κίνησιν. ἡδοναὶ γὰρ καὶ λυπαὶ μαδισσῶν. ὅτι ὁ μὴ
 ἀποδοῖ, ὅτιν τι δει, καὶ ὁποῖ, καὶ ὁποῖον, ἐνδομῶντος ἢ δ'
 τὰ μέτρα τῶν ἀγνοήσας, ὁ ἀποδοῖ. ὅτιν γὰρ ὁ μὴ ὁποῖ
 καδάρων βίῃ ἀναμάρτητος εἶναι μόνον ὁ δ' καὶ ἐπισημῶν πλε-
 ρωδῶν, κατὰ δέμενον καὶ τέλει. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἡδονῶν τε ἀπο-
 καὶ ἀποδοῖ. — ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἀποδοῖ ἐλόμενον, ὁ
 καὶ πρὸς ὁλίγον δελεασθῆναι τῷ ἡδονῇ, διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἀποδοῖ εἰς μ-
 ταμίλειαν ἐπὶ δυνον ἔρχεται. — εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἀποδοῖ π μὴ
 ἡδονῆς ἀποδοῖ, ἢ μὴ ἡδονῇ παρῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποδοῖ μένει. ὅτι
 λυπηρῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι δ' ἀποδοῖ βίαν πρὸς τῶν δ'
 ἀποδοῖ. Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag.

Principles in the foregoing Enquiry. 467

Pleasures, which are only to be found in the Sect. X. Paths of *Virtue*, he arrives at a *Happiness*, where-
in his *Enjoyments* are durable as his *Mind*, and resemble those of the *Deity*.



Gg 2

TREA

Principles in the foregoing Inquiry. 467

Whence which are only to be found in the Self. 17.

Let us of which he writes as a Happiness, where-
in his happiness are as his Mind, and

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Gr. 2. TREAS.



TREATISE III.

SHEWING,

That *Moral Virtue* promotes *Trade*,
and aggrandizes a *Nation*.

Ὅτι αἱ τέχναι, ἐν δὲ τριήρων, ἐν δὲ ναυίων δίοον) αἱ πόλεις
ἢ μέλλουσιν ἐνδαιμονήσιν, ἐν δὲ πλείονες, ἐν δὲ μαχίονες, ἀνι-
στῆναι. οἱ δὲ μέλλουσιν τὰς πόλεις ἀγαθῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ καλῶς,
ἀνιστῆναι τοὺς μετασφύζοντες τοῖς πολίταις. — καὶ αἱ πόλεις ὅσας
οἱ ἐν δὲ ἀρχῇ ἐξασκίοντες αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν οἱ, πᾶν βέλγῃ, ἐν δὲ
τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ διακρίνοντες, καὶ σωφροσύνην. διακρίνεις ἂν καὶ
ἀγαθόντες καὶ σωφρόνους, οὗ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, θρασυλῶς ἀγαθῆται.
Plat. in Alcib. 1.



HAVING hitherto endea-
your'd to establish the Foun-
dation, and explain the Na-
ture of *Moral Virtue*, I will
now beg Leave to spend some
few Pages more, in order
to shew, That the Principles
of *Moral Virtue*, which I have above laid down,
do most effectually contribute to promote the

'Tis pro-
posed to
shew, against
the Author
of the *Fable*
of the *Bees*,
that *Moral*
Virtue pro-
motes, in all
Instances,
the Great-
ness and
Glory of
politick
Societies.

G g 3

Glory

Seet I. *Glory* of all the Nations of the World, and to render every State and Kingdom upon Earth, in all Respects, *great and flourishing*. And, as this bears a plain Contradiction to what the Author of *the Fable of the Bees* maintains; so, I hope, it will from hence evidently appear, that this Gentleman has utterly mistaken the Nature of Things, and is quite out in his Principles.

SECTION I.

'Tis al-
ledg'd, that
moral Vir-
tue can no-
way contri-
bute to the
Greatness of
publick
Communi-
ties.

THAT which our Author * has labour'd all along for, and wherein he flatters himself he has not been unsuccessful, is to demonstrate the gross Error of those who imagine, that the social Virtues, and the amiable Qualities that are Praise-worthy in us, are equally beneficial to the Publick, as they are to the individual Persons that are possessed of them; and that the Means of Thriving, and whatever conduces to the Welfare and Happiness of private Families, must have the same Effect upon the whole Society. "It is certain, says he, that the
"fewer Desires a Man has, and the less he
"covets, the more easy he is to himself, the
"more active he is to supply his own Wants;
"and the less he requires to be waited upon,
"the more he will be belov'd, and the less
"Trouble he is in a Family; the more he
"loves Peace and Concord, the more Charity
"he

" he has for his Neighbour; and the more he
 " shines in real Virtue, there is no Doubt, but
 " that in Proportion he is acceptable to God
 " and Man. But let us be just, what Benefit
 " can these Things be of, or what earthly
 " Good can they do to promote the Wealth, the
 " Glory, and worldly Greatness of Nations?
 " It is the sensual Courtier that sets no Limits
 " to his Luxury, the fickle Strumpet that In-
 " vents new Fashions every Week, the haught-
 " ty Dutchess, that, in Equipage, Entertain-
 " ments, and all her Behaviour, would imitate
 " a Princess; the profuse Rake, and lavish Heir,
 " that scatter abroad their Money without Wit
 " or Judgment, buy every Thing they see,
 " and either destroy or give it away the next
 " Day; the covetous and perjur'd Villain, that
 " squeez'd an immense Treasure from the Tears
 " of Widows and Orphans, and left the Pro-
 " digals the Money to spend: It is these that
 " are the Prey and proper Food of a full-
 " grown *Leviathan*; or, in other Words, such
 " is the calamitous Condition of human Affairs,
 " that we stand in need of all the Plagues and
 " Monsters I have named, to have all the Va-
 " riety of Labour performed, which the Skill
 " of Men is capable of inventing, in order to
 " procure an honest Livelihood to the vast Mul-
 " titudes of working Poor that are requir'd to
 " make a large Society. And it is Folly to i-
 " magine, that great and wealthy Nations can
 " subsist, and be at once powerful and polite

472 Moral Virtue promotes Trade,

Sect. II. "without.— Religion is one Thing, and
 "Trade is another. He that gives most Trouble
 "to Thousands of his Neighbours, and in-
 "vents the most operose Manufactures, is,
 "right or wrong, the greatest Friend to the
 "Society."

THESE are our Author's Principles. And
 in a Word, his Meaning is, "That no Socie-
 "ty can be rais'd into a rich and mighty King-
 "dom, or, so rais'd, subsist in their Wealth
 "and Power, for any considerable Time,
 "without the *Vices* of Man *." For, says he,
all the cardinal Virtues together won't so much
as procure a tolerable Coat, or a Porridge-
*pot *.*

The con-
 trary will
 appear in
 settling
 the true No-
 tion of
 Luxury.

BEFORE I make it appear, from my Principles,
 that the contrary of this is certain and manifest,
 I shall first consider what we ought to under-
 stand by *Luxury*. And the fixing of the Mean-
 ing of this Word will go near to determine the
 whole Matter.

S E C T. II.

In our
 Author's
 Opinion
 every Enjoy-
 ment is
 Luxury, that
 is not im-
 mediately
 necessary to
 our bare
 Subsistence.

OUR Author observes, "That in the first
 "Ages, Man, without Doubt, fed on
 "the Fruits of the Earth, without any previ-
 "ous Preparation; and reposed himself naked,
 "like other Animals, on the Lap of their
 common

* P. 255.

* P. 199.

“ common Parent. Whatever has contributed Sect. II.
 “ since to make Life more comfortable, as it
 “ must have been the Result of Thought and
 “ Experience, and some Labour, so it, more
 “ or less, deserves the Name of Luxury, the
 “ more or less Trouble it required, and devi-
 “ ated from the primitive Simplicity *. So
 “ that if every Thing is to be Luxury (as in
 “ Strictness it ought) that is not immediately
 “ necessary to make Man subsist, as he is a
 “ living Creature, there is nothing else to be
 “ found in the World, no, not even among
 “ the naked Savages; of which it is not pro-
 “ bable, that there are any but what, by this
 “ Time, have made some Improvements upon
 “ their former Manner of Living; and either
 “ in the Preparation of their Eatables, the or-
 “ dering of their Huts, or otherwise, added
 “ something to what once sufficed them *.”

FROM which it appears, that, in our Au-
 thor's Opinion, whatever is more than enough
 to keep Soul and Body together, or to preserve
 the animal Oeconomy, and prevent its Disso-
 lution, is *Luxury*. And therefore, whoever
 pursues any one Object, or indulges any one
 Gratification, which is not absolutely necessary
 to the Support of the Individual, that Man, by
 this Way of Reckoning, is luxurious. 'Tis
 true, our Author is pleas'd to own that this
 Definition,

* P. 182.

* P. 108.

Sect. II. Definition, as he calls it, is too rigorous: *But,* says he, *if we are to abate one Inch of this Severity, I am afraid we shan't know where to stop.* But, I hope, I shall here make it evident, that we may very well abate a good many Inches of this Severity, and yet know where to stop, so as not to go beyond the Nature of Things.

But why is not the Pleasure we have in those Enjoyments that are necessary to our Subsistence, likewise Luxury?

AND first of all, I would beg to know, why that which is immediately necessary to make Man subsist, as he is a living Creature, is not as well *Luxury* as every Thing else. I suppose, "Luxury always signifies, or implies in its Nature, some agreeable or pleasing Perceptions." And, I say, I would fain know, why those Pleasures which a Man naturally perceives, and cannot but enjoy in the Use of those Things that are *absolutely* necessary to keep him alive, do not deserve the Name of *Luxury* as well as every other Gratification besides. Had our Author given us his Reasons for this Distinction, one might have consider'd the Force of them, and examin'd, whether they should not have likewise concluded, That there is as little *Luxury* in other Things, as there is in those that are absolutely necessary to the Support of Life.

If Self-preservation hinders this sort of Pleasure from being *Luxury*, it must likewise hinder a great many others,

'Tis very certain, that every Man has implanted in his Nature a Principle of *Self-love* or Preservation, which necessarily prompts us (when it is not otherwise directed by some greater Power, or some higher Pleasure) to defend and preserve our present Existence: And, without

without Dispute, our yielding to the Influence Sect. II.
of this Principle, and pursuing those Objects
that are necessary to our Subsistence, has no-
thing in it of Luxury. But does this Principle
determine us to nothing but that which is bare-
ly necessary to keep us in Life? Our Author,
all along through his Book, gives us a quite
different Account of it; and he observes parti-
cularly *, " That there is nothing so univer-
" sally sincere upon Earth, as the Love which
" all Creatures, that are capable of any, bear
" to themselves; and as there is no Love but
" what implies a Care to preserve the Thing
" beloved, so there is nothing more sincere in
" any Creature than his Will, Wishes, and
" Endeavours to preserve himself. This, says
" he, is the Law of Nature, by which no Crea-
" ture is endued with any Appetite or Passion,
" but what, either directly or indirectly, tends
" to the Preservation either of himself, or his
" Species. And the Means by which Nature
" obliges every Creature continually to stir in
" this Business of Self-preservation, are grafted
" in him, and (in Man) call'd Desires, which
" either compel him to crave what he thinks
" will sustain or please him, or command him
" to avoid what he imagines might displease,
" hurt, or destroy him."

FROM which, according to our Author, it
appears, that as every Appetite of human Na-
ture

* P. 219.

Sect. II.  ture has a Respect, either to our own, or the Preservation of our Species, “ so the Principle
 “ of *Self-love* compels a Man to crave and pursue, not only what he thinks will barely sustain him, as he is a living Creature, but
 “ what, he conceives, will please him, as he is
 “ animated with such particular Desires or Passions, which he wants to have gratified; and
 “ further commands him to avoid, not only
 “ what he imagines might hurt and destroy his present Being, but what he apprehends might
 “ displease him, or disturb his Well-being.”

And indeed we must allow, that it cannot possibly be otherwise, when we consider that this Principle of Self-preservation is always determined and exerted (as our Author likewise insinuates) according to the Influence of those Appetites or Passions, that are inseparable from our present Constitution; and which, to every Man's Experience, powerfully excite us, not only to those Things that are immediately necessary to make us subsist, but to many other Gratifications.

NOR is there any Thing more indisputable, than that we are determined, from this very Principle, to set a greater Value on some other Things (and, from a dutiful Regard to both God and Man, we are obliged to direct it so on several Occasions) than we do on Life itself, as is evident from People's venturing and laying down their Lives, not in Defence of their present Existence, for that, I suppose, they

they might have preserved to them, and still Sect. II.
 sustain themselves as living Creatures; but in
 Defence of their own, and other People's Well-
 being and Happiness. So that, if our being
 determined by the Principle of Self-preservation,
 makes it not to be *Luxury*, to seek after
 those Things that are immediately necessary to
 keep us in Life; the same Principle cannot
 but protect us from that Imputation (if we
 are not liable to it on some other Account)
 when we are thereby influenced to pursue those
 Objects, or to indulge those Gratifications, that
 are not absolutely necessary to preserve us a-
 live: For if it prevents the Charge of *Luxu-*
ry in one Case, what can hinder it from hav-
 ing the same Virtue in others, where it bears
 equal or greater Sway and Influence? And I
 cannot but here take Notice, that since the
 Principle of *Self-love* naturally determines us to
 rate other Enjoyments more than Life; it is
 impossible (if this Principle has any Concern in
 this Point) that the Pursuit of those higher and
 more valuable Entertainments can be *Luxury*,
 while our indulging of that, which, in com-
 parison, is but very trifling and insignificant, is
 not.

BUT I am apt to believe, that our Author,
 upon second Thoughts, will not contend that
 every Thing is *Luxury*, that is not absolutely
 necessary to keep a Man alive. He observes
 very justly *, "That the Desire we feel to
 " per-

Which
 our Author
 will confess,
 particularly
 with respect
 to the Pro-
 pagation of
 our Species.

Sect. II. “perpetuate our Kind, is innate both in Men and
 “Women, who are not defective in their For-
 “mation, as much as Hunger or Thirst, though
 “they are seldom affected with it before the
 “Years of Puberty. Could we, *says he*, un-
 “dress Nature, and pry into her deepest Re-
 “cesses, we should discover the Seeds of this
 “Passion before it exerts itself, as plainly as
 “we see the Teeth in an Embrio, before the
 “Gums are form’d.” And, I suppose, he will
 not maintain, there is any more Luxury in the
 gratifying of this Appetite which is so very na-
 tural, (though one might live, and Thousands
 have done so, without ever indulging it) than
 there is in the gratifying of our Hunger and
 Thirst, without which indeed no Man can sub-
 sist. And why must we not form the same
 Judgment with respect to other Enjoyments,
 towards which *Self-love* gives us a strong Pro-
 pension, or without which we cannot find our
 selves easy? For my Part, I do not see it
 possible to assign any good Reason, which ap-
 proves of our gratifying those Appetites, that
 lead us to the Preservation of the Individual,
 and the Propagation of our Species, and at the
 same Time condemns our indulging of other
 Appetites that are as natural, and which, we
 are very sensible, require as much to be satisfi-
 ed.

Indeed if
 God hath
 forbid us all
 other Plea-
 sures, we
 can't but
 count them
 Luxury:

BUT perhaps it will be alledged, that the
Author of Nature has forbid us to taste any o-
 ther Satisfactions, but what we feel in reliev-
 ing

ing our Hunger and Thirst, and in perpetuating our Species. Indeed, if this can be made appear, I shall own, that all other Pleasures are vicious and luxurious. But I am well persuaded, there is no Man that knows any Thing of the Nature of God, who will imagine, that any such Prohibition is laid upon Mankind by a good and beneficent Deity (1).

I shall not here take Notice, to what Joys and Felicities we are invited in another World, whereof the Prospects cannot but be exceeding ravishing: Perhaps our Author does not intend to call those Entertainments luxurious. I will only speak of these Objects that fall under our Notice in this World; and, with respect to Things of this Nature, I desire to know, when a Man is not gratifying these Appetites, that prompt him to take Care of his animal Life, or to propagate his Kind, what shall he be doing? Shall he shut up all the Avenues of his Body, by which external Objects have Access to affect his Mind? And shall he rob the Mind herself of all Thought and Reflection? This certainly he must do, before he can be found

But this is so far from being true, that, in the natural Frame and Constitution of Things, numberless other Enjoyments are inevitable.

(1) Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους, ἐπ' ὧν ἄλλοι προσδύναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὃν αἰνιόονται ἔχειν, ὁρῶντες μὲν ὅτι ὁρῶν τὰ ὁρῶντα, ὅτι δ' ὅς' ἀκύνει τὰ ἀκύνει; ὅσμων γὰρ μὴν, οἳ μὴ ῥίπται ἀποστρέψαντες, τί αὖ ἡμῖν ὁφείλουσιν; τίς δ' αὖ αἰνέσει γλυκύων, καὶ θριμύων, καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ σώματος ἡδέων, οἳ μὴ γλυπτοὶ τῶν γυνάμων ἐνοχλάδων; — ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σκοτυμίνω πένυ ἱοικαί τῶν τε σφοδρῶν πόνων θυμαργῆ καὶ φιλοζῶν τεχνηματι. Xenoph. Memorab. 1.

Sect. II.



found obedient to his Maker, if it be supposed, that God has prohibited Mankind all those pleasing Perceptions that spring from those Things which are not absolutely necessary to keep one alive.

FOR, if a Man opens his Eyes, and looks up to the Heavens, or carries his Views through the Earth, 'tis impossible but he must be sensible of all the Pleasures that can arise from the noblest Prospects, the finest Landskips, the most beautiful Colours, or whatever Objects can derive, through his Organs of Sight, the most elegant and delightful Ideas; if he keeps his Ears and Nostrils open, he cannot but be entertained with the sweetest Harmony and Musick from a great many Tribes of feather'd Animals, and with the finest Perfumes and Odours that arise from numberless Plants and Flowers: And if he does not stop Sensation all over his Body, must he not sometimes be delighted with cooling Breezes, and at other Times be cheered with the kind Influences of the warming Sun? All these Gratifications are unavoidable. And if a Man useth his own Thought and Reflection, when he attends to the Relation which his Wife and Children, his Friends and Benefactors, and all his own Species bear to him, he cannot but have a quick Relish of the most delicate Satisfaction: And when he opens his Mind, and looks into the Nature of Things, so as to discern their Causes and Designs, their Frame, Connection, and Symmetry, all the most refined

refined Delights, come flowing in upon him. **Sec. II.**
 These Things cannot possibly be avoided, when
 one's Mind happens to be thus employ'd.

So that, if a Man be not quite deprived of
 all Sensation, Thought and Reflection, when
 he is not taken up in relieving his Hunger and
 Thirst, or in propagating his Kind, 'tis impos-
 sible but he must enjoy numberless other plea-
 sing Perceptions, besides what he has from those
 Things that are immediately necessary to make
 one subsist, as he is a living Creature. And as
 no Body can alledge, that we are obliged to
 lock up all our Senses, and to become so many
 dead lifeless Men, but when we are either eat-
 ing or drinking, or in the genial Bed, so 'tis
 very manifest, that the Author of Nature is so
 far from forbidding us to taste any other Enter-
 tainments, that he has put it out of our Power
 not to enjoy them in great Plenty and Variety,
 by making almost every Thing about us so gay
 and delightful. And when I yield to the Na-
 ture of Things, and only follow that Constitu-
 tion, which the great Former of the Universe
 has settled in the World, I believe no Body
 can find me guilty of *Vice* and *Luxury*. Indeed,
 this Profusion of the finest Delights, spread all
 over the Heavens and the Earth, may, if you
 please, be called *Luxury*. But then I still say,
 that the Enjoyment of this *Luxury* can never
 be counted vicious or criminal, since the Au-
 thor of Nature has made it plainly inevitable.
 So that every Thing that is not absolutely ne-

Sect. III. necessary to keep a Man alive, cannot, with any the least Shew of Reason or good Sense, be counted vicious *Luxury*.

Nor are we restrain-
ed from us-
ing Skill
and Industry
in enlarging
the Sphere
of our
Pleasures.

But it may be alledged further, that when we do not content ourselves with those Pleasures that arise from Things as Nature has laid them to our Hands, but imploy our own Art and Labour in bringing them together, and blending them with one another, or ranging them in such an Order, that they entertain us with agreeable Ideas in greater Plenty and Variety, than they can be had, in common, through the World, we then become guilty of *Luxury*. But why must this be judged *Luxury*? Or, what is there here that can involve a Man in any such Guilt? We do not, I hope, create to our selves any new Powers or Faculties, which we had not before from the Author of our Being; nor do we furnish external Objects with other Qualities, than what they have from the first Cause of all Things. No, human Nature, as to its essential Powers, continues unalterably the same that it was from the Beginning; and external Objects operate upon us, or affect our Minds no otherwise, than according to those Laws which the supreme Ruler of the Universe has established. And where is the Crime of my collecting and disposing so many particular Things together, so as to gratify my Mind with such Plenty and Variety of pleasing Perceptions? All those Things are fitted and appointed, by the Author of Nature, to

enter-

entertain me with such Gratifications: And, Sect. II.
(whatever our Author has insinuated to the contrary, without once pretending to give any (the least Reason for it) I hope, there is no Guilt in exerting my natural Powers, and making Use of my own Labour, Skill, and Industry, in procuring for myself those Pleasures which I have a natural Taste to enjoy, or in applying Things to those Purposes, to which, not sinful Man, but the Deity himself has so well adapted them.*

As I find myself naturally delighted with large open Views, with Symmetry and Proportion, such particular Arrangements and Dispositions of Bodies, with beautiful Colours, agreeable Sounds, fine Odours, and the like; so are there Materials enough lying ready provided by Nature, to minister to these Pleasures: And why may I not bring those Materials together, so as to indulge to myself these Gratifications, in Buildings, Furniture, Equipages and Clothes, wherein, our Author* tells us, the greatest Excesses of Luxury are shewn? I know of no Law of Nature that forbids these Enjoyments, that declares them vicious in themselves, or that prohibits my employing my Thoughts and Labour to procure them: And therefore, till I can be better informed by our Author, I must here presume to remark, that

H h 2

where

* See Xenophon quoted above, P. 65.

* P. 119.

Sect. II. *where there is no Law, there is no Transgression,
no Luxury.*

In short,
one should
think that
Mankind
have as
good Title
to the En-
joyments of
Life as brute
Creatures.

Our Author, through his whole Book, seems to be fir'd with a manly Ambition, to sink himself and the rest of his Species, much below that Dignity, which is commonly ascribed to human Nature: And therefore he is mightily offended at those People, whom he brings in thus arguing upon this Subject * "The Almighty, say they, has endued us with the Dominion over all Things, which the Earth and Sea produce or contain; there is nothing to be found in either, but what was made for the Use of Man, and his Skill and Industry, above other Animals, were given him, that he might render both them and every Thing else, within the Reach of his Senses, more serviceable to him. Upon this Consideration, say they, they think it impious to imagine, that Humility, Temperance, and other Virtues should debar People from the Enjoyment of those Comforts of Life, which are not denied to the most wicked Nations; and so conclude, that, without Pride or Luxury, the same Things might be eat, wore, and consumed, the same Number of Handicrafts and Artificers employed, and a Nation be every Way as flourishing, as where those Vices are the most predominant." I

I do

I do confess, I see nothing wrong in this Sect. II. Reasoning. However, since our Author tells us, that it is only made Use of by haughty *Moralists*, who cannot endure to hear the Dignity of their Species arraigned: I have so great an Inclination to humour this Gentleman in this Point, that I shall here grant, himself, and all his own Kind, are a Species of Creatures, not more honourable than any other Kind of Animals; that "one may as well say, the World was made for insignificant dying Worms, as for them; and that they have no better Title to apply to their own Purposes, whatever Things the Earth and Sea produce or contain, than the most despicable Insects that can make Use of them". But how does this serve to demonstrate, that every Thing is *Luxury*, that is not absolutely necessary to keep a Man alive? I hope our Author will allow, that Mankind have at least, as good a Right to make Use of the Enjoyments of this World, or to gratify their several Desires or Appetites, as any other *Tribe* of their Fellow-creatures. This worthy Gentleman has certainly too much Goodness to refuse such a modest and humble Demand: And as he cannot but own, that there is no Species of Animals, that do not indulge all their natural Appetites, so far as they have it in their Power, without ever regarding, or stinting themselves to, what is immediately necessary to make them subsist as they are living Creatures; I would fain think he has too much

SECT. II. Justice to deny the same Liberty to his Fellow-men; or to contend, that if they take any Pleasure that flows from other Things than what are absolutely necessary to keep them alive, they thereby involve themselves in Vice and Luxury.

Our Author indeed alleges in particular, that the wearing of Clothes for Ornament, is Luxury.

BUT to shew, that People are thus guilty, particularly when they like to be well dressed, or to wear fine Clothes (that he may lose no Advantage, that can be thought capable of doing Service to his Cause) he allows, contrary to his avowed Notions, the Dignity of human Nature, and upon this he argues; "Clothes," "says he, were originally made for two Ends," "to hide our Nakedness, and to fence our Bodies against the Weather and other outward Injuries: To these our boundless Pride has added a third, which is Ornament; for what else but an Excess of stupid Vanity could have prevailed upon our Reason to fancy that ornamental, which must continually put us in Mind of our Wants and Misery, beyond all other Animals that are ready clothed by Nature herself? It is indeed to be admired, how so sensible a Creature as Man, that pretends to so many fine Qualities of his own, should condescend to value himself upon what is robb'd from so innocent and defenceless an Animal as a Sheep, or what he is beholden for to the most

"most insignificant Thing upon Earth, a dying **See II.**
 "Worm"


To set this Matter in a fair Light, I shall here briefly remark, that our Clothes are then judged to be ornamental, when, besides their answering the two first Ends which our Author mentions, they serve likewise to entertain our Minds with pleasing or beautiful Ideas; and derive the like delightful Perceptions to those that are about us, so as to make our Appearance among our own Species the more agreeable. And since Providence has prepared Variety of Pleasures, which (if you will forgive the Expression) we may always carry about us on our *Backs*, not only for our own, but for other Peoples Entertainment; where is the Excess of stupid Vanity in our wearing those Ornaments, or in our shewing ourselves under such agreeable Perceptions? I don't think that I discover any boundless Pride, or that I overvalue myself excessively, and as much underrate other People, when I only make use of those Gratifications, which the *Author* of Nature has provided for my Entertainment, which he has given me Taste to enjoy, and Skill to improve, and whereby I make myself more agreeable to the rest of my Species.

"But, says our Author, is it not an Excess of stupid Vanity, to fancy that ornamental, which must continually put us in Mind of our Wants and Misery, beyond all other Animals, that are ready clothed by Nature herself?"

But our liking to be well dress'd is no Instance of stupid Vanity.

On the contrary, our being employ'd in providing such Ornaments, is of great Consequence to the Peace and Happiness of the World:

Sec. II.



But our
liking to be
well dress'd
is no in-
stance of
liberty. V.
quid

I shall not pretend to speak for our Author; but, for my own Part, I confess, "I no more mind my Wants and Miseries (except it be, joyfully to thank my kind *Benefactor* for having so bountifully supplied me) when I am well and handsomely clothed, than I do when I have cheer'd myself with the liberal moderate Use of good Entertainment. I find indeed, that the present State of Humanity makes it necessary for me to be clothed; but, in my Opinion, Mankind have so little Occasion to envy other Animals that are ready clothed by Nature herself, that our being brought forth naked in to the World, ought rather to be lookt upon as an Instance of the Goodness of God, and his Concern for our Happiness. For, as our Health is very much preserv'd and promoted, and a great many Mischiefs prevented, by our being obliged to employ so much Time and Labour upon getting Food and Raiment for ourselves; so, by this Constitution of Things, we have an Opportunity to express our *Benevolence* towards others, and to recommend ourselves to their Good-liking and Esteem, by assisting them in those Things, and ministering to their Pleasures from such Enjoyments.

And our
wearing
them ren-
ders us
more ac-
ceptable to
one another.

BESIDES that, our almighty and beneficent *Maker* having implanted in our Minds a natural Desire of *Variety*; and Numbers of People having different Tastes, with respect to sensible Objects, according, perhaps, to the different Structure of the Organs of their Body, by be-

ing

ing left to provide and chuse their own Apparel, every Man has it in his Power, amidst so great a Variety of Things, to please his own Fancy: And when any particular Set of Objects is like to give us Satiety from their being too much accustomed and familiar to the Eye, we can then shift the Scene, and relieve or refresh the Mind with a new Set of gay and delightful Perceptions. And I can hardly think, there is in the visible Creation a more entertaining Sight, than a Company of genteel well-dress'd People, that appear each of them under his own particular Set of agreeable Ideas, and all together with a fine Variety of the gayest Colours (1). We are naturally delighted in beholding Multitudes of our own Species; and when they offer themselves to our View, with the additional Advantage of many beautiful Ideas, that arise from their Dress or Attire, this cannot but further recommend them to our Good-liking, as it is an Increase of our Pleasure or Happiness.

So that, not to observe how the *Author* of Nature has provided Materials for us, of which to make our Raiment, and given us Skill and Industry above other Animals, to apply them to that Purpose; I must beg Leave to think, that

So that our being brought naked into the World, is a Proof of God's Concern for our Happiness.

(1) Οτι ἐν εὐκλείῳ ἔστι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἡδὴ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀκαλοῦνται αἰῶνι καὶ εὐφρανόμενα, τὸ αὐτὸ μετὰ τὰ πύλα, οὗτ' ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ δίαμα τῆς ἀναμύτης διὰ τὸν
Plat. de Rep. Lib. 3.

SECT. II. that our being brought naked into the World, is so far from shewing us miserable beyond other Animals that are ready clothed by Nature herself, that, on the contrary, 'tis of great Advantage to us, and serves very much to widen the Sphere of our innocent Pleasures, and thereby lets us see the Goodness of God, and his Con-
cern for our Happiness.

While
other Crea-
tures for our
Use, are rea-
dy clothed
by Nature
herself.

Wonder not, says Arrian (1), that other Animals have Things needful for the Body, not only Meat and Drink, but resting Places, ready provided for them; and that they stand in no need of Shoes, Bed-clothes, or Raiment, whilst all these are Necessaries to our Condition: For it was by no Means expedient, that the Things which are made for Service, should want the Attendance of others. Do but think how you would like it, if

(1) Μὴ θαυμάζετε εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὰ ὁδοὶ τοῦ οὐ-
μα ἔτοιμα γινόνται, οὐ μόνον προβάς καὶ ποῖα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κύνες καὶ
πρὸς μὴ διδόντες ὑποδύματα. καὶ ὑποστροφάμενοι, καὶ ἰδιό-
ημοῖς ὅς πάντων τούτων παρασκευάζονται. τὰ γὰρ ὅλα αὐτῶν ἔστιν,
ἀλλὰ ὁδοὶ ὑποδύματα γινόνται, καὶ ἐκ ἐκονομίας παρασκευάζονται. ἄλ-
λων πιστοποιῶναι, ἐπὶ ὅσα ἴσμεν ἡμεῖς παρατίθενται, καὶ οὐκ ἄν-
των μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτοι ὅτι παρασκευάζονται καὶ ὅτι οὕτως, πῶς ἐκ-
δοῦναι, καὶ πῶς ὑποδύματα. πῶς οὐκ, πῶς πρὸς. ἀλλὰ ὁδοὶ καὶ
παρασκευάζονται ἔτοιμα καὶ τὰ παρασκευάζονται, ὑποδύματα, ὑποδύματα,
ὁπλισμένοι (οἱ δ' ἴσμεν παρασκευάζονται καὶ χηλάρχοι ὑποδύματα ἡ
ἐκδοῦναι τὰς χηλάρχοι, διονδὸν ἄν ἡν) ἔτι καὶ ἡ οὐκ ἐκδοῦναι τὰ
ὁδοὶ ὑποδύματα γινόνται ἔτοιμα, παρασκευάζονται, μελεμῶν καὶ
παρασκευάζονται ὑποδύματα. ἔτι καὶ πρὸς τὸν μακρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν
ἐκδοῦναι τὰ ὁδοὶ. νῦν δ' ἡμεῖς οἴομεθα ὅτι τέτοις ἐκδο-
μεσθαι, ἐπὶ καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴσμεν παρασκευάζονται ὑποδύματα, ἡ
αὐτοῖς ἐκδοῦναι τὰ διδοῦναι. καὶ τοι, καὶ ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸς διδοῦναι,
ἐπὶ ὅτι παρασκευάζονται ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁδοὶ καὶ ὁδοὶ καὶ τὸς διδοῦναι
διδοῦναι καὶ ἐκδοῦναι. Lib. 1. Cap. 16.

beside the Care we must take for ourselves, we were likewise obliged to provide Sheep and Asses in Cloath, Shoes, and Meat and Drink. But, as Soldiers are ready dress'd and arm'd to receive the Commands of their General, (for it would be a vast Disadvantage, if every Captain should be obliged to go about and put on his Men's Cloathes) so Nature has made those Animals that are serv'd to our Service, to be in Readiness, and to want none of our Care. Thus, one little Boy, with a Rod in his Hand, drives a Flock of Sheep. But we are so far from thanking God for these Things, that we find Fault with his Providence, for not putting us to as much Trouble in providing for brute Creatures, as we have in supplying our own Wants. I must say however, that the Formation of any one Creature, is sufficient to convince any sober and grateful Mind of a powerful and kind Providence.

It is but a poor Reflection which our Author makes, when he observes further, "It is indeed, says he, to be admired, how sensible a Creature as Man, that pretends to so many fine Qualities of his own, should condescend to value himself upon what is robb'd from so innocent and defenceless an Animal as a Sheep, or what he is beholden for to the most insignificant Thing upon Earth, a dying Worm." Indeed it is very wonderful how it comes to pass, that Man, a rational Being, should value himself, count himself happy, or perceive any pleasing Ideas from what a filthy Sheep, or a dying Worm produces, which Nature

Nor is our delighting in such Ornaments below the Dignity of Man.

Sept. II. Nature has made fit to be wrought into Clothes, and to be beautifully stained with the gayest and most delightful Colours; and upon which there is bestowed so much human Art, Judgment and Contrivance, to make it subservient to those Purposes. But it is yet more wonderful, how Man, so noble a Creature, should condescend to hold even his very Life and Being of a Piece of lifeless Matter, form'd into a Plant, that springs from the Earth (which not only himself, but every the most despicable Animal treads upon) and is nourished by the vilest Ordure. One might be apt to think, that the Lord of this lower World should scorn to depend so very much on Things in themselves so mean and base, and, in the Scale of Beings, not near so valuable as a dying Worm. But our Author could let us see a great many Wonders more, by shewing us, what contemptible Parts of the Creation (if any Thing can be called so, that was form'd by an infinitely good and wise Being) we stand indebted to, for Relief from Anguish and Pain, and for the Recovery of our Health, the Foundation of all our pleasing Enjoyments. And indeed the whole World is full of Wonders. Mean while, it cannot but appear manifest, that the Nature of Things no more makes it *Luxury* to wear about us so many delightful Ideas, if I may speak so, which not only entertain ourselves, but are exceeding grateful to other People, than to take Delight in beholding those beautiful Colours that appear in

in the Heavens at the rising and setting of the Sun, or in viewing any other Objects that naturally derive to us the finest Images.

UPON the whole I conclude, That the Author of Nature having so settled the Constitution of Things, that it is impossible for us not to perceive numberless other Satisfaction, besides those that arise from such Objects as are absolutely necessary to keep us alive; we may all cheerfully indulge to ourselves those Gratifications, without the least Degree of Vice or Luxury; and having our Breasts warmed with a grateful Sense of his unbounded Goodness, joyfully adore that beneficent Being, who has poured out so much Gladness all over the visible Creation, and given us the Skill and Power, above other Animals, to apply so many delightful Objects to our Entertainment.

BUT if, in our Pursuit after Pleasure, we may thus go beyond those Things that are immediately necessary to make Man subsist as he is a living Creature, *where shall we stop?* Or, is there any Gratification that can be called *Luxury*? Our Author is of Opinion *, "that if once we depart from calling every Thing *Luxury*, that is not absolutely necessary to keep a Man alive, there is then no *Luxury* at all; for if the Wants of Men are innumerable, then what ought to supply them has no Bounds; what is called superfluous

And therefore the Pleasure we have in other Enjoyments, besides those that are necessary to our Subsistence, is not Luxury.

This, however, does not hinder a great many Pleasures from being Luxury.

"to

Sept. II



And those
Pleasures are
Luxury
which we
indulge in
Contradicti
on to the
Self-love of
God and
our Fellows.

"to some Degree of People, will be thought
"requires to those of higher Quality". I
have already made it appear, that the Nature
of Things does certainly oblige us to depart
from calling every Thing Luxury, that is not
absolutely necessary to keep a Man alive. But
so far is it from being the Consequent of this,
that there is no *Luxury* at all, or that a Man
may stop at nothing, but has an unbounded
Licence to pursue every Sort of Gratification.
That the same *Authority*, I mean, the *Nature*
of Things, plainly declares, that a great many
Pleasures, in which People, after such a parti-
cular Manner, or in such particular Circumstan-
ces, may happen to indulge themselves, are
Vice or *Luxury* (1).

And those
Pleasures are
Luxury
which we
indulge in
Contradicti
on to the
Self-love of
God and
our Fellows.

AND when a Man is justly obnoxious, from
his Pursuit after Pleasure, to this Imputation,
may easily be understood from the Principles
which I have above laid down in my *Enquiry*.
I have there, I hope, made it evident, that as
every Man is naturally a Member of an uni-
versal Community made up of God and other
intelligent Agents, and is determined, from the
Principle of *Self-preservation*, to desire the Love
and Esteem of all those Beings to whom he is

(1) Ἐπὶ τῷ δὲ ἐκδημιῶν καὶ τῷ ἰσχυρῷ, αἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ ἡ-
μέτερον τι καὶ ἀποδείκνυνται, αἱ δὲ πάντα διὰ καὶ τὰ τι-
αῦτα, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ, ἡ τῷ πάσῃ καὶ ἐκδημιῶν καὶ φιλοῦν ἑα-
ται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς, καὶ ὁμοειδέσιν. Arist. Eth. Lib. 1.
Cap. 4.

associated; so the only Means that can lift us up to this universal Good-liking and Commendation, without which we cannot be happy, is the accommodating of our Affections and Actions, in all our Pursuits, to that Principle of *Self-love*, whereby God and all Mankind are animated: From this, I say, it appears, what Pursuits, or what Pleasures deserve the Name of *Luxury*.

AND very manifestly, whatever Gratifications we pursue or entertain, so as therein to act inconsistently with the Self-love of God, and our Fellow-men, these in our Case must be called *Vice* or *Luxury*, so far as we thereby give Offence, or do Mischief to those rational Agents, among whom we are mixed, and unavoidably expose ourselves to Neglect, Contempt, and Infamy. So that, in my Opinion, every Pursuit, every Pleasure that carries us beyond the *Self-love* or Interest of those Beings to whom we are associated, or that inspires us with any Affection, or determines us to any Action that is contrary to their Good or Happiness, is *Luxury*.

Thus, if a Man indulges to himself the Pleasures which he feels in Meat and Drink, in Buildings, Furnitures, Equipages, and Clothes, or the like, so as to live above his Income, or squander away his Estate, and thereby put himself out of Capacity to serve the Interests of that universal Society whereof he is a Member; or so as thereby to reduce those he is bound immediately to provide for, to Want and Misery,

SECT. II sery, like the profuse Rake, and lavish Heir, our Author speaks of, that scatter abroad their Money without Wit or Judgment, buy every Thing they see, and either destroy, or give it away the next Day: Or if, in his Pursuit after Pleasure, he injures and oppresses other rational Agents, or sticks at no Means that can gain him the Gratifications he is hunting after, like the covetous and perjurd Villain, (whom our Author calls a *publick Benefit*) that squer'd an immense Treasure from the Tears of Widows and Orphans: Or, if he pursues and indulges pleasing Images, or beautiful and fine Objects, with a Design thereby to allure and betray other People into that which is criminal, like the fickle Scrumper (whom our Author likewise mentions as a common Blessing) that invents new Fashions every Week: Or if, from his being possess'd of so many delightful Entertainments, he hath his Heart swell'd above the Rate of one who is our Fellow-man, so as to look down on the rest of his Species with Neglect, Scorn, or Disdain, like the haughty Dutchess, perhaps, that in Equipage, Entertainments, and all her Behaviour, would imitate a Princess: Or, if he be in such a Manner devoted to his own private Enjoyments, that he forsakes the Interest of the Deity and the human Species, and exerts himself in no Series of Actions that favour the Self-love, or promote the Happiness of the other Members of that Society to which he belongs; but confines himself wholly, or especially to some particular

Sect. II.

Sect. II.

(1) Ματαιὸν ἐξελθεῖν ἄλλο τι ἢ γὰρ τὸ καὶν καὶ τὸ ἀποκαταστήναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅθεν ἐλθὼν πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀποκαταστήσῃ τὴν πόλιν, ἢ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πόλιν καὶ πάλιν, ὅθεν ἐλθὼν πάλιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἢ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πόλιν καὶ πάλιν. Plat. de Rep. Lib. 5.

Sect. II of Life, and procure and enjoy it, without thereby incurring the least Degree of Vice or Luxury.

AND here it is to be remarked, that whereas all Men are not able, because of the Difference of their Fortunes, to equal one another in the Purchase of delightful Objects, without being injurious to other rational Agents; this gives us a good Reason, why that which is call'd superfluous, vicious, or luxurious to some Degree of People, may be thought requisite to, or be innocently pursu'd and enjoy'd by those of higher Quality: And how, notwithstanding our Author's Raillery, People may go to Church together, and be all of one Mind (as to the Concernments of another World) and yet when they pray for their daily Bread, widely differ from one another, with respect to their present Enjoyments; while the Bishop, and every Man according to his Station, virtuously include several Things in that Petition, which the Sexton does not think on. For Luxury does not ly in any particular Set of agreeable Perceptions, but in our pursuing or indulging them, *after such a Manner, to such a Degree, or in such Circumstances, wherein ourselves and others are Losers, or wherein we run counter to the Self-love of God, and our own Species* (1).

So

(1) Οὐτω δὲ καὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, οὐδ' οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς δὲ ἀρχαῖς ἐν τῇ μὲν τῇ ἀρχῇ. *Asian. Lib.*

Moral Virtue promotes Trade,

“mote the Glory of all the Nations of the World, and to render every State and Kingdom upon Earth, in all Respects, great and flourishing.” And in order to this, I shall here give an Account, from our Author himself, of those Things that seem to be the Foundation of, or that immediately contribute to the Greatness and Power of a publick Community.

An Account from our Author, of those Means that are necessary to this Purpose.

The great Art, says he, to make a Nation happy, and what we call flourishing, consists in giving every Body an Opportunity of being imploy'd; “Which to compass, let a Government’s first Care be to promote as great a Variety of Manufactures, Arts, and Handicrafts as human Wit can invent; and the Second, to encourage Agriculture and Fishery in all their Branches, that the whole Earth may be forc’d to exert itself as well as Man; for, as the one is, an infallible Maxim to draw vast Multitudes of People into a Nation, so the other is the only Method to maintain them *. But would you moreover render them an opulent, knowing, and polite Nation, teach them Commerce with foreign Countries, and, if possible, get into the Sea, which to compass, spare no Labour nor Industry, and let no Difficulty deter you from it. Then promote Navigation, cherish the Merchant, and encourage Trade in every Branch

“Branch of it; this will bring Riches, and
 “where they are, Arts and Sciences will soon
 “follow”. It is however to be observ’d, that
 “tho’ Trade is the principal, yet it is not the
 “only Requisite to aggrandize a Nation: There
 “are other Things to be taken Care of besides,
 “the *meum & tuum* must be secur’d, Crimes
 “punish’d, and all other Laws concerning the
 “Administration of Justice, wisely contriv’d
 “and strictly executed. Foreign Affairs must
 “be likewise prudently manag’d, and the Mi-
 “nistry of every Nation ought to have a good
 “Intelligence abroad, and to be well acquaint-
 “ed with the publick Transactions of all those
 “Countries, that either by their Neighbour-
 “hood, Strength, or Interest, may be hurtful
 “or beneficial to them, to take the necessary
 “Measures accordingly, of crossing some and
 “assisting others, as Policy and the Balance of
 “Power direct. The Multitude must be aw’d,
 “no Man’s Conscience forc’d, and the Clergy
 “allow’d no greater Share in State Affairs, than
 “our Saviour has bequeath’d them in his Te-
 “stament. These are the Arts that lead to
 “worldly Greatness, and that make a People
 “potent, renown’d, and flourishing.”

We may here observe, that our Author is
 so far from excluding *Virtue*, universal Equity
 or Righteousness, from having any Concern in

They are
 all steadily
 pursu’d un-
 der the In-
 fluence of
 Moral Vir-
 tue.

Sect III. promoting the Power and Greatness of a Nation, that he expressly declares, that the Preservation of Liberty and Property, and a steady Pursuit of all those Means that are conducive to this Purpose, are necessary or requisite to *aggrandize a Nation*. Now, there can be nothing more manifest, than that my Principles do contribute, in the most effectual Manner, to compass this End. For a Man, in his Pursuit after universal Love and Commendation, being all along conscious, that when he contradicts the *Self-love*, and breaks through the Property of other Beings, he becomes immediately odious and hateful; he cannot but most religiously indulge to every Man the peaceable Possession of his own Rights, and keep himself within those sacred Bounds, where only he can meet with Praise, and have his natural Desire of Esteem gratify'd.

AND in particular, when *Princes* and Ministers of State are fir'd with a noble Ambition to recommend themselves, especially to the Affections and Applauses of that Community which they have under their immediate Care and Protection; with what Zeal and Steadiness will they pursue those Measures that flatter the *Self-love*, and promote the Interest of that Body, whereof they are the Head? Under their Administration there can be no just Ground to complain of Oppression, Tyranny, Slavery, or any Inroad on Privileges. 'Tis impossible but they must wisely contrive Laws adapt-

ed

ed to the publick Good, and with Prudence and *Sec. III.*
Strictness put them in Execution, in Defence of
the Innocent, and Punishment of the Guilty.
They cannot but use their best Endeavours to
keep the Multitude in Aw, so as to prevent
their invading or disturbing the Properties of
their Fellow-subjects. They will not oppress
any Man's Conscience, but suffer every Body
to think as he pleases, and worship God accor-
ding to his own Judgment, so far as it is con-
sistent with the *Safety* of the Nation. Nor
will they sacrifice the Interests of their People
to the Pride and Avarice of an ambitious Cler-
gy, or allow a Set of Men, who pervert the
Design of their sacred Office, that was intend-
ed for the Benefit of Mankind, to impose upon
them so far as to perswade them to give them
their Protection, while they torture the Souls
and Bodies of their Fellow-creatures, by In-
quisitions and all Sorts of Cruelties; or, by
their pious, impious Frauds, to drain the Riches
of the Nation into Monasteries, and other re-
ligious Houses, whereby their Subjects are left
to grone away their Lives under Want and
Misery.

AND as they thus watchfully guard the Li-
berties of the Publick, and do their utmost to
preserve the Peace and Happiness of the Society
at home, by supporting every Man in the full
Possession of all his religious and civil Rights,
of every Thing that is near and dear to him;
so, from the same Principle, with a Design, I

Sec III mean, to support and raise their Reputation among their own People, they will *sharply* look about, and turn their Eyes upon other Nations, so as to have good Intelligence abroad, and be well acquainted with the publick Transactions of all those Countries, that either by their Neighbourhood, Strength or Interest, may be hurtful or beneficial to them, and take the necessary Measures accordingly,

And being further animated (for this my Principles suppose) not only as private, but as publick Persons, who, in a Manner, are inspir'd with the Passions of the Community, which we conceive to be affected towards other Communities after the same Way that one Man is towards another; I say, being further animated with a natural Desire to have the Love and Esteem of all other Nations, as mightily conducing to the Good of their Country, they cannot but be determin'd from this Principle to do all the good Offices they can, that may gratify or assist the *Self-love* of those foreign Communities, as the only Means whereby to engage their Friendship, to render them beneficial, and to influence them to a suitable Return of good Offices, which may serve to promote the publick Interest. And, not to mention the Intercourse of other Sorts of good Offices which different States render to one another, as every Nation has not within itself in that Plenty and Variety, from the Produce of their own Country, what Things are necessary to support human Life, or

to render it comfortable, (which, by the by, *See III.* is, in my Opinion, a plain Evidence of the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence; and lets us see, that the supreme Ruler of the Universe designs, that all Mankind should live in a mutual Friendship and Dependence on one another) they will certainly endeavour to procure the Esteem they are seeking after, particularly by a Communication of such Things as their Country can afford, to supply the Wants, or minister to the Pleasures of those other Nations: In Exchange whereof, they cannot but desire the Return of what Things those foreign Countries can furnish them with, for the Relief of their Necessities, or the promoting of their Happiness, as an Instance of the reciprocal Friendship and Esteem they have for them; to which those Foreigners, since they are influenced by the same Principle, cannot but yield very cheerfully. And thus do different Nations enter into an Intercourse of kind Offices, and carry on a Trade together, in mutually transporting into each other's Country, whether by Land or Sea, such Things as are necessary to advance their several Interests or Pleasures, or one another's Well-being and Prosperity.

So that the Governors our Author speaks of, will especially take Care to teach their Subjects Commerce with foreign Countries, and, if possible, they will get into the Sea; they will promote Navigation, cherish the Merchant, and encourage Trade in every Branch of it; which will

SECT. III. will bring them home Riches, all the Necessaries and Comforts of Life, whatever can gratify their Self-love, or serve to make them great and flourishing. And I cannot but observe, that, according to the Influence of my Principles, this Commerce naturally becomes universal, and is propagated all over the inhabited World, as far as Self-interest can carry us: For it is promoted from a Desire after universal Love and Esteem, which as we cannot acquire, without administering to the Self-love or Happiness of others, so we want always to have it express'd to us by a Return of the like Benefits, or such Things as favour our Interest (1).

In the mean Time, if those Governors, who thus pursue, by an Offer of good Services, the Friendship and Esteem of other Nations, which, as I have hinted, they desire always to have testify'd in a Communication of such Things as contribute to the publick Good, I say, if those Governors do not compass their End, but meet with Hatred and Contempt, or see those foreign Nations following such Measures as tend to

(1) Ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρουσιν πλεονεκτήματα ἡμῶν καὶ συναλλήνους, καὶ οὗτοι ξενίᾳ γ' ἔστιν ὅτι καλοῦσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀνὰ δυνάμιν ἀξιοῦσθαι καὶ πλείους καὶ ἰσχυρότερας ἀρετὰς ἢ πολλὰν. ταῦτα γὰρ πρῶτον, ἡ μένος οὐ κέρδους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἐνεκα, καὶ φιλικῶς ἀποφύγεσθαι αὐτοὺς. ὅσα γὰρ μὴν πλείους αἰσινίζονται τῇ καὶ ἀφαινοῦνται, διὰ τὴν ποσότητα αὐτῶν καὶ οἰσχυροῦνται, καὶ ὀξυζοῦνται, καὶ ἀντιμπαροῦνται, καὶ πωλοῦνται, καὶ μαδραροῦνται, καὶ ταπεινοῦνται. οἱ δὲ εἰς τὴν ταπεινότητα ἀνέχονται καὶ ἀποφύγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀπαρτῶσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀλλὰ ψοφισματὶ τε φιλικῶς καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ. Xenoph. Rat. Red.

hurt their Interest, they will then, from the **SECT. III.** Principle of Self-preservation, do what they can to cross their Designs, as Policy and the Balance of Power shall direct.

ALL these Things necessarily follow from my Principles.

BUT now, I would fain understand, after what Manner it is, or how it comes about, that *Vice* and *Luxury* promote the Power, Glory, and Happiness of a Nation in those Instances. Are *private Vices publick Benefits*, because they mightily serve to secure the *meum & tuum*, every Man's Liberty and Property; to punish Crimes, and keep the Multitude in Aw; wisely to contrive Laws for the publick Well, and strictly to put them in Execution; to debar the Clergy from having a greater Share in State-affairs, than our Saviour has bequeathed them in his *Testament*; and to enable the Ministry of every Nation, prudently to manage foreign Affairs, to establish Manufactures, to encourage Navigation, and to cherish and promote Trade: I say, are *private Vices publick Benefits*, because they mightily serve these Purposes; " which " our Author tells us are the Arts that lead to " worldly Greatness? For my Part, I must " own my Stupidity, and ingenuously confess, " I do not comprehend, how the sensual Cour- " tier that sets no Limits to his *Luxury*, but " runs out his own Estate, and invades the " Properties of other People, how the fickle " Strumpet, and haughty Dutches, how the " profuse

Whereas
Vice and
Luxury pre-
vent the Use
of those
Means, and
involve a
Nation in
Ruin and
Misery.

Sect. III.

“profuse Rake, and lavish Heir, that scatter
 “about their Money without Wit or Judgment,
 “buy every Thing they see, and either destroy
 “or give it away the next Day; or how the
 “covetous and perjur’d Villain, that squeez’d
 “an immense Treasure from the Tears of Wi-
 “dows and Orphans”: I say, so stupid am I,
 “that I do not comprehend how such Persons,
 “under the commanding Power of the most riot-
 “ous and exorbitant Passions, can ever be fit
 “Guardians of the Liberties of a Nation; or
 “how People can be safe and happy in the easy
 “Enjoyment of all their religious and civil Pri-
 “vileges under their Administration. I rather
 “incline to think with our Author*, That these
 “Characters are the *Plagues* and *Monsters* of hu-
 “man Society, that reduce the Affairs of Man-
 “kind to a very calamitous Condition, that con-
 “found all Order, and that break through and
 “destroy all good Government whatsoever.

HOWEVER, upon Supposition that People of
 “such Characters have the Management of pub-
 “lick Affairs, our Author will not allow, that
 “any Mischief can betel a Nation from their *Lux-
 “ury*. “What is laid, says he, to the Charge
 “of *Luxury*, is, that it increases Avarice and
 “Rapine, and where they are reigning Vices,
 “Offices of the greatest Trust are bought and
 “sold, the Ministers that should serve the Pub-
 “lick, both great and small, corrupted, and
 “the

"the Countries every Moment in Danger of
"being betray'd to the highest Bidders. —

"These are indeed terrible Things; but what
"is put to the account of *Luxury*, belongs to
"Mal-administration, and is the Fault of bad
"Politicks; every Government ought to be
"thoroughly acquainted with, and stedfastly to
"pursue the Interest of the Country." Ter-

rible Things indeed, that have frighted our
Author so much out of his good Sense, as to
run him into so pitiful an Answer!

I was engag'd some Time ago in Conversa-
tion, where one of the Company hapning to ex-
press his Sentiments pretty warmly against Pro-
fuseness and Extravagancy; or a Man's giving
up himself to the Pursuit of immoderate Plea-
sures; to let us see the Mischiefs that naturally
attend such Vices, he gave us an Instance of a
Gentleman, once of a very opulent Fortune,
who, by his luxurious and high Living, had so
ruin'd his Affairs, and so miserably involv'd
himself, that after he had quite broke all his
Tenants and Vassals by his Violence and Op-
pression, to appease his outrageous Appetites,
which he had not now wherewithal to gratify,
he was the inhuman barbarous Man secretly to
sell his poor Wife and six Children into Slavery. —

As he was going on to give us the Sequel of
this melancholly Story, he was interrupted by a
smart Fellow we had amongst us, who briskly
told

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SENTE told us, "Gentlemen, says he, you are quite
 "out in your Calculations; what you put to
 "the account of Profuseness and high Living,
 "belongs to Mismanagement, and proceeds
 "from bad Oeconomy. Every Man ought to
 "be thoroughly acquainted with, and stedfastly
 "pursue the Interest of his Family." I will
 not here observe, what secret Scorn the Com-
 pany expressed in their Countenances; at the
 Conclusion of this forward Attack; I shall only
 take notice, that as I never incline to suspect a
 Gentleman of unfair Dealing, or to speak out
 gross Absurdities, I began to reflect, what
 might be the good Sense of what was offered
 in Opposition to that which the rest of the
 Company seem'd to approve of; and at length
 I happily discovered, that it bears this very
 good Meaning, viz. every Man ought to be
 thoroughly acquainted with, and stedfastly to pur-
 sue the Interest of his Family; but *Luxury* be-
 gets Mal-administration or bad Oeconomy, and
 this again produces the Ruin of a Family; so
 that *Luxury* does not ruine any Family or Socie-
 ty in her own Person, but only by her natural
 Offspring, Mal-administration, or bad Politicks.
 But to return to our Author. I do own
 with him, "That what Governors soever make
 "a good Use of the Arts abovementioned, viz.
 "the securing of Property, punishing of Crimes,
 " &c. that have any considerable Nation to
 "govern, whether it be a Monarchy, Common-
 "wealth, or a Mixture of both, can never fail
 "of

“ of making it flourish in spite of all the other Sest. III
 “ Powers upon Earth, and no *Luxury* or other
 “ Vice is ever able to shake their Constitution * ”

But in the mean Time, I can never reconcile it to the Nature of Things, that the covetous Statesman, who spends his whole Life in fatt'ning himself with the Spoils of the Nation, and by pinching and plundering, heaps up an immense Treasure * ; that the sensual Courtier that sets no Limits to his Luxury, the profuse Rake, the covetous perjur'd Villain ; that any such Plagues and Monsters, as our Author calls them, should steadily pursue those Measures, and save themselves from being hurried along by the impetuous Force of their insatiable Lusts, into bad Politicks, Neglects and Mismanagements, to which, our Author * tells us, the Destruction of all the famous States and Empires the World has had to boast of hitherto, has been principally owing.

AND here I might shew, from the Nature of Things, to the Conviction of every impartial Reader, that the *Vice* and *Luxury* of Princes and Governors, those People that have the Management of publick Affairs, have particularly a most fatal Influence upon *Trade*, and tend, in the most pernicious Manner, to undo and ruine all Commerce, both foreign and domestick ;
 for

This particularly happens from the Vice and Luxury of Princes and Governors:

- * P. 116.
- * P. 104.
- * P. 117.

just Reflections of a late famous Author upon *Sec. III.*
 this Point, whose Mind is certainly elevated
 above the Vulgar, and whom our Author has
 for his Well-wisher, particularly with respect
 to Charity-schools, against which he is so very
 sanguine. It is true, this Author is shewing
 how *Trade* cannot possibly subsist under arbitra-
 ry or tyrannical Government; But from his
 whole Reasoning it is apparent, that the Ruin
 of *Trade* springs intirely from the Lewdness,
 Riot, and Luxury of Governors, who invade
 the Liberties of the Subject. And indeed, as
 the only Reason why we call any Government
 tyrannical, is, because those that are concern'd
 in publick Administration, break through the
 Liberties of the People; so, in this impious In-
 vasion of Property, does *Vice* or *Luxury* particu-
 larly consist: For, as I have above hinted, it
 is impossible that any Prince, Statesman, or ci-
 vil Magistrate, can be found guilty of the least
 Degree of *Luxury*, while they keep on this
 Side the *Self-love*, the Rights and Privileges of
 those Beings to whom they are associated. But
 what I am going to transcribe from *Cato's* Let-
 ters, is as follows.

“ NOTHING is more certain, than that *Trade*
 “ cannot be forced; she is a coy and humo-
 “ rous Dame that must be won by Flattery and
 “ Allurements, and always flees Force and
 “ Power; she is not confined to Nations, Seats
 “ and Climates, but travels and wanders about
 “ the Earth, till she fixes her Residence where

Moral Virtue promotes Trade,

“ she finds the best Welcome, and kindest Reception. Her Contexture is so nice and delicate, that she cannot breathe in a tyrannical Air; Will and Pleasure are so opposite to her Nature, that, but touch her with the Sword, and she dies: But if you give her gentle and kind Entertainment, she is a grateful and beneficent Mistress; she will turn Deserts into fruitful Fields, Villages into great Cities, Cottages into Palaces, Beggars into Princes, convert Cowards into Heroes, Blockheads into Philosophers, will change the Coverings of Worms into the richest Brocades, the Fleeces of harmless Sheep into the Pride and Ornament of Kings, and, by a farther *Metamorphosis*, will transmute them again into armed Hosts, and haughty Fleets.”

“ Now it is absolutely impossible, from the Nature of an arbitrary Government, that she should enjoy Security and Protection, or indeed be free from Violence under it. There is not one Man in a Thousand that has the Endowments and Abilities to govern a State, and much fewer yet that have just Notions how to make Trade and Commerce useful and advantagious to it; and, amongst these, 'tis rare to find one, who will forego all personal Advantages, and devote himself and his Labours wholly to his Country's Interest. But if such a Phoenix should arise in any Country, he will find it hard to get Access to an arbitrary Court, and much harder yet

“ to

to grapple with, and stem the reigning Sec. III.

Corruptions in it, where Virtue has nothing

to do, and Vice rides triumphant; where

Bribery, servile Flattery, blind Submission,

extraneous Expence, and very often Lust and

unnatural Prostitutions, are the Ladders to

Greatness, which will certainly be supported

by the same Methods by which it is ob-

tained.

To what has a virtuous Man to do, or what

can he do in such Company? If he pities the

People's Calamities, he shall be called sedi-

tious; if he recommends any publick Good,

he shall be called preaching Fool; if he

should live soberly and virtuously himself,

they will think him fit only to be sent to a

cloister; if he does not flatter the Prince,

and his Superiors, he will be thought to en-

vy their Prosperity; if he presumes to ad-

vise his Prince to pursue his true Interest, he

will be esteemed a formidable Enemy to the

whole Court, who will unite to destroy him:

In fine, his Virtues will be Crimes, Re-

proaches, and of dangerous Consequence to

those who have none. As Jails pick up all

the little pilfering Rogues of a Country;

so such Courts ingross all the great Ones,

who have no Business there but to grow rich,

and to riot upon the publick Calamities, to

use all the Means of Oppression and Rapine,

to make hasty Fortunes before the Bow-

ring

SECT. III. "String overtakes them, or a sudden Favourite
 "supplants them."

"Now, what Encouragement or Security
 "can Trade and Industry receive from such a
 "Crew of Banditti? No Privileges and Im-
 "munities, or even Protection, can be obtained
 "but for Money, and are always granted to
 "those who give most; and these again shall
 "be curtailed, altered, abrogated, and can-
 "celled upon the Change of a Minister, or of
 "his Inclinations, Interest, and Caprices: Mo-
 "nopolies, exclusive Companies, Liberties of
 "Pre-emption, &c. shall be obtained for Bribes
 "or Favour, or in Trust for great Men, or vile
 "and worthless Women. Some Merchants
 "shall be openly encouraged and protected, and
 "get Exemptions from Searches and Duties,
 "or shall be contrived at in escaping them;
 "others shall be burdened, oppressed, manacled,
 "stopt, and delayed, to extort Presents, to
 "wreak Revenge, to give Preference of Mar-
 "kets to Favourites. Governors of Port-towns,
 "or of Colonies, who have purchased their
 "Employments at Court, shall be indulged and
 "countenanced in making Reprisals upon the
 "Traders, and to enable them to satisfy the
 "yearly Presents due to Minions. Admirals
 "and Commanders of Men War shall press
 "their Sailors, or be paid for not doing it;
 "and military Officers and Soldiers shall molest
 "and interrupt them in the Course of their
 "Commerce and honest Industry."

NOR

“NOR shall it be in the Power of the most vigilant, active, and virtuous Prince, to prevent these, and a Thousand other daily Oppressions; he must see with his Ministers Eyes, and hear with their Ears; nor can there be any Access to him but by their Means, and by their Leave: Constant Spies shall watch and observe the first Intentions, or least Approaches to a Complaint; and the Person injured shall be threatned, waylaid, imprisoned, and perhaps murdered: But if he escapes all their Treacheries, and can get to the Ear of his Prince, 'tis great Odds but he will be treated and punished as a Calumniator, a false Accuser, and a seditious Disturber of his Majesty's Government. No Witnesses dare to appear for him, and many false ones will be suborned against him; the whole *Posse* of Ministers, Officers, Favourites, Parasites, Pathicks, Strumpets, Buffoons, Fiddlers, and Pimps, will conspire to ruine him, as a common Enemy to their common Interests.”

“BUT if all these Mischiefs could be avoided, the Necessities of such a Prince, arising from the Profusion and vast Expence of his Court, from his foolish Wars, and the Depredations, Embezzlements, and various Thefts of his Ministers and Servants, will be always calling for new Supplies, for new Exortions, which must be raised by all the Means by which they can be raised. New

Sect. III. "and sudden Impositions shall be put upon
 Trade, new Loans be exacted from Mer-
 chants; Commodities of general Use shall be
 bought up by the Prince's Order, and per-
 haps upon Trust, and afterwards retailed a-
 gain, at extravagant Advantages. Mer-
 chants shall be encouraged to import their
 Goods upon Promises of Ease and gentle U-
 sage, and those Goods, when imported, shall
 be subjected to exorbitant Impositions and
 Customs, and perhaps confiscated upon frivo-
 lous Pretences: But if these, and infinite
 other Oppressions, could be prevented for
 some Time, by the Vigilance of a wise
 Prince, or the Care of an able Minister,
 yet there can be no probable Security, or e-
 ven Hopes of the Continuance of honest and
 prudent Measures in such a Government;
 for one wise Prince so educated, there shall
 be Twenty foolish ones, and for one ho-
 nest Minister, there will be a Thousand
 corrupt ones."

"UNDER such natural Disadvantages, per-
 petual Uncertainties, or rather certain Op-
 pressions, no Man will embark large Stocks
 and extensive Talents for Business, breed up
 their Children to precarious Employments,
 build Forts, or plant Colonies, when the
 Breath of a weak Prince, or the Caprice of
 a corrupt Favourite, shall dash at once all
 their Labours and their Hopes, and there-
 fore it is impossible that any Trade can subsist

" long

" long in such a Government, but what is ne-
 " cessary to support the Luxury and Vices of a
 " Court; and even such Trade is, for the most
 " Part, carried on by the Stocks, and for the
 " Advantages of free Countries, and their own
 " petty Merchants are only Factors to the others.
 " True Merchants are Citizens of the World,
 " and that is their Country where they can
 " live best and most secure; and whatever they
 " can pick up and gather together in tyranni-
 " cal Governments, they remove to free ones.
 " Tavernier invested all the Riches he had a-
 " massed by his long Ramble over the World,
 " in the barren Rocks of *Switzerland*: And
 " being asked by the last King of *France*, how
 " it came to pass, that he, who had seen the
 " finest Countries on the Globe, came to lay
 " out his Fortune in the worst; he gave his
 " haughty Majesty this short Answer, *That he*
 " *was willing for to have something which he*
 " *could call his own*."

WHAT our Author can say against all this,
 I know not. Only I am so far of this Gentle-
 man's Opinion, that I'll undertake to demon-
 strate the Truth of it from the Principles of
 human Nature. In the mean Time, one may
 see a strong Illustration of any Thing that can
 be said to that Purpose, near the End of the
 Ninth Book of *Plato's Republic*, which I shall
 transcribe when I come to the Conclusion of

That are
 founded in
 the Nature
 of Things.

K k 4

this

Sect. III. this Argument. And, says *Cicero*, *Peoples Lusts are insatiable, they ruine not only single Persons, but intire Families, and they frequently overthrow a whole Commonwealth. From our Lusts come Hatred, Strifes, Dissensions, Seditions, Wars* (1).

And from
Machiavel.

I suppose *Machiavel's* Authority is of some Moment in Politicks : And therefore I hope my Reader will forgive me, if I here set down his Opinion upon this Point. “ To keep up *,
“ *says he*, the Name of Liberal amongst Men,
“ it is necessary that no Kind of *Luxury* be
“ omitted, so that a Prince of that Disposition
“ will consume his Revenue in those Kinds of
“ Expences, and be obliged at last, if he would
“ preserve that Reputation, to become grie-
“ vous, and a great Exactor upon the People,
“ and do whatever is practicable for the get-
“ ting of Money, which will cause him to be
“ hated of his Subjects.” And in another
Place he observes *, “ Princes, *says he*, cannot
“ reasonably complain of the Transgressions of
“ their Subjects, because it is necessarily their
“ Negligence, or ill Example that debauches
“ them : And if the People of our Times are
“ famous for Thefts, and Robberies, and Plun-
“ dering, and such Kind of Enormities, it
“ proceeds

(1) *Cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles ; quæ non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias vertunt ; totam etiam labefactant sæpe remp. Ex cupiditatibus odia, dissidia, discordiæ, seditiones, bella nascuntur. Cic. de Finib. Lib. 1.*

Vide his Prince, Ch. 16.

His Discourses, Book 3. Ch. 29.

" proceeds from the Exorbitance and Rapacity Sect. III.
 " of their Governors. *Romania* (before Pope
 " *Alexander VI.* exterminated those Lords who
 " had the Command in those Parts) was a
 " Place of all Kind of Dissoluteness and Ini-
 " quity, every Day, and every trivial Occasion,
 " producing notorious Murders and Rapines;
 " which was not so much from any Depravity
 " in the Nature of the People, as some Persons
 " would have it, as from the Corruption of
 " their Princes; for being poor of themselves,
 " yet ambitious to live in Splendor and Magni-
 " ficence, they were forced upon ill Courses,
 " and indeed refused none that could supply
 " them. To pass by several others, one of their
 " detestable Ways, was, to make Laws against
 " such and such Things, which, after they were
 " published, they themselves would be the
 " first that should break, to encourage others
 " to do the same; nor was there any Man
 " ever punished for his Inobservance, till they
 " saw enough involy'd in the same *Premunire*;
 " then, forsooth, the Laws were executed most
 " strictly, not out of any true Zeal to Justice,
 " but out of a Desire to be fingering the Fines:
 " From whence it followed, that, by grievous
 " Mulcts and Expilations, the People being
 " impoverished, were constrained to use the
 " same Violence upon those that were less po-
 " tent than they; by which Means, Men were
 " not so much corrected, as instructed to do
 " III;

Sect. III.

So that
private
Vices are
publick Mis-
chiefs; but
Moral Vir-
tue is com-
mon Hap-
piness.

III; and all these Mischiefs proceeded from the Iniquity of their Princes.

UPON the whole, I will conclude, that since *Vice* and *Luxury* are riotous Passions, that have no Bounds, whether in Governors or Subjects, and that (especially when they are indulg'd and pursu'd by Princes and Ministers of State, or civil Magistrates,

Quid enim Venus ebria curat?)

do sap the very Foundations of Society, or confound and overthrow Liberty and Property, and all good Government, and even Trade itself; all which, according to our Author, must be steadily maintain'd and promoted as necessary Arts to aggrandize a Nation: I say, I will conclude, that *Vice* and *Luxury* (since they are attended with such wretched Consequents) are destructive of the Good, the Power, and Greatness of any Community. And thus far, I think, *private Vices* are *publick Mischiefs* (1); whereas

(1) Nullam capitaliorem pestem, quam corporis voluptatem, hominibus, dicebat. [Archinas Talentinus, magnus in primis, & praeclarus vir] datam: cujus voluptatis avida libidines, temere & effrenate ad potiundum incitarentur. Hinc patris proditores, hinc rerum. everiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci dicebat: nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis impelleret: supra vero, & adulteria, & omne tale flagitium, nullis aliis illecebris excitari, nisi voluptate. Cic. de Senect.

Sect. IV.

Our Author indeed alledges that Moral Virtue will not suffer our Passions to stir.

BUT at the same Time he is of Opinion, that *Moral Virtue* can never rouse a Man's Appetites, or suffer him to give Way to the Influence of his Passions. And one cannot but observe, that our Author is, all along through his Remarks, very cautious to keep off every Thing that may occasion the Reader to suspect the Truth of his Principles: For wherever he thinks fit to pronounce, that *Moral Virtue* can contribute nothing to the promoting of Trade, or the aggrandizing of a Nation, he carefully avoids mentioning any Piece of *Moral Virtue* that may be apt to raise in the Minds of common Readers, the Notion of a Man's vigorously exerting himself in any Course of Action for the Benefit of others; and talks only of those Virtues, which those People, who have but very imperfect Ideas of Things, apprehend to imply little or no Action; such as *Content, Temperance, Frugality, Meekness, Honesty*, which he is pleased to call *mean, starving, idle, dreaming Things*, that reduce People to a State of slothful Ease, and stupid Innocence*. I am sorry I cannot say, that this looks to be fair Dealing. And I shall be glad to know from his Admirers, why he represents *Moral Virtue* as an idle dreaming Thing, when he would demonstrate, that it can do no earthly Good towards advancing the Riches and Glory of a Nation; but as a very active Principle, that powerfully prompts

a Man to exert himself vigorously for the Interest of his Country, when he would find Fault with Lord Shaftsbury's Character, where he expressly declares that *Virtue lies in Action*. This I do not pretend to comprehend: But those witty Gentlemen who favour his Principles, can certainly shew, if they please, that there is here, neither unfair Dealing, nor Sophistry.

I say, our Author maintains that *Moral Virtue* is so far from allowing a Man to gratify his Appetites, that, on the contrary, it vigorously commands us to subdue them, and to divest ourselves of our Passions, in order to purify the Mind, as Men take out the Furniture when they would clean a Room thoroughly: For, according to him, Virtue consists wholly in *Self-denial*; by which he understands Peoples combating themselves, and undergoing all imaginable Austerities, even refusing what one should think absolutely necessary to keep them alive. "I am willing, says he, to pay Adoration to Virtue wherever I can meet with it, with a proviso that I shall not be oblig'd to admit any as such, where I can see no Self-denial. I have search'd through every Degree and Station of Men, and confess, that I have found no where more Austerity of Manners, or greater Contempt of earthly Pleasure, than in some religious Houses, where People freely resigning and retiring from the World to combat themselves, have no other Business but to subdue their Appetites. What can be

Sect. IV. " a greater Evidence of perfect Chastity, and
 " a superlative Love of immaculate Purity in
 " Men and Women, than that, in the Prime of
 " their Age, when Lust is most raging, they
 " should actually seclude themselves from each
 " other's Company, and, by a voluntary Renun-
 " ciation, debar themselves for Life, not only
 " from Uncleaness, but even the most lawful
 " Embraces? Those that abstain from Flesh,
 " and often all Manner of Food, one would
 " think in the right Way to conquer all ear-
 " nal Desires; and I could almost swear, that
 " he don't consult his Ease, who daily brands
 " his bare Back and Shoulders with unconfe-
 " onable Stripes, and constantly rous'd at Mid-
 " night from his Sleep, leaves his Bed for his
 " Devotion. Who can despise Riches more,
 " or shew himself less avaricious than he, who
 " won't for much as touch Gold or Silver, no
 " not with his Feet? Or can any Mortal shew
 " himself less luxurious, or more humble,
 " than the Man, that, making Poverty his
 " Choice, contents himself with Scraps and
 " Fragments, and refuses to eat any Bread,
 " but what is bestow'd upon him by the Cha-
 " rity of others? Such fair Instances of Self-
 " denial would make me bow down to Virtue,
 " if I was not deterr'd and warn'd from it by
 " so many Persons of Eminence and Learning,
 " who unanimously tell me that I am mista-
 " ken, and all I have seen is Farce and Hypo-
 " cisy. If the strict Rules, and so many
 " outward

“outward Signs of Devotion observ’d among Soft IV.
 “those religious Orders, deserve such harsh Cen-
 “sures, we may well despair of meeting with
 “Virtue any where else; for if we look into
 “the Actions of the Antagonists and greatest
 “Accusers of those Votaries, we shall not find
 “so much as the Appearance of Self-denial,
 “without which there can be no Virtue.”

THIS is the Account which our Author here gives us of *Moral Virtue*, not indeed of a Piece with that with which he entertains us in his *Enquiry*, and quite different from what he gives us as his Opinion in his Character of my Lord *Shaftsbury*. And as this Sort of Virtue is a mean, starving, idle, dreaming Thing, that reduces People to a State of stupid Innocence and slothful Ease, except when, according to its precious Rules, they make Use of the Lash, and whip themselves out of their Stupidity into some Sort of Life, a quick tormenting Sense of Misery; so every Body must own, there is not any Thing of this Nature, which mortifies a Man so dreadfully, that can in the least contribute to the promoting of Trade in any Branch of it, unless it be the Rope-manufactures, that People may have wherewithal to man their bare Back and Shoulders with unconscionable Stripes: For to be virtuous, in our Author's Sense, we must divest ourselves of Humanity, not eradicate our Passions (for that is impos-

And 'tis confess'd that at this Rate, Moral Virtue would prevent all Trade and Commerce in the World.

But upon what I own, and upon what I own, our Author does not say, but I am sure, that it is not a Thing.

Se& IV. sible; since that, do what we will, they must ever remain the Principles of Action) but make Use of them against ourselves as Engines of Misery, and become Self-tormentors, without having any Occasion to beg of him,

*Sine me, vacuum tempus ne quod dēm mibi
Laboris*

For we need not be afraid that in the Drama of Life he will act the Part which *Chremes* perform'd with Applause, and from his Humanity disturb us with his good Offices, or any friendly Attempts to shew us the Folly of our Conduct:

An cuiquam est usus homini se ut cruciet?

*Lachrymas excussit mibi,
Miseretque me ejus.*

On the contrary, when People are thus torturing themselves, he tells us, that such fair Instances of Self-denial, would make him (I suppose, with a good deal of solemn Ridicule) bow down to Virtue.

But upon what Foundation does our Author declare Moral Virtue to be so austere a Thing?

BUT I would beg to know what Authority our Author has to represent *Moral Virtue* as so austere a Thing, and under such horrid Gloom and Melancholy. Are his Notions founded on his own Fancy and Imagination, or does he take them from the *Nature* of Things, or from the

the arbitrary Will of the supreme Being? If we consider any Individual by himself, without regarding that he stands naturally associated to the *Deity*, and other rational Agents, I am clearly of Opinion, that as there is not the least Degree of *moral Virtue* in all the Severities and Mortifications he can submit to, so is there as little Vice or *Luxury* in the highest Pleasures, the most pleasing Gratifications he can indulge to himself from Meats and Drink, or whatever Enjoyments one can possess in a Life absolutely solitary. I own indeed, that this single Man shall more or less find himself happy or miserable, *i. e.* have more or less Pleasure or Pain, according as he neglects or pursues *Temperance*, which, with respect to rational Beings, that act in Society with one another, is call'd *moral Virtue*: But how there can be either Virtue or Vice in his Case, as he stands by himself, suppos'd to be without any Relation to God, or his own Species, is, I confess, to me unimaginable. For as there can be no *Virtue* but between two or more intelligent Minds, so the Principles I have above laid down in the foregoing Enquiry, do, in my Opinion, make it manifest, that this *Virtue* particularly consists in the Proportion, Congruity, or Suitableness, which any Affection or Action bears to the *Self-love* or Interest of all those rational Agents to whom we are associated. And taking Things in this View, can any Man say, that People's wandering about more than half-

Sect IV. Starv'd, with Halters about their Necks, lashing themselves unmercifully, touching neither Gold nor Silver, no not with their Feet; abstaining from Flesh, and often all Manner of Food; contenting themselves with Scraps and Fragments; refusing to eat any Bread but what is bestow'd upon them by the Charity of others; and actually secluding themselves from each other's Company, and by a voluntary Renunciation debarring themselves for Life, not only from Uncleaness, but even the most lawful Embraces: I say, can any Man seriously affirm, that any Thing of so whimsical, ridiculous, or hideous a Nature, is grateful to the Divinity, and is conducive to promote his Delight among his rational Creatures? Or, that by thus dragging along our miserable Lives, in a continued Course of such frightful Penances, we flatter the *Self-love* of our Fellow-men, and advance one another's Happiness (1)?

'Tis absurd
and ridicu-
lous.

I will here again beg leave to transcribe the Sentiments of a late famous Author upon this Point, whom I have already mention'd, as, in some Things, a Well-wisher of our Author.

"We

(1) τίς ὁ δὲν ἀσκητής; ὁ μελετῶν ὀρεῖται ἢ χρεῖται, ἐκκαί-
σι δ' ὁρᾷ μόνον πρὸς σπουδαίας χρεῖδας. καὶ μελετῶν μᾶλλον ὡς
τὴν ἀσκαταπονήτειον. καὶ δ' ὁ καὶ ἄλλος ὁρᾷ ἄλλα ἀσκητῶν. πῶς
ὡς δὲ ποιεῖ τὸ ποδὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ. ἢ τὸ σέβην διμαρτυρεῖ, καὶ ὁλ-
ρον ἢ ὁρᾷ ἀσκήσεων: ἀνδραγαθία, ἀσκησις αἱ γὰρ αἱ, λοι-
πὰ ἀσκήσεων, ἀσκητῶν, ἀσκητῶν, καὶ ἀσκητῶν. Asian. Lib.
3. Cap. 12.

and aggrandizes a Nation.

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"We cannot, says he*, better shew our Ac-
"knowledgments and Gratitude to Provi-
"dence, than by making a proper Use of the
"good Things he has given us, and by en-
"joying them in every Degree, which will
"not destroy that Enjoyment, and change it
"into a Misfortune. If we drink or eat more
"than our Heads will carry, or our Stomachs
"digest, Distempers, Indiscretions, and some-
"times Murders succeed; and if we spend
"faster than our Incomes will supply, there
"is a sure Foundation laid for future Want
"and Misery: But nothing can be more ab-
"surd or impious, than to make Abstinence
"from Food or Pleasures meritorious, any
"farther than it conduces to Health, or qua-
"lifies us for Business or Devotion. Almighty
"God reserved but one Tree in all Paradise;
"but the Priests would keep them all from
"their Posterity."

"BESIDES, the *Luxury* of the Rich (when it
"does not exceed the Bounds of Virtue and
"Prudence) is the Wealth and Support of the
"Poor, and the best judged Charity: For
"what we give in gross Sums to, or for the
"Use of those who appear to be in Necessity,
"is often mistaken, and applied to maintain
"present Idleness, or reward past Extrava-
"gance; and sometimes too, I doubt, is pock-
"eted by those who are trusted to distribute."

L 1 2

"it is

Sect. IV. " it; whereas whatever is laid out upon the
 " Produce of Labour, and for such Manufac-
 " tures as imploy Multitudes of People, never
 " can be misapplied. It might easily be made
 " appear, that there is not a Piece of wrought
 " Silk, Linen, or woollen Cloth, which has
 " not contributed to the Maintenance of more
 " than an hundred thousand industrious People,
 " who must be all kept alive one Way or
 " other."

" As it is the highest Crime to destroy our
 " Beings, so it is proportionably wicked to en-
 " deavour to make them miserable: The Glory
 " and Honour of God are best consulted, in
 " promoting the Happiness of Mankind. It is
 " profane, and a kind of Blasphemy, to attempt
 " to perswade People, that the good God takes
 " Pleasure in vexing and tormenting his Crea-
 " tures: He is not pleased by human Sacrifi-
 " ces, nor by human Sufferings of any Kind,
 " except where our Faith requires it: A pale
 " Aspect, the gripping of the Guts, wry and
 " distorted Faces, and being Ghosts before our
 " Time, will contribute to no Ends of Reli-
 " gion; and therefore, I confess, that I can-
 " not see how Fasting can serve God, or an-
 " swer any Purposes of Devotion, or indeed
 " can inhanse any Appetite, unless to a good
 " Dinner."

" Nothing consequently can be more ridi-
 " culous, than for the *Romish* Clergy to tell
 " us, That any Part of Religion consists in
 " fasting

and aggrandizes a Nation:

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fasting Days, and fasting Weeks; which Sect. IV.
oblige the wretched People to insipid and
unwholsom Diet, while they indulge them-
selves, and riot in the richest Wines, and the
luxurious Dishes of *Salmon* and *Turbat*, with
all the costly Inhabitants of the liquid Ele-
ment: Besides, it is impolitick, as well as
uncharitable; it discourages Trade and In-
dustry, depopulates Nations, and depretiates
Matrimony, by rendring the People unable
to maintain and raise their Families."

BUT it is really doing too much Honour to
such glaring Absurdities, that tend effectually
to ruine the Individual, and extinguish the Spe-
cies, to go about to shew, how exceedingly
inconsistent they are with the beneficent Nature
of a good *Deity*, and the *Self-love* or Interest of
Mankind. I have already made it appear, that,
from the Nature of Things, it is impossible
but we must be sensible of numberless Gratifi-
cations, besides those which arise from such
Objects as are absolutely necessary to keep us
alive: And I do still contend, that *Virtue* is so far
from condemning any such Entertainments, that,
on the contrary, it approves of all the Plenty and
Variety of those Satisfactions that lie on this Side
the *Self-love* or Interest of those rational Agents to
whom we are associated: And indeed our enjoying
of them, naturally tends to raise our Ideas of the
Bounty and Munificence of the supreme Being,
and consequently, our Worship and Adoration
of him; and to engage us to serve one another's

For moral
Virtue in-
dulges to e-
very Man all
the Enjoy-
ments he
can possess
or acquire in
a Consisten-
cy with the
Self-love of
God and his
own Species.

SECT. IV. Interests with Cheerfulness and Alacrity. So that *Virtue* leaves every Man in the full Possession of all his natural Desires and Appetites, to be indulg'd and gratified within the Limits of the *Self-love* of those intelligent Beings among whom we are mixed. And when People bound themselves to this universal Principle, whereby all rational Agents are governed irresistibly, there is neither Vice nor *Luxury* in their desiring and pursuing (even tho reverend Divines*) "good Meats and Drink, convenient Houses, handsom Furniture, good Fires in Winter, pleasant Gardens in Summer, neat Clothes, and Money enough to bring up their Children, and whatever else can contribute to render this present State of Humanity easy and comfortable."

AND from this, methinks, one may easily understand, how the Principles of *moral Virtue*, which, I would tain flatter myself, I have made good in my *Enquiry*, do most effectually serve to promote and encourage *Trade* in all its Branches, the principal Requisite to *aggrandize a Nation*.

For, a Desire after
fire after
each others
Esteem, will
make Man
kind exert
themselves
to each
others Hap-
piness.

It is evident, as I have already hinted, from the Nature of Things, that all Men may, within that Compass which I have described, virtuously indulge to themselves all their natural Desires and Appetites, and pursue and enter-
tain

* See our Author, P. 165.

tain whatever Objects can contribute to promote their Pleasure or Happiness. And therefore, every Man is to look upon all his own Species as under the Influence of such particular Desires or Passions which they want to have gratify'd; and who, according to the Nature of Things, cannot but express a sincere *Love* and Esteem for those Persons who gratify them, and thereby contribute to make their Lives easy and cheerful. This is the View in which we are to regard all Mankind. And every Man being naturally ambitious to have the Love and Esteem of other rational Agents; and at the same Time understanding, that this cannot possibly be acquir'd without exerting himself into some Course of Action that serves the indulging of their Appetites; hence is he naturally dispos'd to pursue some Business, or to discharge some Offices of Life, that minister to their Pleasures, and which he conceives to be of a fit Nature to recommend him to the Love and Esteem of others, from whom he expects, that, in their Turn, they will testify their Benevolence and Regard for him, by gratifying his Appetites, or assisting him in his Pursuits after Happiness.


AND, whereas our Fellow-men are all naturally fond to have this their present State of Existence made as pleasing and agreeable as can be, and there being Plenty and Variety of Enjoyments that may be procur'd for that Purpose, a Man, animated with a Desire to approve

In an Ex-
change of
all good
Things at
home.

SECT. IV. himself to the Good-liking and Esteem of his own Species, will do what he can, according to his Skill and Power, to invent, or improve, or pursue whatever Art, Science, Handicraft, Manufacture, Trade; in short, whatever can be usefully apply'd to the Benefit and Comfort of Mankind. And a Society of Men, under the Influence of the same Principle, will mutually conspire to advance one another's Felicity, or to gratify each other's Desires, according to their several Circumstances, or the different Stations of Life in which they are plac'd, with respect to one another: So that the Rich, who can afford it, shall be provided of stately Buildings, costly Furniture, handsom Equipages, fine Clothes, and all the Implements of a great Life, every Man in Proportion to his Abilities: And the Poor shall get Employment, have their Wants sufficiently supply'd, and, according to their Application and Industry, partake of the Conveniencies of Life. And thus shall as great a Variety of Manufactures, Arts, and Handicrafts, as human Wit can invent, be promoted; and Agriculture and Fishery, in all their Branches, be encouraged, the two great Arts to make a Nation happy, and, what we call, flourishing (1).

AND,

(1) Καλῶς ἡ καὶ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
τιμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ καὶ ἡ
ἐξουσία ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία
ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία
ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία. Xenoph. Memorab. Lib. 5.

AND, as I have already hinted, Providence **SECT. IV.**
designing that the Inhabitants of this little 
Globe should all have a Communication with **And abroad through the World.**
one another, we do not find all the Com-
forts of human Life poured out upon any
Tract of Ground, however large, that is pos-
sessed by any particular Nation; but those
Things lying distributed through the Earth in
such a Manner, that what one Nation or Coun-
try wants to gratify their Desires, or promote
their Happiness, they may be supplied with
from the Growth or Produce of another: Hence
comes it to pass, that, in our Pursuits after the
Conveniencies and Enjoyments of Life, we are
determin'd to travel abroad, or to fetch those
Things from other Countries which we have
not within ourselves to administer to our Plea-
sures, and being likewise inspir'd with a natu-
ral Desire to have the Love and Esteem of
all our own Species in every Part of the World,
we cannot but export with us of the Produce
of our own Country, or what we can command
and spare at home, to supply the Wants, or
promote the Ease and Happiness of those other
Nations, from whom we expect such Instances
of their reciprocal Love and Esteem towards
us, as are fit to gratify our Desires, or to render
our Lives comfortable. And thus have we fo-
reign Trade carried on, and propagated from
one Nation to another all over the inhabited
World.

ALL

SECT. IV.

After this
Manner it
is, that Men
will act un-
der the stea-
dy Influence
of Moral
Virtue.

ALL this, the Principles of *Moral Virtue*, which I have laid down, do plainly direct to, and approve of, and, with the greatest Steadiness, support and animate: So that it cannot but appear, that they are infinitely more beneficial to Mankind, to every State and Kingdom upon Earth, in all Respects whatsoever, than that strange Scheme of Things, which our Author proposes, can ever possibly be.

And there-
fore, while
our Author's
Scheme is
most mis-
chievous,
the Princi-
ples here
laid down
are most ad-
vantagious;
not only as
they pro-
mote every
Branch of
our present
Happiness,

FOR, while Vice and *Luxury* do most miserably invade and confound Liberty and Property, every Man's just Rights and Privileges, and inflame Peoples Breasts with the most horrible Passions against one another, that all tend to involve the World in Ruin and Misery; while they betray civil Governors into Tyranny and Oppression, Neglects, bad Politicks, and Mismanagements, that even affect *Trade* itself in the most pernicious Manner; while they ruine the Credit of all Sorts and Sizes of trading People both at Home and Abroad, as they break forth into Cunning, Fraud, and Villany, and so put an End to all Commerce whatsoever: I say, while *private Vices* are thus *publick Mischiefs*, and fatally overthrow every Thing our Author mentions as the Foundation, upon which the Power, Greatness, and Prosperity of a Nation are supported; it is convincingly manifest, That my Principles do not only most effectually prevent all these Mischiefs, but that, in the most successful Manner, they maintain Liberty and Property, protect every
Man



Man in the easy Possession of all his Rights and Privileges, and warm Peoples Breasts with the most beneficent Affections towards one another, whereby they are all mutually engag'd to promote each other's Happiness; that they inspire civil Governors with a tender Concernment for the Good of the Publick, and determine them zealously to pursue whatever Measures Prudence and Wisdom can dictate to render the Nation happy, great, and flourishing; that they give Life and Vigour to all Sorts of Traffick, and establish the Reputation of every trading Man in every Part of his Business, in all his Dealings both at Home and Abroad; and in a Word, that they animate and excite all Mankind, in their several Stations and Relations, to exert themselves in supplying one another's Wants, in ministring to one another's Pleasures, and in rendring each other as happy and cheerful, as that Plenty and Variety of good Things, of delightful Entertainments, which Providence has distributed through the World, can make us, or as this present State of Humanity can admit of.

SUCH is the Nature and Influence of those Principles of *Moral Virtue* which I have been above explaining in my Enquiry. And as they thus successfully contribute to make us all joyful and happy in one another; so do they heighten our Relish of all our present Possessions, by opening our Minds to the most transporting Views of an almighty beneficent Being, who,

But as they open our Views to higher Enjoyments in another World.

as

Sect. IV. as our common *Father* and Benefactor, has blessed this lower World, for our Entertainment, with so large a Profusion of Delight and Cheerfulness, and who is further inviting us, as we are *immortal Spirits* that survive the Dissolution of our earthly Machine, to higher and endless Felicities in another State of Existence; to which we cannot possibly attend, without sensibly feeling all the sublime Raptures of Devotion, Worship, and Adoration: So that, I say, these Principles are infinitely more beneficial to Mankind, in all Respects whatsoever, than any Thing our Author is able to advance upon his Scheme, which, I must beg Leave to observe, has a plain, natural Tendency to introduce arbitrary Government, to oppress the Liberties of Mankind, to ruine *Trade*, and to sink every Nation upon Earth under all Sorts of Misery.

These are
Principles
maintain'd
by *Plato* and
Isocrates.

I shall conclude with two Quotations that seem not impertinent. The one is from *Plato*, and the other from *Isocrates*; two great Men, and neither *Jews* nor *Christians*, who, from the Justice of all intermediate Ages down to this Time that lies at the Distance of more than two thousand Years, have had their Reputation highly celebrated. *Plato* is arguing, with great Justness of Thought and Strength of Reason, against those of his Age who maintain'd that the committing of *Vice* or *Injustice* is for one's Interest. And after the finest and most convincing Reasoning against that unhappy Principle,

Sect IV. as if they were only one compounded Individual; let them be dressed up in a human Figure, that such People as can look no farther than the outward Shape, may have the Idea only of a Man.

(THIS the divine Plato lays down as a just Representation of the present State of Humanity. And indeed, human Nature, as it now stands, is compounded of Reason, which is here signify'd by the Idea of a Man, and of many wild and extravagant Lusts and Passions, that are here compared to a many-headed Monster. And having thus insinuated what every Man now is, he thus goes on)

Now certain it is, that he who maintains that the committing of Vice is beneficial to this Man so compounded, but that the exercising of Virtue is not, says plainly, 'Tis this Man's Interest to nourish up and strengthen, and to add Rage and Fury to the many-headed Monster, and the Lion; but so to starve and weaken the Man, that he is dragged about in the most miserable Manner, by every wild and exorbitant Passion, according as the particular Fury of any of those savage Natures, (which, far from being tam'd, are continually tearing and worrying one another) may happen to prevail. This is the plain Language of that Man, who recommends Vice as profitable.

But on the other Hand, he that sets forth Virtue as that which contributes to one's Interest, declares expressly, that this Man so compounded, ought, by all Means, to exalt the human Nature within him to the Supreme Command and Authority, and that like

like a good Husband-man, making use of the Courage and Fortitude of the Lion to assist and support him, he ought to employ a particular Care about the many-headed Creature, so as to nourish and train up every Thing that is good-natur'd, meek and gentle; but bear down and suppress whatever is rough, wild and enormous. And thus, by taking Care of the whole Composition, having reduc'd all the Parts of it into a State of Amity with himself, and with one another, he will settle and promote perfect Peace and Harmony. This certainly is what every Man declares, who recommends Virtue as profitable.

So that, without all Doubt, he that offers Virtue to our Pursuit as capable of serving one's Interest, has Truth upon his Side, and is intirely in the Right on't; but he that recommends Vice for that Purpose, is quite out of his Measures, and happens grossly to be mistaken. For, whether you have a Respect to Pleasure, Glory, or Profit, he that opens Virtue as the Way that leads to these Enjoyments, puts you in a plain Path wherein you cannot err, or miss of your Aim: Whereas he that discommends Virtue, and represents it as unfit to carry us to any such Designs, he leads you off into Error and Darknes, and sufficiently betrays his own Ignorance. He discommends he knows not what.

THIS is the Light in which that great Philosopher placeth that Man who goes about to maintain, that the committing of Vice is profitable. And when we take a View of a publick Community,

And since
the Hea-
thens them-
selves have
thus dis-
prov'd our
Author's

Sec. IV.

Principles,
he ought in
Honour to
renounce
them.

Community, as compounded after the same Manner with our Philosopher's Man, which is what *Plato* particularly intends; what can we think of that Person who laughs at *Virtue* as a mean starving Thing, and recommends to the World private Vices as publick Benefits! I will not express the severe Reflections, which one might well make use of on so just a Provocation (1): I shall only refer our Author to that kind benevolent Wish, and that worthy Declaration express'd by the *Athenian* in *Plato* (2). And, in the mean Time, he will give me Leave to observe, what I cannot well omit in this Place; His unhappy Principles can only serve to extirpate altogether the few Remains of Strength we have in human Nature, to enervate the whole Force of all civil Government, and to let loose upon the World the most hideous Monsters,

(1) O vitæ philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum! quid non modo nos, sed omnino vitæ hominum sine te esse potuisset? — At philosophia quidem tantum abest, ut perinde, ac de hominum est vitæ merita, laudetur, ut a multis etiam vituperetur. Vituperare quisquam vitæ parentem, & hoc parricidio se inquinare audeat? & tam imple ingratus esse, ut eam accuset, quam vereri deberet, etiam si minus percipere potuisset? Cic. Tusc. Quest. Lib. 5.

(2) Εἰ δὲ διδοὶ ἡμῖν, ὃ φίλοι, δὴν τις συμφωνίαν, ὥς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δι' αἰνῶν ταῦτα ἔστι ἀναγκαῖα; ὥς ἐστὶ, ὃ φίλοι Κλεινία, καὶ τῇ νῦν συμφωνίᾳ καὶ νομοθεσίᾳ ὅν ταῦτα ποιεῖμεν ὅτι καὶ τί ποιεῖται ἀναγκαῖον ὁδὸς καὶ, καὶ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ζητεῖται τὸ εὖ καὶ μεγαλύνειν τὸν πόλιν. ὅτι εἰ τις ἐν τῇ πόλει ὁδοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώποις ποτὶ ποιεῖται μὲν ὁδὸς καὶ ζῶντες, ἢ λυσιτελεῖται μὲν ἀλλὰ ὅτι καὶ καρτερία, δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἄλλα. Plat. de Legib. Lib. 2.

Monsters, all the most mischievous and exorbitant Passions, those many merciless Tyrants that are a great deal too fierce and insatiable, not totally to oppress and ruine all the most valuable Interests of every Individual, and of the whole Body of the Community. I have the Charity to believe, that if our Author had been apprehensive of any such Consequents, he would never have proposed to the World that Scheme of Things he hath published. And since the *Heathens* themselves, whom he would only have concern'd in this Argument, have clearly expos'd the Falseness of his Principles, and made it appear that they necessarily tend to the total Overthrow of all the Peace, Glory, and Happiness of human Society; I hope, like a Man of Honour, he will do what he can, to repair the Breach he hath made upon the only Fences that Mankind have for all their most valuable Concernments, to undeceive his Retainers, and to prevent his Book from doing any further Mischief in the World.

THE other Quotation I promised from *Iso- crates*, is this (1), *If you will search*, says that

M m

great

(1) Ἦν γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διέτριβε πρὸς ὑμᾶς, αὐ-
τὸν δρῶντα, καὶ μὴν ἀκολασίαν καὶ κακὴν αἰ-
τίαν γυγνόμενον, καὶ ὃ σφραγισμένον ἦν ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν
ὅτι μὴν ἡμεῖς ἰδίῳν ἐπαυνοῦμεν, καὶ νομίζομεν τὸν ταύτην χρῆμα
ἀσφαλίστατον (ἢ καὶ βελτίστην) ἢ πόλιν. τὸ δὲ κοινὸν
ὑμῶν ἐκ οὗτου διὸν τούτου φερεται δεινόν. καὶ τοι σφραγίσκει
τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀσκήν, καὶ τὰς κακίας φέρει, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον
ταῖς

546 Moral Virtue promotes Trade, &c.

Sect. IV. great Man, into what has been the Occasion of the Rise and Fall of States and Kingdoms, you shall find, that their Declension and Ruin have been owing to Pride and Luxury, but their Growth and Prosperity to Temperance or Virtue: And indeed, you commend Virtue as it relates to the Oeconomy of your private Affairs; while you judge that in every Community such particular Persons as are govern'd by its Principles, are of all others the best, and live in the greatest Safety: But yet you do not think that the Community itself ought to be concern'd with any Thing of this Nature, as necessary to the publick Well and Prosperity. Whereas it becometh every Commonwealth, much more than any private Man, to exercise all the Moral Virtues, and to avoid all Sorts of Vice and Luxury. For a particular Person, however wicked and irreligious, may happen to leave the World before the Punishment of his Crimes overtakes him. But a Commonwealth, being in a Manner immortal, lives to receive Punishment from Man, or immediate Vengeance from Heaven.

ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἰδιώταις. ἀνδρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ πονηρίας
τυχὴν ἐν θανάτῳ τελευτῆσαι πρὶν δεῖναι δίκην ἢ ἡμαρ-
τιώσαν, αἱ δὲ πόλεις διὰ τὴν ἀναστασιν ὑπομνήσκει καὶ τοῖς
ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ δίκην πυνέειναι. Ἰσοκρ.
de Pace.

F I N I S

MUSEUM

E O R R

PRef. Page xi. Line 4. read *ἡ*. P. 5. L. 4. Marg. *ἡ*
ἰαυρὸς. P. 43. L. 2. M. r. *ἡ*. P. 45. L. 5. M. r.
ἡ. P. 49. L. 10. M. r. *ματῶν*. P. 51. L. 8. M. r. *ἡ*
ἡ. P. 66. L. 1. M. r. *πᾶν μὲν*. *ibid.* L. 2. M. r. *ἡ*
ματῶν. P. 67. L. 3. M. r. *ἡ*. P. 73. L. 3. M. r. *ἡ*
ἡ. P. 79. L. 11. M. r. *ἡ*. P. 151. L. 24. M. r. *ἡ*
ἡ.

All such other Faults of the Press, and Mistakes in the
 Accents, the intelligent Reader will easily correct.

[illegible]

